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Showing 1 to 20 of 288 Records
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1990 (12) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Mehta since the medical evidence is not fully supporting his plea that the offence is nothing short of murder. In fact, the High Court also examined this aspect regarding the nature of the offence, proved to have been committed by the appellant in paragraph 59 of its judgment and observed as follows Thus even though he may not have the intention to cause death, his act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death and therefore he has committed the offence punishable Under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. and is required to be convicted and punished for the same. 53. After giving our anxious consideration to all the aspects of the case, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken and the reasons given by the High Court and consequently uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court convicting the appellant Under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. 54. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed.
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1990 (12) TMI 342 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... -1990 filed by respondents 1 and 2 tendering unconditional apology in not producing Hardeep Singh in time before the J.M.F.C. Savanur, we are of the view that this is not a case in which any damages should be awarded as claimed by the petitioner inasmuch as the conduct of respondents 1 and 2 cannot be considered to be lacking in bona fides. On the contrary, we must appreciate the manner in which they have chased the lorry and seized 4427 Kgs. of sandlewood worth Rs. 5,53,250/- in which Hardeep Singh and two others were found travelling. We have also been informed that Hardeep Singh was released on bail by the J.M.F.C. Savanur on 30-11-1990. 12. The Memo dated 18-12-1990 filed by respondents 1 and 2 is placed on record. 13. For the reasons stated above, there is no reason to continue this petition any further. It is accordingly closed. 14. Sri Doddamani, learned Govt. Pleader is permitted to file his memo of appearance on behalf respondents in six weeks. 15. Order accordingly.
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1990 (12) TMI 341 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot consider that this is a case in which we will be justified in exercising our power under Order 41 Rule 33 of the C.P.C. Second defendant himself has accepted the decree and acquiesced in it and has not preferred any appeal against that decree. Therefore, the decree of the lower appellate court in so far it confirms the decree of the trial court as against defendant-2 shall have to be retained. 31. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the courts below in so far they relate to appellant -- defendant No. 3 -- are set aside. The judgment and decree of the courts below as against defendant-2 are not disturbed. The suit of the plaintiff as against defendant-3 is dismissed. In view of this, it is unnecessary to consider I.A. No. II seeking amendment to the written statement filed by the appellant. 32. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that each party should bear its respective costs in this appeal. 33. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (12) TMI 340 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n of the matter and to arrive at another and totally different decision. 9. It will thus be apparent that this was a case where a successor officer had sat in appeal over the decision of his predecessor which was already acted upon. The successor had no such power. A new Government or even the same Government has power to revise the earlier industrial or fiscal policy in the light of the view that it takes of the situation and of the measures required to deal with it, from time to time. Hence, if the new Government had taken the decision in question to withdraw the exemption at a later date, it cannot be said that it has done so mala fide. It must be remembered in this connection that when the exemption was granted initially, no assurance was given that the appellant would get it for a longer period than the period mentioned in the then notification. 10. Since this was the only contention raised in the appeal, we find no substance in the appeal and it is dismissed with costs.
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1990 (12) TMI 339 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e property sold and the name of the person who at the time of sale is declared to be the purchaser. Such certificate shall bear date the day on which the sale became absolute. It is manifest that the title passes under the auction sale by force of law and the transfer becomes final when an order Under Rule 92 confirming it is made. By the Certificate issued Under Rule 94, the Court is formally declaring the effect of the same and is not extinguishing or creating title. The object of issuance or such a Certificate is to avoid any controversy with respect to the identity of the property sold, and of the purchaser thereof as also the date when the sale becomes absolute. The use of past tense in the rule stating that the sale "became" absolute, is consistent with this interpretation. The Certificate, therefore, cannot be termed to be an instrument of sale so as to attract Section 147 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1990 (12) TMI 338 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... ater. It is pertinent to mention that out of the lot which was brought in by the respondents part had already been utilised in the manufacture of the finished product and credit in respect of that has not been asked to be reversed as the respondents have been directed to reverse the MODVAT Credit only in respect of that portion of the lot of the inputs which were lying in stock as on 2-11-1987 when the amending instructions are issued. We may mention that in the enacted scheme of the MODVAT once the credit in respect of the specified inputs has been taken and there is no dispute in regard to the use of the inputs for the specified finished products, the credit, in our view, cannot be reversed even when a particular input may be deleted from the specified categories of the inputs under Rule 57A”. 4. In view of above, we hold that the learned lower appellate authority was right in rejecting the plea of the Revenue. The appeal filed by the Revenue is accordingly dismissed.
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1990 (12) TMI 337 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... , the issue is remanded to the file of the ITO." 16. It would be seen from the above observation that paucity of materials was the reason why the Tribunal set aside the matter to the assessing authority. There is no such reason for this year. All materials necessary have been considered by us. We may also mention that the fact that in a sister company’s case, the ITO himself has allowed the deduction, cannot carry the assessee’s case for, because each case will depend upon its facts. Finally, we may also refer to the decision of the Bangalore Bench of the ITAT in the case of Krishna Associates (supra). That case was more or less similar to the Karnataka High Court decision in Datacons Ltd., considered above. So the facts of that case are entirely different. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the assessee is not entitled to Investment Allowance. 17. In the result, the assessee’s appeal is treated as partly allowed for statistical purposes.
