|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 281 Records
-
1988 (2) TMI 482 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... liability to pay that amount. A perusal of Ex. B-1 shows that inclusive of dividends, as against the amount of Rs. 5000 payable by the respondent, a sum of Rs. 2450 alone had been paid leaving a balance of Rs. 2550 payable to the Foreman. Though the assignment of Ex. A-3 is for Rs. 3000, the appellant will be entitled to recover only Rs. 2550 and not Rs. 1550, as claimed by the learned counsel for the respondent. The trial Court, in para 7 of its judgment has referred to this and had rightly, determined the amount payable by the respondent at Rs. 2550. The appellant will be entitled to recover the amount of Rs. 2550 with interest at 12 percent per annum on this amount from 20-8-1974 till this date and future interest at 6 per cent per annum till the date of realisation. Consequently; the second appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and there will be a decree in favour of the appellant as indicated earlier, with costs throughout.
-
1988 (2) TMI 481 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nt to the applications made by the claimants will be taken up afresh by the present Competent Authority. The parties will be given fresh opportunities to present their case. They should even be allowed to produce fresh evidence, if they so desire, and no part of their claim shall be dismissed on the ground of limitation 22. In the result, the rule is discharged in each of Writ Petitions Nos. 269 of 1985 and 270 of 1985 with no order as to costs. The rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a) in Writ Petitions Nos. 834 of 1985 and 835 of 1985 with no order as to costs. The compensation cases stand restored to the file of the Competent Authority who will, after giving opportunity to both the sides, as mentioned above, proceed to determine the compensation amounts. The awards shall be made by him on a day, previous notice of which is given by him to the parties concerned at least 10 days in advance so that either party may, if it so desires, approach the District Court.
-
1988 (2) TMI 480 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... vancy tax in respect of special kinds of properties was held to be outside the power conferred by Section 99 of the said Act. It becomes obvious from the above discussion that the entire decision turned on the special scheme of taxation and the nature of the relevant provisions of the said statute referred to hereinabove. The decision, therefore, cannot be used as an authority for the proposition that where a taxing statute does not in terms provide that different rates can be prescribed for different rights or properties, the Government is debarred from making such provisions while fixing the rates of duties or taxes. 40. No other contention was urged before us. For the above reasons we sec no merit in any of the contentions raised in this batch of petitions. All the petitions, therefore, fail and we hereby reject them and discharge the rule with cost in each petition. In view of the rejection of the petitions, the interim relief granted in each petition shall stand vacated.
-
1988 (2) TMI 479 - CEGAT, MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... tionally. It appears that the authorities were approached for the delivery of the tobacco as well as roasted tobacco, which were unconditionally released by the adjudicating authority in his order dated 16-4-1981. But no such release was made. The respondents offered to pay the fine in lieu of confiscation. Even though, the Collector had given that option the departmental authorities did not allow them to exercise that option. This attitude has neither benefited the Department nor the Nation. On the other hand, certain loss and inconvenience must have been caused to the Department. The valuable storage place available to the department was used during this long nine years for the storage of worthless commodities which have now become dust and earth. The conduct of the department, I should say, is most reprehensible amounting to harassment. 22. A copy of this order may be forwarded to the Central Board of Excise and Customs for information and taking such action as deemed fit.
-
1988 (2) TMI 478 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ognised, it would imply that the Executive is being vested with a totally arbitrary and unfettered power of placing its officers under disability and distress for an indefinite duration." With a few change in words the spirit of the passage applies to the instant case. More than three years have passed since Petitioner was taken off flying duties. Left to itself, it does not appear that the Government will take any decision in the near future. To remedy this unwillingness to take a decision, some directions will have to be given. I propose to grant 90 days time to the Government to make up its mind and take a final decision in relation to disability imposed upon the petitioner. Hence the order. ORDER Respondent No. 2 enjoined to take a final decision in regard to the 'no-flying' disability imposed upon the petitioner within 90 days from today. A writ embodying the above direction do issue. Rule partly made absolute with parties being left to bear their own costs.
-
1988 (2) TMI 477 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... spector was responsible for delaying it for more than four months. The Collector has rightly observed that for this delay, after the department had accepted the refund claim in the Range office, the fault cannot be of the respondent. 5. There are various decisions of this Tribunal in which it has been held that if it has been the practice in the concerned Collectorate to allow assessees to file the refund claims in the Range offices to be forwarded to the concerned Asstt. Collectors, and in any such case, there is delay in forwarding the refund claim from a Range office to the office of the Assistant Collector, then for this delay, such claim should not be held as barred by limitation. The department has not pleaded before this Bench that the filing of the refund claim in Range office was contrary to the practice and orders prevalent in the Collectorate. 6. Considering all the above facts and circumstances, I uphold the orders of the Collector (Appeals). 7. Appeal dismissed.
