|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 224 Records
-
1984 (4) TMI 321 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to Sessions Court at Ernakulam or for the latter to try the Sessions case. In the result, the Cri.R.P. is disposed of in the following manner 1. The order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate is set aside. 2. It is directed that the petitioners will be released on bail on each of them executing a bond for Rs. 5,000/- and furnishing two solvent sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam. 3. Till the Sessions trial is over, the petitioners shall reside within the limits of Cochin Corporation and report their places of residence to the investigator. 4. They shall not enter the limits of the Cannanore District until trial of the Sessions case is over. 5. They shall not in any way attempt to meet or Influence directly or indirectly any of the witnesses cited by the prosecution. 6. They shall report before the investigator or any person in charge of the C.B.I. office at Ernakulam every day at any time between 10 a.m. and 12 noon.
-
1984 (4) TMI 320 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nnatural death. Prima facie, it would be an offence of murder. Who is individually or collectively the perpetrator of the crime or is responsible for their disappearance will have to be determined by a proper, thorough and responsible police investigation. It is not necessary to start casting a doubt on anyone or any particular person. But prima facie there is material on record to reach an affirmative conclusion that both Shri C. Daniel and Shri C. Paul are not alive and have met an unnatural death. And the Union of India cannot disown the responsibility in this behalf. If this inference is permissible which we consider reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that the Registrar (Judicial) shall forward all the papers of the case accompanied by a writ of mandamus to the Superintendent of Police, Ukhrul, Manipur State to be treated as information of a cognizable offence and to commence investigation as prescribed by the relevant provisions of the CrPC.
-
1984 (4) TMI 319 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to Sessions Court at Ernakulam or for the latter to try the Sessions case. In the result, the Cri.R.P. is disposed of in the following manner 1. The order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate is set aside. 2. It is directed that the petitioners will be released on bail on each of them executing a bond for Rs. 5,000/- and furnishing two solvent sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam. 3. Till the Sessions trial is over, the petitioners shall reside within the limits of Cochin Corporation and report their places of residence to the investigator. 4. They shall not enter the limits of the Cannanore District until trial of the Sessions case is over. 5. They shall not in any way attempt to meet or Influence directly or indirectly any of the witnesses cited by the prosecution. 6. They shall report before the investigator or any person in charge of the C.B.I. office at Ernakulam every day at any time between 10 a.m. and 12 noon.
-
1984 (4) TMI 318 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er the amended Act of 1976 irrespective of the dates of their retirement. They will be so entitled with effect from 1.10.1974. Arrears of pension calculated under the provisions of the new Act will be paid to those to whom it is due within four months from today. In the case of Judges who have died after 1.10.1974 the amounts due will be paid to the legal heirs of the Judges within four months from today. The family pension due to the widows will be calculated under the provisions of the 1976 Amending Act and paid to them. Ad-hoc payments made, if any, will be adjusted while making such payments. The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. What we have said about pensionary benefits does not apply to payment of gratuity.
-
1984 (4) TMI 317 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rnational Shoe Company v. State of Washington (1) which was not a matrimonial case but which is regarded as the fountainhead of the subsequent developments of jurisdictional issues like the one involved in the instant case) It is our duty and function to protect the wife against the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum which she and her husband had left voluntarily in order to make their living in England, where they gave birth to this unfortunate boy. For these reasons, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct that the custody of the child shall be handed over to the appellant-mother. that shall be done during the course of this day. The High Court has referred to the evidence showing that the annual income of the father's family is in the range of ₹ 90,000. That would justify an order directing the respondents to pay a sum of ₹ 3,000 (three thousand) to the appellant for her costs of this appeal. Order accordingly. S.R. Appeal allowed.
-
1984 (4) TMI 316 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... llaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955 there was at first an abolition of watans and resumption of watan lands, followed by re-grant of such lands to the watandar as an occupant under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, that hardly makes a difference in principle. The only difference is that under s. 158(1)(b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, there was a simultaneous extinction of the inams resulting in conferral of bhumiswami rights on every person holding inam lands on the date on which the Code was brought into force. The result therefore is that the appeal must succeed and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court are reversed and those of the learned Additional District Judge decreeing the plaintiff’s suit for partition and separate possession of their half share in the properties described in Schedule ’A’ to the plaint are restored. The decree shall be drawn in terms of the compromise arrived at. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1984 (4) TMI 315 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nterference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. On behalf of the appellants reliance is, however, placed on a decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh and Ors. 1980 1SCR1071 In that decision the main point made out was that the acquisition proceedings had been engineered mala fide by a State Minister. We do not have any such allegation in the present case. In the circumstances of this case we do not find that there is any ground to hold that the order made under Section 17(4) of the Act exempting the operation of Section 5-A of the Act is bad in law even though there appears to be some administrative delay in commencing the construction of the Market Yard. Some photographs of the land produced before us, however, show that the work of construction has already been commenced. 9. We do not, therefore, find that there is any ground to interfere with the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
-
1984 (4) TMI 314 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... can still be proved by establishing due execution by producing the necessary witnessed as well as the resolution of the Board of Directors of the - company concerning the same. Unfortunately, there is no evidence on the record of the present case to come to the conclusion that the power of attorney was duly executed or that it was supported by a resolution of the Board' of Directors. We have examined the question whether we should remand the case to give an opportunity to lead evidence to establish the due execution of the power of attorney and to prove the resolution of the company, but seeing the result of the two cases cited at the Bar by learned counsel for the respondent we think that a remand would not be justified as the conditions of Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not satisfied in this case. We have, Therefore, no choice but to dismiss the appeal. But, as the case has been decided on a preliminary point, we do not make any order as to costs.
