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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 155 Records
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1986 (6) TMI 246 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tituted defendants 1 to 3 as her agents. Therefore when she has specifically empowered defendants 1 to 3 to give consent, any consent given by defendants 1 to 3 would be binding on her. This is also the principle laid down in Dorothy Valentine Burnard v. William Douglas Lysnar, AIR 1929 PC 273. Therefore though she might not have been personally a party to the acknowledgement she on account of con-stituting defendants 1 to 3 as her agents, will be bound in law by the acknowledgment given by defendants 1 to 3. 10. Further the surety bond says that it is a continuing guarantee. If it is a continuing guarantee, the question of limitation urged now by defendant 4 will not crop up at all. This is the view taken by the Supreme Court in Mrs. Margaret Lalita Samuel v. Indo Commercial Bank Ltd., . Therefore the decree passed by the court below does not suffer from any illegality. 11. Thus, in the result, the revision is dismissed. 12. No costs in this revision. 13. Revision dismissed.
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1986 (6) TMI 245 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... extension or exclusion of time or otherwise, cannot be regarded to have laid down good law in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Director of Inspection of Income Tax v. Pooran Mall (supra). 9. But even if we exclude the entire period during which the interim order was in operation preventing the registration of the award, we would thereby exclude the period from 26-7-78 till 20-12-82 only. But even after such exclusion, the award which was made on 28-11-77 and was presented for registration on 25-11-83 cannot be said to have been presented within 4 months as provided in Section 23 or even 8 months as provided in Section 25 of the Registration Act. We must, therefore, hold that the Registration Officer could not admit and was wrong in admitting the award to registration and the registration was therefore invalid and ineffective. We accordingly allow the petition, quash the impugned registration, but make no order as to costs. Sukumar Chakravorty, J. 10. I agree.
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1986 (6) TMI 244 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... extension or exclusion of time or otherwise, cannot be regarded to have laid down good law in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Director of Inspection of Income Tax v. Pooran Mall (supra). 9. But even if we exclude the entire period during which the interim order was in operation preventing the registration of the award, we would thereby exclude the period from 26-7-78 till 20-12-82 only. But even after such exclusion, the award which was made on 28-11-77 and was presented for registration on 25-11-83 cannot be said to have been presented within 4 months as provided in Section 23 or even 8 months as provided in Section 25 of the Registration Act. We must, therefore, hold that the Registration Officer could not admit and was wrong in admitting the award to registration and the registration was therefore invalid and ineffective. We accordingly allow the petition, quash the impugned registration, but make no order as to costs. Sukumar Chakravorty, J. 10. I agree.
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1986 (6) TMI 243 - ITAT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... s surplus funds in government securities. In the case before us, it is the very building of the society in which its business is being carried on which is involved and what has happened is only a part of the building, that too only 1/3 of the building, was let out. It is our considered view that the rental income is attributable to the business activity of the society in that it being incidental thereto or is one covered by s. 6 (1) (k) of the Banking Regulation Act, and the claim of the assessee would squarely fall under either ₹ 80 (2) (a) or s. 80P (2) (c). Therefore, we set aside the order of the CIT (A) and allow the appeals of the assessee in respect of the income from house property. 8. As for deduction for dividend, the assessee is not entitled to any deduction in view of the deduction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Central Land Mortgage Bank Ltd. vs. CIT (1975) 100 ITR 472. (AP). 9. In the result, the appeals are partly allowed.
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1986 (6) TMI 242 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ove. 13. We are, therefore, fortified in taking the view that the actual owner can be different from the registered owner, and if it is proved that the registered owner has transferred the ownership to a different person, the tortious liability will have to be borne by the transferee despite the non-transfer of the registration. In such cases, the registered owner cannot be made liable. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants lastly contended that the permit of the vehicle remained with Shri Mathai and on his death the permit was transferred to the name of the 4th defendant and as such the defendants Nos. 1 to 9 are liable for the damages. We may point out that the appellants have not made out a plea like that in the suit. We are not inclined to consider the above contention in the absence of a specific plea in that regard. 15. We do not find any reason to interfere with the decree passed by the court below and accordingly we dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs.
