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Showing 1 to 20 of 222 Records
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1985 (2) TMI 317 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t still curable. 3. I find no force in the contention of the learned advocate for the State, since once a provision of law is held to be mandatory, the question of the same being curable cannot arise. Once a provision of law is to be held mandatory any question of prejudice of the accused also cannot arise as the same is irrelevant for the purpose. If a mandatory provision of law is not complied with, then the act complained of has to be struck down irrespective of any question of prejudice. 4. I am clearly of the view, that there has been a violation of the mandatory provisions of section 155(2) of the said Code in this case and therefore, the entire proceedings against the present petitioner must be quashed. The application accordingly succeeds. The Rule is made absolute and the entire proceedings pending before the learned trial court against the present petitioner is quashed. The accused petitioner is discharged from his bail bond. Let the records be sent below forthwith.
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1985 (2) TMI 316 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Calcutta, Madras and Bombay High Courts. 9. I had the occasion to examine a somewhat similar provision with reference to he Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 in G.P. order 26 of 1984 (Mr. James Francis Dillon v. Holy Cross Social Service Centre), decided n 17-1-1985). Under Section 4(4) of this Act "District Court" has the meaning assigned to that expression in the Civil P.C. and includes a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Relying on a Division Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Sathir Singh v. Rajbir Singh AIR 1954 P&H 274, I had held that the Delhi High Court had no jurisdiction to try a petition under Sections 7 and 26 of the Guardians and Wards Act. 10. I would, therefore, hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant succession certificate felling under Part X of the Succession Act, 1925. The present petition is, therefore, returned to the petitioner for being presented in the Court of competent jurisdiction.
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1985 (2) TMI 315 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... circumstances of sufficient cause has been made out or not to allow the restoration application is for the Court or authority before which the restoration application is pending to take a final decision in the matter and the finding about the sufficient cause is a finding of fact and it cannot be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 23. In view of the discussions made above, I am of the view that there are no merits in the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. No other point has been pressed before me. 24. For the discussions made above the writ petition lacks merits and the same is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 25. As the matter has already been held up and could not be decided by the Consolidation Officer on merits, I consider it necessary to direct the Consolidation Officer to proceed to decide the case on merits expeditiously.
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1985 (2) TMI 314 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ash the operative portion of the order by virtue of which a regular stage carriage permit was granted to Gopi Singh on Khurja-Meerut route. Since the vacancy has been caused in respect of this route, the authorities shall take steps for granting a fresh regular stage carriage permit in respect of this route after following the procedure prescribed under the Act. Since the petitioners have been running their stage carriage on this route for a very long time and also by virtue of the stay order passed by this Court, I think in the interest of justice to permit the petitioners to ply the vehicle on this route in order that the public may not be inconvenienced till the matter relating to the grant of a regular stage carriage permit in respect of the route in question is ultimately decided by the authorities concerned. The vacancy caused by the expiry of the permit in favour of the petitioners shall be filled in very expeditiously. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1985 (2) TMI 313 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... would otherwise have meant net rent, that is the gross rent, less the necessary outgoings, as was held by the House of Lords in Dobbs v. Grand Junction Waterworks Company L.R. 9 App. Cas. 49. Thirdly it gets rid of a possible ambiguity as to machinery. 27. This section, or so much of it as I have cited, may be regarded as in the nature of an interpretation clause explaining the meaning of the words in the earlier section. If so the two must be read together. And then it is, I think, quite clear that the Commissioners have exceeded their jurisdiction. 28. On the other hand this section may be read as only directory, as containing instructions to the Commissioners how to proceed when exercising the jurisdiction conferred by Section 88. In that case a breach of the provisions of Section 104 would not go to jurisdiction. But if so, as I have already pointed, the excess of jurisdiction in this case is, in my opinion, apparent from Section 88 alone without the aid of Section 104.
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1985 (2) TMI 312 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... after adjusting the payments of rupees four lakhs, the Corporation may rephase the instalments so that the petitioner will not be put to undue hardship and also the Corporation will not lose the money. 15. In the ultimate result, therefore, we quash Annexure-3 dated 27-1-1984 in O.J.C. No. 427 of (984 and hold that all actions subsequent to the taking over of possession of the industrial concern of the petitioner including the action of taking over itself are illegal and inoperative and we hereby set aside the same. We further direct that the opposite parties should put the petitioner into possession of the industrial concern immediately after receiving a sum of rupees four lakhs as directed in this judgment within a period of one month from today. O.J.C. No. 427 of 1984 is thus allowed with costs to be paid by the Corporation alone. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 200A. The writ application in O.J.C. No. 340 of 1984 is disposed of accordingly. P.C. Misra, J. 16. I agree.
