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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 218 Records
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1985 (12) TMI 371 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 396 of 1980 under Section 120B/406 IPC in the court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 6th Court, Calcutta, is to be set aside as the petition of complaint does not disclose all the ingredients of an offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 405, IPC and as the petition of complaint is barred by limitation. 11. The revisional application is accordingly, allowed. The impugned order it. 7-1-82 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 6th Court, Calcutta, is set aside and the proceeding in Case No. 2396 of 1980 in the Court of the learned Magistrate is quashed. 12. Let the fixed deposit receipts which are still lying with the Investigating Officer of Park Street P. S. Case No. 316 it. 4-7-78 under Section 120B/406 and Section 406 IPC be returned to the petitioners. 13. Let the operation of the order be stayed for a period of two months from this date. 14. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the court below by a Special Messenger at the cost of the petitioners.
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1985 (12) TMI 370 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er Rule 13 of Order IX of the CPC was served upon him. Even thereafter he has not taken any steps to have the ex parte decree set aside and he has not appeared before us. It is, therefore, obvious that he has accepted the decree and we, therefore, need not trouble ourselves about him. 14. In the result, we allow this Appeal, reverse the impugned judgment of the Calcutta High Court and set aside its order appealed against and dismiss with costs the two revisional applications on which the said order was passed. We confirm the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Bankura, in Miscellaneous Case No. 128 of 1975 in Title Suit No. 93 of 1974 so far as regards the Appellant only. We make it clear that the said suit so far as the Appellant is concerned will be tried on the basis that the compromise entered into between Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and Respondents Nos. 5 to 9, is not binding upon him. 15. Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 will pay to the Appellant the costs of this Appeal.
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1985 (12) TMI 369 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act, as stated above, being Rs. 100/ only. Adjourning the case from time to time is bound to cause undue harassment, hardship and avoidable expense to a person accused of a petty offence like the one in question. I earnestly hope that the Magistracy in Delhi show genuine concern for dealing with such like cases expeditiously and they avail of the provisions contained in Sections 206 and 260 of the Code liberally. Normally I would have remanded this case for further proceedings in the trial Court. However, having regard to the quantum of punishment which may be indicted on th(r) petitioner in the instant case and the fact that he has already undergone lot of harassment as the case has been hanging like a damocles sword on his head since 4th July 1983, I do not think that the interests of justice require adoption of such a course. The ends of justice would be fully met if the further proceedings against him are quashed and he is set at liberty. Hence, it is ordered accordingly.
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1985 (12) TMI 368 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e not up to the mark had such clothes etc. be given as can be used with dignity. This is clear that the husband and mother-in-law of Promila were not satisfied with the dowry received and were making demands. 26. The net result is that I accept Criminal Revision Petition No. 108 of 1985 and discharge the petitioners. Ram Kishan and his wife Smt. Rama Devi. As far as Criminal Misc. (Main) 994 of 1985 is concerned the same, except relating to Dayawati is rejected and I find that Naraini Devi and her two sons Sukhbir and Daulat had been rightly charged by the trial court. The petition of Dayawati is, however, accepted and she is discharged. 27. A copy of this order shall be sent to the learned Additional Sessions Judge concerned for information and necessary action. He will have to amend the formal charges having regard to the discharge of Ram Kishan Smt. Daya Wati, and Smt. Rama Devi. 28. Criminal Revision No. 108 of 1985 and Criminal Misc. (Main) 994 of 1985 stand disposed of.
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1985 (12) TMI 367 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he goods imported were stainless steel sheets, satisfying the description found in Item 63(20-A), we need not go into the correctness or otherwise of the other reasoning given by the learned Judge. Likewise, we need not go into the other points raised by the learned counsel for the respondents such as jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 130 in the light of Section 27(1) of the Customs Act. On the finding given by us, the judgment of the learned Judge has to be set aside. 16. We do not find any need to go into the decisions cited by the learned Counsel on both sides as the findings given by us to the effect that the goods imported were 'stainless steel sheets' answering the description in Item 63(20-A) is based substantially on the facts presented before the revisional authority and also before us. 17. In the result, all the writ appeals are allowed, the judgment in the writ petitions are set aside and the rules nisi are discharged. No costs. Leave to appeal refused.
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1985 (12) TMI 366 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ere fact that Odomos is available even i.t general merchandise shops will not detract the substance from being used as a preventive measure or as a preventive medicine. It is the use of a commodity which normally should be determining factor for interpreting whether the said commodity is covered under a particular item. It is well settled that common parlance meaning has to be applied while interpreting entries under the fiscal statute and the courts have said time and again that it is not safe to be always guided by the dictionary or technical meanings. It is, therefore, not necessary to deal with various authorities cited by the learned counsel for the assessee on the point. Since in common parlance Odomos is used as a medicine and is known as a medicine, in my opinion, the Tribunal was fully justified in holding that Odomos was covered under the notification dated 7-9-1981. 5. In the result the revision fails and is accordingly rejected. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (12) TMI 365 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... #39; or 'sludge', they cannot be understood in the same sense either by the layman or even in commercial parlance irrespective of the fact whether they are strictu sensu so or not. Reliance made on the definition of the term 'sludge' or 'slurry' in the Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol. 9 p. 277 as giving an instance of the coal itself having been made liquid paste and conveyed through large underground pipes to distant places for the sake of convenience in carriage or transportation where at the point of its destination the liquid coal is again dried up and turned into solid coal is of no use to use in the instant cases. Coal whether as a solid block or turned into its liquid form for the purpose of transportation to distant places through underground pipes cannot make the liquid coal the same substance as sludge or slurry. It 'still remains and as at par with the term coal. U.P. Singh, J. I agree with the views expressed by my Lord the Chief Justice.
