|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 273 Records
-
1985 (7) TMI 385 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rity. Such a person is elected by the people and functions undeterred by the commands or edicts of a governmental authority. The mere fact that a MLA gets allowance by way of honorarium does not convert his status into that of a 'public servant'. In Antulay's case (supra), the learned Judges of the Constitution Bench have referred to the entire history and evolution of the concept of a 'public servant' as contemplated by Section 21 of the IPC. 6. In these circumstances, we hold that the appellant, not being a public servant, could not be prosecuted under the provisions of the Act-whether or not sanction to prosecute him is obtained which is wholly irrelevant to the issue. 7. For the reasons given above, we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant and acquit him of the charges framed against him. The appellant, who is on bail, shall now be discharged from his bail-bond. Fine if paid shall be refunded to the appellant.
-
1985 (7) TMI 384 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... two pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the subsequent judgments on the point, the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that the Forest Official in this case, as and when an application is made to him for the presence of a lawyer when the petitioners are being questioned, will have to adopt the following modus operandi - 1. He is not bound to grant the request for the presence of a lawyer during the questioning; 2. But, at the same time, he must bear in mind that the presence of the lawyer will avoid any adverse criticism of any confession that may be made by the petitioner during interrogation. 7. Bearing these two aspects in mind, the Investigation Officer who is investigating the above offence is at liberty to come to his own conclusion on the question whether to permit a lawyer at the time of questioning the petitioners. But, this court cannot give any direction in this regard. Hence, this petition is dismissed with the above observations. 8. Petition dismissed.
-
1985 (7) TMI 383 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... udgment being rendered in the same case by the High Court. In these circumstances, we allow this appeal and set aside the order dismissing C.W.J.C. No. 103 of 1985. This appeal is remanded to the High Court to be heard along with C.W.J.C. No. 5728 of 1984 which is pending hearing. 3. Status quo as on today in both the cases shall be maintained. 4. The Respondents are at liberty to move to the High Court for any other relief if so advised.
-
1985 (7) TMI 382 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... any part of India will depend upon the evidence available. Tastes vary, habits differ and food served, prepared and consumed at the tables in different parts of the country also vary. Therefore, it is safer not to rest our decision on our subjective ideas, if possible. I, however, respectfully agree with the conclusion reached by my learned brothers that the appeals should be dismissed. 10. It is well-settled that it is for the assessee who claims exemption to adduce evidence that a particular article is an exempted item and if he cannot or if he fails to do so, then the revenue may proceed on its basis. In such a situation, the assessee should have such an opportunity. We cannot foreclose such an opportunity. We cannot categorically say that ripened coconut could never be considered to be 'vegetable'. But in this case the assessee has adduced no evidence. In the premises, the assessee must fail and I respectfully agree with the order proposed by my learned brothers.
-
1985 (7) TMI 381 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rovisions is avoidance of harassment at the hands of private individuals such as rival traders or general public. In my opinion, on a consideration of the entire provisions, there is no possibility of any conflict between the two provisions. They are not mutually exclusive also. Therefore no question of implied repeal of Section 11 could be considered as the Legislative intent. A complaint by a concerned public servant will be well within his competence and there is no bar in taking cognizance on the basis of such a complaint which is provided in Section 11. In this case, cognizance was taken on the basis of a report from an officer, who is competent to launch a prosecution under the provisions of Section 11. No question of abuse of the process of court is involved. So also a contingency has not arisen where this Court has to interfere for the purpose of securing ends of justice. The petition is without any merits. In the result, the petition fails and it is hereby dismissed.
-
1985 (7) TMI 380 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... sent case, the evidence on record does not indicate that the loan is not genuine. The question, therefore, of addition does not arise. Naturally the question of previous year which is relevant for assessment only also is not important. The addition is directed to be deleted. Since the above would apply to the interest on the borrowal also, the addition on account of interest also should be deleted. 4. The second ground of appeal challenges the order of ITO not setting off the unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier years. As there was a change on 30th June 1978 in the shareholding of the company, the ITO in pursuance of section 79 (a) did not set off the unabsorbed loss of the year prior to 1979-80. The assessee's contention that the change in shareholding was not with view to evade or reduce the tax liability as such was not accepted. 5. After hearing the parties. I agree that the orders of the authorities below should be upheld on this point. 6. Appeal is partly allowed.
-
1985 (7) TMI 379 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 'if, in any particular case, it considers it essential to do so or if the person concerned desires to be heard.' If the Advisory Board does not consider it essential to do so nor does the detenu express desire to be heard, the section does not impose upon the Board the duty to ask the detenu as to why written representation was not made by him and whether he would like to submit such a representation for consideration of the Board. 27. I, however, agree with the other views expressed and the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother. The result is that the petitions have to be allowed and the petitioners directed to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case. 28. Order delivered by the Division Bench. We have recorded separate orders. The result is that, the continued detention of both the petitioners being unconstitutional and void, we direct that they be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case.
