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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 229 Records
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1990 (4) TMI 309 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ned order has been made to compulsorily retire the appellant from service under the aforesaid Rule as the appellant was found to have committed grave financial irregularities leading to financial loss to the State, the impugned order cannot but be said to have been made by way of punishment. As such, such an order is in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution of India as well as it is arbitrary as it violates principles of natural justice and the same has not been made bonafide. 32. In the premises aforesaid we hold that the impugned order has not been made bona fide but for collateral purposes and on extraneous consideration by way of punishment. The impugned order is, therefore, illegal and unwarranted and so it is liable to be quashed and set aside. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order. We further direct the respondents to reinstate the appellant in service forthwith with full back wages. The respondents will pay costs to the appellant.
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1990 (4) TMI 308 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es an interpretation of the section. Sec. 254(2) of the IT Act provides as under "The Appellate Tribunal may, at any time within four years from the date of the order with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order passed by it under sub-s. (1) and shall make such amendment if the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the ITO." 6. In this particular case, the Tribunal has entered into the merits of the case and the rights and contentions of the parties. This is not a case where the Tribunal has exercised the power by rectifying the mistake apparent on the face of the record. The power under s. 254(2) of the Act is only for the purpose of rectifying the mistake and as such, the Tribunal was wrong by invoking s. 254(2) of the Act in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. Accordingly, this question of law is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. S.C. Sen, J. I agree.
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1990 (4) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he learned Counsel on both sides wanted us to go into the various documents in support of their respective contentions. We do not have before us the factual-matrix to appreciate the argument of Mr. Vaidyanathan that the Special Rules are arbitrary. We, however, find from the judgment under appeal that all these points were raised before the Tribunal in one form or the other but the Tribunal based its judgment on the observations of the High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 4532/71 and did not go into any other point. 15. While setting aside the judgment under appeal we remit the case to the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal for decision on other points as indicated by us or as may be raised by the parties. The Tribunal shall give further opportunity to the parties to file additional affidavits/documents. We request the Tribunal to decide the matter expeditiously and if possible within three months. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.
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1990 (4) TMI 306 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o be presented within the earlier of the two periods, namely, six months from the date on which the cheque is drawn or within the period of its validity and, in view of my conclusion that a post-dated cheque is drawn not on the date the cheque bears but on the date when the cheque is actually signed, complete in its form, and in view of the further fact that the complaints show that all the five cheques have been presented beyond six months of the dates on which they were drawn, it is needless to go into the aspect of the period of the validity of the cheques. Since all the five cheques had been drawn on May 2, 1986, and the cheques had been presented long after the six-month period stipulated in proviso (a) to section 138, that being the earlier of the two periods, section 138 of the Act is not attracted. The present prosecutions being misconceived, it will be an abuse of the process of the criminal court to allow them to continue. The prosecutions are, accordingly, quashed.
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1990 (4) TMI 305 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... iability of the owner under the award. 5. As pointed out in Stroud's judicial Dictionary 'Date' means day, so that where a cover not providing for temporary insurance of a motor car expires 15 days after date of commencement, it runs for the full 15 days after the day on which it was to commence. 6. Similarly it has been stated in Stroud that "a bill of exchange, or note, is of the date expressed on its face, not the time when it is actually issued. 7. To the same effect is the decision in Re F & B Warren 1938 Ch. 725 where it has been held that a judicial act will be referred to the first moment of the day on which it is done. A payment made by a bankrupt in the morning of a day is, therefore, not made, within Section 45 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914 before the date of a receiving order made later in the same day. 8. The ratio of these also supports the view we have taken. 9. The appeals fails and are dismissed. There would, however, be no order for costs.
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1990 (4) TMI 304 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court's judgment as a whole, we are inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Nariman that the High Court has only evaluated the exhibit in the light of the direction of this Court that "full effect will be given to the entry; no more, no less" and not rejected it as inadmissible, as contended for by the appellant. We have referred to these aspects only because counsel had placed considerable emphasis on them in the course of arguments but in the view we have taken of the scope and effect of Ext. PW-11/A, it is unnecessary to elaborate on them or to deal with certain other contentions urged before us. For the foregoing reasons we uphold the finding of the High Court that there was no valid and enforceable contract between the parties as evidenced by Ext. PW-11/A. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed, but under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 303 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... but made on 30th April, 1982 itself and as such the claimants in these two cases become entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1-A). As a result of the above discussion the civil appeals in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 952 1 of 1989 & 10 130 of 1989 stand dis missed. So far as appeal in Special Leave Petition No. 9434 of 1989 is concerned, it is allowed in part and the order of the High Court as well as that of the President Land Acqui sition Tribunal is modified only to the extent that interest shall be allowed at the rate of 6% per annum instead of 12% per annum from the date of Notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, till the date of award of the Collector or the date of possession of the land which ever is earlier. So far as other additional benefits granted by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal are concerned, the same would remain in-tact. In the facts and circum stances of the case there would be no order as to costs. T.N.A. Appeal allowed partly.
