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Showing 1 to 20 of 233 Records
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1987 (6) TMI 397 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nduct or do anything else which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The District Magistrate, it is true, has stated that the detention of the detenus was effected because he was satisfied that it was necessary to prevent them from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order, but there is no reference to any material in support of that satisfaction. We are aware that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate is subjective in nature, but even subjective satisfaction must be based upon some pertinent material. We are concerned here not with the sufficiency of that material but with the existence of any relevant material at all. 4. In the circumstances, the detention orders in respect of the four detenus must be quashed. 5. The writ petitions and the appeals are allowed, the order of detention in respect of each detenu is quashed, and the detenus are entitled to be set at liberty unless their detention is required in connection with other cases.
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1987 (6) TMI 396 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has succeeded in two courts. Merely because a Governmental Agency want to have the luxury of filing a second appeal, is no reason why this court will prolong the agony of the petitioner. In view of the action of the Government Agency the petitioner is not only deprived of his salary but he is also incurring legal expenses which must be huge. Accordingly we are not inclined to grant any stay unconditionally or for an indefinite period. Accordingly we direct that if a sum of ₹ 30,000/- is paid to the petitioner by next Tuesday, then there will be a stay of the operation of our order for six weeks from this date. In default the parties shall and they are hereby directed to proceed on the basis that no order of dismissal was passed against the petitioner and the order passed against the petitioner and the order passed was null and void and has been set aside accordingly and that the petitioner shall obtain all benefits on the basis of the same. Satyabrata Mitra, J. I agree.
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1987 (6) TMI 395 - MUMBAI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ctical world is different. What is necessary is to take stern action against the erring examiners whenever defaults are brought to the notice of the Board. We entertain no doubt that appropriate action will be taken in the matter in terms of the Regulations. What it should be is for the Board to decide. 16. The petitioner has already lost one year. Time for getting admissions to the courses in the current academic sessions is to expire soon. Under the circumstances wedirect the Board to take the Physics practical examination of the petitioner afresh as early as possible and declare results on that basis on or before 10th July, 1987. 17. Petition allowed. Rule absolute accordingly. 18. What about costs, is the only surviving question. For the entire respondent No. 3 is mainly responsible. Actually what he has done is an actionable wrong. We, therefore, direct the respondent No. 3 to bear the costs of the petitioner, first respondent and the second respondent in different sets.
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1987 (6) TMI 394 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... entitled to continue in service till the attainment of 58 years, according to the pre-existing service conditions and who could not opt in favour of those service conditions from a distinct and separate class. Petitioner belongs to an altogether different class of employees viz., those who were allotted to the State of Kerala and who had or are deemed to have opted in favour of the provisions of the Kerala Service Rules. Petitioner submits that officers attain the prime of their efficiency by the time they attain 55 years of age and their continuance in service is more profitable to the State than their retirement. Those are aspects of policy which have to be considered by the Government as held in K. G. O. Front v. State of Kerala, 1987 (1) KLJ 336. It is not for this court to direct retention of employees bound to be retired from service on the attainment of the age of superannuation. The Original Petition cannot, therefore, be entertained and the same is hereby dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 393 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s these appeals and affirm the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad quashing the said seniority list dated 29.7.1980 together with supplementary seniority lists dated 18.12. 1980 and 19.12. 1980 relating to Civil Engineering Wing. Rules 3(c), 5 and 6 of 1969 Rules as well as Rule 23 of 1971 Rules are also quashed. The condition in Office Memorandum dated 21.1.1980, Annexure 2 of Writ Petition No. 2447 of 1980 providing that for the selection for the post of Superintending Engineer the officer must be a confirmed Executive Engineer is quashed. A writ of mandamus be issued directing the Government to prepare a fresh seniority list of Engineers in the Civil Engineering and E.M. Wing respectively in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. This order, however, will not affect any confirmations or promotions (other than ad hoc promotions) made before 29.11.1979. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 392 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... o. Ltd. (1987) 164 ITR 401, it was held by the Hon';ble Calcutta High Court that if the part of the agreement relating to know-how is distinct and separate from the part relating to the services as production adviser, there is no accrual of income under section 9. This decision is also squarely applicable on the facts of the present case and this would be another reason why the department cannot place reliance on the decision of Calcutta Bench of the Appellate Tribunal in the case of Graphite Vicarb India Ltd. (supra). On the facts of the present case, therefore, we are of the view that the learned CIT(A) was justified in taking the view that the amount of 78,500 Sw. Fr. could not be considered to be the payment for technical services but was in the nature of payment for salaries etc. which, therefore, did not attract the liability for tax under section 195 read with section 115A. We would, therefore, uphold his order. 8. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 391 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ner wherein the Commercial Tax Officer should direct the petitioner to find out from the seized records the relevant documents and papers which may be required for the purpose of issue of permits, in accordance with law. Accordingly, the Commercial Tax Officer is directed to dispose of the matter in the light of the observations made above within two weeks from today. Before I part with this matter, it appears to me that the purchases or the imports of the goods by the petitioner had not been disputed but the only thing is that the documents have been seized by the Commercial Tax Office and until and unless a proceeding is initiated on the basis of such seized documents, the Commercial Tax Officer shall not take into consideration the fact that since the seizure has been made the dealer should be treated with suspicion. This application is disposed of accordingly. All parties to act on a signed copy of this order on the usual undertaking. Application disposed of accordingly.
