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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 236 Records
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1985 (8) TMI 385 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... with by it, it is clearly one arising out of its order. 2. When a question of law is raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal fails to, deal with it, it must be deemed to have been dealt with by it, and is, therefore, one arising out of its order. 3. When a question is not raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal deals with it, that will also be a question arising out of its order. 4. When a question of law is neither raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it, it will not be a question arising out of its order notwithstanding that it may arise on the findings given by it." This is a case, in my opinion, covered by item 4 as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (1961) 42 ITR 589 and, therefore, it cannot be said that any question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal. 5. The matter will now go before the original Bench, which heard the reference application for decision according to majority opinion.
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1985 (8) TMI 384 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ost respectfully we beg to differ from the view that the Court has no jurisdiction to allow withdrawal of an application for withdrawal of a suit in exercise of its inherent power as recognised under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, however, made clear that there must be some justifiable reasons for allowing withdrawal of the application for withdrawal of the suit. 17. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned order of the learned Assistant District Judge and allow the plaintiff's application for setting aside the order dismissing the suit for non-prosecution on the application of the plaintiff for withdrawal of the suit. We direct that the application of the plaintiff for withdrawal of the suit will stand withdrawn as prayed for. 18. The revisional application succeeds and it is allowed. There will, however, be no order for costs. 19. The court below is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible. J.N. Chaudhuri, J. I agree.
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1985 (8) TMI 383 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... I meant the same thing as the expression 'actually worked' occurring in Explanation II and that as the workmen concerned had not actually worked for 240 days or more in the year they were not entitled to payment of gratuity for that year. They further question as to what was meant by the expression 'actually worked' was not considered as apparently it did not arise for consideration. Therefore, the question whether Sundays and other paid holidays should be taken into account for the purpose of reckoning the total number of days on which the workmen could be said to have actually worked was not considered in that case. The other cases cited before us do not appear to have any bearing on the question at issue before us. 7. On our interpretation of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B, the workmen must succeed. The workman Shri B. Ravichandran is therefore directed to be reinstated in service with full back wages. The appellants are also entitled to their costs.
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1985 (8) TMI 382 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... control and custody of the Customs authorities for lack of proper up-keep and care dwindles to insignificance. Obviously the intention of the legislature is that the Customs authorities must bestow proper case and attention to the goods like the present seized by them so long as they remain in their custody and control. It may be, however, made clear that it shall be open to the persons having any right and interest in the trucks in question as registered owners thereof or otherwise to apply afresh for interim custody, if and when these trucks are produced in the course of inquiry or trial. (11) The upshot of the whole discussion, therefore, is that the impugned order dated 18th July 1985 of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate directing that interim custody of the truck bearing No. HRN-2341 be delivered to Mal Singh-respondent in Criminal Revision No. 131/85 is hereby quashed whereas the other petition (Cr. M (M) 496/85) filed by Randhir Singh is dismissed.
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1985 (8) TMI 381 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... including tubes, rods, sheets, foils, sticks, other rectangular or profile shapes whether laminated or not, and whether rigid or flexible, including layout and polyvinyl chloride sheets. The contention of Shri B. Datta, learned Additional Solicitor General that the article manufactured comes within the ambit of the general Tariff Entry 18 relating to rayon and synthetic fibres and yarn can hardly be accepted. Where an article falls within a specific entry like Entry 15A(2) which covers plastic articles of all sorts, in different shapes or even of strips, whether laminated or not, they must necessarily be excluded from the general Entry 18 which relates to rayon and synthetic fibres and yarn i.e. man-made fibres. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the High Court. 2. The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs. We quantify the costs at ₹ 500/- in each of these appeals. The bank guarantees furnished by the respondents shall stand discharged.
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1985 (8) TMI 380 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s the date on which a document is executed that is to be taken into account. The market value has to be determined with reference to that date. In the instant case, we find that treating the method of calculation given in Rule 341 as conclusive and final, the Collector found the market value narrated in the sale deeds not to be truthful. This makes the order and judgment of the Collector to be erroneous. It suffers from vice of mistake apparent on the face of the record. The Additional Collector also has committed the error of imposing penalty in the instant case. In these circumstances the order of the Collector is set aside and the case is sent back to him for a fresh determination of the controversy. 19. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Collector is quashed. As the question of registration of the document is pending since long, the present is a fit case for deciding it expeditiously. No order as to costs. Stay order is discharged.