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1985 (12) TMI 364 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s extension of time even if the original period fixed is expired and, similarly, Section 149 also is equally liberal in this respect. An order extending time for payment of the costs, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed, could operate from the date on which the time fixed had expired. This Court cannot also forget the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia (i.e., the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform). The legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit (i.e., the act of the Court shall prejudice no man) can also not be lost sight of. It is, thus, clear from the discussion above that when the trial Court extended the time to the non-applicant defendant, it acted within the orbit of the law. It did not exceed the jurisdiction vested in it nor it failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. In absence of any jurisdictional error, this revision has no force and is, accordingly, dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1985 (12) TMI 363 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... gistered and the forms in question were issued but the Haldwani party had shown much less sales in the details filed before the relevant assessing officer while the assessee has shown much higher sales Exemption has been allowed by the Tribunal to the extent for which sales have been shown by the Haldwani party. Since the existence of the firm has not been disputed and the issuance of Forms 3-A has also not been doubted, in my opinion, the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the exemption on the amount of ₹ 2,13,592.90 and its order in this regard is liable to be set aside. 5. No other point has been pressed for consideration. 6. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed in part. The order of the Tribunal refusing exemption to the assessee on the sales to the extent indicated above to M/s National Iron Depot, Haldwani, is set aside and the exemption is granted. The rest of the order is maintained. However, there will be no order as to costs. ■■
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1985 (12) TMI 362 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... imate exercise of power to make the order of detention. The Court would have to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case in order to determine on which side of the line the order of detention falls. Here the petitioner was caught in the act of smuggling gold and the circumstances in which the gold was being smuggled as also the facts set out in the written statement of the petitioner clearly indicate that the petitioner was engaged in the activity of smuggling gold and if that be so, it is not possible to say that the order of detention was passed by the second respondent with a view to subverting, supplanting or substituting the criminal law of the land. The order of detention was plainly and indubitably with a view to preventing the petitioner from continuing the activity of smuggling and it was therefore a perfectly valid order of detention. These were the reasons for which we sustained the order of detention and dismissed the writ petition. Petition dismissed
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1985 (12) TMI 361 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ist I of the Seventh Schedule under which only Parliament has power to pass the impugned legislation. Parliament thus had full competence and power to pass the impugned legislation. 69. The result is that there is no merit in the petition and the same will, therefore, be dismissed. All interim stay orders given during the pendency of the writ petition shall stand vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Leila Seth, J. 70. I agree. 71. Petition dismissed. 72. Mr. Bhat orally requests for the grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 73. The constitutionality of Chapter III-C of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, has been challenged. This legislation affects institutions all over India. We are also told by counsel for the petitioners that petitions challenging the vires of this legislation have been filed in other courts also. 74. In the circumstances, we feel that this matter needs to be examined by the Supreme Court. Accordingly we grant the necessary certificate.
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1985 (12) TMI 360 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t be held to be importer. Similarly, the assessee cannot also be held to be a manufacturer inasmuch as, he did not collect the same. Collection in fact was made by the farmers and not by the assessee and the assessee only purchased those poppy seeds from the farmers. 6. In view of the aforesaid fact, I am of the opinion that the turnover of the poppy seeds of the assessee was wrongly subjected to tax and he was entitled for exemption on the said turnover Since this question has been decided in favour of the assessee it is not nccessary to go into the other questions involved in the instant revision. 7. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed in part. The order passed by the Tribunal is set aside and the Tribunal is directed to determine the turnover of the assessee in the light of the observations made above. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 8. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as contemplated under Section 11 (8) of the Act.
