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1990 (10) TMI 386 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ould help to advance the manifest ulterior purpose of the statute. Here, strictness relates not to the meaning of the statute but to using the statute as a basis for judicial law making by analogy with it." 6. Construing the provisions of Section 138 of the Act in the said manner, it is not possible to accept the case of the petitioner as set out in paragraph 3(e) of the grounds raised in the petition that the learned Magistrate had failed to note that the intention of the Legislature was to punish the person who committed an offence mentioned under Section 138 of the Act by liberally construing the provisions of that Section and the view taken by the learned Magistrate is very narrow as it would defeat the very purpose of enacting Section 138 of the Act. Consequently, I hold that the petitioner has not made out a case for quashing the impugned order in exercise of the inherent power under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. 7. In the result, the petition is dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 385 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he assessee at the time of hearing. Having heard Mr. S.K. Sharan, the learned counsel for the revenue, we have come to the conclusion that this reference must be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The AAC had found that the cash credit of ₹ 17,000 was satisfactorily explained by the assessee and this finding has been upheld by the Tribunal. The learned counsel for the revenue contended that the assessment of Bibi Manauwar Sultana was reopened and was subject-mater of further enquiry. That enquiry, however, cannot affect the finding of the Tribunal that the assessee had satisfactorily explained the cash credit of ₹ 17,000. Therefore, the Tribunal, in our opinion, was right in holding that the AAC was justified in deleting the addition of ₹ 17,000. Our answer to the question referred to this Court is in the affirmative and against the revenue. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 384 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... p of the company, I have found this jurisdiction to be discretionary, summary and also concerned with the equities. Share transfer forms were executed by the petitioners and duly attested by the second respondent ; consideration for the purchase was paid by the transferees and mostly encashed by the second respondent and one or two by the concerned petitioners. In this situation, I do not think that any injustice would result to the parties if this court declines to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 155. The petitioners may establish their respective legal rights, if any, by resorting to any other remedy. 46. Consequently C. P. No. 62 of 1988 is dismissed. 47. In view of the dismissal of C. P. No. 62 of 1988, C. P. No. 48 of 1987 filed by the same petitioners for the winding up of the company also has to be dismissed as they cannot be treated as shareholders. 48. In the result, for the reasons stated above, both the petitions are dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 383 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nder O; 9, R. 13 read with S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as in these Miscellaneous proceeding it is not possible to determine as to whether the signature of Sri Nagarmal were forged in the earlier proceedings as has been alleged by the petitioner. In this view of the matter the Courts below were wholly correct in taking a view that appropriate remedy for the petitioner is by filing suit, in the facts of the present case, the application under 0.9, R. 13 read with S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not maintainable. 30. In view of what has been stated above it is not necessary to discuss in detail the decisions cited in the present case on behalf of both the parties. 31. For the reasons stated above I dismiss the writ petition with costs. Since I am satisfied that the present petitioner has not come with clean hands in invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, I quantify the cost to ₹ 2000/-in this case. 32. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 382 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rises. 9. Although we are of the view that the respondent has not committed contempt, we do realise that in case the petitioner succeeds in the writ petition, the respondent would have remained in possession of the said premises for a long time after they should have handed over the possession of the same to the petitioner. We find that the respondent has already been directed to pay compensation for the use of the said premises at the rate of ₹ 15,000 per month by an order of this Court passed over two years earlier. We direct that the respondent shall deposit, in addition, an amount of ₹ 10,000 per month commencing from 1st October, 1990, in the Court, the first of such deposits to be made on or before 20th October, 1990, and deposits for each succeeding month to be made by 15th day of each succeeding month. The amounts deposited shall be invested by the Registrar-General at suitable intervals in a nationalised bank in fixed deposit after consulting the parties.
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1990 (10) TMI 381 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o file an application for revocation of the leave which can be considered on merits and according to law. We may mention that although clause (ffa) of a section 104(1) of the Code provides that an appeal shall lie against the refusal of grant of leave, that cannot lead to the conclusion that it is obliga- tory on the part of the court to give notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave because an appeal lies only against the refusal of leave and not against the grant of leave. Before refusing leave the proposed plaintiffs are bound to be heard and it is the plaintiffs and not the defendants who could be prejudiced by refusal to grant such leave. In the result, the appeals are allowed as aforestated. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The Trial Court is directed to dispose of the application for revocation of leave on merits and in accordance with law. On the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost incurred so far.
