|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 283 Records
-
1989 (2) TMI 423 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... manager of the family to protect Chanda and safeguard her rights. We have no doubt that he has failed to perform his moral obligation. But that by itself without anything more is not sufficient to frame a charge against him. We. therefore, agree with the discretion exercised by the trial Court and leave it at that. 21. In the result and for the reasons stated , we allow the criminal appeals to the extent indicated only as against Dilip. We set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the trial court. The appeals against Nathumal are dismissed. His discharge is confirmed. We direct the court to proceed with the trial expediliously. 22. Before parting with the case, We must place on record the useful service rendered by Stri Atyachar virodhi parishad' in this case. It is a social welfare organisation. It has come up to this Court spending its own money by preferring the appeals. We very much appreciate the object of the organisation and the assistance rendered.
-
1989 (2) TMI 422 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... has to be seen that on 20-7-1967 the appellant's Esplanade Agent called upon the respondents to adjust the amounts due on the over-draft account and take back the shares at once and that after that adjustment only a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was due. In our view, the learned single Judge is right in holding that there is no consideration for the respondents-firm to stand sureties for its guarantors. Finally we are not impressed with the arguments of Mr. Dolia, the learned Counsel for appellant-bank, that there are no pleadings under O. VI, R. 4 , C.P.C. A reading of the plaints in these two cases shows that everything is pleaded elaborately. In our view, only the oral and documentary evidence on the side of the appellant-bank are lacking. We have already stated how irresponsible the appellant-bank was in not replying Exs. P. 16 to P. 28. 16. In view of our aforesaid conclusion we agree with the learned single Judge and dismiss both the appeals with costs. 17. Appeals dismissed.
-
1989 (2) TMI 421 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on, therefore, the amount of ₹ 51,295 squarely came within Section 14(3)(iii) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, was right in its conclusion that no tax was payable on the said amount. We would like to point out that under Section 14(3) provision has been made to extend certain advantages to the cooperative societies in order that the legislative purpose of providing incentive to the cooperative movement may be fulfilled. The High Court was right in holding that the provisions contained in Section 14(3) should be liberally construed. Our answer to the second question, therefore, is on the facts and in the circumstances .of the case and on a true and correct interpretation of the various clauses of the agreement, the sum of ₹ 51,295 received as interest on advances in the assessee's income from sugar business was exempt under Section 14(3)of the Income Tax Act, 1922. There shall be no order for costs in this appeal as success is divided. Appeal disposed of.
-
1989 (2) TMI 420 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... cessary to interfere with the Order of the Tribunal. The appeal fails and is, therefore, dismissed accordingly.
-
1989 (2) TMI 419 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... ercentage of loss of raw materials. (Emphasis supplied). Such a conclusion without considering the other essential factors alleged as discussed above, is not legally proper and looks arbitrary. In this view of the matter, we set aside the demand of duty. 10. As regards the penalty imposed, there had been admittedly non-accountal of raw materials and also non-maintenance of prescribed records in respect of breakage losses and form IV account for caps. The appellants being in the line of manufacture of 22 years are expected to be well aware of the requirements. Their plea that the officers have not pointed out these requirements, does not carry conviction. Hence, for these irregularities, imposition of penalty is justified. However, since we have held that the allegation of clandestine removal has not been established, we would deem it proper to reduce the penalty from ₹ 10,000/- to ₹ 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only). The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
-
1989 (2) TMI 418 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. 24. In our opinion the case of Puttan Singh v. State of UP. 1987 All WC 404 1987 All LJ 599 was correctly decided. (i) For the reasons given above our answer to the first question referred to us is in the negative. (ii) Our answer to the second question referred to us is that the High Court has no inherent power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to interfere with the investigation by the police. The High Court has also no inherent power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to stay the arrest of an accused during investigation. The decision by the Full Bench in the case of Prashant Gaur v. State of U.P. 1988 All WC 828 (supra) does not lay down correct law and is overruled (iii) Our answer to the third question referred to us is that the decision in the case of Puttan Singh v. State of U.P. 1987 All LJ 599 (supra) is correct. 25. Let the record of the cases be placed before the learned single Judge with our answers to the questions referred to us.
-
1989 (2) TMI 417 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... th the merits of the application. But I do find certain difficulty in going into the merits of the case as all facts are not on record. I, therefore, suggested to the advocates on either side, that the best course would be to have the order set aside and respondent No. 1 could prefer a separate application and the learned Judge concerned shall then deal with the matter on the merits of the case. Happily there has been a consensus on this. 16. I, therefore, pass the following order The impugned order dt. March 9, 1988 passed by the learned Magistrate is hereby set aside. I give liberty to respondent 1 to prefer a separate application in the Court of Session where the case has been committed. On such application being filed, it is open to the prosecution to file a proper affidavit and rely on such documents as they think proper. The learned Sessions Judge will decide the matter on merits, after hearing both the parties. Rule is made absolute accordingly. 17. Order accordingly.
