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Showing 1 to 20 of 230 Records
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1985 (9) TMI 360 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ection 151 of the Civil P.C. 13. In Hari Nandan v. S. N. Pandita, AIR 1975 All 48, the Allahabad High Court has taken the same view as we have, namely, that when a party has been dispossessed in disobedience of the order of injunction, the Court can in exercise of its inherent power pass such order for ends of justice as would undo the wrong done to the aggrieved party. 14. In our opinion, therefore, the learned. Judge was perfectly justified in passing the impugned order of mandatory injunction under Section 151 of the Civil P.C. by directing the police to restore possession to the opposite party of the room in question. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the learned Judge is affirmed and the appeal, the alternative application under Section 115 of the Code and the application for interim stay are all dismissed. 16. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 17. The prayer for stay of operation of this order is disallowed. J.N. Chaudhuri, J. 18. I agree.
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1985 (9) TMI 359 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ties and no other party has any claim in respect thereof. (10) It is declared that there are no other joint family properties in respect of which any of the parties can make any claim and it is further declared that apart from what is provided in this decree, no party has or will have any claim against any other party on the basis of any property being a part of the joint family property. (11) Save and except the costs already paid by the plaintiff to the defendants, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. It is made clear that the plaintiff will not be entitled to recover whatever costs he might have paid to the defendants and the defendants will be entitled to retain all sums received on account of costs and will not be called upon to refund any part of the amounts received by them by way of costs from the plaintiff. (12) Any direction or finding of the High Court contrary to what we have held must necessarily stand set aside and appeals to that extent stand allowed.
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1985 (9) TMI 358 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of Rs. 45,000/- every year or to offer such payment for obtaining the renewal as a condition precedent and such offer was also not there in Ext. 3 and such being the admitted position, the terms of Sections 5(2) and 7(3) of the said Act, have also been abrogated. 31. For the views as above, we feel and hold that the submissions of Mr. Mullik as recorded hereinbefore, would be of no avail or any assistance and as such, this Appeal should be dismissed and we order accordingly. We further hold that the learned Court below, having made the determination as impeached, on the basis of the available pleadings "and the materials on records, the determinations in the cases of Trojan & Co. v. R.M.N.N. Nagappa Chettior 1953 4SCR789 (supra) and Kanda v. Waghu (AIR 1950 PC 68) (supra), would not really apply in this case. 32. The Appeal is thus dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 33. The prayer for stay of operation of this order is refused. A.C. Sen Gupta, J. I agree.
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1985 (9) TMI 357 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g of fact." Keeping in mind these salient principles, we notice that there are no justifiable reasons to dislodge the findings recorded by the trial Court on a careful consideration of the conflicting oral evidence adduced by the parties to the suit. The question as to whether Champa executed the three deeds voluntarily and with knowledge as to the contents thereof or as to whether the deeds had been got executed fraudulently by exercising undue influence on that illiterate lady who had no independent advice was a question of fact and for clear and cogent reasons, the trial Court had found that the contesting defendants have failed to establish that the deeds had been executed by Champa in the manner sought to be established by them. 15. For the foregoing reasons, we would accept the findings recorded by the learned Subordinate Judge and maintain the judgment and decree. 16. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs to respondent 1/a. Purna Chandra Mishra, J. I agree.
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1985 (9) TMI 356 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to women as possessors of those exclusive qualities. It is the woman who is capable of playing the more effective role in the preservation of society and, therefore, she has to be respected. She has the greater dose of divinity in her and by her gifted qualities she can protect the society against evil. To that extent woman have special qualities to serve society in due discharge of the social responsibility. While all these are true and the struggle for upliftment has to continue, can it be forgotten that men and women in the human creation are complementary to each other and it is only when a man and a woman are put together that a unit is formed? One without the other has no place in the community of homo sapiens. Therefore, in a world where man and woman are indispensable to each other and the status of one depends upon the existence and longing of the other, to what extent is competition between the two justifiable is a matter to be debated in a cool and healthy setting.
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1985 (9) TMI 355 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the case, the contention of Mr. Dutt that the instant case comes under Section 20 of the Act has to be accepted. The learned Additional District Judge was not correct in holding that the case was covered by Section 22 of the Act. As there was a contract of specific goods in a deliverable state the property in the goods passed to the buyer, namely, the plaintiff. The plaintiff has also taken part delivery of the articles and the defendants are not entitled to cancel the contract and resell the balance of the articles. The decision of the Court of Appeal below should thus be set aside and the decision of the Trial Court should be restored. 15. The appeal thus succeeds and it is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Court of Appeal below be set aside and those of the learned Trial Court be restored. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal. 16. The appeal having been disposed of, the Rule becomes infructuous and it is discharged. Anil K. Sen, J. 17. I agree.
