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1990 (3) TMI 384 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to warrant interference by this Court. So far as the temples said to be situated in some of the lands sought to be acquired are concerned, it is enough to observe that T.T.D. itself is a religious institution. We can take note of the fact that T.T.D. is financially helping several other Hindu religious institutions, not only in this State but all over the country. Such an institution would not destroy or demolish temples. If there are really temples in any of the lands being acquired, it is evident that T.T.D. will take steps either to shift them to appropriate places, or make other appropriate arrangements consistent with the importance of the temples concerned, keeping in mind the feelings and sensibilities of the devotees concerned. 32. For the above reasons, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. Writ Appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Govt. pleader's fee Rs. 150/- in each. 33.Appeals dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 383 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rt of the defendants or at least an intention has been amply evinced in the matter of procurement of a breach of agreement between the plaintiffs and its foreign principals. 21. In the premises, there shall be an order of injunction restraining the defendants or their servants and agents from procuring or wrongfully inducing any breach of any agreement made by and between the plaintiffs and the foreign principals as mentioned in Schedule J to the petition in any manner whatsoever or entering into any agreements with the said parties as it appears from Schedule J to the petition relating to the matters forming subject matter of agreements still subsisting between the above noted parties and the plaintiffs in any manner whatsoever. There shall also be an order of injunction restraining the defendants from otherwise disclosing or using confidential informations or trade secrets acquired from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs shall, however, be entitled to costs of this application.
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1990 (3) TMI 382 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on on the basis of his own knowledge and perception instead of relying more on the version of the incident as placed before him by the sponsoring authority. In a case where the detaining authority may not be present at the place of the incident or the occurrence, he has to form the requisite opinion on the basis of materials placed before him by the sponsoring authority but where the detaining authority was himself present at the scene of occurrence he should have relied more on his own observation and knowledge than on the report of the sponsoring authority. In the instant case the detaining authority though present at the scene of occurrence does not support the incident as presented to him by the sponsoring authority. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that there was non-application of mind by the detaining authority in making the impugned order of detention. 21. In view of the above discussion the detention order is rendered illegal and it is accordingly quashed.
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1990 (3) TMI 381 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was, therefore, a case of fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document executed by her and not merely as to its contents or as to its legal effect. The plaintiff-appellant never intended to sign what she did sign. She never intended to enter into the contract to which she unknowingly became a party. Her mind did not accompany her thumb impressions. This is a case that falls within the principle enunciated in Ningawwa v. Byrappa & 3 Ors., (supra) and it was, therefore, a totally void transaction. Accordingly, as stated in Gorakh Nath Dube (supra), the suit is not maintainable by reason of the bar contained in the Act. 8. The High Court has, in our view, rightly held that the remedy of the plaintiff lies in the proceedings pending before the consolidation authorities and it is open to the parties to approach them for appropriate relief. In the circumstances, we see no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed, but we make no order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 380 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t in terms of remand order is expected soon, then in that situation the court may take this into consideration, and pass suitable order. of adjournment awaiting such an order The trial court shall, while disposing of such an application, bear in mind following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Jayappan (supra) "EVEN here the discretion should be exercised judicially and in such a way as not to frustrate the object of the criminal proceedings. There is no rigid rule which makes it necessary for a criminal court to adjourn or postpone the hearing of a case before it indefinitely or for an unduly long period only because some proceeding which may have some bearing on it is pending elsewhere" 18. The petition is dismissed with the above observations. Parties are left to bear their own cost. TRIAL court records be sent back for further action in the matter. The petitioners to appear before the court of the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 23-3-90.
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1990 (3) TMI 379 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... duction of articles". The Court held at, though the pressure piling resulted in laying of the foundation of buildings, but in view of the technology involved, etc., came to hold that, the activity was a manufacturing of an article. Therefore, these judgments also support the claim of the assessee. The three Tribunal decisions relied upon by the assessee, were considering the granting of investment allowance, under sec. 32A of the Act, containing the words, "the business of construction", and have been used in conjunction with the words "article or thing". Though the words "the business of construction" is not contained in sec. 80-I, but having regard to the fact that the Tribunal Decisions (supra) have held that building is an article or thing, the absence of the words "the business of construction", in our opinion would not make any material difference. 5 to 7 These paragraphs are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues .
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1990 (3) TMI 378 - ITAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ds cannot be established, duty cannot be levied. In the other case cited by the learned Counsel (1978 ELT J 172 1976 Cen-Cus 8ID ECR C (S.C.) 198 Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd, v. Union of India) the Supreme Court has held that show cause issued in the absence of evidence of removal of goods without payment of duty the findings are without any tangible evidence and are based only on inferences involving unwarranted assumption and are vitiated by an error of law. We accordingly hold that the duty on brass controllers and tops found by the Deputy Collector in his order to be leviable for which he directed the Range Officer to work out the amount is not due as their manufacture by the appellants has not been established. We, however, support the imposition of penalty of ₹ 2.000/- on them which is related to ;heir removal of LPG Stoves without payment of duty which was paid by them subsequently after the proceedings were initiated against them. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1990 (3) TMI 377 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s an earlier order made by it was, therefore, not concluded by this decision. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override bar of review under section 362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, 1981 1 SCC 500 that the inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code. The court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power. We find that the impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage. We allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (3) TMI 376 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cumstances, succeed for the simple reason that the society has failed to prove the fact which constitutes the foundation for jurisdiction. If the society fails to prove that the appellant has no right to the occupation of the flat since he is a mere trespasser, the suit must obviously fail. That is why even in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited this Court did not consider it necessary to deal with the contention based onSection 91(1) of the Societies Act in detail and felt content by observing that the point stood covered by the decision in Bhatnagar's case. For the reasons afore-stated, we are of the view that the impugned Judgment of the Bombay High Court cannot be allowed to stand. We allow this appeal, set aside the Judgments of all the Courts below and direct that the claim application filed under Section 91(1) of the Societies Act shall stand dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (3) TMI 375 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eir conduct. (See (i) R.K. Lakshmanan v.A.K. Srinivasan, 1976 I SCR 204 and (ii) Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhushan Kar, 1986 2 SCC 567 at 576. (3) The Judiciary and Constitutional Politics--Views from the Bench by Mark W. Cannon and David M.O.'s Brien p. 27. Learned Judge having held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the review petition ought not to have commented on the professional conduct of the appellant and that too without an opportunity for him. We regret to note that the observations made and aspersions cast on the professional conduct of the appellant are not only without jurisdiction, but also they are wholly and utterly unjustified and unwarranted. We therefore, allow the appeal and expunge all the remarks made by B.M. Lal, J. against the appellant in the impugned order. Normally, we would have awarded heavy costs against the respondent but since the respondent is also an Advocate, we refrain from making any order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (3) TMI 374 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erence was made to a decision of this Court in the case of CIT v. National Insurance Co. of India 1981 127 ITR 54. In that case, it was held that the person in respect of whom provision for pension was made had already retired and there was an existing liability under the terms of his employment. Further, existing liability was actuarially computed and thereafter the provision for pension represented accrued liability and was an admissible deduction in computing the profits of the assessee for that assessment year. In that case, only one method was followed. But, in the instant case before us, the assessee intended to follow two different methods, one on the basis of actuarial basis and another on the basis of actual payment made. These two systems cannot go together and, accordingly, they cannot be allowed to go together. Accordingly, the second question is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. 6. There will be no order as to costs. Sen, J. I agree.
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1990 (3) TMI 373 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , a person is sought to be charged, then the said provisions have to be construed as having retrospective effect. In that event, the accused would be deprived of a defence open to him at the time the acts complained of were committed. A defence which was open to the accused at the time he did the acts complained of cannot be taken away by retrospective operation of a subsequent statute (see Queen v. Griffith 1891 2 QB 145). The ingredients of the offence on which the prosecution has been launched had taken place before the amendment came into operation. In our view, therefore, the provisions of Sections 138 and 141 of the Act cannot be pressed into service in this case. The statute will operate on the event which occurs on April 1, 1989, or thereafter. 20. For the reasons aforesaid, this application is allowed. The impugned proceedings are quashed. 21. This judgment will govern the other application being Criminal Revision No. 2277 of 1989. Jyotirindra Nath Hore, J. I agree.
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1990 (3) TMI 372 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court. Even the 20th seat has been filled up pursuant to the order dated 20-2-1990 in Writ Petition No. 368 of 1990. This seat has been given to respondent No. 16. Respondent No. 16 submits that he has given up his seat in the previous medical college on his being admitted to a Municipal Medical College in Bombay. It is pointed out by Mr. Bharucha as well as by respondents Nos. 14 and 16 that the petitioner has not complied with the requirements of the Press Note. She has also not kept the deadline fixed under it. Hence her application cannot now be considered because many other candidates who have been granted admission pursuant to the Press Note have altered their position as a result of the admission granted to them. There is considerable, force in this argument also. 14. In these circumstances, I do not see any reason to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. Petition is, therefore, dismissed. 16. There will be no order as to costs. 17. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 371 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oubt was intended to protect the attaching creditor, but if the subsequent conveyance is in pursuance of an agreement for sale which was before the attachment, the contractual obligation arising therefrom must be allowed to prevail over the rights of the attaching creditor. The rights of the attaching creditor shall not be allowed to override the contractual obligation arising from an antecedent agreement for sale of the attached property. The attaching creditor cannot ignore that obligation and proceed to bring the property to sale as if it remained the absolute property of the judgment-debtor. We cannot, therefore, agree with the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mohinder Singh's case AIR 1971 P & H 381. 10. In the conclusion that we have reached, this appeal must be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court in reversed and that of the trial court is restored. 11. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 370 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... same time the appellants have been wrongly denied their right to the posts of Tehsildars. Having regard to these facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that it would be expedient in the interest of justice not to interfere with the respondents' appointment but at the same time steps should be taken to enforce the appellants' right to the posts of Tehsildars. In this view, we direct the State Government to appoint the appellants on the posts of Tehsildars with retrospective effect, but if no vacancies are available the State Government will create supernumerary posts of Tehsildars for appointing the appellants against those posts. We further direct that for purpose of seniority the appellants should be placed below the last candidate appointed in 1976, but they will not be entitled to any back wages. The appellants will be entitled to promotion if otherwise found suitable. In the circumstances of the, case, parties shall bear their own costs. Appeals allowed.