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1985 (12) TMI 359 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... range, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1214, also belongs to the category of State of Kerala & Ors. v. T.N. Peter and Anr., (supra) both of which are again distinguishable from the present one. It cannot also be said as a rule that the State which has got to supply and maintain large public services at great cost should always pay in addition to a reasonable compensation some amount by way of solatium. The interest of the public is equally important. In any event it is not shown that the compensation payable in this case is illusory and unreal. We do not find any constitutional infirmity in the provisions under challenge before us. There is no ground to declare the Act which has been upheld in Shantilal Mangaldas's case (supra) about 17 years ago as unconstitutional now and to unsettle all settled transactions drawing inspiration from certain vague observations made in some subsequent decisions. In the result, this appeal fails and it is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1985 (12) TMI 357 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hority is to ensure that there is no scope for fabricating the evidence at a later stage. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that the object of sub-rule (14) of rule 32 is to ensure that there is no evasion of tax liability and that the necessary information becomes available to the assessing authority without any difficulty whatsoever. Having regard to the object of the rule and the mischiefs sought to be averted, we have no hesitation in taking the view that sub-rule (14) of rule 32 must be construed as mandatory and not directory. We, therefore, agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge in this behalf. 3.. On merits we have already observed that the appellant has not produced any material in support of his case that he is not the last purchaser in respect of the transaction in question. Thus there is no substance in the merits of the case whatsoever. For the reasons stated above, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1985 (12) TMI 356 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... b-rule (3) of rule 58 deals with the powers of the appellate authority to review its order of summary rejection. That provision cannot be pressed into service for holding that unless tax in respect of which the appeal is filed, has been paid prior to or at the time of filing of the appeal, the appellate authority has no option but to dismiss the appeal. If the stage of admitting an appeal comes later to the stage of filing the memorandum of appeal, as held by this Court in Babulal Mohanlal Kandele v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. 1981 47 STC 164 1980 MPLJ 504, it cannot be held that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the tax should have been paid by the assessee before or at the time of filing of the memoranda of appeals. 8.. For all these reasons, our answers to the two questions referred to us are in the negative and against the department. In the circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own costs of these references. Reference answered in the negative.
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1985 (12) TMI 355 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ismiss the petition on merits. If the order were simply dismissed then it would be a dismissal on merits. If the order does not give reasons, the order may not act as res judicata on the principle underlying the decision of the Supreme Court in Daryao v. State of U.P. 1962 1 SCR 574 at pages 592-595 AIR 1961 SC 1457 at page 1465. But nevertheless it would be a final order which is appealable on the principle of Ramesh v. Gendalal AIR 1966 SC 1445. But if the court chooses not to decide the merits and expressly passes the order dismissed as withdrawn , the order is neither res judicata nor final. No appeal lies from it. On the contrary, a fresh petition would be maintainable in the absence of a provision like Order XXIII, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. We fully agree with this enunciation of law and thus repel the above-noted contention of the learned counsel. For the reasons recorded above, these appeals fail and are dismissed but with no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1985 (12) TMI 354 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... port of this contention. Further it is contended that the petitioner should not be permitted to have unjust enrichment and the learned Government Pleader relied upon the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vyankatlal 1987 64 STC 6 (SC) AIR 1985 SC 901 wherein it is held that the recovery by the sugar factory of the sugar fund the difference between the supply price and the ex factory price paid by it under the notification dated 14th January, 1950 is not permissible when the burden of paying the amount was transferred by the factory to the purchasers and the factory was not obliged to pay the amount from its coffers and grant of such refund amounts to unjust enrichment. This decision is far removed from the situation in the instant case. The respondents are directed to refund the sum of Rs. 1,96,439.11 to the petitioner within one month from the date of the receipt of this order. Writ petition partly allowed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Writ petition partly allowed.
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1985 (12) TMI 353 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n 16(1)(k) of the Act. We are of the opinion that the department could add to the taxable turnover and it is not the only remedy to impose penalty under section 16(1)(k) of the Act. Question No. (3). We have already held while considering the question No. (1), that the Board was not right in holding that no tax was payable by the dealer on account of the provisions of section 5A of the Act. Question No. (1) is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the department and against the dealer-assessee. Question No. (2) is answered in the negative, i.e., against the dealer-assessee and in favour of the department. Question No. (3) is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the department and against the dealer-assessee. The reference, which has been treated as a revision under section 15 of the Act, as substituted by the Amendment Act, is accordingly disposed of. The parties are left to bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1985 (12) TMI 352 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Tribunal in para 3 of its order. It is wellsettled that a question of law not raised before the Tribunal and not dealt with by it in its order cannot be said to arise out of its order even if on the facts of the case stated in the order, the question fairly arises. The other question raised by the applicant is a question of law and it does arise out of the order passed by the Board of Revenue. We, therefore, partly allow the application and direct the Board of Revenue to state the case and refer the following question of law for the opinion of this Court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the applicant had furnished false returns in respect of turnover of sales of Rs. 26,76,785 to the Railways and whether the imposition of penalty of Rs. 1,33,000 on the applicant was legal and justified? 4.. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this application. Application partly allowed.
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1985 (12) TMI 351 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ale under the Act. It further held that the position is the same even in respect of the charge imposed for the meal as a whole or according to dishes separately ordered. The decision has further laid down that supply of food and drinks can only be regarded as service and not as sale, irrespective of whether such service is to a resident of the hotel or casual customers to the restaurant. 3.. The learned Government Advocate sought to make a distinction in the matter of a hotel which has boarding and lodging facility in addition to restaurant facility and restaurant simpliciter. I do not think that what is applied to a restaurant in a composite hotel, will not also apply to restaurant simpliciter. In this view of the matter, the petitioner is liable to succeed and is entitled to a mandamus restraining the respondent from levying sales tax on his business turnover in his restaurant. It is accordingly ordered. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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