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Showing 1 to 20 of 136 Records
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1985 (6) TMI 202 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... otice, the revision petitioner admitted that it is the ancestral property which was in the hands of her father. She had also admitted in that reply that the plaintiff had got 5/8th share. Even in the written statement, she had admitted that the plaintiff has got 5/8th share and that it was the ancestral property belonging to the joint family of their father and other members of the family. Now, therefore, it is too much to say that the property in question was the separate property of Srinivasa Rao. Therefore, the amendment application I. A. No. 5 filed by the revision petitioner to I amend the written statement alleging that the property in question was the separate property of her father, is rather extremely belated and runs contrary to the various admissions made by her. Therefore, the trial Court rightly rejected I. A. No. 5 also. 12. Thus, in the result, there is no substance in the revision. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs in this revision. 13. Revision dismissed.
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1985 (6) TMI 201 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o one who has admittedly wrongly paid the same. Hence order. 4. This petition succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned orders exhibits B, D, F and H to the petition are set aside and quashed. The order at exhibit ‘J’ to the petition is also set aside and quashed but only to the extent the same dismisses the present petitioner-company’s two revision applications in question against which dismissal the present petition is filed. The respondents are directed to refund to the first petitioner-company the amount of ₹ 235981- as also the amount of ₹ 27.980.48P. as expeditiously as possible and in any event latest by 31st December 1985. In the event of the aforesaid amounts not being refunded by 31st December 1985, the respondents will then pay to the petitioners interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from 1st January 1986 till payment. 5. Rule is made absolute in terms aforesaid but, in the circumstances, with no order as to costs.
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1985 (6) TMI 200 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... allowability of the claim in light of the provisions contained in the said section which included the provisions of section 35B(1A). If the assessee was not a ';small-scale exporter'; the power of enhancement was clearly exercisable by the Commissioner (Appeals) when the assessment came before him. In other words, the jurisdiction for enhancement qua the items allowed by the ITO was clearly exercisable by the Commissioner (Appeals) though not actually exercised. He should be deemed to have exercised that power as observed in Shree Arbuda Mills Ltd.';s case (supra). Therefore, for the reasons recorded in Shree Arbuda Mills Ltd.';s case (supra), I agree with the opinion of the learned Judicial Member that the learned Commissioner had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 263, on the facts of these cases. 9. This matter now should go back to the original Bench, which heard the appeals for disposal of the same in accordance with the majority view.
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1985 (6) TMI 199 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... can make operative subrule (1) of R. 3A, it has to be said, receives support from the decisions of High Courts of Kerala, Patna and Bombay (Mayadevi v. M. K. Krishna Bhattathiri, AIR1981Ker240 ; State of Bihar v. Rav Chandi Nath Sahay, AIR1983Pat189 ; and M. Das Gupta v. Prakash K. Shah, 1985 153 ITR 76(Bom) though the reasons given therefore, are not exactly the same as ours. 24. Reverting to the facts of the present revision petition, the order assailed here, is unsustainable and calls to be interfered with because of the views we have taken of the true scope and real operation of sub-rule (1) of R. 3A of 0. 41 of the Code. 25. In the result, we allow this revision petition, set aside the order under revision, and remit the case to the appellate Court with a direction that it shall finally decide the application for condonation of delay at the first instance and if that is decided in favour of the appellant, to hear the appeal on merits and decide it. 26. Petition allowed.