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1990 (12) TMI 336 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Hence, the question of obtaining consent or sanction from the Commissioner of Labour by the complainant does not at all arise. In the result, sub-s. (3) of S. 470 of the Cr.P.C. has in our opinion, no application to the facts of this case." I am in respectful agreement with the view taken in this case, State v. Diamond Prabhu (1980) 1 Kant LJ 23 by the Karnataka High Court. Once, therefore, it is held that the provisions of S. 470(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not enable the prosecution to contend that the period required for obtaining the authorisation of the appropriate Government the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the prosecution was barred by limitation will have to be upheld. Upholding the same, I find that the complaint lodged by the Assistant Commissioner of Labour and which came to be numbered as 1004/S of 1986 along with the order of issue of process passed thereon is liable to be quashed. Rule made absolute. 16. Order accordingly.
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1990 (12) TMI 335 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eported in 1979 U. P. Tax Cases page 684 is equally unsustainable in law in view of the law laid down by this Court in J. K. Synthetics. The attention of the learned Single Judge was not drawn to the principle governing the doctrine of merger spelled out in J. K. Synthetics. 20. To sum up, we hold that the order of assessment having merged in the order passed in appeal, the impugned notice must be held to be wholly without jurisdiction. In the view that we are taking on the question of jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) to issue the impugned notice under Section 22, it is not necessary to pronounce on the alternative ground urged in support of this petition, namely, that there was no error apparent on the facr; of the record so as to warrant exercise of jurisdiction under Section 22. 21. For the reasons stated above, we had pronounced the operative part of the order on 15-11-1990 allowing the writ petition and quashing the impugned notice dated 19-9-1990.
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1990 (12) TMI 334 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . We cannot, therefore, disturb the finding of the Tribunal as incorporated in the statement of case. It is now well-settled that the Tribunal is a fact-finding authority and this Court in its advisory jurisdiction cannot reappreciate the evidence. The Court can only go into the question of perversity of finding, if such a question has been raised on the facts found by the Tribunal. On the facts found by the Tribunal, the conclusion is irresistible that the assessee acquired the shares in various companies for obtaining the directorship or ultimate control of the companies. Accordingly, the acquisition of shares was in the investment portfolio. Therefore, the loss, if any, on sale of such shares must be capital loss and the Tribunal was right on facts in coming to the conclusion as it did. 8. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the negative and in favour of the revenue. 9. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J. - I agree.
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1990 (12) TMI 333 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... marriage. 20. I do not think that the position in India is as what is known and followed in England. Here, there is no difficulty to say that a wife has got a separate status and that she has got right in property even after the marriage. At any rate, to me it appears obaoxiom when a criminal liability is imposed by a statute to maintain the children, to say that a father has no liability to maintain his children only on account of the fact that he professes Christian religion. In the circumstances, I feel that what the court below has done is perfectly correct in ordering maintenance allowance to the 2nd plaintiff at the rate of ₹ 100/- per mensem from the date of suit. The decree in regard to that part is confirmed and I modify the decree passed by the court directing that the 1st plaintiff is entitled to recover only an amount of ₹ 17,000/- with 6% interest per annum from the date of suit till date of recovery from the defendant. Appeal is disposed of as above.
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1990 (12) TMI 332 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dent approached the Government for subsidy, it will have to be presumed that the Government had taken judicial note of the rates likely to be charged by the Corporation or the loss, if any, it was likely to suffer. This assumption is wholly unjustified. No such inference could be possible from the Corporation license for building construction. Such license has nothing to do with the property tax to be levied. Our attention has not been drawn to any other material on which the Government could have taken note of the rates likely to be charged by the Corporation or the loss that it might suffer in recovering the property tax on the basis of rentals of each tenement at ₹ 26.50. We are, therefore, not impressed with the conclusion reached by the High Court. 17. The appeal is accordingly allowed, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and restoring that of Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, Bombay. 18. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1990 (12) TMI 331 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or ordinarily resident in the state of the original court, did not voluntarily appear or otherwise submit during the proceedings to the jurisdiction of that court; There is a short answer to this argument. The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Acts in the various provinces were never intended to alter the rules of private international law. They simply provided for the registration of judgments as a more convenient procedure than was formerly available, i.e. by bringing an action to enforce a judgment given in another province; see First City Capital Ltd. v. Winchester Computer Corp., 1987 6 W.W.R. 212 (Sask. C.A.). This is in fact made clear by s. 40 of the British Columbia Act which provides that nothing in the Act deprives a judgment creditor from bringing an action for enforcement of a judgment. There is nothing, then, to prevent a plaintiff from bringing such an action and thereby taking advantage of the rules of private international law as they may evolve over time.
