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Showing 1 to 20 of 216 Records
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1988 (9) TMI 369 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... htra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, which was enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Clause (b) and (c) of Article 39 of our Constitution; and in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing declaration, to ensure that the ownership and control of the agricultural resources of the community are so distributed as to best subserve the common good and having regard to the purpose of the Bombay Act, it was open to the Ceiling Authorities to determine whether there was, in fact, a genuine tenancy. 10. In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in the approach it made. In the ceiling proceedings it has been held that the transfer to the tenant was not bona fide and was done in anticipation of the Ceiling Act. We find no ground to interfere with the Order of the High Court. There is no merit in this application. Hence, it fails and is dismissed.
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1988 (9) TMI 368 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rned Additional Sessions Judge as against the 26 other accused could not be interfered with. The High Court also failed to appreciate that there cannot be a piecemeal trial. The retrial directed by the High Court must necessarily revise the prosecution and must result in a trial de novo against the 42 accused. The 26 other accused acquitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge were not impleaded as parties to the appeals before the High Court. In the absence of an appeal preferred by the State Government against this acquittal, The High Court could not under Section 386(b) on an appeal by the respondents against their conviction, alter the acquittal nor can there be a splitting up of the trial. See State of Karnataka v. Narsa Reddy 1987CriLJ1929 . 12. Accordingly, the appeals must succeed and are allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court are set aside and the appeals are remitted to the High Court for a decision afresh on merits after notice to the parties.
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1988 (9) TMI 367 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aking conditional his own liability, is bound thereby to every subsequent holder, in case of dishonour by the drawee, acceptor or maker, to compensate such holder for any loss or damage caused to him by such dishonour provided due notice of dishonour has given to, or received by, such indorser. 16. There is no dispute that due notice of the dishonour has been given to the first defendant as well as the 9th defendant. The plaintiff is the holder of the bill of exchange and the 9th defendant is the drawer. The first defendant is the indorser. Hence the requirements of Sections 30 and 35 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are satisfied. In the circumstances, there is no difficulty in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to claim back the amount paid to the first defendant when it is found that the bill of exchange was dishonoured by the drawee viz., the buyer. 17. In the result, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are upheld and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1988 (9) TMI 366 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gers. 28. In this view of the matter, it will have to be held that both the impugned orders, viz. Order dated 8th Sept. 1986 and 20th June 1988 are bad in law and the same are liable to be struck down. Rule made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). in regard to the prayer cl.(b) since I have found that the petitioner has been illegally and unjustly deprived of his amount. He will be entitled to the refund along with interest at 12% per annum. The petitioner will be entitled to costs of this petition from the respondents No.1 and 2 Mr. Bhatia prays that my above order be stayed for a period of eight weeks in order to enable him to prefer an appeal. Mr. Andhyarujina strongly objects by contending that the petitioner has been unjustly deprived of his amount for over two years driving him out of business. In my view, stay of my order for a period of four weeks would meet the ends of justice. My order to stand stayed for a period of four weeks from today. 29. Order accordingly.
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1988 (9) TMI 365 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... d to the bank. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the mere fact that the bank had taken the interest to the Interest Suspense Account did not mean that interest income had not accrued to the bank. On the same analogy in the case of a debtor the mere fact that he is in adverse circumstances and is pleading for concession would not prevent interest from becoming due to the bank. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the authorities below were in error in not allowing the assessee's claim for deduction of ₹ 22,15,707 on account of interest payable to the Union Bank of India. We hold that the said amount had become payable to the said bank and was, therefore, an expenditure deductible in determining the assessee's income for the year under consideration. Therefore, allowing the assessee's appeal we direct that a deduction be allowed to the assessee in respect of ₹ 22,15,707 as expenditure on account of interest payable to the Union Bank of India.
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1988 (9) TMI 364 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to be declared hostile, whereas the other namely PW 2 Tek Chand is an illiterate person belonging to a far away village Gurdor. It beats one's imagination as to why some persons of such status and position could not be persuaded to join the police party on whose testimony the Court could act without second thought. It is not to say that an illiterate person, in all circumstances, is not a good witness, but in case of present nature, we cannot but observe with all the emphasis at our command that the police must devise new and improved investigating processes and ensure that the calibre of the evidence which is brought before a court of law is of a high order. Besides, in this case also, the mandatory provisions of Sections 50, 52 (1) and 57 have not been complied with. The accused is, therefore, entitled to acquittal. Accordingly, this appeal is accepted and it is directed that the accused be released forthwith. The incriminating articles be disposed of according to law.
