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1987 (7) TMI 595 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... it may be prima facie evidence of an intention to cheat. 5. In the present case the Respondent Chaman Lal has alleged that he had supplied goods to the Petitioner on various occasions and only thereafter the price thereof was demanded by him and to discharge this existing liability the Petitioner had issued a number of cheques in Respondent's favour which were dishonoured on presentation to the Bank. Clearly, therefore, the cheques were not issued against delivery of goods but were drawn in order to discharge a pre-existing liability. I am, therefore, of the view that the dishonouring of the cheques amounted to breach of promise which is a civil liability and no criminal offence is made out either under Section 406 or under Section 420, Indian Penal Code. 6. In this view of the matter the impugned complaint as well as the First Information Report and the proceedings taken in pursuance thereof in the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Panipat are hereby quashed.
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1987 (7) TMI 594 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... tatutory provisions concerned and where mere failure is made punishable, it is a clear indication that mens rea is ruled out. It is significant that whenever mens rea was necessary, the legislature had incorporated the required state of mind in the provision itself. Thus we find "willingly" in S. 233, "knowingly" in Ss.59, 105, 207, 420, 538(g), "fraudulently" in Ss.538(e) and (k), "with intent to defraud or deceive" in Ss.539, 540(b) and (c) and "intentionally" in S.62 of the Act, and so on Ss.159 and 220 do not require any mens rea. Courts in interpreting, cannot import an ingredient into the offence, which the statute by implication, has ruled out. Once failure to furnish returns or audited Balance Sheet is proved, the offence is proved. That is what has happened in the instant case. I am unable to accept any of the contentions of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners. 19. The revisions fail and are, therefore, dismissed.
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1987 (7) TMI 593 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ght to have realised that her finding on limitation was subject to review by a superior court and in case the decision of the superior court is in favour of the plaintiff, consideration of other issues also may become necessary for a final disposal of the case. It is always necessary and advisable to enter findings on all the issues when a suit or any other proceeding is finally disposed of on the merits. Now it has become necessary to remand the case. Remand will involve further delay and inconvenience. But that has become inevitable. 7. The civil revision petition is therefore allowed and the judgment and decree are set aside. The finding that the suit is barred by limitation is vacated and it is found that the suit is within time. The case is remanded for the purpose of deciding the other issues and disposing of the suit on the merits. There will be no order as to costs. Parties will appear before the trial court on 3-8-1987. The office will transmit the records forthwith.
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1987 (7) TMI 592 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ount of gratuity payable to the Judges, the learned Additional Solicitor General, on behalf of the Government, has very fairly stated that it is now agreed that the maximum limit of the amount of gratuity payable to a Judge should be rupees one lakh, with effect from 1.1.1986 and that suitable legislation will be brought forward soon. It has also been stated that necessary instructions will be forthwith issued to make payments of gratuity upto a maximum of rupees one lakh to Judges who have retired on or after 1.1.1986. In the circumstances a direction will issue to the Accountant Generals and the Pay & Accounts Officers of the States to make payment of gratuity subject to a maximum of rupees one lakh, with effect from 1.1.1986. Let such a direction issue. 4. We record our sense of appreciation of the obvious interest and trouble that the learned Additional Solicitor General has taken in the matter to make things move fast. 5. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
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1987 (7) TMI 591 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
... ... ... ... ..... P,C. Where, however, a commissioner is appointed, the report becomes evidence and there is no scope for the appellate court to wipe out such evidence. Therefore, in deserving cases, the revisional power is to be exercised. 6. Trial Court has not applied the judicial mind while appointing the commissioner. No consideration has been made if the plaintiff is unable to ascertain the boundary by an expert engaged by him. This amounts to exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity. Accordingly, the order is not sustainable. 7. Mr. A. K. Mohapatra, the learned counsel for the opposite parties, submitted that in the ground of the civil revision this has not been urged. Rules of pleadings are not strictly applicable to a revision application and accordingly I am not inclined to accept the said submission to reject the prayer in the civil revision. 8. In the result, the civil revision is allowed and the order of the trial Court is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (7) TMI 590 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... #39;. Accordingly the exclusion clause contained in the definition of 'cotton fabrics' does not apply. The cotton sarees even if embroidered remain sarees and do not lose its identity as a woven material. The test indicated in this decision for treating embroidered cotton sarees as 'cotton fabrics' as defined in aforesaid item 19 in the first schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, is, therefore, fully satisfied, there being no finding of the Board of ony fact which would attract the exclusion clause of the definition. This decision fully supports the conclusion reached by me. No other decision taking a different view has been cited. 6. Consequently, there is no ground made out to interfere with the decision of the Board taking the view that on the facts found proved embroidered cotton sarees fall within the definition of 'cotton fabrics' as defined above and they are to be taxed accordingly. The revision is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
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1987 (7) TMI 589 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ed letter was not beyond the power of the Corporation or ultra vires the powers of the Corporation of Calcutta. 31. For the reasons aforesaid, this application is allowed. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation shall proceed to accord sanction to the plan in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules without requiring the petitioner to produce any 'No objection' certificate from the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976. 32. Such sanction shall be made within eight weeks from the date of communication of this order. This Order, however, will not prevent the Urban Land Ceiling Authority to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act against the petitioner, if they are so advised. 33. Let all parties act on the operative part of this judgment and order on the undertaking of the Advocate on Record for the petitioner to apply for and obtain a certified copy of the order and judgment made herein.