-
1985 (7) TMI 378 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... a close scrutiny of the evidence adduced, we should arrive at the conclusion that there were no materials for framing a charge under Sections 403 even against the accused. The learned Magistrate, in our view should have discharged the accused. In the result, after hearing the learned advocates and taking the view as indicated above, we conclude that Revision Case No. 222 of 1985 which is being treated as a contested application is liable to be dismissed on contest and is, as a matter of fact, so dismissed. With regard to the other revision application, namely, Criminal Revision No. 448 of 1985, we are satisfied that the said application should be allowed and the rule issued should be made absolute. The order impugned in so far as it framed a charge under Sections 403 against the accused in case No. C/1054/83, TR/188/83 before Shri P. K. Deb, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Third Court, Alipore, be set aside. The accused is discharged. Gobinda Ch. Chatterjee, J. 5. I agree.
-
1985 (7) TMI 377 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n section 23(4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 as ultra vires of the Parliament and that these provisions are not protected under Articles 31-B and 31-C of the Constitution, and further declare that sub-section (1) of section 27 of the Act is invalid insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of urban property for a period of ten years from the commencement of the Act, in relation to vacant land or building thereon, within the ceiling limits. Having struck down sub-sections (1) (2) and (3) of section 23 and the opening words "subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3)" in section 23(4) of the Act, I would declare the remaining provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, including sub- section (4) of section 23 thereof as valid and constitutional. In the result, the writ petitions, except to the extent indicated, must fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. S.R. Petitions dismissed.
-
1985 (7) TMI 376 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... be paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants alongwith the mortgage money. It was, however, argued on behalf of the appellants before us that since Pandu Krishna, the other grantee, has not been impleaded no relief can be granted to the plaintiffs. There is no merit in this contention because the order of the Prant Officer makes the grant in specific shares. Dnyanu, the father of defendant No. 1 and Ananda (defendant No. 2) are granted 1/4 share each and only the remaining 1/2 share is given to Pandu Krishna. We are concerned in this case only with the half share granted in favour of the mortgagees. This decree relates only to that one-half share which had been mortgaged. Pandu Krishna, the other grantee, can have no interest in the one-half share which is the subject matter of these proceedings. This contention is, therefore, rejected. The High Court was, therefore, right in affirming the judgment of the first appellate court. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
-
1985 (7) TMI 375 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ng officer by the State Government for the purpose of enforcing the Act. Our view receives support from a decision of the High Court of Allahabad in Junta Motor Transport and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1970 Allahabad Law Journal, Page 810, by which the appointment of Gazetted Officers, Station Superintendents, Traffic Superintendents and Assistant Traffic Inspectors of Uttar Pradesh Roadways as the prescribed authorites to enforce the Uttar Pradesh Motor Gadi (Yatra-kar) Adhiniyam, 1962 and the rules made thereunder was held to be void. The appeal and the writ petitions are accordingly allowed. The impugned Notification dated March 16, 1973 called the Punjab Motor Vehicles (Haryana First Amendment) Rules, 1973 by which the General Manager, Haryana Roadways was conferred the powers exercisable by a Deputy Superintendent of Police under the Act is held to be invalid and is, therefore, quashed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal & Petitions allowed.
-
1985 (7) TMI 374 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he was unable to hold that the charges were substantiated, We have been taken through the record by learned counsel and we see no reason to differ. It does appear that the respondent and his family suspected that the deceased was carrying on an illicit affair with Ajit Kaur but that is wholly insufficient by itself to establish that the deceased was murdered by the respondent. There are several weaknesses in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses to which the learned Sessions Judge has drawn pointed attention and, to our mind, it is difficult to find fault with his appraisal of the evidence. The evidence and circumstances may conceivably give rise to the suspicion that the respondent was involved in the incident, but suspicion cannot serve as evidence. The High Court was justified in refusing leave to the appellant to appeal to it, and we see no reason to hold a different view 4. The appeal is dismissed and the bail bond tendered by the respondent shall stand cancelled.
-
1985 (7) TMI 373 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Legislature, each of them legislate in their own field with respect to different subjects in this case Evacuee Property and Shamilat-deh we do not find any reason to conclude that there was necessarily a conflict between the two legislations. The question in the present case is not whether there was any conflict between the Central and the State Legislations but whether the legislature of the State could make a law relating to agrarian reform in respect of property which included property which by a process of law had become vested in the Central Government or the Custodian. We do not see any reason why the State Legislature should be considered incompetent to make a law relating to agrarian reform, if indeed it is a law relating to agrarian reforms as it has been found to be so, in the present case, even it affects land vested in the Central Government or the Custodian. In this view of the matter, I agree with the order proposed by my lord the Chief Justice. Appeal allowed.
-
1985 (7) TMI 372 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
... ...
