|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 227 Records
-
1988 (11) TMI 361 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ven before the final report is forwarded, under Section 173(2)(i) of the Code, on the ground, firstly those statements are public documents within the meaning of Section 74 of the Evidence Act, and secondly, in view of Section 173(7) of the Code. Though this question does not arise in these references the above argument cannot be countenanced for the elaborate reasons given in the preceding paragraphs of this order. 63. In the result, the references are answered as indicated above. 64. Before parting with this order we feel that we would be failing in our duty if we do not place on record our appreciation of the valuable services rendered by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Special Public Prosecutor for Central Bureau of Investigation, learned senior counsel and other learned counsel both appearing for the petitioners and as amicus curiae in lucidly analysing and presenting the various propositions of law which have been of immense help to us in rendering this order.
-
1988 (11) TMI 360 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ortgage had expired in 1953. Apparently, the mortgage had inducted the tenant after expiry of the period of mortgage, and such a conduct was grossly imprudent management, and was not bona fide. Such tenant cannot, in any event, claim any protection. 50. Having considered the facts and the circumstances and the ratio of the decision in Jadavji Purshottam's case (supra), we are clearly of the opinion that the tenancy rights did not come to be enlarged by the Tenancy Legislation after the tenant was put into possession by the mortgage and the tenancy created in favour of the tenants by the mortgagor did not have the concurrence of the mortgagor so as to claim tenancy rights even after redemption of the mortgage. See the observations in para 12 of the Jadavji Purshottam's case (supra). 51. In the premises, the appeals must fail and are dismissed. Civil Miscellaneous Petition in C.A. No. 397/80 must also fail and is dismissed. The parties will pay and bear their own costs.
-
1988 (11) TMI 359 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e nature of a 'godown' were not brought to our notice as the concerned judgments were not filed in the paper book. There is, therefore, ample justification for interference in our review jurisdiction. We accordingly accept the finding of the said tribunals and hold that the objection raised by the tenant cannot be sustained. For the aforesaid reasons, the review petition is allowed and the judgment in the Civil Appeal dated 6.2.1998 is set aside and the judgment of the High Court is restored. In the circumstances of the case, the tenant is granted time to vacate upto 31.5.1999 upon filing the usual undertaking within two weeks from today. In case such an undertaking is not filed within that period or in case any of the terms of the undertaking is violated, the order granting time upto 31.5.1999 shall stand recalled and the tenant shall be liable for eviction forthwith as per the judgment of the High Court. There will be no order as to costs in this review application.
-
1988 (11) TMI 358 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 39(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, limiting the time within which loss should be declared, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee was entitled to carry forward the loss even though the loss return was not filed within the time prescribed under section 139(3) as amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act. 1970?" This Court following the decision in Presidency Medical Centre (P.) Ltd. 's case (supra) answered the said question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In our view, the said decision will cover the assessment year 1984-85. The changes made in 1986 which will come into force on and from the assessment year 1987-88 will not take out the assessment year 1984-85 from the ambit of the decision in Presidency Medical Centre ( P.) Ltd. 's case (supra) . In that view of the matter, we answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 3. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J. - I agree.
-
1988 (11) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... pay any monthly allowance for any month hereafter on the part of respondent No 1, Surinder Singh, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall issue a warrant for his arrest, cause him to be arrested and put in jail for his failure to comply with this Court's order and he shall not be released till he makes the payment. With regard to the arrears which have become due till August 15, 1986, learned counsel for the appellant states that having regard to the fact that respondent No 1, has agreed to the aforesaid consent order, the appellant will PG NO 769 not apply for the respondent being sent to jail under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but will reserve the liberty to realize the said amount (Rs 5090 plus the difference between the amount that became due and the amount actually paid under the interim order) under the law except by seeking an order for sending respondent No. 1 to jail. The appeal will stand disposed of accordingly ." H.S.K. Appeal allowed.
-
1988 (11) TMI 356 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ysed by a Chemical Analyser and named. It is our ardent desire that in future the Chemical Analysers on analysing a particular drug or substance do spell out as to under what definition of S. 2 of the Act the drug or substance falls so that the trial Courts may be able to lay their hands on appropriate sections while framing charges and awarding appropriate punishments. Office is, therefore, directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Secretary, Public Health Department, Government of Maharashtra, so that he may circulate it to all the Chemical Analysers in the State of Maharashtra to follow the guidelines indicated hereinabove. 15. In the result, the conviction recorded against the appellant by the trial Court is confirmed. However, it is clarified that instead of S. 17, the appellant stands convicted for an offence punishable under S. 21 read with S. 8(c) of the Act. The sentence inflicted on him is also confirmed. Appeal is accordingly dismissed. 16. Appeal dismissed.
