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Showing 1 to 20 of 263 Records
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1989 (7) TMI 348 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... proved that the mistakes in the ledger and the stores indenting vouchers are only clerical errors. It is quite possible that the accused might have removed diesel through some clandestine method. It is proved in this case that the Indian Oil Company supplied diesel through private contracts carriages. If would be easy for the store-keeper to have any deceitful alliance with these contract carriers. Therefore, I hold that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the guilt of the accused and he has been rightly convicted by the special Judge. 17. The accused has been given only the minimum sentence. However, the fine imposed on the accused is reduced from Rs. 15000/- to Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 5 months in addition to the substantive term of imprisonment. As directed by the Special Judge the sentence of imprisonment shall run concurrently. With the above modification in sentence the appeal is dismissed.
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1989 (7) TMI 347 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t the defendants. As already observed the case of the plaintiffs in the present suit is the same as the case they had set up in the previous suit namely that the first plaintiff being a trustee in management of the trust properties is entitled to an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the said right of the first plaintiff. The properties, going by the pleadings in both the suits, are owned by the trust which is represented by the first plaintiff. The plaintiffs withdrew from the earlier suit, that is, O.S. 598/82 without obtaining liberty to institute a fresh suit. There is no dispute about it. If that be the position the present suit is hit by Sub-rule (1) of Order 23, Sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 C.P.C. The C.R.P. under the circumstances is allowed with costs which I fix at Rs. 1,000/-. The suit from out of which this revision arises, therefore is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the suit, O.S. 300/1983 is dismissed. Issue photostat copy on usual terms.
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1989 (7) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , the people of the locality should have been afforded an opportunity of being heard and the administrative decision by the State Government should have been taken after considering the view of the residents. Denial of such opportunity is not in consonance with the scheme of the rule of law governing our society. We must clarify that the hearing contemplated is not required to be oral and can be by inviting objections and disposing them of in a fair way. 29. The principles and precedents thus enjoin us not to support the view taken by the High Court. We may only observe that the Government is expected to act and must act in a way which would make it consistent with the good administration. It is they, and no one else-who must pass judgment on this matter. We must, therefore, leave it to the Government. 30. In the result and for the reasons stated, we allow the appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1989 (7) TMI 345 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Register of Firms were not, in fact, partners, one new partner had come in and two minors had been admitted to the benefit of the partnership firm regarding which no notice was given to the Registrar of Firms. Thus, the persons suing, namely, the current partners as on the date of the suit were not shown as partners in the Register of Firms. The result is that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the said Partnership Act and the view taken by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court in this connection is correct. Although the plaint was amended on a later date that cannot save the suit. Reference has been made to some decisions in the judgment of the Trial Court; however, we do not find it necessary to refer to any of them as the position in law, in our opinion, is clear on a plain reading of sub-see. (2) of Section 69 of the said Partnership Act. 7. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1989 (7) TMI 344 - FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION APPELLATE BOARD
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... ... ..... ade thereunder. According to the Adjudicating Officer, the fact that the agreement in question contains a stipulation for remittance of foreign exchange from SC to APA conclusively establishes the contravention of section 8(1) and section 14 and, therefore, attracts the provision of section 47 also. The infringement of section 47 is dependent upon the contravention of section 8(1) and section 14. Having come to the conclusion that the aforesaid provisions of law are not contravened, section 47 also would not come into operation. It is abundantly clear from the impugned order itself (relevant portions have been quoted above) that the appellants could not be said to have any attempt to contravene the provisions of the Act. If so, the question of the said agreement resulting in the evasion or avoidance of the other provisions of the Act would not arise. So, the charge to that effect is also not substantiated. 19. In the result, the appeal succeeds and the same is hereby allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 343 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arbitrary. Roop Chand Adlakha's case (supra) is a clear answer to the case of the writ petitioners and also for the analysis which we have done highlighting Ravinder Kumar Sharma's case (supra). Accordingly we hold that the writ petition was rightly dismissed by the learned single Judge. Thus we dismiss L.P.A. No. 283 of 1988. No costs. 64. C.W.P.Nos.363, 811, 1744 and 3450 of 1987 are also dismissed in view of the dismissal of L.P.A. No. 283 of 1988. The parties will bear their own costs. 65. Category 6 On the dismissal of C.W.P. No. 1903 of 1987, on the acceptance of L.P.A. No. 402 of 1988, the decision in Kuldip Singh's case (C.W.P. No. 8167 of 1987) decided on February 10, 1988 read with the order passed in Review Application No. 27 of 1989 on March 10, 1989, should stand automatically reviewed, and thus the said matter be placed before the Motion Bench for a fresh hearing. 66. With these end results, these 23 matters stand disposed of. 67. Order accordingly.