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1987 (6) TMI 390 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT]
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... ... ..... gh Court has held that sinews are a commodity different from bones after referring to some literature on the subject. We agree with the conclusion of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on this aspect. In our case, sinews and bone-meal are commodities different from raw bones as understood in commercial circles and these products were meant for sale by the petitioner. The different entries in the First Schedule regarding bone and bone-meal also indicate the legislature s recognition about this. The validity of these entries is not challenged. Therefore, the Tribunal is right in holding that the assessee s turnover of purchase of raw bones to the extent it was consumed for the production of bone-meal and sinews is liable to tax under section 6-A(ii)(a) of the Act. The controversy under section 8-A of the Central Sales Tax Act does not survive in view of the conclusion reached above. The T.R.Cs. are, therefore, dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 389 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ial officer of the rank of a District Judge, besides another non-judicial member. The appeal lies to it against the orders of the departmental authorities. In the hierarchy, the Appellate Tribunal is the first independent Tribunal. In such a case, we would lean in favour of preserving such a power of the Tribunal rather than leaning the other way. Of course, this concern comes into play only where the language of the amending statute is not clear on the question of restrospectivity. For all the above reasons, we hold that the incidental/ancillary power of the Appellate Tribunal to grant stay continues and is available in respect of all appeals relating to assessment years falling prior to 1st July, 1985 as also in respect of provisional assessment proceedings relating to the months falling prior to 1st July, 1985. The writ petitions are dismissed, subject to the above observations. There shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 388 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eferring to the decisions in Money v. Doud (1957) 354 US 457, Metropolis Theatre Company v. State of Chicago (1912) 57 L Ed 730 and Perminal Basin Area Rate cases (1968) 20 L Ed 2d 312, stated at page 280 The court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the State Government merely because it feels that another policy decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical. The court can interfere only if the policy decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. We do not see anything patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide in the policy decision of the Government according tax concession for a limited period for small-scale industries started in a mini industrial estate earmarked for that purpose. The same principle applies in regard to the policy decision that the concession is available only to industries started after 1st April, 1979. We do not see any merit in the writ appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. Writ appeal dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 387 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , the legislature did not attempt to legislate in the matter of procedure. The legislature expressly sought to confer upon the High Court power to reopen questions which till then were to be deemed finally decided. It was held that the Amendment Act will not have retrospective operation. In the light of the above decision, we hold that the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Central Zone) acted illegally and without jurisdiction in initiating suo motu revision proceedings under section 35(2A) of the Act to revise the assessment orders in these three cases, dated 15th March, 1977. The Appellate Tribunal was in error in holding that the matter related only to procedure and so the Deputy Commissioner was competent to revise the orders. We, accordingly, set aside the common order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in the appeals for the three years, dated 11th January, 1983. 5.. These three revisions are allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in each revision. Petitions allowed.
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1987 (6) TMI 386 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n revision. 2.. We heard counsel for the Revenue. The respondent-assessee is not represented before us. It is admitted that the firewood and charcoal were used as fuel for preparation of food. There is no material to show that they have been used as a raw material in the manufacture of any goods for sale by the respondent-assessee. On these premises, and in the light of the decision of this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Thomas Stephen and Co. Ltd. 1987 66 STC 34 (1987) 1 KLT 161, we hold that the said goods-firewood and charcoal-have not been used in the manufacture of any goods for sale, but only as an aid in the manufacture of goods by the assessee and so the turnover relating to those items cannot be brought to tax under section 5A(1)(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. The decision of the Appellate Tribunal is right. There is no error of law in the order of the Appellate Tribunal. There is no merit in this revision. It is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 385 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se two decisions, in our view, is on the point in issue. We are directly confronted with the question as to whether, where a clarification under section 42(2) of the Act has been issued by the Government, it is open to the Commissioner to take a view contrary to that and make an assessment according to his interpretation of the provisions in the Schedule or in the section. We are definitely of the view that the Commissioner is bound by the clarification issued by the Government under section 42(2) of the Act. We find support for this view that we take, in the Division Bench ruling of this Court in Munaga Singaraiah Sreshty and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1977 40 STC 89. The result, therefore, is that we quash the various orders of the 1st respondent challenged in these special appeals and restore the orders passed by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. All the appeals are allowed as above. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in each case. Appeals allowed.