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1990 (10) TMI 380 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is decreed. The defendant is directed to executethe sale deed regarding plot No. E-554, Greater Kailash Part Ii, New Delhi, measuring 275 Sq. Yds. in favor of the plaintiff and to hand over possession thereof on the plaintiff depositing the balance sale consideration in Court. The plaintiff is allowed two months' to deposit the balance sale consideration.. - On.-the amount of balance sale consideration being deposited, the defendant will, within two weeks, take necessary steps to obtain the requisite permission's from the authorities concerned. Within two weeks of obtaining such per-mission(s), the defendant will execute the sale deed in favor of the plaintiff. If the defendant fails to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff will be emended to seek further necessary directions from Court and to have the sale deed executed through the Registrar of this Court and obtain possession of the plot in suit through process of the Court. The plaintiff will be entitled to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 379 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llant and other employees who were transferred to the Corporation that their conditions of service would not be adversely affected. The said assurance was incorporated in the directions issued under the Act. The Corporation cannot frame regulations contrary to the directions issued by the State Government Under Section 34 of the Act. The age of superannuating which the appellant was enjoying under the State Government could not be altered to his disadvantage by the Corporation. We are, therefore, of the view that Regulation 59 framed by the Corporation was not applicable to the appellant. He was entitled to continue in service upto the age of 60 years. 12. We, therefore, allow the appeal with costs and set aside the judgment of the High Court. The appellant has already attained the, age of 60 years. He is only entitled to two years emoluments. The respondents are directed to pay the same to the appellant within three months from today. We quantify the costs as ₹ 5,000.
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1990 (10) TMI 378 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ears on its face signs of having been tampered with, he has only to answer the question whether the document is in the state in which it was executed by the parties to it. He would be exceeding his functions if he went into a roving enquiry to guess at the probabilities of its provisions; and in a suit under Section 77, Registration Act, the same considerations should guide the Court which should guide the Registrar in considering his duty to register or to refuse registration. 14. In these circumstances, the concurrent findings of the courts below that the respondent has denied the execution of the sale deed Ex. A1 and that the orders of the District Registrar and the Sub-Registrar refusing to register the document Ex. A1 is just and legal are correct and do not call for interference in these second appeals. There are no merits in the second appeals and they are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly they are dismissed, but, in the circumstances, there is no-order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 377 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... resent case, the appellants should be given the facility to make the payment in three equal annual installments and the interest should be charged on such deferred payment at not more than 14 per cent per annum. The respondent-lessees would, however, not be entitled to convert the present user of the land into the commercial user until and unless the last of the amount of the additional premium together with the interest thereon is paid. The respondents will further be liable to pay the misuse charges mentioned at items 6 and 7 of the notice of 12.1.1984 till 12th April, 1984 from which date, they would be paying the conversion charges as above. The appellants will give the respondents the facility to pay the rest of the amounts, i.e., the amounts other than the conversion charges in twenty-four monthly installments with interest at no more than 10 per cent annum. 13. The decision of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 376 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... an of the Commission. In case the Commission is not constituted, the two questions indicated above which are of vital importance to the efficient functioning of the judicial system in the country require consideration and there is an clement of immediacy in the matter. We, therefore, suggest that the writ petition on the two issues indicated above may be taken up for hearing at an early date and preferably before the end of this year. We hope and trust that the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association would continue to evince interest in the matter but if our expectations are belied, this being in the nature of a public interest litigation, some one interested in the restitution of the issues would be brought on record to effectively continue the proceeding and assist the Court. 51. We clarify that apart from the two questions which we have indicated, all other aspects dealt with by us are intended to be final by our present order. 52. There shall be no order for costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 375 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... counts, I hold that the Board is not an 'industry'. In this view of the matter, prima facie the petitioner cannot claim to be a workman employed by an industry. In this view of the matter, I uphold the finding of the First Labour Court that the Board is not an 'industry'. I also uphold the finding of the First Labour Court that the petitioner is not a 'workman'. If there would have been an occasion to consider the merits of the case, it would have been necessary to examine as to whether the petitioner was automatically confirmed on the probation period of three months having come to an end or not. Perhaps no probationist can claim automatic confirmation on expiry of the initial probation period. However, it is not necessary to examine any of these questions on merits. 17. In view of the above discussion, the petition is dismissed and the Rule is discharged. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, these shall be no order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 374 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and we are satisfied that the High Court was completely wrong in concluding that her evidence was not corroborated in material particulars by independent evidence. We are afraid that the High Court embarked upon a reappreciation of the evidence as if it were silting in appeal against the decision of the departmental authorities. Its reappreciation of the evidence is also unsustainable. 9. For the above reasons we set aside the order of the High Court and restore the order of removal from service passed by the appellate authority and direct that it be given effect to in accordance with law. We, however, make it clear that if in the meantime the respondent was re-instated in service pursuant to the High Court's order, the salary and allowances paid for actual duty rendered on such re-installment shall not be liable to be refunded. Except for the same the rest of the consequences of the removal order will fall on the respondent. The appeal is allowed accordingly with costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 373 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... served in pursuance of our Order dated 3-8-90 and the point in the appeals seems to be covered directly by the decision in the case above cited. We proceed to dispose of this appeal as follows Following our decision in Bank of Baroda v. Rednam Nagachaya Devi , we set aside the Order of the High Court. We hold that, though the respondent is not entitled to claim relief under Andhra Pradesh Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 against the appellant, the question as to whether the debt in favour of the appellant is liable to be scaled down in terms of the provisions of Usurious Loans Act, 1918 should be considered by the High Court insofar as they are applicable in relation to the debts due to the appellant. With these observations, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the second appeal restored on the file of the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law on the point above mentioned. 2. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no Order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 372 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... perannuation. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in quashing the impugned order of punishment but we think having regard to the special facts and circumstances pointed out earlier, it should not have ordered payment of 'all consequential benefits' flowing from the declaration that the impugned order was bad in law. We, therefore, modify this part of the order by substituting the words fifty percent' in place of the word 'all' in the penultimate paragraph of the learned Single Judge's order. To put the matter beyond the pale of doubt we clarify that the respondent will be paid 50 of the consequential benefits and not all the consequential benefits. Except for this modification, the rest of the order of the High Court will stand. The appeal will stand allowed to the above extent but, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we think the parties should be directed to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed partly.
