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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 231 Records
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1989 (4) TMI 341 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a whereof all policy decisions originated and the prayers were made in the said case for directing the respondent company, which had its Head Office at Calcutta, to give effect to a certain order. In the instant writ petition the facts, as I have already held, are entirely different and the case cited hereinbefore has no manner of application. In the instant case, nothing that has been challenged, happened within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. 15. In the circumstances, I am constrained to hold that, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, and in view of the discussions made hereinbefore, this court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the instant writ petition. In the circumstances the application fails, the rule is discharged. I, however, make it clear that I have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and the petitioner will be at liberty to agitate his grievances before any appropriate forum. There will be no order as to costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 340 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uot; 4. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that, in respect if tax assessed and due from a private limited company, no demand could have been forwarded by the first respondent to the second respondent for recovery of arrears of tax against the directors except in the manner provided in section 16B, We would accordingly quash the impugned order of the first respondent issue a writ of mandamus restraining the respondents from proceeding against the petitioners who are directors of Western India Gunnies pvt. Ltd., Writ petition No. 18277 of 1988 is allowed. No costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 150. 5. W. P. No. 18168 of 1988 6. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner company wishes to withdraw W. P. No. 18168 of 1988. Accordingly, W. P. No. 18168 of 1988 is dismissed as withdrawn and there will be no order as to costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 150. 7. It is, however, made clear that there is no bar for recovering the tax from the private limited company.
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1989 (4) TMI 339 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... stry which includes newsprint, paperboard and strawboard. The High Court has also referred to the circumstance that the process of manufacturing strawboard is identical with that of manufacturing paper. The expression 'paper and pulp' in the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act includes paper-board and strawboard. Our attention has been drawn to the Entry relevant to the assessment year 1964-65 which speaks of 'paper and pulp including paper products' and, it is said, strawboard is evidently not within the natural meaning of the word 'paper'. We do not think that the submission merits serious consideration. Newsprint, paper board and strawboard have been specifically mentioned in the entry in order to make it clear that they are included within the meaning of the word 'paper'. 6. In our judgment, the High Court is right in taking the view which it has, and therefore, the appeals must be dismissed. 7. The appeals are dismissed with costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 338 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n the allegation that forged/false certificates had been produced by them in support of qualification/eligibility and in the enquiry a prima facie case had been made out. We express no opinion about it as it shall be for the State Government to deal with the question and the appellant's appeal has nothing to do with it. 13. The appeal is allowed, the order of the learned single Judge as also the appellate order are vacated and the State Government and the Public Service Commission are directed to consider the appellant's claim for recruitment on the basis of the notification for recruitment. In case the appellant is found qualified, he shall be selected for the post and duly appointed. The question of appellant's seniority is left open to be dealt with by the State Government in consultation with the Public Service Commission. The appellant shall have the cost of the appeal. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 3,000/- to be recovered from the Respondent-State only.
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1989 (4) TMI 337 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... disputed also that if an. assessment is made on one there can be no assessment on the other, and therefore, in this case if the assessment had been made on the Indian agent the assessment could not have been made on the assessee. However, the facts show that the re-assessment proceedings commenced on the agent were found to be barred by time by reason of s. 149(3) of the Act. The issue of notice under s. 148 of the Act to the agent after the expiry of two years from the end of the relevant assessment year is prohibited by the statute. The Income Tax Officer dropped the proceedings when he was made aware of that prohibition. The assessment proceedings taken by him against the agent have to be ignored and cannot operate as a bar to assessment proceeding directly against the assessee. On this point also the High Court has taken the correct view when it answered the question in favour of the Revenue. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 336 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... we are now satisfied that the grant of discretionary interest could be declined on the facts now before us, we would be putting too much premium on mere technicalities in waiting, may be for years, for another order from the trial Court after remand. 15. This is sufficient to dispose of the appeals. But we still reiterate what we have stated hereinabefore, namely, in the changed context resulting from our constitutional obligation to secure, protect and promote Social and Economic Justice, if we find that as a matter of fact such Socio-Economic Justice has in fact been done to a debtor, all our Judge made rules of practice and procedure to the effect that a Judge must expressly manifest his advertence to the question and application of mind thereto by a reasoned order, should not stand in the way of our upholding the impugned order. 16. We would accordingly dismiss both the appeals, but would do so without costs. Pabitra Kumar Banerjee, J. 17. I agree. 