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1985 (2) TMI 311 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ayed benefit from the point of view of time, but with reference to the very benefit itself and its connection with the levy. We once again have to reiterate what we were forced to point out in Amar Nath Om Parkash v. State of Punjab 1985 2SCR72 that judgments of courts are not to be construed as Acts of Parliament. Nor can we read a judgment on a particular aspect of a question as a Holy Book covering all aspects of every question whether such questions and facets of such questions arose for consideration or not in that case. We must however, hasten to notice that the Madras High Court in Shakti Pipe Limited v. E.S.I. Corporation 1978 L I C 410 and the Kerala High Court in Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. v. E.S.I. Corporation 1975 L I C 1395 have upheld the levy of special contribution as a tax. Therefore, whether the special contribution is to be viewed as a tax, fee or neither it has sufficient constitutional protection. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
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1985 (2) TMI 310 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ith the instrument, and, when once the instrument is held to be void on the ground that it is hit by S. 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, then the plea under S. 65 of the Contract Act is not available. So, the contention, which is misplaced and devoid of substance, is rejected. The order under appeal is set aside, while allowing the appeal without costs. 15. It may, however, be recorded that a memo has been filed by the learned counsel for the appellants which reads -- “In the above manner, purely as a matter of concession and magnanimity of this appellant, the appellant hereby undertakes that he shall not recover the amounts so far paid to the respondent or her counsel under the interim orders in this matter.” 16. In fact, at the end of the arguments, an undertaking has been given by the learned counsel that the amounts so far paid either to the respondent. The amounts so far received by the respondent or her counsel need not be returned. 17. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (2) TMI 309 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alanced and suitable safeguards provided for. Considering all the facts and the circumstances and also taking into account the initiation of the proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate against the petitioner by the issue of a notice on 3-12-1984, the ends of justice would be met by directing the department to complete the proceedings already initiated by it under the provisions of the Act within four months from this date, and return the seized currency to the petitioner on or before 15th June, 1985. 11. In the result, a Writ of Mandamus will issue directing the respondent herein to complete the proceedings initiated against the petitioner by the issue of the notice dt. 3-12-1984, within four months from this date and to return the currency seized from the petitioner oil or before 12th June 1985. The rule nisi is made absolute in the above terms and the writ petition will stand allowed as indicated above. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 12. Petition allowed.
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1985 (2) TMI 308 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appeal only on the ground of delay and not decided on merits at all. The respondent 1 no doubt had the power to condone the delay if a proper ground was made out. The petitioner may not have any grievance if respondent 1 takes a decision on merits. 7. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case I think this is fit case where the order of respondent 1 has to be set aside. In the result the order dt. 9-7-1971 is quashed with a direction that respondent 1 after giving the petitioner an opportunity by way of a personal hearing will decide the appeal filed by the petitioner on merits. Needless to say that since long time has elapsed the appeal should be disposed of at an early date. After rule nisi was issued by this Court after hearing counsel for both the sides on 24th Feb. 1972 the order of stay of recovery of the amount was made absolute. This order of stay will have to continue till the final disposal of the appeal. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (2) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ention would give rise to complicated situations and keeping the scheme of the section in view we are of the clear opinion that where an order is quashed by a Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, the power of making a fresh order under sub- section (2) of s. 11 is not available to be exercised. In view of this conclusion of ours, the orders made on August 20, 1984, on the same grounds on which the previous order of detention had been made and which had been quashed by the High Court are not tenable in law. Once those orders are held to be invalid, the declarations made subsequently under s. 9 of the Act could not be made and would have no effect. Leaving all other questions mooted in the writ petitions and partly argued before us by Mr. Jethmalani open for examination in suitable cases, we allow these writ petitions on the rationale of our conclusion indicated above. The petitioner in each of these cases is directed to be set at liberty for with. Petition allowed
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1985 (2) TMI 306 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... High Court has understandably reduced the sentence of imprisonment to less than the minimum permissible. The High Court was clearly in error in doing so. 8. In that case the accused was convicted by the Magistrate under Section 34-A of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act and sentenced to two years R.I. which was the minimum sentence provided under that section but the High Court reduced it to the period already undergone. In that case the accused was also a natural person and not a juristic person. That case is also clearly distinguishable. 9. We are thus in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. J.B. Bottling Co. Pvt. Ltd. (supra) that a sentence of fine only can be awarded to a company under Section 16 of the Act. 10. For the reasons given above our answer to the first question is in the negative and to the second question is in the affirmative, 11. Let our opinion be placed before the appropriate Bench.
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1985 (2) TMI 305 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he suit claim and also from the evidence adduced in the case that the interest has been charged on the loan at varied rates approved by the Reserve Bank, and 13 per cent interest has been claimed only for the period from April 1, 1972 to June 16, 1972. 13. In the result, we allow the appeal in part and modify the decree of the Court below. The Bank shall re-calculate the interest on the advance given to the appellant at varied rates, but without quarterly rests and file a memo accordingly in this Court. The Bank is entitled to 13 percent interest per annum from April 1, 1972 till the date of decree and thereafter at 6 per cent per annum till the date of realisation. The Bank should also give adjustment to payment, if any, made by the appellant after filing of the suit. The decree shall be drafted as per the memo to be filed by the Bank. Memo must be filed within 60 days. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs in this appeal. 14. Appeal partly allowed.