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1987 (7) TMI 588 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... d we see no reason to interfere with that. 20. In the result, in MAC No. 41 of 1981, the compensation amount is fixed at ₹ 8,000. 40 per cent of the same should be paid by the appellant. Since 60 per cent is to be borne by the owner of the bus, the insurer of the bus viz., M/s. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company shall pay the amount of ₹ 4,800 and the balance amount of ₹ 3,200 shall be paid by the appellant. The principal amount will carry interest at six per cent per annum from 17th September, 1977, till realisation. 21. In MAC No. 42 of 1981, the 5th respondent, M/s. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company shall pay ₹ 4,800 with interest at six per cent per annum from 17th September, 1977, and the balance amount of ₹ 3,200 with interest at six per cent per annum from 17th September, 1977, till realisation shall be paid by the appellant. 22. The MFAs and cross objections are disposed of as above. The parties shall bear their costs.
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1987 (7) TMI 587 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... serious to contest the election he could have done so and any discrepancy regarding his name in the ballot paper could not affect his chances at the election. It is a matter of common knowledge that the voters cast their vote not on the basis of name of the candidate but on the basis of symbol allotted to him. The appellant asserted that since his name was not corrected in the list of contesting candidate he did not carry on his election propaganda, and he lost interest in the election. This is quite strange logic, if the appellant was serious candidate he could have carried on his election campaign and persuaded the voters to cast their vote for the symbol of 'Lion' which admittedly related to him. The facts and circumstances available on record show that the petitioner was not serious in contesting the election. 15. In view of the above discussion we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with a cost which we quantify ₹ 2,000/-. ,
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1987 (7) TMI 586 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ants of the house. Hence the respondent will be fully justified in asking for the eviction of the appellant from the hall let out to him. For all these reasons, we do not find any merit in the contentions of the appellant. As we have already stated the findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority are vitiated by the inherent defects in them and the High Court was, therefore, justified in taking the view that the findings have no binding force on the revisional court. In the result the appeal fails and will stand dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs. In order to enable the appellant to secure alternate accommodation for shifting his clinic he is granted time till 31.1.0.1987 to vacate the premises subject to the condition he files an undertaking in the usual terms within three weeks from today failing which the respondent will be entitled to recover possession in terms of the judgment and decree of the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (7) TMI 585 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... da Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1981) 2 AP 158 was not available. In all the circumstances of this case, we think. that this is a proper case where the writ petitioners should he allowed to file a revision before the Commissioner. Land Revenue, against the orders of the Director of Settlement. It is accordingly directed that if the writ petitioners-respondents in this appeal file a revision petition before the Commissioner of Land Revenue within two months from today, the same shall be entertained by the Commissioner, Land Revenue, and disposed of on merits according to law. It is evident that it shall be open to the writ petitioners-respondents in this appeal to urge all such questions as are available to them in law, including the question of justification and reasonableness of the Director invoking his suo motu powers of revision after a lapse of three years. 15. The writ appeal is accordingly allowed subject to the above directions. No costs. 16. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (7) TMI 584 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... We are unable to accept this distinction. Basically the principle of waiver and estoppel is not only applicable where the award had been made but also where a party to the proceeding challenges the proceedings in which he participated. In the facts of this case, there was no demur but something which can be called acquiescence on the part of the respondents which precludes them from challenging the participate 11. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the judgment and impugned order cannot be sustained. In the premises the appeal is allowed. The order and judgment of the High Court dated the 8th December, 1986 are set aside. The arbitration proceedings will go on before the Arbitrator appointed by order dated 19th April, 1983. Time for making the award is extended for four months from today. For further extension of time the party may apply to the High Court of Calcutta. 12. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. The parties will bear their respective costs.
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1987 (7) TMI 583 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the Appellate Judge and remitted the suits for fresh consideration with directions to consider the merits of the application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC but should have itself allowed the petition and added the Registered Society represented by its Secretary Dr. Om Prakash who is already on record, also as a party and disposed of the writ petitions on their merits. We, therefore, allow the appeal and remit the matter to the High Court for disposal on merits after allowing the application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC by the appellant and ordering Smt. Chandramukhi Ram Saran Shiksha Samiti through its Secretary Dr. Om Prakash to be also added as a plaintiff in the suits so as to make it clear that Dr. Om Prakash is representing not only the appellant's school but also the Registered Society and dispose of the writ petitions on merits after the formal amendments have been carried out in the pleadings. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (7) TMI 582 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... sed copies of all or any of the documents referred to in sub-section (5)." 12. The convenience of the Investigating Officer referred to in this provision of law pertaining to the furnishing of all or any of the documents to the accused whittles down the mandatory nature of sub-section (5) of S. 173 of the Code and for that reason the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to above loses force. 13. So, for the aforesaid reasons, the challan submitted before the Magistrate by the Investigating Officer cannot be said to be in complete and was rather complete in terms of sub-section (2) of S. 173 of the Code, on the 90th day, the petitioner did not become entitled to the grant of bail in view of the proviso (a)(i) of sub-section (2) of S. 173 of the Code. 14. No other point for the grant of bail was urged on behalf of the petitioner and consequently in view of the above discussion the petition for the grant of bail is dismissed. 15. Order accordingly.