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1985 (9) TMI 354 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , or any other law relating to indebtedness in force in any state, a transaction between a banking company and its debtor shall not be reopened by any Court on the ground that the rate of interest charged by the banking company in respect of such transaction is excessive." 5. It is clear that the said provision makes the provisions of Usurious Loans Act inapplicable to any transaction between a banking company and its debtor. The Courts power to reopen the transaction under the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act on the ground that the rate of interest charged is excessive is no longer available. It is not disputed that it affects the pending proceedings also though the Act came into force on 15-2- 1984 . Thus it is clear that the Usurious Loans Act is no longer applicable to any debt due to a Banking Company. 6. In view of this, no other survives for our decision in this appeal and accordingly the appeal is dismissed. We make no order as to costs. 7. Appeal dismissed.
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1985 (9) TMI 353 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be beyond the financial capacity of the beedi industry and will severely handicap it in competing with the cigarette manufacturing industry. There is no nexus, it is said, between the burden imposed on the industry and the object of the statute of providing postretirement benefits. It is urged that this aspect did not engage the attention of the Central Government when the impugned Notifications were promulgated. On the basis of this submission the petitioners contend that their Fundamental Rights under Article 14, sub-cl. (g) of cl. (1) of Article 19 and Article 31 of the Constitution have been violated. We have carefully examined the record before us and we are unable to find adequate material in support of this submission. We need say nothing more. The contention is rejected. In the result, we see no force in these writ petitions, the connected writ petitions and the connected special leave petitions, and they are all accordingly dismissed. There is no order as to costs.
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1985 (9) TMI 352 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he tenant have claimed any such right? Obviously, they could not have the question of acquiring any vested rights really does not arise. Even if it could be said that the tenants had acquired any right because of any invalidity of the earlier provision before amendment, it is always open to the Legislature to remove any defect to make it valid. It is well settled that if any provision made by the legislature is found constitutionally invalid for some lacunae or otherwise such provision can always be validated by removing the defect or lacuna by passing a validating Act. Validating Acts may be passed and, in fact, are usually passed with retrospective effect to remedy any situation which might have brought about as a result of the original provision being declared invalid, provided however the Validating Act sought to be passed is within the competence of the Legislature. 19. In the result, these writ petitions are all dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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1985 (9) TMI 351 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... disposed of. 71. Execution Case No. 27/80, E.A. 189/84 & E.A. 39/85. 72. I give 15 days' time to the objectors to vacate the premises (77, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi) and hand over physical possession of the same to the decree-holder. On 8th October, 1985 (unless the decree-holder gives a statement that he has already received the possession) issue warrants of possession with the direction that physical possession be delivered to the decree-holder by dispossessing M/s. Batliboi & Co. Ltd. from the ground floor and M/s. SMS Investment Corporation Pvt. Ltd. from the first floor of 77, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi and also by dispossessing Shri B.M. Lal, from the ground floor and Col. Bhawani Singh from the first floor. 73. A direction be sent to the police that they shall aid in the delivery of possession. The delivery of possession, if need be shall be given by breaking open the locks and doors. Warrants of possession, if issued, shall be returnable by 29th October, 1985.
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1985 (9) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dismissal were validly passed against them. Final Orders In the result, both these Appeals fail and are dismissed and the interim orders passed in these Appeals are hereby vacated. If any payment has been made to any of the Appellants in the pursuance of any interim order, such Appellant will not be liable to refund such amount or any part thereof. The Appellants have a right to file a departmental appeal under the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. In case they desire to file such an appeal, we give them time until October 31, 1985, to do so and we direct the appellate authority to condone in the exercise of its power under the proviso to Rule 25 of the said Rules the delay in filing the appeal and to hear and dispose of such appeals expeditiously subject to what has been laid down in Tulsiram Patel's case and summarized in the earlier part of this judgment. There will be no order as to the costs of these Appeals. Appeals dismissed.
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1985 (9) TMI 349 - ITAT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... is necessary is that the machinery should be owned by the assessee and the same should be used for the business of the assessee. It is not necessary that the raw materials in the manufacture or production of the articles should also be owned by the assessee. In this view of the matter, the mere fact that the assessee-company undertakes job works is not fatal to its claim for investment allowance provided the other conditions of section 32A are satisfied. I would, therefore, reject the argument of the learned representative of the department in this behalf. 18. In view of the above discussion, I conclude that the assessee-company which carries on the business of electroplating and undertakes job works in electroplating is entitled to investment allowance under section 32A. 19. I would, therefore, agree with the learned Accountant Member and answer the question referred to me in the affirmative. 20. The case will now go to the Bench for disposal according to the majority view.
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1985 (9) TMI 348 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion to that effect. 18. No exception can be taken to the view of the Appellate Tribunal that the publication of the applications made by some of the petitioners was defective. Two notifications were issued. In the first notification the Transport Authority had fixed a time limit of 15 days for filing of objections. The second notification, which was issued in the nature of a corrigendum and which filed in the lacuna in the earlier notification, was admittedly issued long after the expiry of period of 15 days. This notification did not call upon any one to file objections. Under the circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal was perfectly justified in taking the view that the intending objectors were deprived of a statutory right to prefer objections. 19. This petition, in substance, fails and the order of remand passed by the Appellate Tribunal is maintained except with the modification indicated above. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1985 (9) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e repository and source of all legal powers and any power granted by the Constitution for a specific purpose should be construed liberally so that the object for which the power is granted is effectively achieved. Viewed from this angle it cannot be said that any of the provisions of the Symbols Order suffers from want of authority on the part of the Commission, which has issued it. We are not satisfied with the submission that the several evils, malpractices etc. which are alleged to be existing amongst the political parties today are due to the Symbols Order which recognises political parties and provides for their registration etc. m e reasons for the existence of such evils, malpractices etc. are to be found elsewhere. The surer remedy for getting rid of those evils malpractices etc. is to appeal to the conscience of the nation. We cannot, however, set aside the Symbols Order on the grounds alleged in the petition. We dismiss the petition accordingly. Petition dismissed.
