|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 178 Records
-
1984 (5) TMI 272 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the case are also not within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this Court, this application does not satisfy the requirements provided under Sub-article (1) as well as Sub-article (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore, this application, in my opinion, is not maintainable in this jurisdiction. The application for variation of the interim order, therefore, succeeds. The interim order is vacated and the Rule is discharged and the application for contempt which has been filed is also disposed of on the above terms. There will however, be no order as to costs. 11. C. R. 12166(W) of 1983 (item No. 18) is also taken up on the consent of the learned Advocate for both the parties and is disposed of on the similar terms stated hereinbefore. 12. The Bank guarantee that was given by the petitioner Company in C. R. 12165(W) of 1983 pursuant to the order of this Court be returned to the petitioner forthwith by the Registrar. Appellate Side of this Court.
-
1984 (5) TMI 271 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... stitutional perspective demands that considerations of populism are not allowed to obstruct the path of duty. We, therefore, cannot take a lenient or indulgent view of this matter. the day must be dreaded when a Judge' cannot work with independence by reason of the fear that a disgruntled member of the Bar can publicly humiliate him and heap disgrace on him with impunity, if any of his orders, or the decision rendered by him, displeases any of the Advocates appearing in the matter. 12. We firmly believe that considerations regarding maintenance of the independence of the judiciary and the morale of the Judges demand that we do not allow the appellant to escape with impunity on the mere tendering of an apology which in any case does not wipe out the mischief. We are of the opinion that the High Court, was therefore justified in imposing a substantive sentence. And the sentence imposed cannot be said to be excessive or out of proportion. 13. Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
-
1984 (5) TMI 270 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... TO should deal with the same and if possible find some rebutting material, but in a case of this type, i.e. the date of birth, which is personal matter, the certificate of New Delhi Municipal Committee plus the affidavit of the father should be sufficient. 7. There is an intriguing point inasmuch as the mother gave the date of birth as December, 1949 and the father gave the date of birth as January, 1949. We feel that there was some mistake in the affidavit of the mother, which may be typographical because we cannot imagine that she should give an affidavit showing her son minor. So in the circumstances of the case we think that the Tribunal was right in setting aside the order of the AAC to the extent that it remanded the case back to the ITO. We would accordingly answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Department. This point has to be viewed only on the exceptional facts of this case. there will be no order a to costs.
-
1984 (5) TMI 269 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tive effect from such dates and if necessary, supernumerary posts in the grades of Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineers shall be created for the purpose of accommodating them and all arrears of salary and allowances shall be paid to them on the basis of such retrospective promotions. We may make it clear that those Assistant Executive Engineers who have been promoted as Superintending Engineers or Chief Engineers upto the date of this judgment shall not, on account of revised seniority in the grade of Executive Engineers, be disturbed from the positions which they are occupying at present but their seniority in such higher grades will have to be rearranged on the basis of the directions given in the judgment. We hope and trust that this judgment will put a quietous to the long ranging controversy between Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers. The writ petition will stand disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs. S.R. Petitions allowed.
-
1984 (5) TMI 268 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n of the Court the sentence of fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary, then, the Court may direct detaining the contemner in civil prison for a period not exceeding six months. 21. We hold that the respondent is guilty of contempt of Court for willful breach of the undertaking to surrender vacant possession of the premises in dispute within 15 days of the dismissal of L.P.A. 102/69. We direct the contemner to pay a fine of ₹ 2,000/- Fine alone does not meet the ends of justice. We further direct that in the event of the contemner carrying out his aforesaid undertaking and surrendering vacant possession of the premises in dispute and putting the petitioner in possession thereof within 15 days from today, there would be no further punishment. In the event of the contemner failing to do so, we direct that the contemner failing (impression blurred) in a civil prison for one month for contempt of Court. 22. Order accordingly.
-
1984 (5) TMI 267 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in the same judgment, even if my interpretation of the definition is incorrect that timber comes within the meaning of agricultural produce, that a judicial enquiry of the item whether it comes within the agricultural produce or not is out of question. 9. Mr. Maloo, however, contended that no judicial enquiry is needed, because in the Notification itself the timber used for building purposes is stated to be a forest produce I have said that the definition as herein before stated quite clearly may be read in the four Sub-heads (i) agriculture, (ii) animal husbandry, (iii) horticulture, and (iv) or otherwise, or these items which may be included in the Schedule by Notification under Section 40 of the Act. 10. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, apart from the reasons already stated by Mr. Iustice C.M. Lodha, as he then was, and for further reasons, which I have stated in my judgment, this rule must stand discharged, which I hereby do. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1984 (5) TMI 266 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... h an order remanding the matter to the authority directed to investigate facts. The Industrial Court had made an order of remand. The High Court was not justified in interfering with the same. By this uncalled for interference, it has merely prolonged the agony of the unemployed workmen and permitted the jurisdiction of the High Court under Act. 226 to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the deteriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from court to court for adjudication of peripheral issues avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. (D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Ors. Accordingly these appeals succeed and are allowed and the decision of the High Court is. set aside and the one of the Industrial Court is restored with costs. As the matter is an old one, the Labour Court is directed to give top priority to this matter and dispose this of as early as possible and not later than six months from today. Appeals allowed
-
1984 (5) TMI 265 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he learned Judge could entertain a Special Civil Application against a decree passed by a subordinate court when the procedural law allows an appeal against it and that appeal lies to the High Court itself. It must be realised that the jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution is an extraordinary jurisdiction which is to be exercised sparingly and in appropriate cases and it is not to be exercised as if it were an appellate jurisdiction or as if it gave unfettered and unrestricted power to the High Court to do whatever it liked." (6) No authority to the contrary was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner and consequently the provision under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India can also not be invoked by the petitioner for quashing the impugned order as the remedy by way of revision was open to him which he did not avail and allowed the limitation within which it could be filed to lapse. (7) In view of what has been stated above the petition is dismissed.