-
1988 (11) TMI 355 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e granted. So far as prayer (a) is concerned, the objection reflected therein cannot be tried as a preliminary issue but it will have to be tried along with the other issues on the merits of the petition and will have to be answered ultimately while deciding the main company petition on merits. Prayer (a), therefore, is treated to be premature at this stage and hence cannot be entertained. It is, however, clarified that the question whether the company petition is maintainable in law and in fact, will have to be decided ultimately on merits while considering the main petition. This is not the stage to express any opinion one way or the other on this aspect. Subject to this clarification, therefore, it is held that none of the final prayer as put forward in Company Application No. 97 of 1987 can be granted at this stage. Consequently, the company application fails and is rejected. There will be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstance of the case. Notice discharged.
-
1988 (11) TMI 354 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on a mere writing, even if the amount mentioned is an agreed amount. Summary suit being a special suit where the right to defend depends on leave being granted, that too very often on terms such as deposit of a part or whole of the amount, will have to be construed strictly, and the cause of action must arise on the items mentioned under Order 37, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No extension of the items, not falling within the scope of the said provision, is legally permissible. 8. Even on merits, Prima facie, trible issues do arise in the present case and unconditional leave to defend ought to have been granted. I, therefore, pass the following order I set aside the impugned order. I grant unconditional leave to defend the suit. The petitioner to file his written statement within a period of twelve weeks from today. Usual orders for discovery and inspection. Suit to appear on board in the ordinary course. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs.
-
1988 (11) TMI 353 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... conclusions recorded hereinabove, the three seniority lists are unsustainable and consequently they are quashed and set aside and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are directed to prepare a fresh seniority list of promotees and nominees on the basis of the date of appointments of the respective Sales Tax Officers Class-I in that cadre ignoring the period during which the private respondents and other similarly situated Sales Tax Officers Class-I were appointed on fortuitous basis, until further orders or on long term basis etc. The date of regularisation shall be the relevant date for the purpose of fixing the inter seniority of promotees and nominees. 23. In the result, the impugned judgment and order dated January 7, 1997 passed by the Tribunal is set aside and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are directed to prepare a fresh seniority list in terms of this judgment expeditiously and finalise the same within six months from today. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1988 (11) TMI 352 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ication of the mind" geared to the earlier report of the Commission of Enquiry (Justice P. Narayana Pillai) which resulted in Ext.P-3, regarding charge No. 4, and so it cannot be said that the inclusion of charge No. 4 in Ext.P-6 is in any way justified in law. Similarly, charge No. 14 was held to be "vague" and so not one referable by the earlier Council of Ministers. That aspect has not been adverted to before passing Ext.P-6 order. It was stated by the learned Advocate General that the Government itself will take steps to delete the said two charges. This is recorded. In the light of the above, we hold that Ext.P-6 order dated 16-12-1987, appointing a Commission of Enquiry under Section 3 of the Act, in so far as it relates to all charges, except charges 4 and 14, is valid, legal and reasonable. To that extent, Ext.P-6 is not open to any attack. The Original Petition is without merit. It is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1988 (11) TMI 351 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of public interest litigations, the traditional litigation along with justice will suffer. It is only when courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class action or when basic human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the courts. especially this Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the underdog and the neglected. The learned Judge in the context of that case ended his judgment with a question "Is there something more than what meets the eye in this case?". The answer in the instant case is obvious--there is very much more than what meets the eye in the instant case before us. This application must. therefore, fail and is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
-
1988 (11) TMI 350 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n 12-5-1987 and 4-6-1987 from Mansoor Mohamed Ali Jinnah and on 12-5-1987 from Seeni Mohamed and Bhuhari. Hence, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge. 35. In the result, we set aside the order of the learned single Judge and allow the appeals with costs (Rs. 500/- in each writ appeal). 36. After the judgment has been pronounced, Mr. Abdul Kareem, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents made an oral application for the grant of a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. As we are of the view that no substantial question of law of general importance, to be decided by the Supreme Court, is involved in these cases, leave is refused. 37. Then a further representation was made by the learned counsel requesting to suspend the operation of the order for a period of one month. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to suspend the operation of the order as prayed for. 38. Appeals allowed.
-
1988 (11) TMI 349 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lack-listing of the appellant in respect of future contracts, cannot be sustained in law. In the premises, that portion of the order directing that the appellant be placed in the black-list in respect of future contracts under the Collector is set aside. So far as the cancellation of the bid of the appellant is concerned, that is not affected. This order will, however, not prevent the State Government or the appropriate authorities from taking any future steps for blacklisting the appellant if the Government is so entitled to do so in accordance with law, i.e. giving the appellant due notice and an opportunity of making representation. After hearing the appellant, the State Government will be at liberty to pass any order in accordance with law indicating the reasons therefor. We, however, make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made against the appellant. The appeal is thus disposed of. Appeal disposed of.
