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Showing 1 to 20 of 232 Records
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1986 (4) TMI 370 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Mr. K. G. Sheth. Mr. Sheth has rightly abstained from taking sides as it is not open to the Receiver to take sides. He is only the officer of the Court and has to obey the directions of the Court. In the circumstances of the case, the appeal is partly allowed - The order of the learned trial Judge vacating the ex parte interim injunction granted by him earlier is set aside. The ex parte injunction granted by the trial Court earlier is restored. The Receiver (respondent 5) is directed to hand over the possession of the suit shop to the plaintiff forthwith. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 8. At this stage, Mr. Thakker and Mr. Nanavati request that the operation of this order be stayed for a period of three weeks from today as they wish to carry the matter further. The request is reasonable and is granted. The operation of this judgment and order is stayed for a period of three weeks from today. Order accordingly. 9. Appeal partly allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 369 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... res judicata and the other issues were decided in favour of the plaintiffs against which no appeal or cross-objections were filed by the defendants before the District Court, the said findings on the said issues were not challenged by the learned advocate for the defendants, but however, he submitted that for passing appropriate decree in the matter, the matter may be remanded to the District Court. In my view, this submission is just and reasonable. 18. Hence the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Jamnagar, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 76/75 is set aside. The District Court is directed to pass appropriate decree after hearing both the sides and after taking into consideration the finding of the trial Court and the finding of this Court on the issue of res judicata within four months from the date of the receipt of the writ of this Court after issuing notices to both the sides. There will be no order regarding costs all throughout.
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1986 (4) TMI 368 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t; should also be understood in the sense of any work necessary for the expansion of the factory or establishment or for augmenting or increasing the work of the factory or establishment. Such work is incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work of the factory or establishment. 16. We are, therefore, unable to accept the view of the Madras High Court in all these cases that the workers employed for the construction work of the additional buildings for the expansion of the factories are not employees within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the Act. 17. For the reasons aforesaid, we allow Civil Appeals Nos. 801 of 1976 and 819 (NL) of 1976 and set aside the judgments of the Madras High Court. 18. So far as Special Leave Petitions Nos. 1143-1145 (NL) of 1978 are concerned, we grant special leave in all these matters, set aside the judgment of the Madras High Court and allow the connected appeals. 19. The parties are directed to bear their own costs in all these matters.
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1986 (4) TMI 367 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l Commissioner some more points had been raised by the respondents in their revision petition before him. This plea of the learned counsel, again, does not appeal to me. The order, Annexure Pl, does not show that any contention other than the one adjudicated upon therein was raised before the Financial Commissioner. It was only in view of the contention raised by the respondents that there was a question of title involved in the case that their revision petition was allowed by the Financial Commissioner. As per the order passed by him no other plea appears to have been raised before him. 6. For the reasons recorded above, I allow this petition and while setting aside order Annexure Pl direct the authorities to proceed to decide the application of the petitioner under S. 111 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act in accordance with the law and the observations made above. The petitioner is also held entitled to the costs of litigation which I determine at Rs. 500. 7. Petition allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 366 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on 15(2) is radically different from the provisions of section 13 of the old Act and the distinction between the two sections has been clearly made out by the Delhi High Court in the aforesaid reported decision. If once we accept the interpretation put forward by the Tribunal on section 14(2) read with the proviso thereto it is not at all necessary to enter into the alterative contentions raised by Shri Bhatia. If the words of statute are clear, there is no question of interpretation. Grammatical construction has been accepted as the golden rule and so construed, the respondents cannot be deprived of the benefit of section 14(2) merely because they had obtained similar benefit under sub-section 2 of section 13 of the Act of 1952. We see no reason to differ from the view taken by the Tribunal as confirmed by the High Court. In the result the appeals must fail. They are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1986 (4) TMI 365 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... omplaint or the Police report. One of the essential facts in either case will be the manner or involvement of the accused. Having held this, in my view no case is made out against the petitioners to indicate their being in charge of and responsible to the affairs of the company as stated in the complaint which fact was required to be stated in proper detail as I have stated above. In absence of the required facts, as I have held above, a partner by a designation is not a person having the same connection as a General Manager and cannot by merely being a partner be treated to be a person in charge of and responsible to the affairs of the company like the General Manager. In this prosecution, the offence alleged was directly against the company and the connection of the petitioners has already been set out above. Which is purely inferential. 34. In the result the application has to be allowed and the prosecution against the petitioners has to be quashed and is accordingly done.
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1986 (4) TMI 364 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n on the advisory Board to suo motu adjourn the, hearing of the reference made to it when on the date of the hearing the detenu's request for assistance of a legal practitioner is rejected even though the detenu does not request for adjournment. (2) The confessional statement made by, the detenu to the police officer can be considered by the detaining authority as material relevant for making an order of detention against the maker of the statement, but the weight to be attached to it is for the said authority to decide. Reference is answered accordingly. 40. Though the second question is also referred to the Full Bench in W. P. No. 351 of 1985, we were informed at the hearing that since the detenu has already been released, the writ petition really became infructuous. W.P. No. 351 of 1985 is, therefore, dismissed as infructuous. 41. The papers in W. P. No. 6445 of 1985 will now be placed before the Division Bench which had made the order of reference. Answer accordingly.
