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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 317 Records
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1987 (3) TMI 530 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... abu's case (supra). This again concerned a hire purchase agreement for a truck. The financiers filed a suit against the complainant to recover the balance of the instalments due. The complainant, thereafter, filed a complaint alleging mis-appropriation of two instalments paid by him. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the High Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, stayed the criminal proceedings pending decision of the civil court in the earlier suit filed by the financiers. No such situation exists in the present case. Neither of these authorities bear any resemblance to the facts here and thus provide no support for the point canvassed. No exception can thus be taken to the order of the trial magistrate framing a charge under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners. This revision petition is accordingly hereby dismissed with the direction to the trial magistrate to try and dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible.
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1987 (3) TMI 529 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... earlier staled that it would not be necessary in view of the entry 23 but still it has been observed that the Act intends to give breathing time to a sick industry and thereby encourage them to continue its productive activity and from this point of view it may be stated that the Act is within the competence of the powers of the State legislature in item 33(a) of List III. 13. Although reference has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioners to I. B. Bose v. R. S. Debi, AIR 1970 SC 228 and 2. Thangia v. Hanuman Bank AIR 1958 Mad 403 but these decisions do not in any way help the petitioner. So far as the doctrine of pith and substance is considered, 1 have already considered the applicability of this doctrine in relation to the provisions of the Rajasthan Act. 14. In the result I find no force in the objections raised on behalf of the creditor petitioners, so the objections are overruled. The proceedings of winding up shall remain stayed in view of the notification.
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1987 (3) TMI 528 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... manufacture of tyres and tubes would be chargeable to duty under Tariff Item 68 Central Excise Tariff this Tribunal has held that they would be so chargeable. This was in the case of Super Tyres (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise 1984 Vol. 3 ETR 305 . We see no reason to differ from the said conclusion in the present appeal. 4. The other category of scrap is that which arose by scrapping of fully manufactured tyres and tubes which appear to have been scrapped evidently for the reason that they were found not marketable. If scrap arising during the course of manufacture would itself be liable for duty under Tariff Item 68 Central Excise Tariff, the scrap arising by way of the scrapping of the fully manufactured tyres and tubes for the reason mentioned earlier would also be liable for duty under Tariff Item 68 Central Excise Tariff. 5. In the circumstances we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Appellate Collector and restore the order of the Assistant Collector.
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1987 (3) TMI 527 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... do that, by selling his supposed right and putting another in his place, his right is gone and cannot stand in the way of the landlord's recovering possession. 6. We fail to appreciate how these observations can be of any avail to the appellants. The view expressed by Couch, CJ that the right of an occupancy tenant under Section 6 of the Recovery of Rents (Bengal) Act does not lay down any contrary principle. As to the question of abandonment, the relationship of the parties was regulated by the stipulations contained in the mortgage bond and under the terms the appellants were entitled to retain possession till the mortgage debt was paid of. We wish to point out that under the U.P. Debt Redemption Act, 1940 all usufructuary mortgages became self-liquidating mortgages. As held by the High Court in Ram Prasad v. Bishambhar Singh AIR1946All400 , the mortgage money would be deemed to have been paid off. 7. For these reasons, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 526 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion, reference may be made to the observations of Das Gupta, J., (as his Lordship then was) in the Division Bench decision of this Court in Ashalata Mitra v. A. D. Viz., (1955) 59 Cal WN 692 at 694. A fortiori, therefore, the findings, if any, made by us in disposing of this appeal against the impugned order of ex parte injunction cannot in any way take the place of the findings to be arrived at in disposing the application for temporary injunction now pending before the learned trial Judge. But on the materials now on record we are of opinion that the learned trial Judge was not wrong in making the impugned order. 7. We accordingly dismiss the appeal, but do not make any order as to costs and we direct the learned trial Judge to hear out the application for temporary injunction now pending before him as expeditiously as possible. Let a copy of this order along with the records of the case, if any, be transmitted to the court below forthwith. Ajit Kumar Nayak, J. 8. I agree.