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1985 (2) TMI 304 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the judgment of the first appellate court should be confirmed and there is no need to remand the case again to the High Court for deciding it afresh on merits. 9. We are not inclined to accept the contention raised by the counsel for the appellants. A number of issues were involved in the case and the High Court has decided the case only on the ground of jurisdiction and no other point has been dealt with. It will not be fair to the respondents to accept the finding of the first appellate court without the same being examined by the High Court. 10. For the reasons given above the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the other issues involved in the case on merits. However, this decision will be without any prejudice to the respondents' rights, if any, under any other enactment. There shall, however, be no orders as to costs.
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1985 (2) TMI 303 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iod 1950-53, the plaintiff would be entitled to get a refund of ₹ 7,84,539.60p. and for the period 1953-59, the plaintiff would be entitled to get the sum of ₹ 21,18,909.05 less ₹ 13,90,474. that is, a sum of ₹ 7,28,435. 6. Shri G.B. Pai, learned Counsel for the Company urged that the High Court was in error in refusing to allow any adjustment for the years 1948-49 and 1949-50 on the ground of limitation. The suit was filed on December 15,1953. The income-tax in respect of the accounting years 1948-49 and 1949-50 had become payable on April 1, 1950 and the claim for adjustment was therefore, rightly disallowed by the High Court in regard to those two years. 7. In the result the appeal filed by the Company is dismissed and the appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan is allowed to the extent that the direction to refund ₹ 21,18,909/- is modified to a direction to refund ₹ 7,28,435/-only. 8. There will be no order as to costs in either appeal.
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1985 (2) TMI 302 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Civil Procedure, in view of the special provisions in Section 32(8) of the Act. As no decree within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure is passed by a District Judge at the time of making of an order under Section 32(7) of the Act there is no question of granting instalments under Order 20 Rule 11 or for invoking the provisions of Order 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, as My Lord has just now pointed out, the period of 20 years is also going to expire soon. The appellant should not, thus, be granted any instalment for payment of the money due to the Corporation. 32. The learned Counsel for the appellant prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that an important constitutional point is involved in the matter. In our view, the point sought to be agitated has been fully considered in judicial decisions and we do not think that it is a fit case where leave to appeal to the Supreme Court should be granted. The prayer is, therefore, rejected.
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1985 (2) TMI 301 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arbitration. 51. Thus, the learned Subordinate Judge having failed to exercise judicial discretion in the matter and having rather arbitrarily refused to stay the legal proceeding, the impugned order passed by him refusing to stay the legal proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act cannot be sustained. 52. The appeal accordingly succeeds and is allowed on contest. 53. The impugned order of the learned Court below dated August 17, 1983 is hereby set aside. 54. We allow the application filed by the defendants under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and stay all proceedings in Title Suit No. 68 of 1982 of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Purulia. 55. The matter should now go to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause in the agreement. 56. The appeal and the stay application are thus disposed of. 57. No order is made for costs. 58. No formal decree need be drawn up. 59. Let this order be communicated to the Court below without delay. A.K. Sen, J. 60. I agree.
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1985 (2) TMI 300 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... liance with rule 4 before the issuance of notification under section 4(1) of the Act is bad is set aside. As mentioned hereinbefore, since the issuance of the notifications was challenged on several other grounds and the High Court had not decided those grounds, we remit the matter back to the High Court to decide those grounds- We request the High Court to dispose of those grounds as early as possible. In a matter of this nature there several contentions factual and legal are urged and when there is scope of an appeal from the decision of the Court, it is desirable as was observed by the Privy Council long time ago to avoid delay and protraction of litigation that the court should, when dealing with any matter dispose of all the points and not merely rest its decision on one single point. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the matter is being remitted back to the High Court, costs of this appeal will abide by the result of the High Court decision. Appeal allowed
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1985 (2) TMI 299 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... them "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the provisions of section 81(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were not applicable to the interest received by the assessee on Government securities which were held by it as part of its stock-in-trade?" 4. In the above case, it was held that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the provisions of section 81(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act') were not applicable to the interest received by the assessee on Government securities which were held by it as part of its stock-in-trade. 5. The question referred was answered in the affirmative. 6. The learned counsel for the department tried to distinguish the above case, but we do not feel inclined to take a different view. 7. In the result, the question referred to us in these cases are also answered in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (2) TMI 298 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... squo;thirty per centum’ if an appeal happened by chance or accident to pending an April 30, 1982. Surely it was not the intention of Parliament to reward those who kept alive the litigation of Parliament to make the amended s. 23(2) applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation wherever they be pending, the words after the 30th day of April 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act" in s. 30(2) and would become meaningless. It is clear that Parliament wanted the amended s.23(2) to have very limited retrospectivity. It made the provision applicable to awards made after April 30, 1982 and before September 24, 1984 also and further to appeals to the High Court as the Supreme Court arising from such awards. In this view we see no force in the submission of Shri Bhat. o p /o p All the appeals are dismissed. No costs. o p /o p N.V.K. Appeals dismissed. o p /o p
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