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1987 (6) TMI 384 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he assets were used in connection with the petitioner s business. In such circumstances, a conclusion was reached that the sale of these items was in connection with or incidental or ancillary to the business carried on by the assessee. The Appellate Tribunal concluded that if an assessee engaged in the business of processing and sale of sea foods, sells his vehicles or vessels used in such business, it is definitely a transaction in connection with or incidental or ancillary to such business. It was so held in view of the wide definition of the word business contained in section 2(vi) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. 4.. We are of the view that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal dated 28th August, 1984 does not suffer from any infirmity. It is in accordance with the decisions of courts referred to above. No interference is called for with the said decision. There is no merit in this tax revision case. The tax revision case is dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 383 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... old items is used again for making new ornaments or new wares. In fact, in the case of G.S. Pai and Company, referred to by the State Representative, there was clearly a manufacture of new ornaments. But that is not so in the present case. The Appellate Tribunal has found, as a fact, that no manufacturing process takes place in the instant case. By the process of melting, only the shape of the article is changed. This is largely a question of fact. On the basis of the above facts, we are of the view that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal that the purchase tax under section 5A of the Act is not attracted, is justified. The Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that no question of manufacture is involved in the instant case and so the purchase of old silver ornaments and silver wares will not attract the purchase tax under section 5A of the Act. 3.. We see no reason to interfere with the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. The T.R.C. is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 382 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The Revenue contends that this decision is pending in appeal before the Supreme Court of India as Civil Appeal No. 2495 of 1985. So the matter is not beyond doubt or the question of law now urged is an open question. We are unable to agree. The very question posed for consideration has been adjudicated by a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sterling Foods v. State of Karnataka 1986 63 STC 239 AIR 1986 SC 1809. Indeed counsel for the Revenue did not and could not dispute this fact. The Supreme Court has held that the prawns purchased by the assessee in that case and the prawns exported are the one and same commodity notwithstanding the processes employed. The said decision squarely applies to the facts of the instant case. On this short ground we see no error in the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. No interference is called for with the decision of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The tax revision case is without merit. It is dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 381 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Tax Act or under the Central Sales Tax Act. It is not disputed that the splints and veneers were liable to tax at the hands of the assessee under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act or under the Central Sales Tax Act. The plea of the Revenue is that the entirety of purchase should be utilised for the manufacture of splints and veneers. There is no warrant for stating so. On a plain reading of S.R.O. No. 148/72, we are of the view that, on the facts of this case, the soft wood purchased by the manufacturers (assessee in this case) are entitled to exemption under section 5A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, as per S.R.O. No. 148/72, even though a portion of the soft wood (left over) was used for wood-wool. The Appellate Tribunal was justified in taking the said view. There is no error of law in the said decision. 3.. We see no reason to interfere with the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. The tax revision case is without merit. It is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 380 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... anufacturing process. These two new or commercially different commodities are taxable again under entry 27 of the First Schedule of the Act at 8 per cent. The same commodity at different stages could be treated and taxed as commercially different articles. This position is settled by a series of decisions of courts see Sri Siddhi Vinayaka Coconut and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1974 34 STC 103 (SC) at page 110, Ganesh Trading Company v. State of Haryana 1973 32 STC 623 (SC) and Achamma Sebastian v. State of Kerala 1967 20 STC 483 (Ker) FB 1967 KLT 832 (FB) . We are of the view that chilli powder and coriander powder are distinct and different from chilli and coriander, both in common parlance and in commercial circles. In this view of the matter, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the turnover relating to the said items is taxable at 8 per cent. There is no merit in this tax revision case. The tax revision case is dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (6) TMI 379 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the company s bankers against retirement of documents of title to the goods. The above clause shows that the appropriation, if any, is conditional. It is evident that this condition was not fulfilled. On this basis, there is no escape from the position that the sale did not fructify. If that basis, there was no sale exigible to tax. The assessing authority as well as the Appellate Tribunal were in error in holding that such unfructified sale will be exigible to tax. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) was justified in holding that the sale was not complete in respect of such goods which were refused by various consignees. In this view of the matter, we hold that the Appellate Tribunal was in error in its reasoning and conclusion in holding that there was an appropriation of goods, as contained in the Kerala General Sales Tax Act to attract sales tax. We reverse the decision of the Appellate Tribunal in T.A. No. 838 of 1986. This tax revision case is allowed. Petition allowed.
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1987 (6) TMI 378 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Order XLI, rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code. There are innumerable decisions of courts, which lay down the guiding principles governing the admission of additional evidence in appeal. Normally, the Appellate Tribunal is entitled to consider only the records and materials which were produced and/or relied on, before the lower authorities. It is open to the Appellate Tribunal to consider fresh material or record at the appellate stage for the first time, in certain special circumstances and subject to certain limitations. The regulations referred to, similar to Order XLI, rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, specify the circumstances and conditions, subject to which it can be so done. It is worthwhile to keep in mind the said guiding principles in the matter of admitting additional or fresh evidence in the appeals irrespective of the fact whether it be produced or relied on, by the assessee or by the Revenue. The tax revision case is disposed of as above. Petition allowed.
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