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1988 (9) TMI 363 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of a particular case, would generally be entitled (A) to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses; and (b) to address argument on the basis of the plaintiff's case. We would like to make it clear that the defendant would not be entitled to lead any evidence of his own nor can his cross-examination be permitted to travel beyond the very limited objective of pointing out the falsity or weaknesses of the plaintiff's case. In no circumstances should the cross-examination be permitted to travel beyond this legitimate scope and to convert itself virtually into a presentation of the defendant's case either directly or in the form of suggestions put to the plaintiff's witnesses. For reasons mentioned above, we allow the appeal and restore the suit before the trial Judge for being proceeded with in the light of the above conclusions. We direct that the costs of this appeal will form part of the costs in the suit and will abide by the result thereof. Appeal allowed.
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1988 (9) TMI 362 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... claiming in view of the guarantees given by the petitioner Bank. There is no dispute that a suit is pending in the High Court at Singapore, bearing No. 90 4/85, wherein an interim injunction order was passed by that court on 11th September, 1985. The suit was filed against Ringler and Ors. . In view of the defence raised by the non-petitioner Company and the defence raised by the other non-petitioners, which is of a substantial character and which has not been proved to be malafide by the Bank on any ground, thus, 1 am of the opinion that the debt is bonafide disputed. 12. In the premises aforesaid, there is no merit in the winding up petition and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. 13. Since the Company Petition for winding up has been dismissed by this order, the Company Petition No. 27 of 1987 filed under Sections 442 and 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 and other miscellaneous applications on which no order has been passed by this Court, shall stand dismissed.
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1988 (9) TMI 361 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cability to the question put under consideration by the Tribunal. On considering the Tribunal's decisions and the aforesaid decision, the ITO should decide, in the first place, whether the activity of the flight kitchen can be considered to be an activity which should entitle the assessee to be classified as a manufacturing company. It is only thereafter that he will take the exercise of computing the income from such activity and not otherwise. If we give this clarification as an addendum to the direction given by the Tribunal, there is no necessity of issuing rule in the matter. This is because, in our opinion, the ITO is bound in this matter as in other matters to take into account decisions of the High Courts or of the Supreme Court given or reported subsequent to the appellate decision of the Tribunal remanding the matter back. We give this clarification so that the ITO is properly guided. 3. In this view of the matter, the application is directed to stand rejected.
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1988 (9) TMI 360 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of India to hear the matter afresh on the same evidence. It is understood that an application for restoration of the suit which has been dismissed for default in the City Civil Court at Bangalore has been made by the complainant and is still pending before the Court. It will be open to the Bar Council of India to consider whether the hearing of the matter has to be deferred till the application for restoration is disposed of. The Bar Council of India may give appropriate consideration to all these questions. 13. We further direct that in case the judgment rendered by this Court or any part thereof is reported in Law Journals or published elsewhere, the name of the appellant shall not be mentioned because the matter is still subjudice and fairness demands that the name should not be specified. The matter can be referred to as an Advocate v. The Bar Council or in re. an Advocate without naming the appellant. 14. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No order regarding costs.
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1988 (9) TMI 359 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases, no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. 18. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the instant case, I am of the opinion that the first information report do not disclose any offence at all. Therefore, the continuation of any further investigation would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. For the reasons stated above, I allow this application and quash the investigation pertaining to G.R. No. 646/87 arising out of Kishanganj G.R.P.S. Case No. 55/87 dated 30.9.87 including the order dated 7.4.1988 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kishanganj.
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1988 (9) TMI 358 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ani v. Pravinchandra, (1966-67) Bom. LR 306; Contessa Knit Wear v. Udyog Mandir Cooperative Housing Society. AIR 1980 Bom. 374 and Bandra Green Park Co- operative Housing Society Ltd. & Anr. v. Mrs. Dayadasi Kalia & Ors. AIR 1982 Bom. 428. These cases more or less reflect the different views that have prevailed in the High Court but the law is now governed by the principles laid down by this Court in O. N. Bhatnagar's case . The result therefore is that the appeal must fail and is dismissed(l with costs. The appellants are however given six months' time to vacate the disputed premises on their furnishing the usual undertaking to the Registrar of this Court within four weeks from today in the form of affidavits sworn by each one of them that they shall deliver vacant and peaceful possession to respondents nos. i and 2 on or after 31st March 1989 and shall not in the meanwhile part with, assign or otherwise encumber the premises in any manner. Appeal dismissed.
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1988 (9) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er No. 1 Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. is clearly protected under s. 15A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. 1947. In that view of the matter, we do not think it necessary to deal with the contention as regards the applicability of s. 91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. All aspects arising out of the submissions as to the jurisdiction of the Registrar under s. 91(1) of the Act have already been considered by this Court on O.N. Bhatnagar's case and we reiterate the principles laid down therein. In the result, the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution succeeds and is allowed. I he judgment and order passed by the Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court dated June 6, 1983 allowing the claim of respondent No. 1 Shyam Co-operative Housing Society for eviction of the petitioners as also the proceedings initiated by it under s. 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. 1960 are quashed. Petition allowed.