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1986 (4) TMI 363 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e amount to the dealer and affirm the High Court's judgment on this basis. 32. In the view we have taken, we are of the opinion that question No. 1 need not be answered. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, we are of the opinion that in the view we have taken on question No. 3, this question also need not be specifically answered. We are in agreement with the majority view of the learned judges that question No. 3 should be answered in the affirmative and that really disposes of the controversy between the parties. So far as question No. 4 is concerned, in the way we read the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that there has not been any lapse of several years from the date of the assessment order and we are further of the opinion that in the facts of this case, the Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales tax, was justified in entertaining the application in question. The question is answered accordingly. 33. The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs.
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1986 (4) TMI 362 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... al against one such matter and succeeds in that matter, he would still be faced with the plea of finality of the Judgment based on res-judicata by those against whom appeals were not filed. But this plea did not find favour with this Court in the above case. It was held that the Judgment rendered by this Court in one appeal, took away the finality of the common Judgment even against those against whom appeals were not filed because of the all pervasive operation of Article 141. We do not think it necessary to probe further into the facts of this case and lengthen this Judgment, for one good reason; this case has moved along the files of various Courts for more than 15 years and it is high time that we give it a decent burial. In view of the law laid down by this Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh's case (supra) we set aside the order of the High Court, allow this appeal and restore the order of the Magistrate, dated 6.1.1972 dismissing the complaint. M.L.A. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 360 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g that the crime committed by the appellants has shocked the conscience of the community as a whole. 58. Before I part with this case I must say that rules and procedures were not followed in Gopalganj Jail and due to the laxity of the jail authorities the nefarious plan could be achieved. The State Government should take serious view of this matter and there should be a regular inspection by the jail authorities so that the rules and procedures are followed. The investigation in this case has been done in a very efficient and fair manner. I place on the record my sense of appreciation for the assistance given by the learned Counsel for the parties, specially by the learned Counsel for the State Sri P.N. Pandey, who has ably and fairly placed all materials before us. 59. All the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed and the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellants are hereby affirmed. The reference made by the Additional District and Sessions Judge is also accepted.
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1986 (4) TMI 359 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nation Tribunal, Jalna made the aforesaid order after hearing the parties holding that the Respondent No. 1 had in his possession at the relevant date surplus land to the extent of 30 acres and 31 gunthas after including the land of survey No. 143 reversing its earlier findings. The said judgment and order was confirmed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. 8. Considering all these circumstances and specially the fact that the Respondent No. 1 waived his right to object to the order or remand by submitting to it, the judgment and order rendered by the High Court of Judicature, Bombay is set aside and the order of remand made by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 30-7-1976 as well as the order dated 25-12-1976 passed by the Surplus Land Determination Tribunal and confirmed by the judgment and order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal dated 5-4-77 after remand are hereby affirmed. There will, however, be no order as to costs in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
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1986 (4) TMI 358 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ious remedy under Section32, Legislature was satisfied with the delay-prone remedy by way of civil suit against a third party surety. For these reasons with great respect we are unable to follow the view taken in the latter decision of the Allahabad High Court. In the above circumstances, we repel the contentions of the appellant that the appellant who joined the mortgage deed as co-mortgagor and mortgaged her own immovable property to the Corporation cannot be proceeded against in an application before the District Judge. We have already indicated that the audi alteram rule has to be read into the scheme of Section 32, even in regard to such surety. As a matter of fact, the District Judge issued notice to the appellant and the appellant was heard. There has been no violation of principles of natural justice in the instant case. Since the only contention urged on behalf of the appellant fails, the appeal is dismissed with costs of the contesting respondent. Appeal dismissed.
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1986 (4) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... were neither justified nor called for. Having regard to the limited controversy in the appeal to the High Court and the hearsay nature of evidence of the appellant it was not at all necessary for the Appellate Judge to have animadverted on the conduct of the appellant for the purpose of allowing the appeal of the first respondent. Even assuming that a serious evaluation of the evidence of the appellant was really called for in the appeal the remarks of the learned Appellate Judge should be in conformity with the settled practice of courts to observe sobriety, moderation and reserve. We need only remind that the higher the forum and the greater the powers, the greater the need for restraint and the more mellowed the reproach should be. As we find merit in the contentions of the appellant, for the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal and direct the derogatory remarks made against the appellant set out earlier to stand expunged from the judgment under appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 356 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... led before us from April, 1972 till the end of the accounting year shows that various bills were submitted by that party to the assessee, against which payments were being made and ultimately there was a debit balance of ₹ 3,296 which was eventually written off as a remission granted. In view of this position, this amount could not be regarded as bed debt and the disallowance of this sum is not proper. We therefore, direct that this sum should be treated as a deduction not on the ground that it was a bad debt but on the ground that it was a remission granted in rates. 12. The last ground in the asst. yr. 1980-81 is regarding the charge of interest under s. 215. The interest being levied under s. 275 has now become consequential in the sense that the interest to be calculated will have to be on the income finally determined after giving effect to our order now. The ITO will recompute the interest leviable under s. 215. 13. In the result, the appeals are allowed in part.
