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Showing 1 to 20 of 267 Records
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1986 (8) TMI 458 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urt. learned Counsel for the respondents had no good answer in regard to the grave failings in the judgment of the High Court but, nevertheless, he pleaded that having regard to the long interval between acquittal of the respondents by the High Court and the hearing of the appeal, this Court may not interfere with the judgment of the High Court. We cannot accede to this request because the judgment of the High Court suffers from a glaring and serious errors and an omission to correct it will lead to gross failure of justice. 13. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the acquittal of the respondents and restore their conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the Sessions Judge. The respondents will surrender themselves to custody for undergoing the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to them.
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1986 (8) TMI 457 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nvictions under Sections 302 read with Section 149, 396, 201 read with Section 149, 148 and 147 Indian Penal Code by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kumaun will stand restored. We do not think that at this distance of time the sentence of death should be re-imposed on Accused 1, 2 and 16. We, therefore, sentence them and the other convicted viz Accused 1 to 11 and 16 to 19 to undergo imprisonment for life for the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code. In view of this sentence we are not awarding separate sentences for the convictions under the other heads. 23. In the result, Crl. Appeal No. 94 of 1978 will stand allowed, Crl. Appeal No. 95 of 1978 will stand allowed as against all the Respondents except Accused 12 (Respondent No. 10) and Crl. Appeal No. 96 of 1978 will stand dismissed. 24. Accused 1 to 11 and 16 to 19 will be re-arrested and placed in the prison to serve out the remaining part of the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to them.
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1986 (8) TMI 456 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... already delay and the plaintiff has known the nature of the evidence which would be adduced by defendant No. 1. Therefore, I am not able to confirm the order of the trial court. In the circumstance, I direct the trial court to give opportunity to the plaintiff to adduce further evidence if he is so advised and thereafter examine the witnesses of the defendant No. 1. This will, however, be subject to the condition that the defendant No. 1 pays a cost of ₹ 100/- (one hundred) to the plaintiff to mitigate the prejudice caused to him. The costs shall be paid within two weeks from today in the trial court. Parties shall appear before the trial court on 23-8-1986 on which date the date of further hearing shall be fixed by the trial court and the suit shall be disposed of early but not beyond 1986. In case the costs as directed is not paid, the order of the trial court shall stand confirmed. 6. In the result, the civil revision is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1986 (8) TMI 455 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . It disrupts the education of his children and leads to numerous other complications and problems and results in hardship and demoralisation. It therefore follows that the policy of transfer should be reasonable and fair and should apply to everybody equally. But, at the same time, it cannot be forgotten that so far as superior or more responsible posts are concerned, continued posting at one station or in one department of the Government is not conductive to good administration. It creates vested interest and therefore we find that even from the British times the general policy has been to restrict the period of posting for a definite period. We wish to add that the position of Class III and Class IV employees stand on a different footing. We trust that the Government will keep these considerations in view while making an order of transfer. 7. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner as given four months' time to join his new place of posting.
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1986 (8) TMI 454 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... at the Commissioner (Appeals) ought to have directed the ITO to disallow one-fourth dieselising expenditure of the car as the assessee has debited it as a revenue expenditure in their profit and loss account. We agree with the Commissioner (Appeals) in holding that comprehension does not take him to treat a portion of the conversion charges also as on a personal account. We dismiss this ground. 7. For the assessment year 1982-83 another grievance of the revenue is that the Commissioner (Appeals) ought to have noticed that the assessee has again claimed dieselisation expenditure this year as in last year for the same car which being a duplication of last year's claim, disallowed it or in any other appropriate manner corrected the ITO in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kapurchand Shrimal v. CIT 1981 131ITR451. This does not arise out of the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). Hence, we dismiss this ground also. 8. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1986 (8) TMI 453 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... all the means to hold an inquiry, as asked for, and provide medical facilities to the detenus and adequate facilities to the interviewers. That Court, if it so chooses, can even personally inspect the jail premises to see the conditions of the detenus. It is futile here to enter into any controversy as to where did the detention begin and whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. Let us assume that this Court has the jurisdiction (not by any means now holding so) but it cannot be denied that the Rajasthan High Court too has jurisdiction. The petitioners thus must be relegated to seek their remedies in that Court. Though the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is wide and extraordinary, it yet remains discretionary with this Court to exercise it or not in a given set of circumstances. As indicated earlier, the present is not a case in which this Court would like to interfere. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed in limine.
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1986 (8) TMI 452 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur which can grant prompt and adequate relief to the Petitioners.... It was further observed Let us assume that this Court has the jurisdiction (not by any means now holding so) but it cannot be denied that the Rajasthan High Court too has jurisdiction. The Petitioners thus must be relegated to seek their remedies in that Court. Though the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is wide and extraordinary, it yet remains discretionary with this Court to exercise it or not in a given set of circumstances. 6. I am still of the same view. It is the Bombay High Court which can grant adequate relief to the Petitioner and the Petitioner is relegated to seek his remedy there. That Court has the necessary equipment to grant prompt and adequate relief to the Petitioner. That Court has all the means to expand and enquire into the subject and have its orders obeyed in a better way. 7. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is dismissed in limine.