-
1984 (4) TMI 313 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on of limitation in regard to any appeal which may be filed against an order of the Assistant Commissioner; if any appeal is preferred within a period of three months from the date the amended provision conferring the right of appeal came into force, the Deputy Commissioner taking into consideration the fact that a period of three months has been prescribed for preferring an appeal from the date of the order of the Assistant Commissioner, may have no difficulty in entertaining the appeal by condoning the delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act in terms of the power conferred on the Deputy Commissioner under the said Section 5A, provided the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the appeal is otherwise maintainable and the interest of justice requires that the appeal should be entertained and not be thrown out on the ground of limitation. With these observations we dismiss the appeals and the Special Leave Petitions with no order as to costs. Appeals & Petitions dismissed.
-
1984 (4) TMI 312 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tions as well as the appeals are allowed and the orders of the High Court dated October 10, 1980 are quashed and the impugned rule 4(ii) of the Punjab Government National Emergency (Concessions) Rules 1965 as amended by the Haryana Government Gazette Notification No.GSR 77/ Const/Art. 309/Amend/(1)/76 dated 22nd March 1976 and the Notification No. GSR. 182/Const/Art. 309/Amend/(2)/76 dated 9 August 1976 amending the definition of the expression 'military service' in rule 2 are declared to be ultra vires the Constitution in so far as they affect prejudicially persons who had acquired rights as stated above. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued directing respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to prepare the seniority list afresh in the light of the decision of this Court taking into consideration the military service rendered by the petitioners as well as the appellants. In the circumstances of the case however there will be no order as to costs. Appeals and Petitions allowed.
-
1984 (4) TMI 311 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... not have been passed under section 12 (2) of the Act which authorises the detention of anti-social elements only. Before leaving this case, I should state that a number of decisions were cited before us in which it had been held that an order of detention based on a criminal charge which is still to be tried may not be invalid and that an order granting bail by a criminal court cannot be a bar to the passing of an order of detention. But I have not found it necessary to deal with them here as they would have become relevant only if I had been satisfied that the petitioner was an anti-social element. Moreover the orders of detention questioned in those cases were governed by the provisions of the statutes under which they had been issued. In the result, I quash the order of detention passed against the petitioner. The petition is accordingly allowed. The petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be in custody on some other ground. Petition allowed.
-
1984 (4) TMI 310 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... n 77 shall be liable for confiscation. According to the Department, no declaration had been made in this case by the appellant. In that event, the provisions under Section 113(h) would not be attracted, whatever may be the action to which the appellant may be exposed on the basis of failure to make a declaration under the appropriate Act. Therefore, the order of confiscation purporting under Section 113(h) of the Customs Act also does not appear to be correct. 6. In the circumstances, we accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the order of confiscation of the bank draft in question was not valid. We, therefore, further hold that the imposition of penalty was also not called for. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the order of the Additional Collector dated 15-9-1983 is set aside so far as it relates to the order of confiscation of the bank draft for £65,000/- and the imposition of penalty of ₹ 1 lakh imposed on the appellant.
-
1984 (4) TMI 309 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... rs had been availing of the concession under the notification, even though they were using higher percentage of ferro-alloys. In particular, two of them-National Iron and Steel and Oriental Steel Industries Ltd. both within the jurisdiction of Calcutta Collectorate-had been availing of this concession, though they had also been using similar ingredients in their manufacture. It is therefore clear that denial of the concession to the Appellants was discriminatory. 9. While an authority acting quasi-judicially is certainly not bound by directions or circulars of other authorities, it would not mean that it should ignore or not give due weight to interpretations given to the trade by the Government or other concerned authorities. To us, the decision contained in the Board’s order and the Government of India’s Circulars referred to above are reasonable and unexceptionable. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal.
-
1984 (4) TMI 308 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... e basis of government’s clarification) and not the actual duty charged from the suppliers of the scrap, which is higher. We do not see sufficient force in the arguments of the department to deny them this benefit. 9. The amount of refund claimed is seen to be ₹ 3,26,314. 80p. It will be for appellants to satisfy the lower authorities in regard to the correctness of this claim, in terms of Notification No. 42/74. We confine this order to allowing the appellants’ claim for refund of the amount that would have been allowed as set-off in terms of this notification, but for the fact that duty on the steel melting scrap had been paid under Item 26AA instead of the correct rate applicable to such scrap under Item 26 and direct the authorities to determine and refund the amount admissible. The appeal, for claim of the benefit of Notification No. 42/74 in respect of steel melting scrap consumed by the appellants is allowed in the light of observation aforesaid.