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1990 (12) TMI 330 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ute the decision of the Superintending Engineer of the circle shall be final". The respondents pointed out that the arbitration agreement was contained in Clause 14 and that clause specifically excluded any dispute arising under Clause 13A. Disputed rates were matters which came within the ambit of Clause 13A. Such disputes were not covered by the arbitration agreement. The awards were, therefore, made without jurisdiction and were void. 4. The learned judge of the High Court held that Clause 14 containing the arbitration agreement had no application to the dispute in question which fell under Clause 13A and, therefore , the arbitrator had no jurisdiction in the matter. He held that the reference of the dispute to the arbitrator was invalid and the entire proceedings before the arbitrator including the awards made by him were null and void. 5. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning of the learned judge. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs throughout.
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1990 (12) TMI 329 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... scation because the submission of the appellants was that what had been imported "should have been palm acid oil" and not coconut acid oil. There was no material on the basis of which such a submission could have been made. It was based on mere conjectures and therefore the learned Single Judge rightly repelled the contention. Levy of penalty involves proceedings which are quasi-criminal in nature. It is now settled law that to establish a charge it is not only necessary to prove the existence of mens rea, but also that the allegations must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. On the basis of the materials on record, the allegations against the respondents could not be said to have been proved much less beyond any reasonable doubt. The learned Single Judge therefore rightly allowed W.P. No. 1767 of 1982 and as a consequence thereof, dismissed W.P. No. 1768 of 1982 as not pressed. We do not find any cause to interfere. The Writ Appeals fail and they are dismissed.
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1990 (12) TMI 328 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ly a figurative description of a colourable transaction to evade the provisions of a statute and does not, for purposes of choice of the remedy, distinguish itself from the consequences of fraud as vitiating the permission Under Section 21 referred to in Vohra's case. 16. Indeed, in Dhanvanti v. D.D. Gupta 1986 3SCR18 it was held that permission Under Section 21 for letting out the premises to the same tenant for limited periods more than once successively would not by itself and without more vitiate the subsequent grants. In one sense, the successive grants of permission would share the characteristics of post-facto grant. 17. In the circumstances and for the foregoing reasons, this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court dated 29.11.1989 in SAO No. 384 of 1987 set aside and the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 17.10.1987 affirming the order of the Rent Controller dated 16.2.1987 restored Parties are left to bear and pay their own costs in this appeal.
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1990 (12) TMI 327 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... trial Court, the appeal filed by his client in the Court of District Judge, Aurangabad becomes infructuous and he would withdraw the same for that reason. However, it appears that an interim relief has been granted in Misc. Appeal by the appellate Court on 29-8-1990 and that interim relief still continues. This interim relief is directed to be continued and to be taken as interim relief granted under sub- section (2) of section 9-A only during the pendency of the decision on the question of jurisdiction. Preliminary issue to be framed by learned trial Judge, if any, under section 9-A within a period of two months from today. The writ to go forthwith Since the learned trial Judge has taken a view about the interim relief in his order, it would be desirable if the matter is .assigned to some other Judge This liberty is there with Principal Judge of Civil Court, Aurangabad Parties are directed to appear before the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Aurangabad on 26-12-1990.
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1990 (12) TMI 326 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... earned Counsel but this will not solve the problem of the appellant. For, under Order 21, Rule 90 it is not sufficient for the appellant to contend that there was an illegality or irregularity in the conduct of the sale; he must also prove by adducing sufficient facts that some substantial injury has been caused to the petitioner as a result of the Order under Order 21, Rule 72 having been passed without such notice. We have been taken through the relevant facts in detail by Sri Dholakia but we are unable to find any such overwhelming circumstances as can enable us to hold that this irregularity was such as has caused substantial injury to the appellant within the meaning of the rule in the circumstances of the case. 4. Having gone into the matter at length we are unable to find any grounds to interfere with the decision of the Courts below to dismiss the application under Order 21, Rule 90. This appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. However, we make no Order as to costs.
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1990 (12) TMI 325 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rest produce as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act and consequently it does not require transit permit. 14. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that in the present instance the expression "includes" is used really to mean "means and includes" and not "includes" as generally understood. We are thus of the view that the consignment in dispute is not a consignment of forest produce and no permit or certificate is required from the Forest Department for transit of the goods in dispute, and to that extent the impugned circular is ultra vires the Rules and the respondents are issued a writ of Mandamus directing them to accept the consignments without insisting on the production of a permit from the Forest Department in respect of the goods in dispute. 15. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The order of the learned single Judge is set aside and the appeal is allowed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. 16. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (12) TMI 324 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... veral poor subscribers who are lured into the business by the promise of lump sum payment. The precaution that the State has taken by the present legislation requiring enhanced deposits to be made is a prudent one and is essential for the purpose of regulating the chit fund trade. We see no restrictiveness at all in the measure. 5. On the second question the High Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in Syed Ahmed Aga v. State of Mysore and came to the conclusion that the amended provision only varied the form of restriction which was already inherent in the original Act. According to the High Court since the principal Act had the sanction of the President it was not necessary to obtain the sanction of the President for the amending Act. 6. We have been taken through the judgment of the High Court. We see no infirmity in the same. We approve the reasoning and the conclusions reached by the High Court. 7. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.
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