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1988 (9) TMI 356 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... they would be working for a great cause, and working for themselves instead of working for others who often deny to them their legitimate dues and even deprive them of such legitimate dues by appropriating to themselves the fruits of the workers' labour. Be it also realised that the Trade Union Movement, in the event of the success of this exercise, will be stepping into a new creative phase in the struggle of the working class to assert its identity. One can almost hear the footsteps of the new era in the corridors of future. The workers must therefore ensure the roaring success of this Scheme in this noble cause at any cost. 13. We also hope and trust that the concerned nationalised Banks, IDBI, and the concerned Governments will continue to be co-operative with the same enthusiam and zeal and with the same motivation in order to make the Scheme a success so as to usher in a new era in the industrial history of New India. On this note of cautious optimism we conclude.
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1988 (9) TMI 355 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (P.) Ltd. AIR 1972 SC 288, but this question is purely academic in view of the fact that the Tribunal found that for collecting only three dividend warrants, the assessee could not have spent a sum of ₹ 17,270. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the question of allocation of any expenses against the income from dividend did not arise. The finding of the Tribunal is that the dividends which were received from the companies of the same group were sent to the bank for realisation. The sending of the three dividend warrants of the Bank would not involve any expenditure. On this fact, the Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) deleting the expenditure deducted by the ITO to determine the dividend income for the purpose of allowance of relief under section 80M of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 5. In our view, the Tribunal came to a correct conclusion. In that view of the matter we reject this application. Order accordingly. Yusuf, J.-I agree. Order accordingly.
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1988 (9) TMI 354 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... take limited tenancy rights under the order of the Rent Controller for a period of two years commencing from 1.3.1976 they must be deemed to have impliedly surrendered their earlier tenancy rights as envisaged under Clause (f) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, it has no merit in it because, the High Court has rightly pointed out after referring to Does d. Earl of Egrement v. Courtenay, 1843-60 All. E.R. Rep. 685 and some decisions of the High Courts, that when a new lease does not pass are interest according to the contract the acceptance of it will not operate as a surrender of the former lease; that, in the case of a surrender implied by law from the acceptance of a new lease, the condition ought also to be understood as implied by law, making void the surrender in case the new lease should be made void." For all the aforesaid reasons, the appeals have to fail and will accordingly stand dismissed but there will to no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1988 (9) TMI 353 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion of the lifetime of Mirza Ghalib. o p /o p After it was so found, the idea of respondent No. 2 was considered and the proposal was duly considered. We have satisfied ourselves from the records produced at the time of the hearing and from the affidavits filed before us that there was objectivity in the actual consideration of the different proposals and that there was fairness in the decision and that no malice or ill-will coloured the decision-making process in this case. The petitioner was not refused proper consideration because what respondent No. ’ described the petitioner as one who is a ’maverick’. o p /o p In the aforesaid light and in the facts of this case and the principles of law that are applicable, we are satisfied that the High Court was right and the decision of the respondent No. 1 does not call for any interference. The Special Leave Petition must fail and is, therefore dismissed accordingly. o p /o p Y. Lal Petition dismissed. o p /o p
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1988 (9) TMI 352 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ubstantive rights given by the Section or the sub-section. A land lord has a right to the property. The Section should not be construed as to defeat the right to possession of property in appropriate cases unless the intention of the Legislature is manifest we find no such clear intention in the facts of this case. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court came to the correct conclusion that a landlord, even though not in actual physical possession at the time of the possession of the property call ask for review of the order of release or allotment. It must be borne in mind that this view was also expressed by Mr. Justice N.D.Ojha, as our learned brother then was, in his judgment in Niren Kumar Das v. The District Judge, Pilibhit & Ors., AIR 1977 Allahabad 47. We agree with that interpretation. In that view of the matter, there is no substance in the contentions urged in the special leave petition. The application is, therefore, rejected. Petition dismissed.
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1988 (9) TMI 351 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... accepted by the assessee and no appeals against the same have been filed, the dispute that has been raised is only regarding interest under Section 8 (1) of the Act. In the case of Banwari Lal Budha Sen v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., 1987 UPTC 880, I have held that no appeal lies under Section 9 of the Sales Tax Act against the calculation of charge of interest and, therefore, neither second appeal lies before the Tribunal nor a revision lies in regard to the same before the High Court. In this view of the matter, the preliminary objection is upheld and all the revisions fail and are dismissed as not maintainable. Costs on parties.
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1988 (9) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual-situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not think it necessary to say, anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down any general guideline. PG NO 826 In the instant case, the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts. We are of the view that the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed and the High Court was not right in interfering with the trial court's order of injunction which had been affirmed in appeal. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is vacated and that of the trial court as affirmed in appeal is restored. The appellant shall be entitled to costs. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 2,000. We would like to point out that for the first time in this Court, the enquiry report in the disciplinary proceedings was produced. We express no view about it. Appeal allowed.
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