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1986 (6) TMI 241 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inery used in entry 141 of the First Schedule should be related to transport equipments. We see no force in this submission. The word machinery occurring in entry 141 of the First Schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act should be construed in the context and the collocation of words. It is settled law that the word machinery will derive its content and colour from the words transport equipments . So construed, we have no doubt in our mind that the word machinery occurring in entry 141 of the First Schedule should be related to only transport equipments . The machinery sold by the assessee in the instant case are not admittedly transport equipments. We are of the view that they will not fall under entry 141 of the First Schedule. The Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding so. There is no error either in the reasoning or in the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal. These two tax revision cases are without merit. We dismiss the revisions in limine. Petition dismissed.
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1986 (6) TMI 240 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ment was done on the basis of the alleged suppressed turnover disclosed in the books of accounts. Therefore, the action of the respondent in collecting Rs. 3,000 by way of composition fee and also collecting Rs. 7,000 by way of tax even before the assessment was made, is ex facie arbitrary and speaks of the high-handed way in which the respondent collected Rs. 10,000 when the petitioner appeared in the office on 27th January, 1983. 5.. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is allowed and the respondent is directed to refund a sum of Rs. 10,000 which was recovered by issuing notice to the Canara Bank, Mandya, under section 14 of the Act, with interest at 6 per cent, within one month from the date of receipt of this order by the respondent. 6.. The respondent or the assessing authority who has the jurisdiction over the petitioner-assessee is however at liberty to issue notice to the petitioner to complete the assessment for the relevant period. Writ petition allowed.
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1986 (6) TMI 239 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oner s right of appeal. So far as validity of section 2(o) of the Act of 1954 is concerned, I have already held that section 2(o) is intra vires to the Constitution. So far as question that whether in the present cases transfer of goods by Bhilwara unit to Gulabpura unit amount to sale or not is essentially a question of fact and the assessing authority has already recorded its finding on that question, therefore I need not go into that because it will be unnecessarily prejudice the right of the parties before the appellate authority. Thus, in the result I dismiss all the writ petitions and leave the petitioner to file a proper appeal against the order of assessment made by the assessing authority in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 443 of 1985 and against the order annexure 1 dated 20th February, 1986, in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos. 496 of 1986 and 495 of 1986, denying the remission under section 5CC of the Act of 1954. There is no order as to costs. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1986 (6) TMI 238 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in paragraph 20 thereof I further submit that under section 3 of the Revenue Recovery Act, the Collector of the district to whom the arrear is payable, has to issue the certificate to the Collector in whose jurisdiction the defaulter resides or his property is situated. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax has no jurisdiction to issue the certificate to the Collector of Madras and such a certificate will not confer jurisdiction of the first respondent to initiate proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act (1 of 1890). Hence, the proceedings initiated by the first respondent are illegal and without jurisdiction. As we could see from the above averments, they have not touched specifically the contentions as they have been advanced before me. Yet, I permitted the counsel to make his Submissions and I have dealt with them as above. I have not sustained any of the contentions and accordingly the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. Writ petition dismissed.
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1986 (6) TMI 237 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld be enabled to pass on the incidence of the tax on sale to the purchaser in order that it might be a tax on sales of goods. 5.. The principles enunciated in the aforesaid decision have full application to the facts of this case. No authentic material has been placed before the court to show how the additional tax is confiscatory in character. The grievance of the petitioner that the Act does not permit him to pass on the liability to the customer cannot be a ground to strike down the Act, because as pointed out above it is not necessary that the dealer should be enabled to pass on the incidence of the tax on sale to the purchaser in order that it might be a tax on sale of goods. On consideration, we find that the provisions of the Act do not infringe any fundamental rights of the petitioner and are not unconstitutional. 6.. In the result, this writ application which has no merit is rejected. Parties will bear their own costs. L. RATH, J.-I agree. Writ application rejected.