-
1984 (5) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ry on the part of the Central Government to consider a second representation for revocation under s. 14. We may profitably refer to Phillippa Anne Duke’s case, supra, where in somewhat similar circumstances it was held that failure of the Central Government to consider a representation for revocation of an order of detention under s. 11(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act handed over to t he Prime Minister during her visit to England did not render the continued detention invalid. It was observed "Representations from whatever source addressed to whomsoever officer of one or other department of the Government cannot be treated as a representation to the Government under s. 11(8)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act." The result therefore is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 is maintained. Appeal allowed.
-
1984 (5) TMI 263 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... The respondents were bound to pay the defaulted instalment on the due date but without complying with the notice of demand moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the demand on the ground that the licence fee partakes of the nature on an excise duty. As already stated, the High Court following its decision in Kanhiya Lal's case struck down the notice of demand. The result has been that the respondents enjoyed the privilege of retail vend of country liquor, Butana for the entire period without payments of any licence fee. On merits, learned counsel appearing for the respondents had nothing to urge against the impugned notice of demand. The result therefore is that the appeals succeed and arc allowed with costs throughout. The judgment and, orders of the High Court dated November 11, 1969 quashing the impugned notice of demand served on the respondents are set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed. Appeals allowed.
-
1984 (5) TMI 262 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e operation merely because it was applied in 1974 to Subash Chander who had joined the M.B.B.S. course in 1965 when the rule regarding award of grace marks was different. In these circumstances, we affirm the view of D.K. Mahajan and P.C. Jain, JJ. expressed in the Division Bench judgment in Sewa Ram v. Kurukshetra University (Supra) and disapprove the view taken by the learned Judges of the Full Bench in the decision under appeal in this case and hold that the University was right in holding that Subash Chander, respondent 1, was not entitled to 16 grace marks under the old rule but was entitled to only 4 grace marks under the new rule and had therefore not passed the examination in Midwifery. We allow the appeal but without any order as to costs. However, this decision will not effect the result of the examination of Subash Chander in Midwifery if it had been declared as per the direction of the learned Judges of the Full Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal. Appeal allowed.
-
1984 (5) TMI 261 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ...
... ... ..... question on the basis of the PWD rates. Thereafter the case will be decided afresh on the point of determination of the cost of construction. 5. The last objection of the revenue is that unexplained investment was not correctly apportioned by the Commissioner (Appeals). Shri Saxena argues that as per the assessee, total investment made during the assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76 was ₹ 25,000 and ₹ 15,000, respectively, and the balance was made during the assessment year 1976-77. He, therefore, argues that whatever unexplained investment is there, that should be apportioned in the ratio of the investment made by the assessee during the three assessment years. We find force in the submission of the revenue. If any unexplained investment is found to be there, that will be apportioned in the ratio of the investment made by the assessee. 6. In the result, both the appeals of the revenue and the assessee will be treated to be allowed only for statistical purposes.
-
1984 (5) TMI 260 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to salary for the period he was employed with M/s KDR Woollen Mills. Even for the rest of the period, the conduct of the appellant cannot be said to be entirely in consonance with corporate culture. As a highly placed officer he was bound to strengthen the corporate culture and he should have acted within the spirit of the regulations both for house building advance and conveyance advance, which are devised to help the employees. There has been lapse in totally complying with these regulations by the appellant though it neither constitutes misconduct to attract a penalty nor substantially good enough for initiation of disciplinary inquiry. Accordingly, having regard to all the aspects of the case, the appellant should be paid 50% of the back wages for the period since his removal from service upto his reinstatement excluding the period for which he had procured an alternative employment. The respondent shall also pay the costs of the appellant quantified at ₹ 3000.