-
1988 (2) TMI 476 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y, nature of the products and the nature of display, we are of the opinion that the learned Judge was right in dismissing this application. However, in order to make the position further clear we propose certain further safeguards to which the learned Advocates appearing for the parties have no objection. The respondent shall make it clear in respect of all publication or advertisement or anything of that sort, that they have nothing to do with the products going under the trade mark 'RAJA'. Similarly the appellant shall in respect of their publication, advertisement etc. make it clear that they have nothing to do with the products selling under the trade mark 'MAHRAJA' Subject to this the lower Court's Order is confirmed. 4. Let a pamphlet showing the mark as produced by Mr. Gupta be kept in the records of this case which is marked as Ext. A. 5. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. 6. There will be no order as to costs. Satyabrata Mitra, J. 7. I agree.
-
1988 (2) TMI 475 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r ought to have taken into consideration before directing respondent No. 1 to pay the costs to each of the delinquents. Further respondents 2 to 15 had more or less a common cause with respondent No. 1. It however, appears that the petitioner was all along opposed to the granting of adjournment to the respondents. Costs in favour of the petitioner would have met the ends of justice and it was therefore unnecessary to grant costs to the other contesting respondents. We will therefore modify the order passed both by the Appellate Court as well as the Inquiry Officer and direct that the. Inquiry Officer's order of costs of ₹ 200/- in favour of the petitioner Bank will stand and respondent No. 1 should pay the said costs to the petitioner. The order of costs in favour of the other respondents is however quashed as the lower Appellate Court has done and we do not wish to interfere with that part of the order. The rule is made absolute as above with no order as to costs.
-
1988 (2) TMI 474 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n on the part of the State or its instrumentalities to act fairly can never be over- emphasised. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed to this extent that the liability of the appellant is fixed at ₹ 20,000 together with interest as allowed by the High Court. In view of the order of this Court dated 14th September, 1984 quoted above, however, it is held that even if the total liability of the appellant falls short of ₹ 1,00,000, it shall not be entitled to any refund out of the sum of ₹ 1,00,000 which was deposited by it and withdrawn by the claimant-respondent in pursuance of the said order. The decree of the High Court as against the driver and the owner of the vehicle namely Respondents 2 and 3 is, however, maintained and all sums in excess of ₹ 1,00,000 which has already been withdrawn by the claimant-respondent as aforesaid shall be recoverable by him from Respondents 2 and 3 only. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1988 (2) TMI 473 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t cannot be exposed to the mischief committed by plaintiffs merely because the party who approached the Court first is the plaintiff in a suit. These are probably the reasons for not incorporating any prohibition in the Rules under Order 39 against a defendant making an application for injunction against the plaintiffs. Hence there is nothing wrong in assuming that Order 39, Rule 1 affords scope for passing orders of injunction, prohibitory or mandatory, on applications filed by defendants also. Therefore, I uphold the preliminary objection accepting the view that the impugned order falls within the ambit of Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code. Any such order is appealable as per Order 43, Rule 1(r) and hence no application for revision is entertainable. It is open to the petitioners to file an appeal and move for condonation of delay on the ground of pendency of this revision petition. The Civil Revision Petition is disposed of in the above terms. Issue carbon copy on usual terms.
-
1988 (2) TMI 472 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... benefit of the members of the public. They are not, in our opinion, concerned with the question as to the legality or otherwise of the exemption granted by the Government to the respondent No. 5 under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. A copy of the draft revised development plan has been produced before us by Mr. Desai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 5. We are satisfied that the question whether or not sufficient quantity of land has been kept reserved for park and recrea-tion ground has been adequately considered and taken into account by the High Court. In the circumstances, we do not think that we are called upon to decide the legality or otherwise of the order granting exemption to the respondent No. 5 under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. There is, therefore no substance also in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 17377 of 1985. 20. In the result, the appeal and both the special leave petitions are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
-
1988 (2) TMI 471 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... en raised and urged before the High Court. We think, we should not permit the appellant to re-agitate this question over again in this court. It is also to be observed that no specific ground is taken in this behalf in this appeal either. 14. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part and while the compensation determined and awarded for the land is left undisturbed, the compensation awarded for the building and tree-growth is enhanced from ₹ 57,660 to ₹ 2,00,000 and from ₹ 355.85 to ₹ 7,500 respectively. Appellant shall be entitled to interest at 6 on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date of taking of possession till realisation. Liberty is reserved to the appellant to seek such additional relief on Contention (d) depending upon the ultimate decision in Bhag Singh's case. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. The appellant shall be entitled to the costs in this appeal. The advocate's fee fixed at ₹ 2,500. Appeal allowed.