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1985 (8) TMI 379 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessee, that as no specific suppression was detected in regard to inter-State sales the assessment at ₹ 1,50,000/- each was bad, is erroneous. Then the question is whether the assessment at ₹ 1,50,000/- each for both the years is justifiable. In 1970 UPTC 309 (supra) this Court also held in Para 7 as follows - "The suppression was distributed between the U. P. and inter-State sales in the same proportion, in which the assessee had disclosed his sales. In the absence of any other available method, the assessing authorities did not commit any error of law in adopting this procedure." 6. Relying on the aforesaid view of this Court, I am of the view that the assessment at ₹ 1,50,000/- each for both the years is quite reasonable as it is consistent to the facts of the case relating to the assessment year 1975-76, decided under U. P. Sales Tax Act. 7. In the result, both the revisions fail and are dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1985 (8) TMI 378 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ourt in Moti Lal v. Chandra Pratap Tiwari & Ora. AIR 1975 SC page 1178 see also the observations of this Court in Raghuvir Singh v. Raghubir Singh Kushwaha. AIR 1970 S.C. page 442. In view of the nature of the evidence on record, we find no reason to disagree with the appraisement of the evidence by the learned trial judge. Last point indicated above is interesting as was sought to be raised by Mr. Sibbal, because preventing a person from casting his vote or causing a bogus vote purpoting to be a vote of some one other than the genuine voter would be a serious interference with the electoral process, as grave as preventing a person from voting. Right to abstain from voting is recognised in our system of election. But in view of the evidence in this case, the point need not be pursued further. For the reasons mentioned before, I agree that the appeal be dismissed. ORDER In accordance with the decision of the majority, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1985 (8) TMI 377 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ding Act satisfies the tests laid down by this Court in the decision in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mill's case (supra) for overcoming an earlier decision of a court in such circumstances. The Amending Act thus neutralises the effect of the decision in the case of Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. case (supra) which can no longer be relied upon by the appellant after the amendment of the Act as stated above. There is no other contention urged by the appellant in support o its appeal. The levy and collection of octroi in the area which was included within the municipal limits of Bhiwani with retrospective effect from August 10,1965 in accordance with the notification issued earlier are, therefore, no longer open to question. In the result this appeal fails and the order of dismissal of the writ petition passed by the High Court is affirmed but on a ground different from the ground on which the High Court had dismissed it. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1985 (8) TMI 376 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... itioning facility depending on the floor area for which that facility was provided. This also showed that there was no lease of the air-conditioning plant along with the building in favour of the lease. since there was on lease of the air-conditioning plant, section 56(2)(iii) was not applicable. The rent realised in respect of the lease of the building was assessable in accordance with section 26 and the income realised or account of the provision of the air-conditioning facility was assessable as income from other sources. 22. Looking to the aforesaid facts, evidence on record coupled with the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the letting of the building in question and hiring of the air-conditioning plant were in separable and it was intended by the parties that their enhancement shall be all together. So income therefrom had to be assessed as income from other sources falling under section 56(2)(iii). 23. In the result, all the three appeals are allowed.
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1985 (8) TMI 375 - ANDHRA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion 12AA." 4. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the Sessions Court, so also the High Court, are not fettered by the provisions enacted under S. 12-AA of the Essential Commodities Act from exercising powers laid down under S. 438 Cr.P.C. 5. Since in this case, the learned Sessions Judge while holding that it is a case for anticipatory bail felt himself helpless, inasmuch as in view of S. 12-AA, he is not entitled to exercise powers within the meaning of S. 438, Cr.P.C. Inasmuch as this court also feels that it is a fit case where anticipatory bail is to be granted, the petitioner, in case of his arrest, in connection with the Cr. No. 35/85 VCCS, Tirupathi before the Inspector of Police, Flying Squad, Nellore, is enlarged on bail on his executing a personal bond in a sum of ₹ 4,000/- and furnish two sureties for the like sum from Chittoor district only, to the satisfaction of the Inspector of Police, VCCS, Flying Squad, Nellore. 6. Order accordingly.
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1985 (8) TMI 374 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible." (27) Reference be also made to Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and others, where it was held that "This provision (Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code .) confers a separate and independent power on the High Court alone to pass order ex debito Justitiae in cases where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where the process of the Code has been seriously abused." (28) It bears repetition that there was hardly any justification for the Magistrate to proceed under Section 473 of the Code when the application for condensation of delay did not even remotely explain the inordinate delay of more than three years in filing the complaint. Moreover to talk of "interest of justice" in the presence of Board's resolution dated 29th August 1980 is nothing but a myth and a moonshine. (29) To sum up, therefore, this petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed.
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1985 (8) TMI 373 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fee and direct that the appellants A shall be paid enhanced compensation at the rate determined by the Division Bench, according as the land belonging to them fell within one or the other belt, and they shall also receive solatium calculated at the rate of 30% on the amount to enhanced compensation under the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) as also interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date on which possession of their land was taken up to the expiration of a period of one year and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum. The appellant will pay up the deficit amount of court fee within two months from today and a final order in the above terms will be drawn up in favour of the appellants only after payment of the deficit court fee is made within the time stipulated by us. We think that the fair order of costs in the present case would be that each party shall bear and pay its own costs throughout. Appeals allowed.
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1985 (8) TMI 372 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d the petitioners of their sad plight and us of this avoidable exercise. It is not as though that the subsequent developments were not brought to the notice of this Court in Nagara’s case, (supra). We were told that the Bench was alerted in time about the developments that had taken place but unfortunately they were not taken into account. When the Judgment ultimately came on 18.1.1985, as many as 6000 employees had lost their service, a tragic result, not based on any relevant consideration having a nexus to the age of superannuation. The damage had been done and it can be repaired only by extending this Court’s powers to a section of employees who deserves sympathy and fair deal. This short Judgment is only to vindicate my stand. I respectfully agree with the Judgment prepared by my learned brother Reddy, J. I am also in entire agreement with my learned brother Eradi, J. about the limited scope of the principles laid down in these cases on their peculiar facts.