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1987 (3) TMI 525 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ar owner, under fortuitous circumstances, fall in the two newly formed States, will not in any way affect the operation of the orders which had become final prior to 1st November, 1966. To accept the Appellant's contention would create anomalies. Persons against whom proceedings under the Act were taken and became final prior to 1st November, 1966, would be entitled to claim lands in both the States while those whose petitions are pending on the date the States Re-organisation Act came into force would be in a disadvantageous position. This is not the object of the Act. Nor the scheme behind it. The States Re-organisation was a historical accident. The land owners cannot take advantage of this accident, to the detriment of ejected tenants or tenants in need of re-settlement. For the above reasons, we had that the High Court was justified in answering the question referred to it against the Appellant. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 524 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on of this Court in I.T.R. No. 203 of 1970. R. Kilachand, Bombay vs. CIT delivered on 12th Feb., 1979 by Chandurakar and Desai, JJ. Following that judgment, the 1st question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 3. The question reads thus "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessees were entitled to the deduction of the interest form the dividend income ?" Mr. Paralkar, on behalf of the assessee, does not press this question. It is, accordingly, not answered. 4. No order as to the costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 523 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... city consumed cannot be estimated by having reference to the consumption in the month of June or July, during which time the consumption may be higher because of fans, coolers, etc. In the present case, while estimating the consumption of electricity for the period 11th January, 19'73 to 29th September, 1973 the respondents have referred to the correct months from January to September but for the wrong year. Instead of comparing this period with January to September, 1970, 1971 and 1972, it has estimated the consumption for the period January, 1973 to September, 1973 by reference to the actual consumption in January to September, 1974. This it could not do and this was in clear violation of Clause 22(d), extracted above. (20) For the aforesaid reasons the writ petition is allowed. A writ of mandamus is issued quashing the bill dated 1st November, 1980 whereby a demand for ₹ 1183.36 was raised. The petitioner will be entitled to costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 500.
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1987 (3) TMI 522 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... an never be said that the defaults were of such a serious nature' as to warrant the court refusing to exercise its discretion and to feel constrained to strike out the defence. Such being the case the answer to the second question has also to be in favour of the appellant. The subordinate courts and the High Court were in error in holding that the delayed payment of rent for the months of September 1968 and March 1969 constituted such defaults as necessarily warranted the striking out of the defence under Section 17. In the light of our conclusions the appeal succeeds and will accordingly stand allowed. The suit filed by the first respondent will stand dismissed. In so far as the petitions for impleadment are concerned, though we heard the arguments of the counsel for the parties, we do not think their presence is necessary in the appeal and hence both the petitions are dismissed. The parties will pay and bear the respective costs. Appeal allowed and Petitions dismissed.
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1987 (3) TMI 520 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ec. 17, no further amendment of secs. 21 and 22 was necessary. The consequential amendment to sec. 23 has however been made. Again the marginal note has been changed from "excise duty in respect of lease" to "payment for exclusive privilege." It is now specified in the new section that the payment of the same in consideration of the grant of lease or licence or both for the exclusive privilege is to be instead of or in addition to any excise duty or fees leviable in secs. 21 and 22. We are, therefore, satisfied that the amendments effected to secs. 17 and 23 have fulfilled the object of removing the vices or defects pointed out by the Full Bench in Atluri Brahmanandam's case, if indeed there were defects or vices. In the result, the petitions for special leave to appeal filed against the judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding the amending Act and the demands made by the excise authorities are dismissed. Appeals & Petitions dismissed.
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1987 (3) TMI 519 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ons. The objection raised by the petitioner with reference to specific medicines has not been examined by us mainly for the reason that we have found this proceeding not an appropriate one for such purpose. We, however, hope that the Central Government shall take into consideration the objections raised by the petitioner and have the same referred to the Consulative Committee or to such other body as it considers expedient for immediate examination and a decision in that regard shall be taken, not later than six months. The petitioner has indeed done a commendable job in bringing the matter before the Court. We appreciate his move and are inclined to think that he should be suitably compensated with a view to reimbursing him for the expenses. We direct the Ministry of Health of the Central Government to deposit a sum of ₹ 5000 (Rupees Five Thousand only) in this Court within two months hence which the petitioner will be at liberty to withdraw. Petition disposed of. 484
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1987 (3) TMI 518 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... idered to be good law. That in matters relating to travelling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion, previous approval under Section 115 (7) of the States Reorganization Act would not be necessary in view of the Memorandum dated May 11, 1957 addressed by the Central Government to all the concerned governments is now settled law in view of Raghavendra Rao case 1. Subject to this clarification we do not consider it necessary to interfere with the order passed by the High Court. The promotion given to the respondent should not be disturbed. The order of the High Court insofar as the impugned order of reversion of the respondent has been quashed and set aside is confirmed. We only restate the position that the law which governs the question regarding previous approval is the law laid down by this Court in Raghavendra Rao case 1. Subject to this clarification the appeal will stand dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 517 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... herefore, reject the contention that the order passed by the High Court is contrary to the proviso to subsection (3) of section 4 of the Act. It is lastly urged on behalf of the petitioner that the enforcement of the Act will be highly prejudicial to the management, since its financial position is not satisfactory and the management is not able to pay equal remuneration to both male Stenographers and female Stenographers. The Act does not permit the management to pay to a section of its employees doing the same work or a work of similar nature lesser pay contrary. to section 4(1) of the Act only because it is not able to pay equal remuneration to all. The applicability of the Act does not depend upon the financial ability of the management to pay equal remuneration as provided by it. We do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The petition, therefore, fails and it is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (3) TMI 516 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the U P. Sales Tax Act. Before, however, the eligibility certificate was given certain assessment orders had been passed. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that after the grant of eligibility certificate the Sales Tax Officer has no power to assess the petitioners ignoring the same. For this purpose the petitioners placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Kumar Fuels v. State of U. P. and others, 1986 U. P. Tax Cases 357. In paragraph 18 of the Judgment in that case the Division Bench held that after grant of eligibility certificate there was no power in the Sales Tax Officer to assess the petitioner. Following the decision in that case we hereby direct respondent No. 2, Sales Tax Officer, Sector 2, Hathras not to assess the petitioners in future till the period of eligibility certificate does not expire or is otherwise cancelled by the authority authorised to do it. 2. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the mandamus in the terms stated is issued.