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1990 (10) TMI 371 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o the maker as so spoilt or unfit. The system of charging up the duty on the subsequent event of non export cannot, therefore, be said to be irrespective of production or manufacture. In the instant case if it is proved to the satisfaction of the appropriate authorities that countervailing duty had been paid on the entire consignment irrespective of the wastage then the question would arise as to whether the wastage could be ignored altogether by the exporting State as was done by the importing State. Counsel for the parties had no objection to the idea that if the explanation for wastage was satisfactory and the countervailing duty was paid in the importing State on the entire consignment irrespective of the wastage, there would be room for adjustment by reducing the duty to similar extent. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned Judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed, but under the facts and circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (10) TMI 370 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ar as the cases of Udai Lal, Shyam Lal and Prem Shankar are concerned even if the Board did not challenge the order of the High Court dated 28.3.1982 in their cases, it cannot act as res-judicata or as estoppel against the Board in challenging the present order of the High Court before this Court. There is no question of applying the principle of equal pay for equal work in the facts and circumstances of this case and to allow Meter Readers- II/Meter Checker Gr. II, the pay-scale of Meter Reader/Meter Checker Gr. I. Apart from that, these controversies have been raised by the respondents for the first time by filing affidavits before this Court at the fag end of arguments, and these questions being mixed questions of fact and law, cannot be permitted to be raised now. In the result, we allow all these appeals, set aside the Judgment of the High Court, and dismiss all the writ petitions. In the facts and circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 369 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ry in the future either by reason of some beneficiaries ceasing to exist or some new beneficiaries coming into being." (p. 557) Thus, the third question stands fully answered by the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court which is binding on us; it becomes totally unnecessary to call for a reference to answer the third question. 13. In the view we have expressed, if the assessing authority has correctly assessed in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 161, as it was prior to the amendment, then it cannot be said that the Commissioner could assume jurisdiction on the ground that it was prejudicial to the revenue and, therefore, he certainly would not get jurisdiction to revise. 14. Thus, even the other questions raised would be the inconsequential in the light of the answer already given by the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in regard to question No. 3. 15. In the result, we dismiss these petitions, but there will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 368 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in forest produce through State monopoly. These measures are undoubtedly well within the province of the legislature and reasonably and rationally adapted to the end sought. The, legislative findings and the subject-matter of the legislation; the area of its operation; its purpose and intent; its legislative history; the objects and reasons for the amendments made consequent on judicial decisions; the vice that is sought to be remedied; the legislative response to compelling necessities; all this lends support to the presumption in favour of reasonableness, legality and constitutionality of the legislative actions in question. All rights and interests contrary to and inconsistent, with the statute accordingly stand rescinded. We see no merit in the challenge against the statutory provisions or the notifications issued thereunder or the actions taken in accordance with them. The appeals and writ petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeals and Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 367 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ates that Guru Pooja is being performed to Lord Subramanya followed by poor feeding and distribution of saffron coloured clothes. The endowment with regard to these purposes must therefore be upheld. The permanent dedication of properties for performance of annual ceremonies of the testator is equally valid. Whether one terms it as annual Shradha or anniversary, it is certainly a religious rite and it is not uncommon among the Hindu testators to make provisions in their Wills for celebration or performance of such anniversaries of themselves or their ancestors. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court. We are on the other hand in agreement with the views expressed by learned Single Judge. In the result, the appeal is allowed. In reversal of the judgment of the Division Bench, the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge are restored. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal to the appellants. Appeal allowed.
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