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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 274 Records
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1990 (1) TMI 329 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 89. In an interview in daily 'Urdu Times' dated 16.4.1989 the respondent asserted that he knew the names of the traitors but could not disclose the same. He also asserted that the punishment for traitors is death and they would be killed and this decision has not been taken by him in anger. 9. In the backdrop of such assertions, it was necessary for the Court to consider the further materials collected by the investigating agency by recording statements of witnesses. The court below misdirected itself in refusing to look into such statements and concluding that it is a case for granting bail taking into account only the position held by the respondent in the party. The court clearly erred in disposing of the application for bail. 10. In view of what has been stated above, we set aside the order of the Designated Court and allow the appeal and cancel the bail granted to the respondent, without prejudice to his right to move the Designated Court at any subsequent stage.
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1990 (1) TMI 328 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n' in which 'the existence and amount of one party's liability to the other can only be ascertained by discovering the ultimate balance of their mutual dealings'. To put it differently, the banker has the right to 'set off one account against the other. The use of the word 'lien' in this context is misleading. (See the observation made in this regard by Lord Denning M. R. in Halesowen's case). 10. The direction given by the executing court to deposit ₹ 8,812/- made mention of in the petition E.A.878/87 treating the bank as a garnishee, in the light of the discussion above, is beyond challenge. Regarding the balance amount in the fixed deposit there is no prohibitory order from the court and therefore it is for the bank to decide as to whether the same could be adjusted towards the amounts due from E. V. John to the bank under the agricultural loan account. The C.R.P. accordingly is dismissed. But in the circumstances no order as to costs.
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1990 (1) TMI 327 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gamation because of the Rules and Provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, then the assessee must be deemed to have taken certain steps for the purpose of remaining in business and in such case the expenditure would be an expenditure in the profit-making process and not an expenditure relating to the capital structure of the company. But the finding of the facts made by the Tribunal is that the Indian Company, which is the assessee, came into existence as a result of the amalgamation. Therefore, the expenditure was of capital nature so far as the assessee was concerned. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. 5. The second question is concluded by the judgment of this Court in the case of Molins of India Ltd. v. CIT 1983 144 ITR 317. In view of the judgment delivered in that case, this question is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. B.P. Banerjee, J. I agree.
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1990 (1) TMI 326 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aim on the basis of escalation. Such a consideration does not make the award on the face of it, bad on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record. Indeed, the arbitrator, when a claim is made, has to take that into consideration either for acceptance or rejection of the claim made. The award states that he has taken the claim made, into consideration. The award does not state that he has awarded any amount on that account. There is neither any error apparent on the face of the record, nor any material to satisfy that the arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding the amount as he did. 9. In that view of the matter the special leave petition has no merit made must, therefore, fail, and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioners were allowed to withdraw the awarded sum on furnishing security but in view of the decision now rendered, they will be entitled to take back the security. We order accordingly. The application is dismissed with aforesaid directions.
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1990 (1) TMI 325 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed out that the learned Judge did not go into the question at all nor the facts stated amounted to sufficient reason even under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Having regard to the observation of the learned Judge that according to him he had no jurisdiction to entertain this application, we are of the opinion that sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 11. Accordingly, we allow the prayer for condonation of delay. We are also satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown. Accord-ingly, we allow the application for restoration. This appeal is allowed. The application for condonation and restoration is allowed, The delay is condoned. The order dismissing' the suit for default dated 15th June, 1987, is hereby recalled. The suit is directed to appear at the top of the appropriate warning list a fortnight hence. Interim order, if any, is vacated. 12. There will be no order as to costs. 13. I agree. 14. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (1) TMI 324 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ring Works & Another v. Union of India & Ors. this appeal has no merit. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (1) TMI 323 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the law as indicated above. 17. Thus to sum up, we hold that Ananta Kumar Bose's case (supra) is the binding decision as approved by this Court on the important questions dealt therein and the foundation laid concerning integration of both the services of O.A.S. II and O.S.A.S. III as merged in O.A.S. II and we decline to unsettle a settled position in the interest of the service. We accordingly dismiss Civil Appeal No. 750 of 1987 and also Writ Petition No. 12770/85 and to that extent Writ Petition No. 1044/ 87 on that point. We have, however, allowed the later writ petition in part to the extent above indicated of declaring Section 3(2)(a) ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution and extend the benefit of Ananta Kumar Boses's case (supra) to the 1972 direct recruits as well. For the reasons indicated we have not made any final order on merit in W.P. 929 of 1987. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1990 (1) TMI 322 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... an efficient judicial officer not below the rank of an Additional District Judge on such terms as the State Government and the High Court consider appropriate shall be made available for discharging the duties indicated and/or as may be provided. We would like to impress upon every Committee that fulfilment of the laudable purpose of the providing a home to the poor homeless depends upon its commitment to the goal and every effort should be made by it to ensure that the builder does not succeed in frustrating the purpose. The State Government shall suitably modify its Code in the light of this judgment and recirculate the same to all concerned within four weeks from today. 23. At present we have confined the directions to the State of Maharashtra. Liberty is given to members of the weaker sections residing in other States, builders and the respective State Governments to ask for extension of the Code with such modifications as may be necessary for other parts of the country.