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1987 (7) TMI 581 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... refore, allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court and the Courts below are set aside and the claim for ejectment is dismissed. But the justice of the case demands increase of rent. The appellant has been in occupation of the premises in question since 1972 at a monthly rent of ₹ 250 per month. In the present standard this is wholly inadequate for the premises in question, we direct that the appellant shall go on paying at least ₹ 350 per month from 1.8.87. If the standard rent is more than ₹ 350 then the respondent will be at liberty to make any application for increasing the rent before the appropriate authority. Arrears, if any, must be paid by 31.8.87. There will be, however, no order as to costs. o p /o p This Court records its appreciation to Sree Amul Ganguly, learned counsel for the appellant and Sree Gobind Mukhoty, learned counsel for the respondent for the valuable assistance rendered to this Court. o p /o p N.P.V. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1987 (7) TMI 580 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ll the building, plant or machinery is erected or constructed is part of the actual cost of the project within the meaning of section 33 read with section 43 of the Act, for the purposes of development rebate claimed by the assessee. Again, this was a case of a new factory being set up for the first time. 11. Similar is the view taken by the Madras High Court in CIT v. L.G. Balakrishnan & Bros. (P.) Ltd. 1974 95 ITR 284 holding that the interest paid on the amount borrowed for the purpose of machinery had rightly been capitalised as part of the cost of the machinery and the Tribunal was right in allowing the assessee's claim for depreciation and development rebate on this amount also. This was also a case of starting a new business. 12. The questions are answered accordingly, the first question in the affirmative, in favour of the revenue and the second, in the negative, in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (7) TMI 579 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n law could have come to such a finding or there is misdirection in law or view of fact has been taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence or the finding is not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice. Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction. In this instant case the tests laid down have not been transgressed by the court of Small Causes both trial court as well as the appellate bench. The view it took was a possible view. A different view might have been taken out that is no ground which would justify the High Court to interfere with the findings. In that view of the matter, we allow the appeals, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and restore the order of the appellate bench of Court of Small Causes dated 4th June, 1973. There will be an order for possession and mesne profits as directed by the Court of Small Causes. The respondents will pay the cost of these appeals. Appeals allowed.
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1987 (7) TMI 578 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the view that the appeal itself can be heard and disposed of expeditiously on merits. However, for one reason or other, the appeal could not be heard expeditiously. In the meanwhile since the undertaking had been given only for a limited period i.e. 25.10.76, the respondents seem to have been under the impression that the undertaking had come to an end and hence they were entitled to recover possession. It is of relevance to note that the respondents had not taken possession immediately after 25.10.76 but only on 23.12.76, i.e. nearly two months later. In such circumstances it is difficult to sustain the charge levelled by the appellant that the respondents had committed a breach of their undertaking to the Court and had recovered possession illegally and should therefore be called upon to restore possession. In the light of our conclusion the appeal fails and will accordingly stand dismissed. We, however, direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (7) TMI 577 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... period 1.10.72 to 31.3.74 and they had also failed to surrender the Certificate of Registration and the Certificate of Fitness which was in force till 28.11.72. In such circumstances the Trial Court was in error in acquitting them and the High Court too was not justified in dismissing in limine the appeal against acquittal. Since the transfer of the vehicle had not been reported to the Authorities the first respondent was as much liable as the second respondent to pay the arrears of tax that was demanded. However, as stated at the outset itself the State is not anxious to pursue the prosecution against the respondents. Moreover, it is reported that the second respondent has died during the pendency of the appeal. In the result the appeal succeeds in so far as the contentions of the State regarding the scope and effect of Section 3(1) and the Explanation of the Taxation Act, 1957, are concerned, but the acquittal of respondents 1 and 2 will remain undisturbed. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (7) TMI 576 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... towards the heating fees etc., from time to time in respect of the several heatings of these arbitration proceed- ings and the amount in deposit be appropriated and has/ have accordingly been appropriated towards the remuneration of the Umpire". Therefore, in his award as a whole no reasons have been given for the purpose of making the award. In other words, it is not a speaking award at all. The Award did not speak as to why the umpire has awarded as he did. It does not speak the mind of the umpire. It mentions the events leading to the making of the award. In the award, there is no legal proposition which is unsustainable or improper. In that view of the matter the challenge to the award cannot be accepted. In the premises, the objections are rejected. There will be decree in terms of the award of the Umpire, Shri P. Jaganmohan Reddy. There will be interest on the judgment at 9 until realisation. The applicant will have the costs of this application. Award Confirmed.
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