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1986 (8) TMI 451 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is a proceeding in execution and therefore Section 141 which applies only to original proceedings does not apply to such proceedings. In this case their Lordships have used the term original proceeding in contradistinction to execution proceeding. In the case in hand before me there is no dispute that the suit for permanent injunction is pending and application for temporary injunction is a miscellaneous proceeding in that suit. In this view of the matter, I am clearly of the view that the aforesaid authorities relied upon by Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the defendants do not assist him in the controversy raised in the present case. 19. In the result both these revision petitions are allowed, the orders passed by the trial Court are set aside and taking in view the facts and circumstances of these cases, leave is granted to the plaintiffs for filing the rejoinder under the provisions of Order 8, Rule 9 read with Section 141, C.P.C. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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1986 (8) TMI 450 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be entitled to 1/15th share. It is made clear that so far as the business is concerned, the plaintiff's and defendants 6 and 7 are not entitled to any share or accounting. Thus, the shares of the plaintiff's are worked out as follows The plaintiff's and defendants 6 and 7 will be each entitled to 23/900th share in their grandfather's properties. They will also be entitled to 1/15th share each in the jewels of the 1st defendant. The 6th respondent in the appeal viz., the grand-daughter, is held entitled to 8/900th share in her grandfather's properties and 1/15th share in their grand-mother's jewels. The result is, the appeal preferred by the plaintiff's and the 2nd defendant is dismissed and the Memorandum of Cross-Objections preferred by defendants 3 to 5 it allowed in part modifying the shares of the plaintiff's and defendants 6 and 7 as indicated above. Each party to bear his own costs in the appeal and in the Memorandum of Cross-Objection.
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1986 (8) TMI 449 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was not raised in Apollo Mills case (supra). Indeed, in that case, it has been observed by this Court that the case of Badli workmen does not appear to have been separately raised and, accordingly, there is no reason not to award them compensation. Thus it appears that nothing was decided by this Court but, as no body challenged the right of the Badli workmen to get compensation, this Court directed payment of compensation to them. We have, however, come to the conclusion that the Badli workmen are not entitled to any compensation on account of closure under Standing orders 16 & 17. In the circumstances, the order of the Industrial Court in so far as it directs payment of compensation to the Badli workmen is set aside and, except that, the rest of the order of the Industrial Court is affirmed. The appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated above. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will, however, be no order for costs. Appeal allowed in part.
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1986 (8) TMI 448 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ppears to have crept into the judgment by some slip. It is not a sequitur to the reasoning of the court on any of the issues. In fact, in the subsequent paragraphs, the court has expressly proceeded to consider the claim of the Ananda Marga to perform Tandava dance in public streets pursuant to the right claimed by them under Art. 25(1). We, therefore, find that the Fundamental Rights of the appellants under Art. 19(1)(a) and 25(1) have been infringed and they are entitled to be protected. We allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct the respondent authorities to re-admit the children into the school, to permit them to pursue their studies without hindrance and to facilitate the pursuit of their studies by giving them the necessary facilities. We only wish to add our tradition teaches tolerance; our philosophy preaches tolerance; our constitution practices tolerance; let us not dilute it. The appellants are entitled to their costs. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (8) TMI 447 - PUNJAB HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lowed. Consequently, it is prayed that the filing of the original certificate be dispensed with for the time being. The plaintiffs have since filed the original certificate. Therefore, the civil miscellaneous has become infructuous. 14. The rate of damages has not been challenged in the appeal before me. Consequently, I do not find any merit in the appeal. 15. Now I advert to R.S.A. No. 1210 of 1982. The plaintiffs have filed this suit for damages at the rate of ₹ 500/- per mensem for the period from 1-7-1976 to 31-7-1977 regarding the property in dispute. The trial Court decreed the suit for recovery of ₹ 5,200/-. The appeal by Piara Singh was dismissed by the Additional District Judge. He has come up in second appeal to this Court. 16. No additional argument has been raised in the appeal by Mr. Anand Swaroop. 17. For the reasons already mentioned, I do not find merit in this appeal too. Consequently, I dismiss both the appeals with costs. 18. Appeals dismissed.
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1986 (8) TMI 446 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... to, for the purpose of exercising rectification jurisdiction to look into the whole evidence. He was not justified when he stated in his order under section 154 dated 13-9-1982 that ‘the fact whether the assessee had actually lost the goods for the value of ₹ 1,06,004.70 on high seas on 6-2-1978 and whether the assessee had obtained any amount by way of insurance claim are to be enquired into in detail before allowing the assessee’s claim. Such detailed enquiries cannot be made in a proceeding under section 154’. Pendency of settlement of insurance claim is no bar to the allowability of loss in this year as has been held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Laxmi Ginning & Oil Mills v. CIT 1971 82 ITR 958. So, in the circumstances, we hold that there is a mistake of law apparent from the record and direct the ITO to look into the assessee’s claim of trading loss and allow it. 8. In the result, the appeal is treated as allowed.