-
1988 (2) TMI 470 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed to a serious default on his part as a Government servant. He recommended that since the respondent had already retired from service a lenient view should be taken and reduction in pension to the extent of Re. 1 per month be made The State Government accepted the findings and passed the impugned order reducing the pension by 50 per cent In our view the reduction of pension 50 per cent was too harsh and disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the respondent. The State Government should have taken into consideration the fact that the respondent had retired from service and the reduction of pension by 50 per cent would seriously affect his living. Accordingly, we allow the appeal partly, and set aside the order of the High Court dated February 13, 1987, and the State Government's order dated December 4, 1982 and direct the State Government to reconsider the question of reduction of respondent's pension. There will be no order regarding costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1988 (2) TMI 469 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rom the respondent calculated for the entire period of the licence could have been demanded in a lump sum as price for parting the privilege and it could not have been challenged by the respondent in view of the principle enunciated by this Court in the aforesaid cases. Simply because the demand was spread over with a view to making it just and reasonable so as to represent the actual expenditure incurred by the Government to maintain the requisite excise staff at the factory premises of the respondent as contemplated by the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules, it would not become illegal and vulnerable. o p /o p 7. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the judgment appealed against rendered by the High Court cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment appealed against is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed with costs throughout. o p /o p
-
1988 (2) TMI 468 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he bus stand armed with deadly weapons could not therefore be doubted. The next earlier statement was that of Devji, (PW-4) which was recorded as dying declaration Exh. 66. He has specifically named accused 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 as those attacked him. He has not mentioned the names of the accused who attacked his brother, Trikam. The accused No. 5 and 6 do not figure in the complaint Exh. 17 made by Jada v. We can, therefore, conclude that accused No. 5 and 6 must have come later and attacked only Devji. The benefit of doubt may therefore, go in their favour for the offence under Section 302 for the murder of Trikam. Their conviction and sentence under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC however, cannot be unjustified. 15. In the result, we allow the appeals in part, acquit the accused No. 5 and 6 for an offence under Section 302 and their conviction and sentence under Section 307 read with Section 149 are however kept undisturbed. The appeals of other accused are dismissed.
-
1988 (2) TMI 467 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... igh Court of Rajasthan in Ramdhan v. Shanwarlal, A.I.R. 1985 Rajasthan 185 which have held that by necessary implication an appeal to the High Court from an interlocutory order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court in the course of a trial of an election petition filed under the Act is excluded. The reasons given in the latter case by the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court are indeed quite substantial. The Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat had, therefore, no jurisdiction to hear the appeal filed by the Ist respondent against the interlocutory order passed by the learned Single Judge who was trying the election petition. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and dismiss the Letters Patent appeal filed before the High Court. We however express no opinion on the merits of the case. The parties are at liberty to resort to any other remedy open to them in law. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1988 (2) TMI 466 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... be treated as having been instituted within time. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will no order regarding costs. 20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises--Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
-
1988 (2) TMI 465 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... each of trust is both a civil wrong and a criminal offence. There would be certain situations where it would predominantly be a civil wrong and may or may not amount to a criminal offence. We are of the view that this case is one of that type where, if at all, the facts may constitute a civil wrong and the ingredients of the criminal offences are wanting. Several decisions were cited before us in support of the respective stands taken by counsel for the parties. It is unnecessary to refer to them. In course of hearing of the appeals, Dr. Singhvi made it clear that Madhavi does not claim any interest in the tenancy. In the setting of the matter we are inclined to hold that the criminal case should not be continued. Criminal Appeal No. 657 of 1986 is allowed and the criminal prosecution against the two appellants being Madhavrao and Russi Homi Avari is quashed. In view of what we have stated above, Criminal Appeal No. 658 of 1986 has to fail and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1988 (2) TMI 464 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ar. 1585) that the High Court could maintain a second revision. This view was sought to be reversed by the subsequent Full Bench in Yaragatti's case, in the light of the decision in Aundal Ammal, but that attempt was overruled in Shyamaraju's case. In the result, the position has been that, right through in the State of Karnataka and for atleast for a period of almost twenty years in the State of Kerala, the prevalent view has been in favour, of the maintainability of a second revision by the High Court. I think that in a matter of procedure such a long standing practice should not be disturbed unless the statutory indication is quite clear to the contrary. 9. I would, therefore, hold that the revision petitions before the High Court were maintainable and that the matters before us should be disposed of accordingly. However, the petitions and appeals will stand disposed of in accordance with the majority view of my learned brothers. Appeals and petitions disposed of.
-
1988 (2) TMI 463 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... records the nature of the arrangement arrived at as regards the division of the remaining property. A mere agreement to divide does not require registration. But if the writing itself effects a division, it must be registered. See Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar, LR (1923) 69 IA 123 and Nani Bai v. Gita Bai, AIR (1958) SC 706. It is well-settled that the document though unregistered can however be looked into for the limited purpose of establishing a severance in status, though that severance would ultimately affect the nature of the possession held by the members of the separated family as co-tenants. The document Exh. P-12 can be used for the limited and collateral purpose of showing that the subsequent division of the properties allotted was in pursuance of the original intention to divide. In any view, the document Exh. P-12 was a mere list of properties allotted to the shares of the parties. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
........
|