-
1984 (5) TMI 259 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... erm in order to be understood. But that does not mean that the-generic term is not applicable to the article for which there is a specific term. For instance Item 33C covers “Domestic Electrical Appliances, not elsewhere specified”. An electric shaver, a hair dryer, a toaster, and a hot plate are all domestic electrical appliances which clearly fall within the scope of this item. At the same time if one goes to a shop and asks for a “domestic electrical Appliance”, it is obvious that one would not be shown the shaver, hair dryer or other specific article which one has in mind. In the same way, if one asks for a socket, one may not be shown a lamp holder, but that is only because the first is a generic and the second a specific term, and it does not mean that the second does not come within the scope of the first. 19. For the above reasons we find that there is no force in these two appeals and we accordingly reject them. Announced in open Court.
-
1984 (5) TMI 258 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... nder protest on 13-5-1975, it is reasonable to hold that the dispute remained unsettled. The Superintendent’s indirect communication of the A.C. having approved the classification list was hardly an Order-in-Original; a reply to the protest made to the Collector; or an appealable order,. as the department would have us believe. In that view of the matter, the protest would be technically still alive and there would be no question of any time-bar. In these circumstances, it would be neither legal nor proper to hold that the protests were deemed to have been extinguished since no appeal was filed. Were this, so, the refunds given to the Jhinjirapole Works were also illegally granted and ought to have been simultaneously recalled by initiating proceedings at the time of withholding the present refund. In these circumstances, we find insufficient justification for this appeal on facts and also in law. We accept the plea of the respondents and accordingly reject the appeal.
-
1984 (5) TMI 257 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... as already pointed out, two items have already been held by the Tribunal to be Computer sub-systems and peripherals. About the remaining three items the question whether they are computer peripherals or sub-systems is primarily a question of fact. There would appear no good reason for not accepting the concession or admission made by the respondent that use of the expression sub-system in the two earlier notifications and peripherals in the third notification was intended to convey the same meaning. In view of this concession or admission being accepted, it is not necessary to discuss in detail the technical and other data adduced by the appellants. 13. As a result, the orders under appeal are set aside and the appellants granted benefit of Notification Nos. 272-Cus., dated 2-8-1976, 47-Cus., dated 1-3-1979 and 115-Cus., dated 19-6-1980, as they were applicable at the time of each import. 14. The appeals arc thus allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
-
1984 (5) TMI 256 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... . From the rulings cited it appears that each process suffers the original commodity to experience a change. But it is only when the change or a series of changes takes the commodity to the point, where commercially it can no longer are regarded as the original commodity, and is recognised as a new and distinct article, that a manufacture can be said to take place. 13. As laid down in the case reported in 32 STC 326, the question is as to when a commodity loses its essential character of the raw material or semifinished material and becomes a different manufactured article or product is one of the degree and when precisely to draw the dividing line is a different task. On the facts of this case, we are of the view that such a degree of proof has not been set out in the show cause notice and in the absence of any other material, we are constrained to hold that there are no grounds to interfere with the orders of the Collector (Appeals). The appeal is therefore dismissed.
-
1984 (5) TMI 255 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... nging and regulating the voltage from sub-transmission to primary distribution. To our mind, the line between transmission and distribution is blurred and the Department has not shown where transmission ends and distribution begins. Further, if Heading 85.18/27 (7) was intended to cover only suspended type of insulators and not the bushing type as contended by the Department, this would have been specifically stipulated. There may be a unit which both generates power and distributes it. For instance, the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking not only generates power but also transmits the same to sub-stations and distributes it. It cannot be argued that supply or distribution systems do not include transmission or sub-transmission The voltage of these insulators/bushings of 220 KV is also a great many times more than the stipulated limit of 400 volts under the Heading 85.18/27. 7. In the circumstances, we set aside the order of the Appellate Collector and allow this appeal.
-
1984 (5) TMI 254 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... quo;s letter on which the Assistant Collector took decision dated 8-5-1979. 7. At one stage, the learned Counsel for the respondents was agreeable to this relief with qualification that benefit of job work Notification for the earlier period should be given to the respondent but later he retracted this concession. We have mentioned this argument only to reject the same, on the ground that this argument before us is premature. The Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Bombay allowed the appeal with consequential relief which is yet to be worked out by the Asstt. Collector of Central Excise after taking into consideration the pleas advanced by the parties. There is no decision as to quantum of consequential relief by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise or by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals). The point is, therefore, not in issue before us. We, therefore, decline to express any finding on this argument. In view of the foregoing, the appeal stands dismissed.
-
1984 (5) TMI 253 - DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, VISAKHAPATNAM
... ...
... ... ..... y and is, therefore, not “goods”. Hence it cannot be subjected to the levy under section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. In short, it can be said that the activities of the Contractor so far as they relate to the fabricated steel structurals and the shed are outside the purview of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The charges levelled against the Contractor in the SCN are, therefore, baseless. The Contractor was right in not bothering to obtain a Central Excise licence and to follow the other Central Excise formalities as they were beyond the purview of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The other arguments of the Contractor that the fabrication yard was not a factory and that the SCN was invalid as the amount was not specified therein are totally irrelevant to the case on hand in view of my conclusions indicated above. I, therefore, do not propose to discuss them. 13. No case is made out against Contractor I drop further proceedings.
........
|