18. Appeals dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 335 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssumption of management by the Collector under Section 37 of the Revenue Recovery Act after attachment of the properties under Section 36 of the Act cannot, therefore, be assailed. It is also open to the State to bring the properties to sale for recovery of the amounts due from the petitioner other than the agricultural Income Tax due from him for the years 1977-78 to 1981-82 which is yet to be determined by the first respondent afresh. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, we quash the assessment orders, exhibits P-8(a) to P-8(e), and the revisional order, exhibit P-13, and direct the first respondent, the Agricultural Income Tax Officer, Nedumangad, to pass fresh orders of assessment in the light of the observations and directions contained in this judgment after affording the petitioner sufficient opportunity to substantiate his objections to the pre-assessment notice served on him. 23. The writ appeal is allowed as indicated above. The parties will suffer their respective costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 334 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e counter affidavit filed by the Additional District Magistrate (Land Reforms), Mayurbhanj, Orissa it has been stated in reply to paragraphs 21 to 24 of the SLP that there is no Home-Stead land and no non-agricultural land belonging to the appellant-land holders in the Notified Area Council of Udala. It has also been stated in paragraph 3(c) of the said counter affidavit that no Notification as contemplated by Section 73(c) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act has been made by the State Government. It has further been stated therein that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 has not been made applicable so far to the Udala Notified Area Council. In this view of the matter it is not possible for us to record any finding with regard to this submission and consequently we express no opinion in this behalf. 14. In the result, we find no merit in any of these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 333 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion of the premises or of the rent payable therefor. That is the position as between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased tenant. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. In the present case it appears that the respondent acted on behalf of the tenants, that he paid rent on behalf of all and he accepted notice also on behalf of all. In the circumstances, the notice served on the respondent was sufficient. It seems to us that the view taken in Ramesh Chand Bone (supra) is erroneous where the High Court lays down that the heirs of the deceased tenant succeed as tenants in common. In our opinion, the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act served by the appellant on the respondent is a valid notice and therefore the suit must succeed. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court are restored. There is no order as to costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 332 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Act would become void to that extent is not correct. We are of the view that the legislation has the effect of validly extinguishing the right of the respondents to receive annually a sum of ₹ 3,500/- on a hereditary basis. The respondents are entitled to the payment of whatever compensation is payable under the Act notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 14 and 19 and Article 31 of the Constitution of India (as it existed prior to its deletion. 13. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the suit instituted by the respondents. We, however, make it clear that the dismissal of the suit does not come in the way of the respondents being paid whatever compensation they are entitled to under the Act. If such compensation has not been paid yet, the authority concerned shall proceed to compute the amount of compensation payable to the respondents and to disburse it within three months from today. 14. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 331 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ry fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court." Thus, the cause of action would differ from case to case and enactment to enactment. Is the place of residence of a close relative of a COFEPOSA detenu by itself a cause of action in the matter of a challenge to the order of detention by a writ petition under Article 226? We do not think so. That would be too farfetched. However, there can be no about the place of detention providing a cause of action. That place in the instant case is Bombay and hence. High Court at Bombay will have jurisdiction to entertain this petition. 11. We, therefore, uphold the preliminary objection and direct forthwith transmission of the papers and proceedings to Bombay where the Registrar shall place the matter before the appropriate Bench. By consent of parties, we fix 24th April, 1989, as the date for appearance. Rule accordingly. 12. Order accordingly.
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1989 (4) TMI 330 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... estion had not been established. The High Court has interfered with these findings of facts in the view that the two courts below had made out a new case by concluding that there was no partition between Abdul Sab and Mohammad Sab and they were tenants in common in respect of the suit property. What the High Court has done is to reverse the findings of fact upon considerations which proceed entirely upon facts. This the High Court was not competent to do in a second appeal under Section 1(x) of the CPC. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court are restored. In the circumstances there is no order as to costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 328 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which were supplied to him along with the grounds of detention were not legible and he placed before the Advisory Board a copy of representation said to have been made by him for supply of legible copies of the documents. The legible copies of the documents were, however, supplied to the detenu after the detention order was confirmed. It was held that the detenu was denied the opportunity of making a representation and as such there was a clear contravention of the right guaranteed by Article 22 of the Constitution. The detenu was, therefore, set at liberty. 7. Considering these decisions we are constrained to hold that the refusal on the part of the detaining authority to supply legible copies of the said relevant document to the detenu for making an effective representation infringed the detenu's right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The order of detention is, therefore, set aside and the detenu is directed to be released forthwith. The appeal is thus allowed.