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1990 (4) TMI 302 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Development is different from acquisition. For the aforesaid reasons we are not able to follow the decision in the unreported judgment of the Division Bench in Kesoram Cement's case (WP No. 1451 of 1976, D/-21-9-1982 (Andh Pra). 32. For all the reasons stated above we declare that S. 3 of the State Act, 1975 is ultra vires of the powers of the State legislature and as all the other provisions are dependent on S. 3, the whole State Act, 1975 is declared ultra vires. We, however, hold that, as in India Cement's case there being justification for the levy and collection in view of H. R. S. Murthy's case in the amounts already collected need not be refunded by the State. However, the State shall not levy and collect any mineral rights tax in future under the provisions of the State Act, 1975. The interim orders passed in this batch are also made absolute and the writ petitions allowed as stated above. No costs. Advocates fee ₹ 250 in cash. 33. Order accordingly.
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1990 (4) TMI 301 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erest Act, plaintiff would be entitled to interest. The suit was instituted after service of notice dt. 20-1-1975 (Ex. C). At the permissible rate, plaintiff will get ₹ 13,413.00 towards past interest. 12. To sum up, plaintiff will be entitled to a decree for the principal sum ₹ 3,40,652.26 ps. and past interest ₹ 13,413.00, totalling ₹ 3,54,065.26 ps. The principal sum will carry interest @ 6% per annum from date of suit till realisation. Plaintiff will get costs corresponding to its success and defendants shall bear their own costs. The balance of plaintiff's claim fails and will stand dismissed with costs thereon. 13. Decreed that defendants do pay to plaintiff ₹ 3,54,065.26 ps. and the corresponding costs. Rest of the plaintiff's claim dismissed with costs. Defendants to bear their own costs. ₹ 3,40,652.26 ps. from out of the decretal sum to carry interest @ 6% per annum from date of suit till realisation. 14. Order accordingly.
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1990 (4) TMI 300 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ... ... ..... ically that deceased Nos. 1 and 2 were armed with any deadly weapons. Therefore, the assailants had definitely exceeded the right of private defence when they went to the extent of intentionally shooting them to death by inflicting bullet injuries. Therefore, the offence committed by them would be one punishable under Section 304 Part 1 I.P.C. 38. We accordingly set aside the conviction of the appellants-accused Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6, Vijayee Singh, Ranjit Singh, Ram Briksh Singh and Chirkut Singh respectively for an offence punishable under Section 302/149 I.P.C. and the sentence of imprisonment for the awarded thereunder. Instead they are convicted under Section 2504 Part I read with Section 34 I.P.C. and sentenced each of them to undergo 10 years imprisonment. The other sentences/convictions awarded to them are confirmed. The sentences shall run concurrently. Criminal Appeal Nos. 375-77. of 1987 are allowed to this extent only and Criminal Appeal Nos. 372-74/87 are dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 299 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ll be taken from whoever might be in possession thereof and, if the Court Receiver finds any difficulty in obtaining possession, he shall take the necessary assistance from the police authorities. It is further clarified that this order shall supersede any interim orders which might have been passed by the Court of Small Causes or the Bombay City Civil Court or any other Court excepting this Court. In the event of respondent No. 2 being able to finally establish his right to the sub-tenancy of the suit premises as claimed by him in the declaratory suit in the Court of Small Causes, it shall be open to him to apply for vacation or variation of this order as he may be advised. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to pay the appellant the costs of this appeal fixed at ₹ 20,000 the liability for the payment of the said aggregate amount being joint and several as between respondents Nos. 1 and 2. As far as respondent No. 3 is concerned, we do not propose to take any action against him.
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1990 (4) TMI 298 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed upon by the plaintiff, there was interference by this Court in revision and so was in Jai Bhagwan's case (supra). Therefore, the argument which has been raised in this behalf does not stand in our way to grant relief to the revision-petitioner, because if the suit for specific performance is alowed to continue, when such a relief cannot be ultimately allowed, it is certainly going to cause manifest injustice to the petitioner. 19. For the reasons recorded above, we allow the revision and after setting aside the order of the trial Court, allowing the amendment, the application for amendment of the plaint is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs in this revision. 20. In case the plaintiff filed the amended plaint with additional Court-fee after the grant of application for amendment of the plaint by the trial Court, the additional Court-fee paid by the plaintiff would be refunded to her. The trial Court would issue the refund order. 21. Revision allowed
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1990 (4) TMI 297 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dent's group. 33. I, accordingly, direct that respondents Nos.2 to 4 shall exercise their first choice to purchase the shares of the petitioners, the fifth respondent and the other shareholders of the fifth respondent's group within two months from today at the face value of the shares. In case of default, the petitioners and the fifth respondent shall have the choice of purchasing the shares of the first respondent and his group of shareholders at the face value of the shares. If both the groups fails to exercise the above choice or commit default in payment, there is no other choice, but for the company to be wound up. It is open to any one of the shareholders to move the court for appropriate orders in the event of the above two options not being exercised by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in the first instance and the fifth respondent and his group of shareholders in the second instance. 34. With the above directions, the company petition is dismissed but without costs.