-
1984 (4) TMI 307 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... e conception is used for tax evasion or to circumvent tax obligation or perpetrating fraud, this is to be resorted to only in exceptional cases. In absence of evidence that profits made by Telstar flowed back to Meteor or evidence of control or supervision of Meteor over Telstar, we are not inclined to do so. The rulings do not help the respondent. 21. In the view we have taken it is not necessary to consider the other points urged by the parties, whether the show cause notice issued by the Collector of Central Excise was competent or the same should have been issued by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise or whether the demand against the appellants was time-barred. 22. As a result the order passed by the Collector of Central Excise, Baroda holding that the goods produced by Telstar were manufactured for and on behalf of Meteor is set aside. As a consequence the order of penalty, confiscation and redemption fine are also set aside. The appeal is thus allowed.
-
1984 (4) TMI 306 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... tation have even been alleged in the notice to show cause-much less proved. (g) In the premises, it has to be held that the demand pursuant to the notice to show cause in April 1978, was barred by limitation. 63. The Adjudication order is, thus, seriously erroneous on all the issues that arise for determination. The first of them on the question as to whether the Appellant was a “manufacturer” is fundamental and a Revision of the Adjudication Order, even if it be on other issues, cannot sustain, once the decision on said basic issue was gravely erroneous and even perverse and is questioned in the Revision proceedings. If the Appellant was not a “manufacturer’-as it should be held-there could be no question of realising any duty in excess of what was determined to be payable by the erroneous Adjudication order-which had, unfortunately, become final-by way Revision thereof. 64. In the result, I am of the view that the Appeal has to be allowed.
-
1984 (4) TMI 305 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... the appellants to positively prove that the goods had not been smuggled into India. As pointed out for them such goods are freely sold in the auctions held by the Calcutta Port Authorities or by the Customs Authorities. They are thereafter freely sold in the market place also. In the circumstances, there is no ground to presume that these goods must have been smuggled into India, thereby shifting the burden on the appellants to prove that they had not been so smuggled but had been lawfully acquired. 9. Therefore, in the absence of any proof to indicate that the goods claimed by the appellants were not legally imported, the appellants are entitled to the release of the goods as claimed by them. 10. In the result, the order of the Collector, so far as it relates to the 30 bales claimed by Shri S.N. Sarkar and 2 bales claimed by Shri Latiff, is set aside and the order of confiscation with reference to these bales set aside. The appeals are allowed on the above terms.
-
1984 (4) TMI 304 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... these words would be re-writing this Section and they would be legislating which they could not do. They held that there was no warrant for drawing the inference that it related to goods which were manufactured only for the purpose of sale and not for the purpose of use in the installed unit. The Tribunal in the two decisions referred to above followed the Gujarat High Court judgment in preference to the Allahabad High Court judgment. 8. In view of the above, following the Gujarat High Court judgment and the two decisions of the Tribunal, we hold that the goods are classifiable under T.I. 29A(3) and not under Tariff Item 68 of the C.E.T. as held by the Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta. The order passed by the Collector in Revision is set aside and that of the Assistant Collector restored. In view of this the cross-objection filled by the respondents does not survive for consideration and becomes infractuous. The appeal is allowed and the cross-objection dismissed.
-
1984 (4) TMI 303 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... er quasi-judicial authorities”. 11. To us the reasoning adopted by the Board and Government of India appear acceptable. While they are certainly not binding on the Tribunal, the Tribunal would not lightly ignore the same when they are not shown to be erroneous or unreasonable. Accepting the reasoning in the Circular and the order, we hold that preparation of ingots for duty paid lead in admixture with duty paid antimony to an extent of 0.85% does not constitute manufacture of lead ingots assessable under T.I. 27A. In view of this finding, the other points urged like time bar, proforma credit under Rule 56A or who is the manufacturer, do not survive for consideration. 12. As a result of foregoing discussion, we set aside the three orders No. 201-203 (27A)82/Collr. 63/82, dated 7-8-1982, No. 229(27A)82/Collr. 71/82, dated 13-9-1982 and 240 (27A)82/Collr. 69/82, dated 13-9-1982) passed by the Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta and allow the three appeals.
-
1984 (4) TMI 302 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... e appellants from Nepal the goods were therefore, cleared liable to payment of Central Excise duty. However, on question of time-bar, he had no comments to make except to state that the appellants had not derived any financial benefit out of these transactions. 6. We do not consider it necessary to go into the merits of the case because the present appeal is on the short ground of limitation. The show cause notice did not allege any misstatement or suppression of facts on the part of the appellants. The extended period of 5 years limitation would not, therefore, be applicable to the present case. We hold that the demand of duty made from the appellants is barred by limitation. 7. As for penalty, on the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think that there was any intention on the part of the appellants to evade payment of Central Excise duty, the imposition of penalty is, therefore, not justified and is hereby set aside. The appeal is, therefore, allowed.
........
|