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1989 (7) TMI 342 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to delay in making payment of certificated debt. It was not a penalty. This case has also no application to the facts of the instant case. 11. In our view whenever interest is charged under the Act, whether for delayed payment of tax or filing under estimate of tax or for non- submission of the estimate or return or for default in filing return within the time or delay in making payment of tax, it cannot be allowed as deduction in computing total income as essentially interest in such a case for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act is inextricably connected with the amount of income-tax. Where income-tax itself is not a deductible amount, be it compensation or be it penalty, payable in addition to the tax cannot be allowed as a deduction in computing total income. 12. We, therefore, answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. 13. The assessee shall pay cost of this reference. Banerjee, J. - I agree.
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1989 (7) TMI 341 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d missed the real facts involved in the case. Consequently, the alleged subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority cannot be held to be a satisfaction approved of by the Parliament as a justification for the detention under the preventive detention law. 12. Further, the satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority is the result of a cumulative consideration of the detenu's statement, the follow up action and the retraction of the detenu as is clear from para-10 of the grounds of detention. The satisfaction does not rest here on any one of the facts, in isolation. 13. in the view we have taken on the first ground, it is not necessary for us to discuss the other contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 14. In the result, for the reasons stated above, this petition is allowed and the order of detention dated 8th October, 1988 made in Order No. F.No. 673/389/88 (Annexure-A) is quashed. The detenu (Amjad Hussain) shall be released forthwith.
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1989 (7) TMI 340 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... der sub-section (1). 15. In the affidavit of the Sarpanch, it has been mentioned that almost 80 per cent of the income of the Gram Panchayat in the instant case comes from the amount paid by the company by way of taxes. As a result of the embargo placed upon the recovery of the taxes due from the company by section 22(1) of the Act, all the activities of the Gram Panchayat will grind to a halt. If this is so, it is an unfortunate situation, but we cannot interpret the provisions of an Act with reference to hardship in a particular case. We may, however point out that it is open to the Gram Panchayat to obtain the consent of the Board to proceed with the recovery of the property taxes and other dues from the company. If such consent is obtained, then the embargo imposed by Section 22(1) of the Act is lifted. 16. In the result, the petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (b)(i) and (b)(ii) of the petition. No order as to costs. 17. Petition allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 339 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ination cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. When the termination order is set aside by the courts normally the servant becomes entitled to back-wages and other consequential benefits. This case has a chequered history. From 1976 onwards there has been continuous litigation and mistrust between the parties. The facts which we have narrated above go to show that Sharma has equally contributed to this unfortunate situation. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case we order that sixty per cent of the back-wages be paid to Sharma. Money already received by Sharma under orders of this Court or the High Court shall be adjusted and the balance paid to him. If the money already paid to Sharma is more than what we have ordered then there shall be no recovery from him. Civil Appeal 3154/85 is allowed to the extent indicated above, Civil Appeal 3155/85 filed by the company is dismissed. C.M.P. 1213/ 88 is dismissed as infructuous. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1989 (7) TMI 338 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ering the true meaning of 'permissible area' under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act and for that purpose the meaning of land was being examined; whether banjar Jadid should be excluded with reference to the meaning of land under the East Punjab Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act and the Punjab Tenancy Act was being debated before the Court. We do not think in view of the statutory definition any digration is necessary. It is impermissible to rely on definitions containing meanings different from the definition under the Act for a proper resolution of the dispute. The High Court, in our opinion, came to the correct conclusion when it held that the disputed property constituted land under the Act and became liable to vest in the Gaon Sabha under the Act. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, is upheld and the appeal is dismissed. In the peculiar facts of this case, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (7) TMI 337 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... during the year under consideration any money was spent by the assessee on further construction of the house property and that the only activity of the assessee happened to be to collect rent. The Tribunal held that the assessee was not carrying on any business and, therefore, its status as an AOP was rightly taken by the ITO and confirmed by the AAC. 7. The activity of the assessee was only to collect rent. The Tribunal has found that the assessee was not carrying on any business. The finding, although challenged, the question was not allowed. Thereafter the assessee did not come to this Court under section 256(2). 8. On the facts found by the Tribunal we are of the view that the Tribunal has come to a correct conclusion. Since there was no business, the assessee was rightly held as an AOP. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. 9. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J.- I agree.
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1989 (7) TMI 336 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... its longivity is replaced by altogether a new assset. It is not a case of mending the existing asset or restoring it to sound or good condition to make up for part damage injury or decay. 24. In our view this expenditure cannot be allowed as current repairs. It is no doubt true even if in a case the costs of repairs or current repairs are not allowable under section 31, section 37(1) of the Act may be attracted if the conditions laid therein are satisfied. The nature of expenditure laid out and incurred in this case is capital and, therefore, the question of deduction of such expenditure under section 37 would not arise. 25. For the reasons aforesaid we are of the view that the Tribunal was not justified on the facts of this case in allowing the expenditure on reconstruction of the furnace as expenditure on current repairs or as revenue expenditure. We, therefore, answer the first question in the negative and in favour of the revenue. 26. There will be no order as to costs.