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1990 (4) TMI 296 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... udication. When the Deputy Registrar rejected the appellants' application for rectification on the ground that the two marks are not deceptively similar, he did not use any discretion but adjudicated upon the rival contentions of the parties". In the present case also the Deputy Registrar has adjudicated upon the dispute. There is no question of exercising any discretion. 26. There are however, some authorities which say that even if the Registrar has adjudicated upon a dispute his decision should not be interfered with lightly. In the present case, however, the Registrar's decision was clearly wrong. In such a case it is not merely permissible, but is also necessary to set aside his decision in appeal which is expressly provided under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. 27. The learned single Judge, therefore, was right in setting aside the order of the Registrar. In the premises the present appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 28. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 295 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... elivering the goods on debts being satisfied cannot claim any interest for the said period and the observations of their Lordships in Lallan Prasad's case (supra) to the effect that if the pawnee is not in a position to re-deliver the goods he cannot have both the payment of debt and also the goods, would apply. We would, therefore, hold that the Bank as pawnee will not be entitled to charge any interest on the principal amount for the period 2-4-1976, the date on which the petitioner wanted release of the gold pledged by satisfying the debt and the Bank expressed its inability till 22-9-1981 when the Sessions Judge vacated the ad interim order of attachment, whereafter the Bank was in a position to deliver back the possession of the goods on petitioner satisfying the debts in question pursuant to the pledge agreement. 8. The writ application is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. There will, however, be no order as to costs. J.M. Mahapatra, J. 9. I agree.
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1990 (4) TMI 294 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gh Court was clearly in error in striking down the Government's action of fixing the last date for receipt of applications as 31st January, 1988 as arbitrary. It was lastly contended that the State Government had given an undertaking to the High Court that 'no appointment shall be made from any previous panel and that, as decided by this Court, if the panel, which is likely to be prepared pursuant to the advertisement in question, is allowed, appointments shall be made from the same panel or if that panel is not allowed and a new panel is required to be prepared, as directed by this Court, appointments shall be made from the same panel'. This undertaking, in our opinion, cannot preclude the State from challenging the decision of the High Court. In the result, this appeal succeeds. The impugned decision of the High Court is set aside and the Writ Petition which has given rise to this appeal will stand dismissed with no order as to costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (4) TMI 293 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... made the correct original order passed contrary to law. But there is no mistake apparent from the record which could be rectified under s. 154 of the IT Act because the exact amount of expenses relating to the earning of the dividend was not available in the original assessment order and so, the figure had to be estimated with reference by the ITO on the basis of his own estimate, without having relation to the records of this case. In our view, in order to attract the provision of s. 154 of the IT Act the error must be apparent from the record. In other words it must appear expressly in the order itself. In the order if the mistake could not be detected, in that event s. 154 could not be invoked as rightly pointed by the Tribunal. Accordingly, we are of the view, the Tribunal has taken a correct view in the matter. Accordingly, the question of law is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Suhas Chandra Sen, J. I agree.
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1990 (4) TMI 292 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... portunity to put forward their grievances before the court by dismissing these writ petitions on the preliminary objections raised by the Bank. In fact, we should like to place on record our appreciation of the stand taken by Sri G. Ramaswamy, learned counsel for the Bank in this respect. He fairly stated that, as he is appearing for a public sector undertaking, he is quite prepared to contest the writ petitions on their merits and that his preliminary objections were primarily intended to bring to our notice the conduct of the petitioners in this case. We are glad he did it as this was a matter which needed serious notice. We should like to record our dis-approval of the way in which the proceedings have been conducted on behalf of the Federation. However, as mentioned above, we overrule the preliminary objections and will proceed to dispose of the writ petitions on their merits. The Writ Petitions are adjourned, as per separate order, to 17.7.90 for further hearing. N.V.K.
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1990 (4) TMI 291 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d to a wrong person, the Bank has to own the responsibility to pay the plaintiff. The liability of banker to customer in such a case is absolute even if no negligence is proved. In Hals- bury's Laws of England (supra, para 94), it is stated "where the bank delivers the goods to the wrong person, whereby they are lost to the owner, the liability of the bank is absolute, though there is no element of negligence, as where delivery is obtained by means of an artfully forged order. In law the banker could contract out of this liability, but he would be unlikely to do so in practice." Before parting with the case, we may also state that in practice, bankers do not set up the statute of limitations against their customers or their legal representatives, and we see no reason why this case should be an exception to that practice. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs, but not for all the reasons stated by the trial court and the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 290 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ubordinate authority, to whom disciplinary powers were delegate by the President only in 1979. Though this point does not appear to have been raised before the Tribunal, it goes to the root of the matter and we, therefore, think that it should be left open to be considered by the Tribunal now. As the cases before us are many and were decided principally on the point of law discussed earlier, we have not touched upon the facts or merits of individual cases. We set aside the orders of the CAT in all cases--except C.A. Nos. 1443 and 4340/88 which stand dismissed as mentioned above--and direct the Tribunal/High Court. to pass fresh orders disposing of the applications filed before them in the light of our judgment. Where disciplinary proceedings have been stayed at the stage of initiation or later because of the view taken by the Tribunal, they should now be continued and finished without delay in accordance with law. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. Appeals disposed of.
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