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1985 (6) TMI 198 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stions or enquiries which are indecent or scandalous though such questions or enquiries may have some bearing on the questions before the Court unless they relate to the facts in issue or the matters necessary to be known in order to determine whether or not the facts in issue existed. If the parties make an honest approach to the Court, counsel fulfil their duties and responsibilities consistent with high professional standards and if Courts are knowledgeable and vigilant abuse of judicial process could certainly be avoided. The privilege extended by law should not be allowed to be used either to blackmail any of the persons participating in the judicial process or to secure partisan or improper ends for that would be contrary to public policy which after all dictates the rule of absolute privilege. 20. I do not find any ground to interfere with the dismissal of the suit; no substantial question of law arises for decision by this Court. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1985 (6) TMI 197 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... objcts. I think, the apprehension of the plaintiff is well-founded. There is a third unseen party in the present case which is the investing public. The public is bound to be misled by the name of defendant No. 1 as the company belonging to the plaintiff group of companies. The defendants cannot be permitted to cash on the name of the plaintiff. If ultimately defendant No. 1 fails it will rebound on the plaintiff and its group causing misery to the shareholders of the plaintiff and its group of companies. All this will bring these companies into disrepute. There would certainly be no measure of damages that the plaintiff might suffer. The balance of convenience is obviously in favor of the plaintiff. (34) I would, therefore, allow the application, to the extent that I would restrain the defendants from entering the capital market and making the public issue under the name of M/s Khosla Extractions Ltd. The plaintiff will be entitled to costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 1000/
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1985 (6) TMI 196 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... ly to the situation of returned goods for re-making to the factory while defining the ‘relevant date’. In fact, the wording of Explanation B(b) is almost identical with the latter part of the wording of Rule 173L(1). Thus, one has to hold that in a situation like the present one is indeed covered by the provisions of Section 11B. The formal claim for refund was received by the Assistant Collector only after the expiry of six months from the date of return of the goods. I have also considered if the letter dated 14-7-1981 could be considered as a claim for refund in respect of the four D.3s referred to therein. I am afraid it cannot be so considered for two reasons for one thing (a) it ends by saying that the claim for refund would be filed later; for another (b) it is addressed to the Superintendent of Central Excise and not to the Assistant Collector who is the authority to whom a claim for refund has to be made. Under the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed.
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1985 (6) TMI 195 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... and no explanation was given by him for belated retraction. This Statement of the appellant has also been corroborated to a great extent by the statement of Subramani referred to supra. 7. Regarding the plea of the appellant for remitting the matter for readjudication, I do not find any force in the submission of the learned counsel because it is not open to the appellant to take advantage of his own indiscretion or lapses in not substantiating the plea he has put forward and on that basis seek a remand at this distance of time. 8. In these circumstances, on consideration of all the materials available on record, I am inclined to hold that the sum of ₹ 31,000/- recovered from the possession of the appellant represented the sale proceeds of contraband goods within the meaning of Section 121 of the Customs Act and as such the money is liable for confiscation. Accordingly, I uphold the order appealed against as clearly sustainable in law and dismiss the appeal.
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1985 (6) TMI 194 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... of six months or an order passed without the issuance of any show cause notice. The issuance or otherwise of a show cause notice is not determinative and deciding criterion of the powers of the Collector of Central Excise under Section 35E of the Act. 8. The decision reported in AIR 1962 Calcutta 258 and relied upon by the respondent has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case. This decision relates to construction of Sections 39 and 190A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 which are not in pari materia with Section 11A and Section 35E of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 arising for consideration before us. 9. We, therefore, hold that the impugned orders appealed against are not sustainable in law and they are therefore set aside and the appeals are consequently allowed. As the lower appellate authority has not decided the issues on merits, the matter is remitted back to the Collector (Appeals) for consideration of the issues on merit as per law.
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1985 (6) TMI 193 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ill still be classifiable under that Tariff Item. It appears that provision of the Explanation to Tariff Item 68, has not been brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Bench, otherwise the decision might have been different. The said Explanation of Tariff Item 68 reads as under “Explanation. - For the purposes of this Item, goods which are referred to in any preceding Item in this Schedule for the purpose of excluding such goods from the description of goods in that Item (whether such exclusion is by means of an Explanation to such Item or by words of exclusion in the description itself or in any other manner) shall be deemed to be goods not specified in that Item. In view of the above statutory provision of the Tariff Item 68, the decision of the Appellate Tribunal on this aspect of the matter needs re-consideration to the extent that goods which are specifically excluded from Tariff Item 14E, would be classifiable under Tariff Item 68 and not under Tariff Item 14E.