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1986 (4) TMI 355 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted on account of such illegal closure continued and are continuing in the employment of the Company on and from September 18, 1984, and are entitled to receive from the Company their full salary and all other benefits under the Settlement dated February 1, 1979, entered into between the Company and the Appellant Union, from September 18, 1984, until today and thereafter regularly until their services are lawfully terminated according to law. If any workman whose services were purported to be terminated by the closing down of the Churchgate Division of the Company has received retrenchment compensation from the Company, the amount of back wages will be set off against such retrenchment compensation and if after such setting off any balance of retrenchment compensation still remains, it will be adjusted by deducting twenty per cent from the periodic salary payable to such workmen. The Respondent Company will pay to the Appellant Union the costs of this Appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 354 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he declaration under S. 6(1) of the Act. If for any reason the notification under S. 4(1) of the Act is quashed or declared illegal by any Court, it is obvious that the State Government will not be entitled to give effect to the declaration under S. 6(1) of the Act. Conversely if the notification under S. 4(1) of the Act is held to be valid, then having regard to the view which we have taken with regard to the validity of the declaration under S. 6(1) of the Act, the appellant will not now be entitled to raise any dispute with regard to the validity of the declaration under S. 6. 13A. Subject to the above observations, this appeal is dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs. 14. We also direct that the appeal pending before the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin, should be disposed of before the 31st of August 1986. 15. The oral application made by the learned counsel for the appellant for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is rejected. 16. Appeal dismissed.
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1986 (4) TMI 353 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... This case is distinguishable on facts. In that case the bank was prevented from taking recourse against the surety because the bank had in its possession various valuable properties and assets, belonging to the principal debtor and which were lost through the negligence of the Bank itself. Because of the negligence of the Bank which resulted in the loss of property it was held that Section 141 of the Contract Act came into operation. These are not the facts in the instant case before us. There is no such allegation that security has been lost because of the negligence on the part of the Bank. On the contrary, in the instant case a suit has been filed by the Bank to enforce the equitable mortgage in the appropriate court. 17. For the reasons aforesaid we are of the view that there is no merit in this appeal. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. All interim orders are vacated. Filing of paper book is dispensed with. Undertaking is discharged. D.K. Sen, J. 18. I agree.
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1986 (4) TMI 352 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... th the requirements of law and which disclosed a cause of action could have been presented 'within' the period of limitation. In this backdrop the High Court was perfectly justified in dismissing the petition. And it makes no difference whether the expression employed is 'dismissed' or 'rejected' for nothing turns on whether the former expression is employed or the latter. There is thus no valid ground to interfere with the order passed by the High Court, and the appeal must accordingly fail. 29. But before the last word is said one more word needs to be said. The expression 'corrupt practice' employed in the Act would appear to be rather repulsive and offensive. Can it perhaps be replaced by a neutral and unoffensive expression such as 'disapproved practices'? Since this aspect occurred to us and there is an occasion to do so, we hint at it, and rest content at that. And now the last word. The appeal is dismissed. No costs throughout.
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1986 (4) TMI 351 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... have, however, had the honour of being sacrificial lambs on the altar of the God of Linguistic States and can console themselves with the knowledge that the local, and in a large measure even the State, administration of their State has after the division of the old State been carried on in the mother tongue of the residents of the new State. It is time we lifted the Language Curtain which has descended criss-cross across India so that an Indian can understand others Indian. St. Paul said in his First Epistle to the Corinthians (xiv. 11), "Therefore if I know not the meaning of the voice, I shall be unto him that speaketh a barbarian, and he that speaketh shall be a barbarian unto me." Let us then have a common tongue, whatever it be. We may take pride in our mother tongue. We may take pride in the locality, town or region from where we come. But let us above all prides take pride in being Indians. 26. The parties will bear and pay their own costs of these Appeals.
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1986 (4) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion approach to guard against all pitfalls. The approving authority must be aware that in such matters the trustees, or persons authorised to sell by private negotiations, can, in a given case, enter into a secret or invisible under-hand deal or understanding with the purchasers at the cost of the concerned institution. Those who are willing to purchase by private negotiations can also bid at a public auction. Why would they feel shy or be deterred from bidding at a public auction? Why then permit sale by private negotiations which will not be visible to the public-eye and may even give rise to public suspicion unless there are special reasons to justify doing so? And care must be taken to fix a reserve price after ascertaining the market value for the sake of safeguarding the interest of the endowment. With these words of caution we close the matter. Appeal is allowed, order of the High Court is set aside, order in the aforementioned terms be and is passed. Appeal allowed.
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