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1987 (3) TMI 515 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ding and the case has been consigned to the record. There is nothing to indicate that any proceed- ings are pending nor anything to indicate that any claim of any creditor still remains to be satisfied. In the absence of any proceedings pending the effect of clause 4 of Sec.7 will be of no avail. In our opinion therefore a decree for specific performance could be passed. The High Court there- fore was in error in allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned courts below. It is no doubt open to the respondent to approach the executing court to retain the sale proceeds if they are in a position to satisfy the court that any part of the claim still remain to be satisfied. The appeal is therefore allowed, the judgment and decree. passed by the High Court is set aside. Instead the decree passed by the trial court and maintained by the Appellate court is restored. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 514 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in order to establish his right, if any, in respect of the compensation amount latest by July 15, 1987. If respondent No. 1 institutes such a suit, the intervening period will be treated as having been occupied in prosecuting the matter in good faith and no question of limitation will be permitted to be raised. In case respondent No. 1 does not file a suit by July 15, 1987, the authority before whom the amount is lying will make over the amount of compensation to the appellants. If on the other hand, such a suit is filed the trial court will permit the appellants to withdraw the amount on furnishing sufficient bank guarantee to cover the unpaid amount along with interest after hearing the parties. The learned Judge will ensure that respondent No. 1 is properly protected and in case he succeeds he is able to reap the fruits of litigation by ensuring that the bank guarantee is for the proper amount. 2. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 513 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
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... ... ..... adies and minors without the initial capital and other things being properly investigated and proved ?" 2. The question falling for our consideration are concluded by the decisions of this Court in CIT vs. Pushpa Devi (1986) 56 CTR (Pat) 251 (1987) 164 ITR 639(Pat) and CIT vs. Rambha Devi (1987) 59 CTR (Pat) 1 (1987) 164 ITR 658(Pat) in which we held that the Scheme did not apply to ladies and minors. We also held that no enquiry in terms of s. 143 of the Act had been effected by the ITO. We also held that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the CIT was fully justified in cancelling the order of assessment passed by the ITO. 3. The same questions had been referred to us for our opinion in CIT vs. Pushpa Devi (supra) and CIT vs. Rambha Devi (supra). All the three questions before us must, therefore, be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and we do so accordingly. In the special circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 512 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... awn and the documents received subsequently are only referred to, to confirm or endorse the said conclusions, the process indulged in is not of forming a subjective satisfaction but one of finding reasons to support the pre-conceived formulations. That is exactly what the detaining authority has done in the present case. Such an approach can hardly be countenanced. We once again reiterate in as clear terms as is possible for us to do that the grounds of detention have to be formulated and the order has to be passed only after considering all the material together and at a time. The checking of the fresh material received with the grounds already formulated and the order kept ready is nothing but a pretense of following the law and is a fraud upon it. 3. Hence this petition will have to be allowed. The impugned order of detention is set aside and the Rule is made absolute accordingly. The detenu to be released forthwith, unless required in any other case. 4. Petition allowed.
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1987 (3) TMI 510 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ) was attracted to the case, and before an appeal could be entertained, he had to deposit 20 per cent of the amount of tax assessed. The Revenue relied on these observations. This case is clearly distinguishable, inasmuch as, no direct question was raised therein before the court, whether under clause (b) to sub-section (1-B) of section 9, the appellant who filed no return and who did not admit any liability at any stage in any proceedings, will be liable or not, to deposit 20 per cent of the amount of tax assessed. The questions before the learned single Judge, as reproduced in page 350 of STC (paragraph 1 at page 1276 of UPTC), were entirely different. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal to pass an order under section 11(8), directing the appellate authority to entertain the appeal of the assessee, without calling upon him to deposit any portion of 20 per cent of the amount of tax assessed. Petition allowed.
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1987 (3) TMI 509 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ation that the trial court s declaration that the impugned notification amending rule 3(28) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941 was ultra vires be set aside and prayer for mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect or further effect to the amended rule 3(28) of the said Rules be rejected. The writ petitioners are, however, entitled to declaration that the State and its officers have power to levy and realise sales tax upon sales and purchases of carpets manufactured wholly of wool or containing 40 per cent or more by weight of wool at the rate not exceeding the maximum prescribed by section 15(a) read with section 14(x) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The sales tax authorities would be at liberty to enquire into and determine if the carpets sold and purchased by the petitioners as dealers contain the required quantity of wool specified in item No. 21 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. PADMA KHASTGIR, J.-I agree. Appeals dismissed.
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