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1985 (8) TMI 371 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... T.I. 52, it will be seen that if it is for use in a stationary diesel engine, the arguments with reference to a connecting rod bolt being termed a motor vehicle part would become inapplicable to this article. In regard to the rear wheel bolts and front wheel bolts, the basic arguments advanced by the respondents would have no application and prima facie these would appear to be covered by the Tribunal’s decisions on hub bolls. While we have taken note of these distinctions, our decision in the present appeal is with reference to arguments based on connecting rod bolts for motor vehicles. 47. In the light of the preceding discussion, we find that the Appellate Collector was wrong in holding that the 32 items covered by this appeal were classifiable under T.I. 68. We accordingly set aside the Appellate Collector’s order and restore the Assistant Collector’s order holding these 32 items as classifiable under item 52 of the Central Excise Tariff Schedule.
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1985 (8) TMI 370 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ance of legislation by incorporation, the exceptions would apply and, therefore, the provisions of the Act as amended would have to be applied. In that event the present appeals would be maintainable before us. 19. Shri Das, no doubt, raised a further contention that even if the appeals are maintainable before the Tribunal, the appeals should be heard by a Regional Bench only and not by a Special Bench as a question as to rate of duty or value for purpose of assessment is involved. But as the present hearing was confined only to the question of the maintainability of the appeals before the Tribunal, no decision is taken on this point at present. 20. As earlier mentioned, M/s. National Jute Manufactures Corporation Limited are themselves appellants in two of the appeals. 21. We therefore hold that all the five appeals are maintainable before this Tribunal and will be posted for hearing on merits on a suitable date, of which notice shall be given to the parties.
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1985 (8) TMI 369 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... e in exercise of their Writ jurisdiction. The powers of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the High Courts in their writ jurisdiction are very wide and large in their scope and ambit. The Tribunal does not have such powers and has to operate within the jurisdiction conferred on it by the 3 Enactments, namely, Customs Act, 1962, Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and Gold (Control) Act, 1968. 6. We, therefore, hold that a decision with regard to issue of Detention Certificates by the Customs authorities is not a decision or order pursuant to any provision of the Customs Act, 1962. As this Tribunal derives its appellate powers, in customs matters, from Customs Act, 1962 and since the said Act does not have any provision with regard to issue of Detention Certificates, we are of the considered view that matters pertaining to Detention Certificates fall outside the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. 7. In the result, we see no merit in this application and reject the same.
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1985 (8) TMI 368 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... d in the factory, the goods cannot qualify as exempted bars as they cannot be described as aluminium in crude form. As against the specific allegation in the show cause notice that the products were not bars, the Board found that they were bars but not entitled to exemption in view of the continuous casting process through which they were obtained and could not, therefore, be called aluminium in crude form. 8. In view of the legal interpretation about inclusive definition above, the appellants’ product ‘bars’ must be held to be aluminium in crude form and entitled to exemption under the notification. The demand of duty in respect of bars made from the appellants, and penalty imposed, are, therefore, set aside. So much of the matter which has been remanded by the Board of Excise and Customs to the Collector of Central Excise would be decided by him taking into consideration this order and in accordance with law. The appeal is disposed of in these terms.
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1985 (8) TMI 367 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... . Zutshi do not, in our view, advance the case of the Respondent. They describe the process of lamination, different types of laminated sheets, etc. But they do not contain anything which would help us to distinguish between “insulators” and “insulating fittings”. Perhaps, it may be possible to say in the light of the above-cited definitions that insulating fittings should be ready-to-fit articles. That, however, does not seem to be the case with insulators. Both could not have been used synonymously. We do not see why rigid plastic laminated sheets made out of electrically insulating material, viz. plastics, paper, glass, etc., should not be said to be “insulators”, if not “insulating fittings”. 26. In the above view of the matter, we do not think it necessary to consider and discuss the other contentions raised before us. 27. In the result, the impugned order is set aside with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1985 (8) TMI 366 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ure pyrotechnic ammunition for toys, caps for toy pistols, snaps for Christmas crackers, etc.”. The bird scaring cartridges, as described in the literature of the manufacturers, are seen to produce light and sound effects, and are somewhat similar to Very flares. Accordingly, we consider that they would be classifiable under heading No. 36.01/08, keeping in mind the Explanatory Notes reproduced above. 13. We find that the rate of duty applicable to Heading No. 36.01/08 is the same as that applicable to Heading No. 93.01/07. It appears that this was the position also at the time of import of the goods. No claim was made earlier for classification under Heading No. 36.01/08. We do not, therefore, consider it necessary to order reclassification of the bird scaring cartridges under Heading No. 36.01/08, which in any case would be an academic exercise. In the view we have taken, we find that no relief is due to the appellants. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
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