-
1988 (11) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... factory and PG NO 992 hope that the legislature would soon set it right. But, on the provision as it stands, we cannot but hold that a landlord must be held to have complied with the statutory requirement by sending a notice correctly addressed to the tenant by registered post. Also, in the present case, we are satisfied--as indeed the lower courts were--that the landlord did his best to bring the notice to the knowledge of the tenant. He cannot be expected to do any more. His petition for eviction cannot be dismissed on this score. We only wish to add that, having regard to the fact that the tenant had deposited the arrears subsequently, we suggested to the parties that they should try to settle the matter amicably between themselves but the submissions filed by the parties after the hearing show that this has not been possible. We have, therefore, no alternative but to dismiss this appeal and we hereby do so without, however, making any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1988 (11) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... fter the issuance of the impugned circular, that would not be any compliance with the rules of natural justice or avoid the mischief of arbitrariness as contemplated by Article 14 of the Constitution. The High Court. In our opinion was perfectly justified in quashing the impugned circular . In the result, Civil appeal No. 3214 of 1979 is dismissed. In view of the reasons given in Civil Appeal No. 3214 of 1979, Civil Appeal No. 3518 of 1979 is also dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 3212 of 1979 has been preferred by the writ petitioners in civil Writ Petition No. 426 of 1978 filed before the High Court. The writ petitioners succeded in getting the impugned circular quashed by the High Court. As the High Court rejected some of the grounds of challenge to the impugned circular, the appeal has been preferred. There is no merit in this appeal and it is wholly misconceived. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in any of these appeals. Appeal dismissed.
-
1988 (11) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... onsider other grounds, if any, that may have been raised by him for quashing of the prosecution, we are of the opinion that after setting aside the orders appealed against in this case, the High Court should be required to decide afresh the petition mde by Mangal Singh Minhas for quashing of the prosecution on grounds, if any, other than those which have already been considered above. In view of the foregoing discussion, Criminal Appeal No. 422 of 1988 as against Kailash Nath is dismissed and the order quashing the First Information Report in his case is maintained even though on another ground; whereas Criminal Appeal Nos. 423-24 of 1988 as against Mangal Singh Minhas are allowed and the orders appealed against passed by the High Court as set aside. The High Court shall however, decide the petition made by Mangal Singh Minhas afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. R.S.S. Crl. A No. 422/88 is dismissed and Crl. A Nos. 423-24/88 is allowed.
-
1988 (11) TMI 345 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... be made use of in determining the average count of such cotton fabrics in the prior period also. 7. The facts of the present appeal are similar and in our view the ratio of the Tribunal’s judgments relied upon by the learned Advocate of the respondents has to be applied to the facts of this matter. The only difference is that instead of Notification No. 7/78, it will be Notification No. 210/79 wherein, for the first time. the formula now computing the average count of round mesh mosquito netting was prescribed. The observations of the Tribunal referred to earlier relevant to this matter and we respectfully follow the same and apply the ratio to this appeal. We order that the method of calculation prescribed by Notification No. 210/79 should be applied to the present matter so that the average count of the mosquito netting is arrived at. 8. The impugned order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) is modified to this extent. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
-
1988 (11) TMI 344 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o be wrong. We do not think that it is necessary to multiply authorities in support of this accepted but of forgotten principle. 8.. We do not find any plea that the learned single Judge was clearly wrong or that he exercised discretion in an arbitrary or perverse manner in dismissing the original petition. It is not for this Court to interfere in appeal even on the assumption most favourable to the appellant that we would, perhaps, have taken a different view had we or either of us heard the original petition initially. 9.. There is no likelihood of any prejudice to the appellant in this case, since the application for stay is still pending before the appellate authority. It has not so far been disposed of. It is for the appellant to approach the appellate authority either to expedite the disposal of the appeal or to obtain an order of stay of recovery as is provided under section 34 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1988 (11) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there has been any excessive detention?
Held that:- Appeal allowed & the order of detention impugned in the petition quashed and the petitioner is directed to be set at liberty. There would be vitiation of the detention on grounds of non-application, of mind if a piece of evidence, which was relevant though not binding, had not been considered at all. If a piece of evidence which might reasonably have affected the decision whether or not to pass an order of detention is excluded from consideration. There would be a failure of application of mind which, in turn, vitiates the detention. The detaining-authority might very well have come to the same conclusion after considering this material; but in the facts of the case the omission to consider the material assumes materiality.
-
1988 (11) TMI 342 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sale of the commodity by the petitioner is a second sale, no writ petition can be filed asking for refund on the basis of a fresh enquiry by this Court as if the same commodity which has been purchased by the petitioner is sold by it, when the assessments for those years have become final. The dispute regarding the assessment order for the year 1986-87, is still pending before the authority concerned, and we do not find any reason to entertain this petition at this stage. Coming to the challenge to the validity of section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, which has been introduced by way of an amendment, it is to be noticed that on the facts of the case, the section is not at all in controversy. Therefore, the petitioner is debarred from challenging the vires of the same. With these remarks, the writ petition is dismissed. The petitioner is, however, allowed further fifteen days time from today to pay/deposit the amount in demand. Writ petition dismissed.
........
|