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1986 (8) TMI 445 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ting authority is not well founded and is merely on imaginary apprehension. It has, to be ke0pt .in view that as per S. 50 of the Act, in cases of infraction 6f S. 29, maximum penalty which can be imposed will be ₹ 5,000/- as there would be no question of imposing penalty not exceeding five times the amount or value involved in any alleged contravention as infraction of S. 290) cannot be measured in terms of money as already seen earlier. Consequently, ₹ 5,000/- would be the maximum penalty which can be imposed under S. 50, in case the adjudication proceedings go against the petitioner and when such penalty amount if at all, imposed against the petitioner is paid up, there would remain no occasion for the respondents to insist for retaining custody of the seized passport. Its relevance would automatically come to an end with the termination of the adjudication proceedings one way or the other, as observed above. Paras 15 and 16 omitted -Ed. 17. Order accordingly.
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1986 (8) TMI 444 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... above sheds some light to our present purpose. The remuneration received by marine workers as advances in foreign currency outside India was stated to be wages in foreign currency; On this, it was urged by Shri Patil that advances received by the assessee outside India in foreign currency, are wages earned by him outside India. The rejoinder of Shri Rungta was that relief under s. 80RRA could be given if only the income is taxable in India and the submission is no doubt true. But, this can only be where such income is earned by a resident or a resident who is not ordinarily resident. In the case of non resident where such wages are earned on account of services rendered outside India, it cannot be said that the income had accrued or arose within the Indian territory. 9. For all the above reasons, we hold that the income earned by the assessee as salary is not taxable in India and hence we decline to interfere with the order of the AAC. 10. The appeal fails. It is dismissed.
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1986 (8) TMI 443 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ). It is rather unfortunate that the appellant should upon the construction placed on r. 11-B of the Rajasthan State and Subordinate Services (Direct Recruitment by Competitive Examination) Rules. 1962 fail to secure entry into the Rajasthan Administrative Service and allied services of the Government of Rajasthan merely because he exceeds the upper age limit just by one day. The Government ought to consider the question of relaxing the upper age limit in the case of the appellant in order to mitigate the hardship, if otherwise permissible. There is need for a provision like the proviso to r. 4 of the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1955, conferring the power of relaxation on the State Government under certain conditions without which a deserving candidate would be rendered ineligible for appointment. The result is that the appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1986 (8) TMI 442 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... interfere by way of injunction to prevent its due implementation. It was observed that commitments of banks must be allowed to be honoured free from interference by the courts. Otherwise, trust in international commerce would he irreparably damaged. The Court referred to, with approval, the following observations of Kerr, J. in Section 4D. Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank Ltd. It is only in exceptional cases that the courts will interfere with the machinery of irrevocable obligations assumed by banks. They are the lifeblood of international commerce. And added Except possibly in clear cases of fraud of which the banks have notice, the courts will leave the merchants to settle their disputes under the contracts by litigation or arbitration as available to them or stipulated in the contracts. 6. We do not see why the same principles should not apply to a banker's letter of indemnity. 7. Accordingly, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.
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1986 (8) TMI 441 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e him succor is far better than a sentence by deterrence. The compensation awarded by the High Court, in our opinion, appears to be inadequate having regard to the nature of injury suffered by Joginder. We have ascertained the means of accused and their ability to pay further sum to the victim. We are told that they are not unwilling to bear the additional burden. Mr. Lalit learned counsel said that his clients are willing to pay any amount determined by this Court. It is indeed a good gesture on the part of counsel and his clients. With due regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider that ₹ 50,000 compensation to Joginder would meet the ends of justice. We direct the respondents to pay the balance within two months in equal proportions. The order of the High Court is modified only to the extent of Compensation as indicated above and in all other respects it is kept undisturbed. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. R.S.S. Appeals disposed of.
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1986 (8) TMI 440 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... then said "It is high time that governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. " This is mere expression of a hope and does not lay down any universal rule of application that the Government is prevented from pleading limitation as a bar. On the other hand, the Court itself observed in the Madras Port Trust's case that 'if a government or a public authority takes up a technical plea, the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well-founded it has to be upheld by the Court'. Obviously, the petitioners cannot plead their own laches as a ground sufficient for condonation of delay. There is no reason for us to grant special leave in these cases which are hopelessly barred by time and there is no justification for condonation of inordinate delay. The special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1986 (8) TMI 439 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... had in an issue of the status of a person not on the ordinarily resident issue came to the conclusion that by placing reliance on the decisions of the Madras High Court in CIT v. V.E.K.R. Savumiamurthy (1946) 14 ITR 185 and K.M.N.N. Swaminathan Chettiar v. CIT (1947) 15 ITR 418 come to the conclusion that in the absence of any contrary decision that in case a person would be considered to be not ordinary resident in India if he has been non-resident in 8 out of the 10 previous years. The same ruling would also apply to the present case, of course, in the present case since we had already decided that the status to the assessee is a non-resident, the second alternative argument is only an academic one which has no impact of the case at all. 9. It the result, what could be included in the hands of the assessee is only the income earned in India, i.e., the salary income and the income earned from Iran is not to be included at all. The appeal of the department, therefore, fails.
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