-
1989 (2) TMI 416 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... one slabs are still used for panel-boards, but there is now a great variety of insulating boards made by compressing glass fibres, quartz, or minerals with binders, or standard laminated plastics of good dielectric strength may be used....Synthetic rubbers and plastics have now replaced natural rubber for wire insulation, but some aluminium conductors are insulated only with an anodized coating of aluminium oxide. Wires to be coated with an organic insulator may first be treated with hydrogen fluoride, giving a coating of copper fluoride on copper wire and aluminium fluoride on aluminium wire. The thin film of fluoride has high dielectric strength and heat resistance.... 11. It follows from the above definitions that an article made from materials which have electrically insulating properties can be appropriately described as an insulator. There is no dispute about the fact that the laminated plastic sheets under consideration in the present appeal are such that can be used.
-
1989 (2) TMI 415 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nd degree of the occupation of the transferee and the facts found, it cannot be said that either there was any assignment or sub-letting or parting with possession to such a degree by permitting the hoarding that the tenant had lost interest. He was using this premises for his benefit. Unless the tenant has infracted the prohibition of the Act, he is not liable to be evicted. The case rests on the express provision of the Act and there is no scope to explore the latent purpose of the Act. 22. In the premises, the High Court's order of eviction cannot be upheld. As no question of non-payment has been found by the trial court and the learned District Judge and there is no finding of any material alteration, in our opinion, the order for eviction cannot be sustained. The appeal, therefore, must be allowed. 23. The appeal is allowed and the order for eviction is set aside. In the facts and the circumstances of the case, however, the parties will pay and bear their own costs.
-
1989 (2) TMI 414 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... fendants consequently fails. 15. Mr. Lalit lastly submitted that in view of the observation in paragraph 11 of the judgment of the High Court that properties which were subsequently purchased by the plaintiff are held to be his self-acquisitions, the suit in any event should not have been dismissed in its entirety. We do not find any merit in this argument either. It has been pointed out in the judgment that the aforesaid claim of the plaintiff was not disputed by the defendant. If the reliefs claimed in paragraph 21 of the plaint are examined, it will be clear that there was no lis in this regard and the plaintiff therefore did not ask for any relief in regard to the same. It is, therefore, not open to the plaintiff to make a grievance against the dismissal of the entire suit by the High Court. His interest so far as the self-acquired properties are concerned, is fully protected by the observations in the judgment. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1989 (2) TMI 413 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s the power of attorney is admitted by the first defendant he is only an agent of the plaintiff. Recitals in Ext, A-1 would show that the plaintiff being a helpless widow required the help of the first defendant to manage her properties. In such a case it is difficult to believe that the plaintiff had agreed to sell the property not only belonging to her but also belonging to her minor daughter. Under Mohimmedan Law a minor's property cannot be sold by a defacto guardian. As the first defendant has admitted the power of attorney he cannot validly claim the property on the basis of the agreements. 15. As the averments in the written statements, even if they are totally accepted, will not be sufficient to attract Section 53 A, no purpose will be served by remanding the case to the trial Court to adduce evidence by the defendants. No amount of evidence can improve a case if there is total lack of pleadings. We find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
-
1989 (2) TMI 412 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... fidavit came into existence upon the respondents stating that his second representation was not signed and, therefore, was not forwarded. It is for that reason that the third representation was sent by the detenu and in support of the fact of his sending a third representation he had filed his additional affidavit. But this additional affidavit has necessarily to be read along with the earlier affidavit and all the pleas taken in the earlier affidavit would certainly be available to the detenu if the documents and facts relate to the point which had been taken. In this case the point taken is the prejudice to the detenu by non-supply of the documents. That was taken in the earlier affidavit and the fact of non-supply has been established in this subsequent affidavit. This contention is also rejected. 13. In the result, the petition is allowed, the order of detention is set aside and the detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith unless required otherwise. 14. Petition allowed.
-
1989 (2) TMI 411 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... vailable from different kinds. Of these, the chief are morphine, coneine etc." So, morphine is the main and. principal alkaloid of opium and if morphine is found in the product above 0.2 the product has to be treated as ''opiume'' Thus, it is clear that morphine is the derivative of opium and is covered by the definition of ' 'manufactured drug". s. 22 of the NDPS Act pertains to possession of "psychotropic substance" which has been defined in s. 2 (xxiii) to mean "any substance natural or synthetic etc. specified in the Schedule". The Schedule does not refer to 'morphine'. So, the prosecution has rightly challaned the petitioner and the co-accused for an offence punishable u/s21 of the NDPS Act. I, hence, partly allow the criminal revision petition and quash the charges already framed and direct that the charge against the petitioner and co-accused be framed for the offence punishable u/s 21 of the NDPS Act only.