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1986 (6) TMI 236 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Tobacco Company Ltd. (1985) 4 SCC 369 and Prabhat Chandra Saikia v. Rajany Bala Devi (1986) 1 SCC 64, in support of his contention that his client is entitled for the benefit of the principles of promissory estoppel. I think this can be decided on a much narrower ground. This is a case where orders have been issued by the competent authority of the State Government. Those orders are binding on the Government and enforceable by this Court. They have been ignored by a group of subordinate officers constituting The State Level Committee . This is clearly not permissible. In view of the above, I direct the respondents to examine the case of the petitioner for grant of interest-free sales tax loan afresh on the basis of G.O. Ms. No. 224, Industries, dated 9th March, 1976 and G.O. Ms. No. 736 dated 28th December, 1981, and grant the petitioner the loan he might be found entitled to. The writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 500. Writ Petition allowed.
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1986 (6) TMI 235 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n 2(r)(ii) of the Act were disallowed. That decision really does not turn upon the factum of cancellation of registration of the selling dealer. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the dealer purchased bardana in question from the registered dealer and the subsequent cancellation of the selling dealer will not deprive him of the benefit of the provisions of section 2(r)(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in allowing the claim for deduction of sale price of bardana from the taxable turnover under section 2(r)(ii) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 even though the registration certificate of the selling dealer was cancelled with retrospective effect, i.e., from the date of its issue. 6.. The question referred is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the dealer and against the Revenue. The dealer, i.e., M/s. Roshanlal Gulshanlal shall get the costs of this reference. Counsel fee Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1986 (6) TMI 234 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t reliable , is unwarranted and so perverse. This forms subject-matter of question No. (c). Since the original of the letter referred to was not available in the file, nor was there any material to show that the sales of rubber were effected as stated in true copy of the letter, the Tribunal doubted its genuineness. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to hold that even on the basis of N forms, invoices and certificates of ownership adverted to and relied on by the Appellate Tribunal, the conclusion reached by it, that there was sufficient link between the movement of goods and the contract of sale and that the seller was aware that the goods were sent outside the State and so the transactions were interState in character is justified. The tax revision case is without merit and it is dismissed. No other point was argued by the Revenue. Issue carbon copies of the judgment to counsel for the petitioner and to the Government Pleader on usual terms. Petition dismissed.
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1986 (6) TMI 233 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ended that the direction of the Commissioner to assess the turnover under section 5(1) instead of section 5(4) of the Act was illegal. 27.. Sri Babu has urged that the direction of the Commissioner to assess the sales turnover under section 5(1) of the Act was legal and valid. 28.. We have earlier found that lisa sugar was an entirely different commodity and was not sugar occurring in entry 31-B of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. Lisa sugar is not covered by any of the entries in the Second and Third Schedules to the Act. If that is so, then lisa sugar had to be treated as an unclassified article attracting section 5(1) of the Act as rightly directed by the Commissioner. We see no merit in this contention of Sri Srinivasan and reject the same. 29.. As all the contentions urged for the appellant fail, this appeal is liable to be dismissed. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. But, in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1986 (6) TMI 232 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Charges - Registration of, Winding up - Avoidance of certain attachments, executions, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... no such leave was obtained, the remedy could not be availed of by the secured creditor. Section 537 of the present Act must be interpreted in the same manner. The sale by SICOM having been effected outside the winding-up and without the intervention of the court, it is not void. In the result, we hold that the charge created by the mortgage deed is not void and, accordingly, that MSFC is entitled to the sum of Rs. 15,60,000 from out of the price realised by SICOM by sale of the secured property. The consequence is that the official liquidator is entitled to no part of those sale proceeds. The order of the learned company judge dated October 17, 1985, is, therefore, set aside. Consequently, his order dated October 25, 1985, is also set aside. These orders shall be substituted by the following Leave to take out the judges summons under section 440. The judges summons is made absolute in terms of prayers (b), (c) and (d ). The parties to bear and pay their own costs throughout.