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1985 (6) TMI 192 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ;manufacture’ the essence of which is that a different thing should be made from that out of which it is made. 15. The facts of that case are different from the case before us. In this case without coating of rubber on the metal roller it cannot be said to be Rubber Roller. Metal Roller and Rubber Roller are quite distinct and different articles and therefore, the coating of rubber on blank metal roller amounts to manufacturing process. We find no justification in the reasoning of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) that since the rollers were originally cleared on payment of duly, their subsequent recoating does not bring into existence goods of different taxable description. 16. The respondents, i.e., M/s. Lathia Industrial Supplies Co. Pvt. Ltd. are not entitled to the refund claim filed before the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Division I, Ahmedabad of the amount paid as duty on the Rubber Rollers. 17. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
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1985 (6) TMI 191 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... . That was also a case of a long-standing practice having been allowed to continue by the Department by means of orders issued and approvals recorded both from the period prior to introduction of TI 68 as well as subsequent dates; till the issuance of show cause notice in 1980. We feel inclined to adopt a similar view on the peculiar facts of this case, and hold that the demand for additional duty in this case under TI 68 can be held enforceable only with effect from the date of issue of the first show cause notice, i.e., 28-4-1980. 36. As a result, whereas the appeal is dismissed on merits and the goods, cleared as (wheels, axles and wheel-sets), are held liable to pay excise duty under TI 68, in spite of duty having been paid on the forged products under TI 26AA (ia); the appeal is allowed partly on the point of limitation; namely, the period for which the additional demand is enforceable, will be only with effect from 28-4-1980. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1985 (6) TMI 190 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ppears to us that the answer to this question has to be in the negative. 12. In the Order-in-Appeal, we find that the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) had taken due note of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Anup Engineering Limited. He has, however, rejected the appeal on the basis of his finding that he disagrees with the findings of Gujarat High Court. Obviously, such a stand is not sustainable. 13. On behalf of the department, a lot of stress has been laid on the import of the decision of the High Court of Delhi in the case of M/s. Metal Forgings Private Limited v. Union of India. We have carefully gone through this judgment. We find that this judgment does not, at all, deal with the question of either job work or the scope of Notification No. 119/75. 14. In view of the foregoing findings, we set aside the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), New Delhi, and allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1985 (6) TMI 189 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... se, whether the basic duty or the special duty or any other variety of excise duty. But, that judgment clearly has no application to the present case where Section 37 of the Finance Act, 1978 clearly differentiates between the duty of excise under the Central Excises and Salt Act and the special duty under sub-section (1) of Section 37 of the Finance Act, 1978. 15. For the reasons given above, we consider that the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) was wrong and that special excise duty was correctly demanded in the order of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Collector (Appeals) and restore the order of the Assistant Collector in so far as it held that in this case a special duty of excise was leviable in addition to the basic duty and with reference to that basic duty, this being the same as the “sum” calculated with reference to Rule 96-ZI and the notifications thereunder.
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1985 (6) TMI 188 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... xcise Rules, 1944. However, the said Notification cannot go beyond the provisions of section 4 which lays down the principles and guidelines for determination of assessable value of excisable goods. Applying the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment supra, and on a careful re-examination of the matter, we are of the considered view that in determining the invoice price, the same principles have to be followed with respect to freight and transit insurance charges even where an assessee avails himself of the invoice price procedure vide Notification No. 120/75-C.E. 3. The dispute in the present appeal centers around the question of allowing the appellant the benefit of deduction of freight incurred for moving the goods from the factory gate to the nearest delivery point. Such a deduction is covered by the Supreme Court’s judgment supra. Therefore, the appellants are entitled to this deduction. 4. In the result, we see no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.