-
1989 (2) TMI 410 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of the arbitrator to decide the scope of his jurisdiction as we have said earlier that the court cannot make a contract between the parties and its power ends with interpretation of the contract between them. The same principle also applies to the arbitration agreement unless of course, the parties to the arbitration agreement authorises the court to make and modify the agreement for themselves. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan for the respondents states that the respondent shall have no objection to a retired Judge of the Supreme Court being appointed as Arbitrator and the respondents shall not raise the question of limitation as indicated by Mr. Shanti Bhushan learned counsel for the appellant. We have no doubt that the Arbitrator so appointed shall proceed in accordance with law to decide the questions including that of the jurisdiction, if raised. In the result, we find no merit in this appeal and hence it is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1989 (2) TMI 409 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the seats are filled up. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the impugned rule for admission in the evening classes is struck down as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and accordingly, invalid. We, however, make it clear that the striking down of the impugned rule shall not, in any manner whatsoever, disturb the admissions already made for the session 1988-89. The respondents are directed to admit both the appellants in the second semester which has commenced from January, 1989 and shall allow them to complete the Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course, if not otherwise ineligible on, the ground of unsatisfactory academic performance. As was directed by this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, 1981 2 SCR 79, the seats allocated to the appellants will be in addition to the normal intake of students in the college. Both the appeals are allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1989 (2) TMI 408 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rule of seniority contained in the Annexure thereto only to employees appointed after the date of that Memorandum, there is no escape from the conclusion that the seniority of Ganapathi Kini and Ravi Varma, respondents, who were appointed prior to December 22. 1959. would have to be determined on the basis of their length of service in accordance with Office Memorandum dated June 22, 1949 and not on the basis of the date of their confirmation." These considerations apply equally to the present case as well. The general rule is if seniority is to be regulated in a particular manner in a given period, it shall be given effect to, and shall not be varied to disadvantage retrospectively. The view taken by the Division Bench, which is in substance contrary to this principle is not sound and cannot be supported. In the result, these appeals are allowed with costs. In reversal of the judgment of the Division Bench, we restore that of the learned single Judge. Appeals allowed.
-
1989 (2) TMI 407 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e the learned Magistrate and the Magistrate had ordered investigation under Section 156(3), the police would have had to submit a report under Section 173(2). It has been held in Tufa Ram & Ors. v. Kishore Singh, 1978 1 SCR 615 that if the police, after making an investigation, send a report that no case was made out against the accused, the Magistrate could ignore the conclusion drawn by the police and take cognizance of a case under Section 190(1)(b) and issue process or in the alternative he can take cognizance of the original complaint and examine the complainant and his witnesses and thereafter issue process to the accused, if he is of opinion that the case should be proceeded with. In the light of our conclusion, the appeal succeeds and the order of the High Court is set aside. The order of the Second Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore will stand restored and the case against the second respond- ent will be proceeded further in accordance with law.
-
1989 (2) TMI 406 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... roviding conveyance to the scientific personnel to travel from their respective residences to the factory, cannot be regarded as a facility for the prosecution of scientific research. Sri Sarangan, the learned counsel for the assessee, however, submitted that the language used in the explanation was very wide and every capital expenditure incurred which facilitates the prosecution of scientific research, falls within the definition of the explanation and, consequently, the benefit of section 35(1)(iv) would be attracted. 3. As stated earlier, the two authorities, namely, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal have taken the view that the buses in question were facilities for the prosecution of scientific research and, therefore, the assessee was entitled to the benefit of section 35(1)(iv). We find no reasons to take a different view. 4. Accordingly, we make the following order The question referred for our opinion is answered in the affirmative and against the revenue.
-
1989 (2) TMI 405 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he royalty relating to the period from 1-6-1958 to 31-10-1963. The Tribunal held that since the assessee had given this undertaking to pay this royalty within the relevant period of accounts, the assessee was entitled to claim this amount as deduction. 5. We see no reason to interfere with this finding made by the Tribunal. The actual liability had taken place by virtue of an agreement entered into by the assessee with the Government of Bihar and an undertaking had been given to the Bihar Government relating to that earlier period. The Tribunal had come to the conclusion that the liability for payment of royalty had arisen in this particular year of accounting. In that view of the matter, the second question must also be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 6. Question No. 1 is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. Question Nos. 2 and 3 are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 7. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1989 (2) TMI 404 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the death sentence should be vacated?
Held that:- Undue long delay in execution of the sentence of death will entitle the condemned person to approach this Court under Article 32 but this Court will only examine the nature of delay caused and circumstances ensued after sentence was finally confirmed by the judicial process and will have no jurisdiction to re-open the conclusions reached by the Court while finally maintaining the sentence of death. This Court, however, may consider the question of inordinate delay in the light of all circumstances of the case to decide whether the execution of sentence should be carried out or should be altered into imprisonment for life. No fixed period of delay could be held to make the sentence of death inexecutable and to this extent the decision in Vatheeswaran's case [1983 (2) TMI 321 - SUPREME COURT] cannot be said to lay down the correct law and therefore to that extent stands overruled.
........
|