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1989 (7) TMI 335 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n the promise of beating 'Batmider' of police. And you are beating innocent persons who oppose your activity of liquor etc." These statements are vague and without any particulars as to what place or when and to whom the detenu threatened with Rampuff knife and whom he has alleged to have beaten. These vague averments made in the grounds of detention hereinbefore are bad in as much as the detenu could not make an effective representation against the impugned order of detention. As such the detention order is illegal and bad. It is pertinent to refer to the decision of this court in the case of Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 15/1989 (judgment of which has been pronounced today) on this score. It is no, necessary to consider and decide other questions raised in this writ petition. For the reasons aforesaid, we allow the writ petition and set aside the impugned order of detention made against the petitioner. We direct the respondents to set free the petitioner forthwith.
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1989 (7) TMI 334 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t; 12. After a consideration of the matter, we are inclined to the view that the reasoning of and the conclusion reached by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the new Section 80 is a selfcontained provision are sound and require to be preferred to the view expressed by the Assam and the Madras High Courts. The view of the Full-Bench is to be preferred having regard to the weight and preponderance of the relevant interpretatory criteria. No appeal, in our opinion, could be made to Section 21A of the State Amendment to the Small Cause Courts Act either, in as much as, that provision cannot be understood to have been intended to cover a situation of the present type. It does not exclude a special law applicable to and governing a distinct class of subject matter intended to be covered by that special law. In the result, for the fore-going reasons, these appeals fail and are dismissed; but in the circumstances, without any directions as to costs. . Appeals dismissed.
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1989 (7) TMI 333 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in accordance with Article 146 of the Constitution after considering the recommendations of the Pay Commission in respect of the Supreme Court employees and all other relevant materials, and that the said amendments to the Rules will be forwarded to the President of India for approval, and, after obtaining the approval of the President in terms of the proviso to clause (2) of Article 146 of the Constitution, the same will be implemented. In the circumstances, no further order is required in the present proceedings', apart from directing that, until rules are properly made by way of amendments to the existing rules in accordance with Article 146 of the Constitution, the interim orders of this Court dated 25.7.1986, 14.8.1986 and 15.1.1987 shall remain in full force and the status quo as on this day as regards pay and allowances shall be maintained. Accordingly, I agree that there shall be a direction as stated by my learned brother in the final paragraph of his judgment.
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1989 (7) TMI 332 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... h cases may be rare, reasonable security may be demanded from dealers who do not have a clean record or from persons against whom there are sufficient reasons to believe that the goods may be dealt with otherwise than in the manner declared. 18.. In view of the reasons given above, we do not find any illegality in the action of the commercial tax authorities demanding security. 19.. The main prayer of the applicant is that a direction be issued commanding the respondents to withdraw, cancel and/or rescind the purported action for demand of security by way of bank guarantee as a condition to issue of permit for clearance of goods at the check-post and all purported proceedings thereto. By an interim order of the High Court a permit was issued to the applicant on his furnishing a bond. The prayer of the applicant has, therefore, become infructuous. 20.. The application is thus disposed of without costs. B.C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree.
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1989 (7) TMI 331 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat the sale must precede the inter-State movement and (iii) it is also not necessary for a sale to be deemed to have taken place in the course of inter-State trade with the covenant regarding inter-State movement must be specified in the contract itself. It would be enough if the movement was in pursuance of and incidental to the contract of sale. Applying the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court to the facts of the instant case, it must be held that the movement of the goods from factory to Delhi office was occasioned by the sale or that the movement was incidental to the contract of sale and, therefore, transactions of sale to the extent of Rs. 1,60,015.62 held by the Tribunal amounting to stock transfer, are held to be inter-State sales. For the reasons, the revision is allowed. The Tribunal s order dated 3rd February, 1987, is set aside and the order dated January 10, 1979, of the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) is upheld. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 330 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cluding articles of personal adornment, and the word further imports that the articles are of value in the community where they are used. A belt of cowry shells, a necklace of bears claws, a head ornament of sharks teeth, though possessing no value in themselves, are esteemed valuable in the communities where they are worn ....................... Articles manufactured from those for the purpose of personal adornment are known as articles of jewelry. In the light of the above meaning to the word jewellery , we have no doubt that the silver vessels and ware sold by the respondent-assessee will not be covered by entry 162 of the First Schedule to the Act. The decision on that score by the Appellate Tribunal is erroneous in law. We set aside the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, dated 31st October, 1986 in T.A. No. 722 of 1986 to that extent and restore the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The tax revision case is allowed to the above extent. Petition allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 329 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntion of the dealer was not to make the entries in the books. Moreover, the penalty under section 13-A(4) cannot be levied merely on account of the intention of the dealer not to show the goods in the account books, but penalty could be levied only when the goods were wilfully omitted from being shown in the accounts and this conclusion can be reached only after the goods having been received at the destination and they having not been entered in the account books and other documents maintained in the course of business. Therefore, the orders of the authorities below are not sustainable. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and orders of the Sales Tax Tribunal, Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), annexures 5, 4 and 2 to the writ petition respectively, are quashed and the Sales Tax Officer, respondent No. 5, is directed to refund a sum of Rs. 30,000 if deposited by the petitioner, forthwith to the petitioner. Writ petition allowed.
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