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1990 (3) TMI 369 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n pending enquiry. It is, however, open to the writ petitioner to approach the Co-operative authorities against the order of suspension. Under sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 72 of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1964, the Registrar has got the overall supervisory jurisdiction and Control over the service conditions of the Secretaries. Even otherwise, under S. 4(2) of the Act, the Registrar has got power to give appropriate directions in the interest of co-operative movement, public interest, or in order to prevent the affairs, of the society from being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the members, depositors, and creditors. This power is wide enough to give appropriate directions even in a service matter, if such course is found expedient in the interest of factors mentioned in S.4(2). The enquiry, however, shall be concluded expeditiously. 55. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed with the above observations. No costs. 56. Order accordingly.
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1990 (3) TMI 368 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... evision of a non-existing order. Once it is accepted that the order passed by the ITO for levy of interest under section 215 is not a part of the assessment order under section 143(3), then the Commissioner cannot direct the ITO to pass an order under section 215 on the ground of the failure of the ITO to pass such an order. In the case of Premchand Sitanath Roy (supra) the Court was not called upon to decide and did not decide in any way the question whether the Commissioner had jurisdiction under section 263 to direct an ITO to pass an order levying interest when such an order had not at all been passed by the ITO at any stage of his proceeding. Therefore, in our opinion, question No. 1 must be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Although many interesting arguments were advanced on the scope of section 215 raised in question No. 2, in view of the answer given to question No. 1, we decline to answer question No. 2. 25. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 367 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... see whether the appointment had contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance. The High Court should show due regard to the opinion expressed by the experts constituting the Selection Committee and its recommendation on which the Chancellor has acted. See also the decisions in Dr. J.P. Kulshreshtha & Ors. v. Chancellor, Allahabad University, Raj Bhavan & Ors., 1980 3 SCR 902 at 912 and Dalpat Abasahed Solunke v.B.S. Mahajan, 1990 1 SCR 305 at 309-310. In the result, tile appeals are allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside. We also set aside the consequential order dated June 16, 1989 made by the Registrar of the University reverting the appellant to her substantive post of Lecturer in Psychology. Needless to state that her original appointment as Reader pursuant to the decision of the Chancellor shall remain undisturbed with all the consequential benefits. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1990 (3) TMI 366 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on in the Miscellaneous Application is to be regarded as res judicata it would assume the status of a special rule of jurisdiction applicable to the parties in derogation of the law declared by the legislature. We, therefore, see no substance in the second submission. Civil Appeal No. 708 of 1978 is accordingly dismissed with costs. o p /o p In Civil Appeal No. 709 of 1978, the only question is about the validity of a decree obtained before the date of the notification issued under s. 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957. In view of what we have said above, this question has to be decided against the appellant. This appeal is also dismissed with costs. o p /o p In Civil Appeal No. 718 of 1978, special leave was granted under a misapprehension that the appeal raised the same questions as were raised in Civil Appeal No. 708 of 1978. It is now stated that it is not so. This appeal is also dismissed with costs. o p /o p S.R. Appeals dismissed. o p /o p
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1990 (3) TMI 365 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sonal advantage to the assessee. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) in holding that the rent-free accommodation provided to the assessee was exempt under s. 10(14) of the IT Act. Our attention has been drawn to the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Addl. CIT vs. Brakes India Ltd. (1979) 118 ITR 820 (Mad). It appears that the decision of the Tribunal gets in support from the decision of the Madras High Court referred to above. Nothing has been stated by the Revenue as to why the said decision of the Madras High Court should not be followed. We agree with the view expressed by the Madras High Court on this point and hold that rent-free accommodation provided to the assessee by his employer was exempt under s. 10(14) of the IT Act on the selfsame reason given by the Madras High Court. 4. Accordingly, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN, J. I agree.
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