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1990 (1) TMI 321 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n no triable issue is shown to arise. Permitting the continuance of such a suit is tantamount to licensing frivolous and vexatious litigation. This cannot be done. It being beyond dispute that the plaint averments do no disclose a cause of action, the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C. without going into the applicability of Order 23 Rule 3A, C.P.C. to the present suit. Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to adopt the technical course of directing the Trial Court to make the consequential order of rejecting the plaint and, instead, we adopt the practical course of making that order in this proceeding itself to avoid any needless delay in conclusion of this futile litigation. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of the Trial Court and the High Court holding the suit to be maintainable are set aside and the plaint is rejected under Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C. The respondent shall pay the appellants' costs throughout.
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1990 (1) TMI 320 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ving regard to the difference in the scope of the tariff heading, we are of the opinion that the previous decision is not applicable to the instant case. 9. The appellants’ products squarely fall within the ambit of the notification. There is no dispute that the products are piping and tubing designed for use as hydraulic or air brake hoses in motor vehicles. In the case of Brakes India Ltd. v. CCE - 1987 (31) E.L.T. 1030 , this Tribunal has held that a hose pipe is converted into a brake hose assembly by cutting the hose into requisite size, addition of end fittings etc. The presence of end fittings (which are necessary for use as brake hoses) cannot disqualify the products from the benefit of exemption under Notification 197/67. We hold that the appellants’ products are eligible for the benefit of exemption under the above mentioned notification. 10. In view of the above discussion, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal with consequential relief.
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1990 (1) TMI 319 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng the decisions in Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. Commr. of Sales Tax, 1985 155ITR144(SC) , State of Tamil Nadu v. M. K. Kandaswami, 1976 1SCR38 and they are (i) Taxable event attracting the levy; (ii) Person on whom the levy is imposed and is obliged to pay the tax; (iii) Rate at which the tax is imposed; and (iv) The measure or value to which rate is applied for computing tax liability. Under Section 4-B the exhibition of video shows is the subject matter of tax under the Act, payable by proprietors or owner or exhibitors of video shows and the rate of tax is ₹ 2,500/-. Thus, the provision clearly spells out all the necessary ingredients to charge the tax on video shows and the arguments to the contrary that it is not the charging section are untenable. 16. For the foregoing reasons, with great respect to the learned single Judge who decided the writ petitions, we set aside the order made therein and dismiss the writ petitions. Rule discharged. 17. Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (1) TMI 318 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... where a suit is filed against a company and a third person, ordinarily, while exercising its jurisdiction, the court will grant leave to file the suit. Nowhere in the said authorities, it has been laid down that the company court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit which it allowed to be filed or to be continued where a company and a third party are impleaded as defendants. The argument of Mr. Kala based on the observations mentioned above in Taxman's Company Law Digest corroborates the view that there are no fetters imposed by law on the jurisdiction vested by sub-section (2) of section 446 of the Companies Act in the company court to entertain and dispose of any suit or proceeding instituted by or against the company. 7. The result, therefore, is that the application is partly allowed and, accordingly, leave is granted to the applicant, Deutsche Bank, to file the proposed suit before this court. There will be no order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case.