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1989 (4) TMI 327 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o the suit. The Court held, that those who were impleaded as party to the suit in place of the deceased defendant represented the entire estate as they had share in the property and since they had been brought on record the decree was binding on the entire estate In the instant case Mrs. Nalini Bai had admittedly hall share in the property left by the deceased defendant and as she was brought on record within time, she represented the estate of the deceased defendant and the suit could proceed on merit. In this view the impleadment of other legal repre- sentatives at a subsequent stage could not affect validity of the proceedings. In the result we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the Judicial Commission- er dated 30.6.1972, and restore the order of the trial Judge. Since trial of the suit has been delayed, we direct the trial court to make every effort to decide the suit expeditiously. The appellant is entitled to its costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (4) TMI 326 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... riod of 30 days. In the present case, this fact is not disputed that the assessee deposited the security within a period of 30 days from the date of the service of the said order. In my opinion, the argument advanced on behalf of the assessee has considerable force and while interpreting the limitation of 30 days provided in Section 9 (3-A) (iii), in my opinion, the period of 30 days shall start from the date of the service of the order on the assessee and not from the date of the passing of the order by the appellate court. In view of the said fact, I am of the opinion that the order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. 7. In the result, revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Tribunal is set aside and the appellate court is directed to accept the security furnished by the assessee as having been deposited in time. Parties shall bear their own costs. 8. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal as contemplated under Section 11 (8) of the Act.
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1989 (4) TMI 325 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he benefit of the Provident Fund Scheme and took those benefits, have been held entitled to opt for the Pension Scheme without fixing a cut-off date. The question raised is of considerable importance. Even, as far as the financial implications to the Railways are concerned, they would be immense. The same question would again arise in connection with other departments of the government or State Undertakings where a similar situation might have existed. In view of this, we are of the view that the matter should be decided by the larger Bench, preferably comprising five learned Judges or at least, of three learned Judges. 3. Before parting with the matter we may add that many of the retired employee before us are quite old and are anxious that their matters should be decided very early. The matter is, of course, one which deserves to be disposed of very expeditiously. 4. We, therefore, direct that the papers may be placed before the learned Chief Justice of appropriate orders.
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1989 (4) TMI 324 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ar from the order of the Tribunal that none appeared on behalf of the assessee and the appeal was decided only after hearing the State representative In view of the undisputed facts that no intimation was sent by the Tribunal to the assessee for adjourned date of bearing, i.e. 1-9-1986, I am of the opinion that there has been violation of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as, the assessee was not afforded any reasonable opportunity of being heard by the Tribunal. In view of the said fact the order passed by the Tribunal deserves to be set aside and it is desirable that the assessee should be given an opportunity of being heard. 5. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal is quashed. The Tribunal is directed to decide the appeal afresh after hearing the counsel for the parties. The parties shall bear their own costs. Let a copy of this order may be sent to the Tribunal concerned as contemplated under Section 11 of the Act.
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1989 (4) TMI 323 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... side, employers and workers, to be responsible for one week at a time. "Next, it was suggested that, even if the board could not delegate their functions, at any rate they could ratify the actions of the port manager, but, if the board have no power to delegate their functions to the port manager, they can have no power to ratify what he has already done. The effect of ratification is to make it equal to a prior command, but as a prior command, in the shape of delegation, would be useless, so also is a ratification." These observations again are of little assistance to us since we have already held that there was no prior delegation of power to the Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary action against the respondent. There was no subsequent delegation either. Therefore, neither the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor, nor the ratification by the Executive Council could be sustained. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 322 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he validity and correctness of the deduction to be made under Section 8 as well. So construed, the provisions of Section 10 would furnish a reasonably adequate machinery for the assessment of the "net-amount" payable to licensee. 38. So far as Arbitration is concerned, even after the decision of the "Special-Officer", there is the further Arbitral forum to decide disputes in respect of the specific areas in which disputes are rendered arbitrable under Sec- tion 20. In view of these circumstances, we think the grievance of the petitioners on these points questions are not sub- stantial. The points (h) and (i) are also, accordingly, held and answered against the petitioners. 39. In the result, for the foregoing reasons all the contentions urged by the petitioners in support of their challenge to the impugned legislations fail. The Writ peti- tions are, accordingly, dismissed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 321 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ngaswamy, JJ Appeal dismissed
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