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1985 (6) TMI 187 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... .06/07 to 73.14 (Headings 73.06 to 73.13 are not relevant for the goods in question or for the present appeal), read with Heading 73.14, iron or steel wire, whether or not coated but not insulated must be accepted. 9. In coming to the above conclusion we have also taken note of the fact that Bombay Custom House, as evidenced by order dated 9-10-1979 passed by the Collector of Customs (Appeals) had accepted the claim for classification and reassessment under Heading 73.14 for another consignment of identical goods. (It appears that before him it was not argued that the wire was not made of iron or steel but made of alloy steel and high carbon steel mentioned in Heading 73.15). 10. As a result appellants’ claim for classification of the goods in question under Heading 73.15 read with Heading 73.14 of CTA is accepted. The orders passed by the lower authorities are modified with consequential relief to the appellants. The appeal is allowed in the foregoing terms.
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1985 (6) TMI 186 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... aterials (including semi-finished material) or consumable stores, imported as a part of a contract or contracts, registered in terms of sub-heading (i) provided the total value of each spare parts, raw materials, and consumable stores does not exceed 10% of the value of the goods covered by sub-heading (i) and further provided that such spare parts, raw materials or consumable stores are essential for the maintenance of the plant or project mentioned in sub-heading (i).” 11. It would be seen from the foregoing that for concession under the provision, Registration of contract or contracts under sub-heading (i) of the Heading is condition precedent. The appellants, as already stated, had got their contract de-registered. The requirement thus of fulfilling of the pre-condition aforesaid was lacking. The lower authorities, therefore, were justified in denying the concession under the provision to the appellants. Finding no force in the appeal, we dismiss the same.
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1985 (6) TMI 185 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... in a motor vehicle is possible. In view of this admission and the inference I propose to draw I will not consider it necessary for the Customs authorities to go and enquire as to what is the preponderant use of the bearings. Keeping this in view, bearings being specified in Tariff Item 34, it has by all standards a reasonable claim to be classified under this Item and as laid down in AIR 1977 S.C. 597 it will be against the very principle of classification to deny it the parentage and consign it to an orphanage or residuary clause, i.e. Tariff Item 68, on the basis that the Internal Combustion engines manufactured by the appellants are predominantly for non-vehicular application. I would therefore hold that classification of bearings and bush under Tariff Item 34-A by the lower authorities is correct and calls for no interference and I would dismiss the appeals. Order In accordance with decision of majority the appeals are allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1985 (6) TMI 184 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... d out that in the case of other importers of identical goods, the facility of registration of contract under the project import has been duly allowed. In this case, reference has been made to the order of the Assistant Collector, Bombay, dated 9-10-1980, in the case of M/s. Tharangini Studios and another order in the case of M/s. Leela Chitnis Studios, Bombay. 8. We have carefully considered the facts of the case and the submissions made before us. In view of the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of M/s. Das Colour Lab. and, in the absence of any judgment of another High Court or the Supreme Court, taking a contrary view, we feel that we do not need to go into the merits put forward by the Department, in this case, since these are similar to the arguments that were put forward in the case decided by the Madras High Court. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the Collector of Customs, Madras, and allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1985 (6) TMI 183 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... xcise duty. We have come to the finding that the goods in the appeal before us is not caustic soda lye. It would not, therefore, fall under Item No. 14-B, CET. The question whether the cell liquor is saleable or is sold is of little consequence in so far as this question is concerned and does not affect our finding. The Supreme Court’s decision in the D.C.M. case, where the Court held that in order to attract excise levy a new product having a distinct name, character or use must emerge as a result of the manufacturing processes, also does not have any application to the present case, since we have found that the product under consideration does not answer to the description “Caustic Soda Lye”. 15. Since the entire proceedings culminating in the appeal before us have their genesis in the classification of cell liquor under Item No. 14-B, CET and this classification has been set aside by us, nothing else survives for our consideration. The appeal is allowed.
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