... ... ..... how is a capital asset. Since the assessee had not paid anything to acquire such capital asset, even the provisions of s. 45 of the Act, cannot be attracted din view of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Case of B. C. Srinivasa Setty (supra). We entirely agree with the stand taken on behalf of the assessee that there is no difference whatsoever between this capital asset and the goodwill which the assessee sold to M/s. Stein Dhoshi & Bhalla. It is worthwhile mentioning here that even though the ITO had proposed that goodwill of ₹ 1,00,000 sold by the assessee to said firm should be treated as capital gains, the IAC in his directions under s. 144B of the Act had accepted the submissions made on behalf of the assessee that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of . S. Srinvasa Settly (supra) no capital gains tax be levied on the sale of self generated goodwill. 19. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
-
1985 (7) TMI 371 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Union of India and Ors. v. Sadanand Jha and Ors. Civil Appeal No. 3512 of 1982 Union of India and Ors. v. G.P. Koushal II Following the law laid down in ’Challappan’, the Writ Petitions and allied appeals and the companion matters hereafter mentioned are allowed and the impugned orders against the Petitioners are declared to be void and quashed with no order as to costs - Writ Petitions Nos. 2267, 2268, 2269, 2273, 3349, 3350, 3351, 3352, 3353, 6500, 8120 of 1982 and 562 of 1983. Bishwaroop Chatterjee etc. v. Union of India and Ors. etc. with Civil Appeal Nos. 3231 of 1981 and 4067 of 1983. Achinita Biswas etc. v. Union of India and Ors. etc. and other allied Transferred cases and matters arising out of Railway Service matters. III The same orders dismissing the Writ Petitions coupled with the same directions as per the majority judgment in Writ Petition No. 1953 of 1981,7393,1392, 2202 of 1981 and other allied M.P. Police Force matters under Article 311 (2) (c).
-
1985 (7) TMI 370 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s required for a public purposes, in which case, alternate sites or accommodation will be provided to them, the ’Low Income Scheme Shelter Programme’ which is proposed to be undertaken with the aid of the World Bank will be pursued earnestly; and, the Slum Upgradation Programme (SUP)’ under which basic amenities are to be given to slum dwellers will be implemented without delay. In order to minimise the hardship involved in any eviction, we direct that the slums, wherever situated, will not be removed until one month after the end of the current monsoon season, that is, until October 31,1985 and, thereafter, only in accordance with this judgment. If any slum is required to be removed before that date, parties may apply to this Court. Pavement dwellers, whether censused or uncensused, will not be removed until the same date viz. October 31, 1985. The Writ Petitions will stand disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions disposed of.
-
1985 (7) TMI 369 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... as granted by the department to cross-examine those witnesses though the appellants had specifically so requested by writing letters. Denial of opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses has resulted in miscarriage of justice and as such it is a point of law which has arisen out of this order. 7. Shri Thakar, however, agreed that during the course of arguments of the main appeal this question of law was neither raised before the Tribunal nor it was considered by the Tribunal in its judgment. It has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C.I.T. v. Scindia Steam Navigation (1961-ASC-1633) that when a question of law is neither raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it, it will not be a question arising out of its order notwithstanding that it may arise on the findings given by it. 8. As no question of law arises out of the order passed by the Tribunal, so this reference application is not maintainable and the same is hereby rejected.
-
1985 (7) TMI 368 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... epartment accepted the position that the respondents were primary manufacturers. The record also shows that whereas the secondary manufacturer just re-melts the worn-out platinum crucibles and converts them into sheets, all other work- pre-cleaning, fabrication, welding and fitment of several parts - is done by the respondents. Their part of the work in re-making of the bushing is far greater than that of the secondary manufacturer. Assuming that the activity of remaking the bushings amounts to manufacture and not merely repair, the respondents, as the manufacturers of the bushings, would be entitled to claim assessment of the bushings under item 68 read with Notification No. 118/75-C.E. 10. In the view of the matter we have taken in paragraphs 7 to 9 above, we do not consider it necessary to go into the new plea of the respondents that their activity amounts to repair only and not manufacture. 11. In the result, we uphold the impugned order and reject this appeal.
-
1985 (7) TMI 367 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... no refund can be paid to the payer of the excess because there is no longer any excess. Had there been no payment away to the public of the excess, there could be a case for refunding that excess, even if the payer of the excess had recovered it from his customer; because in that case, the refund will be made from excess still available with the state. 15. In this case, that excess is no longer available, because when this claimant paid an excess to the state he compensated himself by recovering it from his customer, who in turn took away that money from the state as credit. 16. My order is that the refund can be given only of such money as has not been given as credit and this may be done. The refund for the rest deserves to be rejected. 17. The Appellate Collector’s order is confirmed. The appeal is rejected. 18. In accordance with the decision of majority, the order is set aside and the appeal allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
-
1985 (7) TMI 366 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... l as files and they fall outside the purview of printing industry. The Appellate Collector has rightly observed that the printing of the brand name etc. is one of the processes used in the manufacture of the files and it cannot be said to be a product of the printing industry. The printing is done with the aid of power as admitted by the appellants and they cannot take up this stand now that they are entitled to take the benefit of exemption Notification No. 179/77-C.E., dated 18-6-1977. Relying upon the decision of the Special Bench ‘D’ of this Tribunal in the case of Card Board Box Manufacturing Co. 1984 (17) E.L.T. 494 and that of the Government of India in the case of M/s. Vijay Flexible Containers Ltd. (1980 E.L.T. 646) and that of the Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M/s. Golden Press v. Deputy Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad (1985 ECR 1001) we confirm the findings of the authority below and dismiss this appeal.
........
|