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1985 (9) TMI 346 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n order to effectually and completely decide the dispute in issue. We also declare that when there are two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court consisting of equal number of Judges, the later of the two decisions should be followed by the High Courts and other Courts. In view of the reference answered by us in para supra, we feel that there is nothing left to send back the case to the, file of the learned single Judge for disposal. Hence, we allow the Civil Revision Application holding that the petitioner is an interested party and the petitioner's presence is necessary for effectually and completely deciding the issues involved in the suit pending before the Civil Judge (S. D.), Bhavnagar as Regular Civil Suit No. 151 of 1981. The order passed by the learned trial Judge is set aside. The application, Exh. 20, filed by the Gujarat Housing Board to be added as a party-defendant is granted. The Civil Revision Application is allowed with costs 13. Application allowed.
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1985 (9) TMI 345 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t paragraph of the judgment. It reads "The charge against the appellant of making payments to persons in India by order of persons resident abroad is thus clearly established by the statements of the recipients. The testimony of these individuals was not challenged by the appellant before the learned Director by requesting that they should be summoned for purposes of cross-examination or otherwise .....". (5) This finding is against the record of the case, which shows misapplication of mind. Non-summoning of the said witnesses for purposes of cross-examination has resulted in miscarriage of justice. (6) In the result I allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 15th February, 1975. I remand the case to the Appellate Board for deciding it afresh in accordance with law. The application dated 18th February, 1974 (Ex. 24) be decided after affording an opportunity to the parties of being heard. (7) The record of the Appellate Board be returned immediately.
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1985 (9) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es and Bye-laws, 1965. As regards the last contention it is difficult to accept that the Corrigendum dated 10.3.1965 amounts to modification of the Rules and Bye-laws. The material on record clearly shows that corrigendum was issued with a view to rectify typographical errors or mistakes that had crept in the typed copies of the Rules and Bye-laws forwarded to the Divisional Commissioner which had come to the notice of the Respondent-Municipality. Even the omission of sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 in the copies forwarded appears to be an inadvertant typographical mistake. Besides, 80 far as the Rules are concerned the High Court has rejected the contention on the basis that the corrigendum even if lt is held to amount to modification in regard to sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 the same cannot be held to be outside the powers of the Government. The contention i, therefore, rejected. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.
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1985 (9) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er of detention was passed as the detaining authority was apprehensive that in case the detenu was released on bail he would again carry on his criminal activities in the area. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raised. Merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under trial prisoner was likely to get bail an order of detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed. We are inclined to agree with counsel for the petitioner that the order of detention in the circumstances is not sustainable and is contrary to the well settled principles indicated by this Court in series of cases relating to preventive detention. The impugned order, therefore, has to be quashed. 7. We allow the writ petition, and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith unless he is in lawful detention otherwise.
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1985 (9) TMI 342 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... sp;In that event, the Varnished Textile Fabrics manufactured by the respondents would not be considered under Tariff Item 22F and if they do not fall within that item, they should be held to fall within the residuary item T.I. 68 only. They could not be held to fall within Tariff Item 22B in the light of the observations of the Gujarat High Court. 13. So far as item 22F is concerned, it is to be noted that the report of the Chemical Examiner is that the fibre content in the Varnished Textile “Fibre-glass Fabrics was less than 50%. It is, therefore, clear that the same would not fall within 22F(4) - Central Excise Tariff. In the absence of any other specific item, it has only to be held, following the Gujarat High Court judgment, that the goods fall under Tariff Item 68 - Central Excise Tariff as held by the Appellate Collector. We hold accordingly. 14. In the result, the order of the Appellate Collector is upheld and the Review Show Cause Notice is discharged.
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1985 (9) TMI 341 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... , while removing other finished goods manufactured therefrom. In view of this, Section 11A would not seem to have any application. We are strengthened in our view when we refer to analogous provisions in respect of proforma credit permitted under Rule 56A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. Rule 56A specifically provides that where credit has been allowed on account of the various factors set out therein, recouping of such credits allowed wrongly has to be done after serving a notice on the manufacturer within 6 months (or 5 years as the case may be), from the date when such credit has been allowed. Obviously the absence of such a provision in the notification would indicate the legislative intent that in the case of Notification No. 201/79, no time limit is contemplated. As however there is a decision of the West Regional Bench holding to the contrary, we direct that the papers be placed before the President to consider the constitution of a larger Bench to hear this appeal.
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