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1990 (1) TMI 317 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e sections will come into play only when there is a proceeding for winding up a banking company. They cannot be invoked, in these proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 48. In the circumstances, this Court cannot frame or formulate any guidelines as prayed for by the petitioner. The net result of the analysis of the above facts and circumstances of the case is that the two prayers contained in the writ petition cannot be granted to the petitioner. No argument was advanced by the petitioner as to whether this Court should grant any relief in a moulded form. No prayer was made by the petitioner. On the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that it is not possible to grant any such relief in moulded form when it is found that the reliefs actually prayed for by the petitioner cannot be granted in his favour. 49. In the circumstances, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. 50. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (1) TMI 316 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... earlier attempts has now again come forward with the present petition with a highly belated plea that some documents, though he made a request, have not been supplied. This request, as we find from the records, was made after this Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition No. 302/89, He, however, justifies the filing of the present petition on a plea that he was unaware of the existence of these documents. But as noted above his petition itself shows that he was aware of all these documents. Therefore, we do not see any bonafides in this plea of his. Under these circumstances, we are unable to say that the refusal to supply the documents requested by him amounts to violation of Article 22(5). 13. After a careful perusal of all the materials, we are satisfied that the detenu was afforded a full reasonable opportunity to make an effective representation. Consequently we see no merits in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
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1990 (1) TMI 315 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e award was made covering a period not only prior to January 10, 1968 but to a period thereafter also. As we have interpreted Section 25, the objection as raised before the High Court was valid for the period before January 10, 1968, but not beyond the period commencing thereafter. The High Court's view , in sustaining the objection for the later period as well, does not commend to us. The Legislature by enacting Section 25 of the Requisitioning Act and on the perishing of the Defence Act, has more than impliedly made available a right of appeal regarding the rate of compensation for a property remaining under requisi- tion for the post th January, 1968 period recurring as the rate of compensation would be. We hold it accordingly. For the view above taken, we partially allow these appeals and remit these cases back to the High Court of Karnataka for disposal on merits in accordance with law. We, however, make no order as to costs in the appeals before us. Appeals allowed
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1990 (1) TMI 314 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... this sum of £ 15 was included in his taxable income. On appeal, it was held that the employee never acquired any rights either against his employers or against the tailor supplying the suit and that only the value of the suit was includible in his hands which was £ 5 only. This value was determined on the basis that what he could get for it if he sold it as soon as he had received it. In any case, noting the circumstances, cited by us above, this is not a case where the employee has demanded that he be put up in a five star hotel but under compelling circumstances, he was made to stay in the hotel and therefore, the hotel bill cannot be the basis for determining the value of perquisite on account of rent-free accommodation in his hands. We, accordingly, hold that the Commissioner (Appeals) was right in calculating the value of the rent-free accommodation at ₹ 18,370 in the present case. We accordingly affirm his order and dismiss the appeal of the Revenue.
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1990 (1) TMI 313 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mstance. The Supreme Court pointed out that equitable consideration was wholly out of place in construing the provisions of a taxing statute. If the allowance claimed is permissible under the Act, then the same has to be deducted from the profits. 11. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases clearly apply to the facts of the instant case. It is not the case of the revenue that various units of business carried on by the assessee independently are separate business concerns. The assessee had relied on the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court before the Tribunal. No attempt was made to distinguish these judgments on the ground that the business carried on by the assessee were separate and independent transactions. 12. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two judgments, both the questions are answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. 13. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J. - I agree.
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1990 (1) TMI 312 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or the carrying into effect of a trading agreement." Accordingly, the question referred by the Department is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 6. With regard to question No.1 which is at the instance of the assessee, it is now concluded by decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sajjan Mills Ltd. vs. CIT & Anr. reported in (1985) 49 CTR (SC) 193 (1985) 156 ITR 585(SC). Following the said judgement of the Supreme Court, this question of law is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. 7. With regard to question No. 2, which is at the instance of the assessee, the language of the section is quite clear and there is no room for any doubt as to the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal. We are of the view that the Tribunal has taken a correct view of the matter. Accordingly, this question is answered also in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN, J. I agree.
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1990 (1) TMI 311 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sion in Gurjargravures' case (supra). The claim having never been made before the authorities below and not being prima facie allowable unless a fresh and thorough investigation is made into the facts of the case, the same, therefore, cannot be entertained at this stage. We, therefore, refuse to allow the assessee to raise this additional ground." 6. The question is whether the Tribunal will allow taking additional grounds or not is a discretionary matter. The Tribunal has given reasons for not exercising the discretion and from the reasons it appear that the Tribunal has judicially exercised its discretion. We find no reason to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Tribunal with regard to question Nos. 2 and 3. Accordingly these two questions must also be answered in the affirmative in the favour of the Revenue. 7. In the circumstance, all the four question are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. 8. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (1) TMI 310 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the point of law in dispute was settled by a judgment of this Court. It was not the case of the Department that the judgment was under appeal or that the judgment had been set aside or that even a contrary view had been taken in some other case on this point. The Department was bound to apply the principles of law laid down by the Calcutta High Court. Since the point of law had already been decided by the Calcutta High Court the ITO had to follow the law laid down by this Court. If that was not done then an obvious and glaring mistake of law had been committed. Such mistake can be rectified under s. 154 of the Act. 6. Therefore, question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 is concluded by a judgment of this Court in the case of Presidency Medical Centre Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (supra). Question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE, J. I agree.
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