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1986 (6) TMI 222 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... es Officer, has appeared today, and has invited our attention to the original end-use certificate. We find this affidavit is signed by Lt. Col. A.R. Sharma (Production Planning and Control) in which it is specifically stated that this general assembly was imported for the purpose of manufacture of Motor Grader (Earth Shifting Machine) and there are full particulars in the schedule, which contain correct reference of the bill of entry in this case. Shri D.K. Saha, DR has been supplied a copy of the end-use affidavit and he concedes that this satisfies conditions of the notifications. We, therefore, accepting this end-use affidavit allow the appeal for benefit of Notification No. 350/76, in respect to these goods, with consequential relief.
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1986 (6) TMI 221 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Manufacture
... ... ... ... ..... ission towers. It is, therefore, safe to say that the transmission towers were formed only when they were assembled, partly from the sections received from M/s. R.S. Steel Works and partly from the bolts and nuts which were received from other sources. The complete transmission tower, therefore, cannot be said to have been made by M/s. R.S. Steel Works it was made by other people. Hence, the action to gather duty on transmission towers from M/s. R.S. Steel Works is not correct and the effort to collect duty on the components of the steel tower is equally incorrect, because these components are goods which have already paid duty in the form that they left M/s. R.S. Steel Works or to change the statement a little, these goods were received by M/s. R.S. Steel Works duty paid as MS angles and remained duty paid MS angles when they left their factory. These people are, therefore, not required to pay the duty demanded from them. 8. We set aside the order of the Appellate Collector.
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1986 (6) TMI 220 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... ifferent items and the third was ldquo Tubes and pipes for boilers falling within Heading No. 84.01/02 and blanks therefore rdquo . 4. ensp We have held in Appeal No. C/1810/85-B2 (Collector of Customs, Bombay v. M/s. Warner Hindustan Ltd., Bombay) 1986 (26) E.L.T. 367 (Tribunal) that ldquo Incoloy 800 is not rdquo Stainless Steel . 5. ensp Following the ratio of our aforesaid decision, the goods in this appeal can come within the ambit of Item 73.17/19(l)(iii) only and not Item 73.17/19(2). Item 84.01/02 cannot apply when Item 73.17/19(l)(iii) specifically applies. 6. ensp While duty was chargeable at 60 ad valorem in terms of Item 73.17/19(l)(iii) at the material time, it was to be assessed at 40 ad valorem under Item 84.01/02. 7. ensp The appeal, thus, partly succeeds. The goods are entitled to assessment under Item 73.17/19(l)(iii) at 60 ad valorem basic and, accordingly, both the orders below are set aside. Consequential relief, if any, may be afforded to the respondent.
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1986 (6) TMI 219 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Review notice ... ... ... ... ..... e. 1-7-1978 as its operation was not deferred to a future date and the President had given his assent to the amendment on this date. Shri Sunder Rajan agreed that the Five Member Bench decision referred to above, squarely covers the issue in so far as it relates to preliminary objection in this appeal and this decision is against the Revenue. He, however, reiterates the arguments that the Revenue had advanced before the Five Member Bench. This he does to protect the interests of Revenue should it decide to file an appeal before the Supreme Court. 4. emsp Following the Five Member Bench decision, we uphold the preliminary objection raised by Shri Hidayatullah and hold that Review Notice dated 10-11-1980 proposing to review order dated 29-11-1979 having been issued beyond six months was barred by limitation. The consequence of this finding would be that the Review Show Cause Notice, now the appeal before the Tribunal, shall stand dismissed as time barred. 5.Ordered accordingly.
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1986 (6) TMI 214 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Seizure and confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... ng in the books with that of any one in the factory. We, therefore, held that the Revenue has not proved that the entries in the accounts in these books represented actual clandestine removals. Besides, it appears odd that the books were kept on the roof of the factory. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, we extend the benefit of doubt and set-aside the Board rsquo s order to the extent that duty was demanded on the basis of these registers. 20. It is established that the Appellants did not make entries in their RG-1 Register for a number of days. We do not accept the explanation given by the appellants. Maintenance of proper accounts, especially of production, is a very important statutory duty of the appellants. They failed in this regard and rendered themselves liable to penalty. 21. In the circumstances, we order that the penalty may be reduced from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 2,000/- only. We modify the impugned order as indicated above. The Appeal is partly allowed.
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