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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 353 Records
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1990 (8) TMI 418 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tor and the Additional Chief Secretary appear to be beyond their jurisdiction. The Additional Chief Secretary has held that the sale by auction was not consistent with the provisions of Section 27 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. Section 27 relates to prohibition of transfer of any urban land with a building thereon. Apart from the legal position that Section 27 has been struck down as ultra vires, it is quite obvious that no such question of transferring urban land with a building thereon has ever arisen in the present case. Thus, the order of the Revisional authority has proceeded on a misconception of relevant legal provisions also. 13. Rule, is, therefore, made absolute, and the order of the collector at Annexure-C dated 30th January, 1988 and the order of the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue Department, Annexure 8 dated 29-11-1989 are hereby quashed and set aside. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. 14. Petition allowed.
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1990 (8) TMI 417 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... finding is also to the same effect. 38. The effect of non-impleadment of idols or deities has been dealt with in the order of Hon. U. C. Srivastava, (J) as he then was, at pages 16 and 17 and he has observed that the same can be decided "when the case is finally heard and disposed of." In fact the sanctity or divinity, if any acquired by the idols placed in the temple, is itself in dispute. Perhaps not all idols will have juristic personality. Whether the idols placed inside the so called mosque have acquired juristic personality is a question on which oral evidence may also be necessary. The question raised by the parties is a serious one and we agree with Hon. U. C. Srivastava, J. that the same should be dealt with at the stage of final hearing. 39. In view of the above Civil Misc. Application No. 18(1) of 1989 is rejected. The prayer of Sri V. K. S, Chowdhary for hearing and deciding aforesaid issues as preliminary issues is also rejected. 40. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 416 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the High Court has negatived the claim of respondent No. 1 with regard to the ownership of the suit land on the basis of possessory title. 15. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court dated November 24, 1989 in R.S.A. No. 2488 of 1988 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the courts below dismissing in the suit filed by respondent No. 1 are restored. There will be no order as to costs. 16. It appears that petrol and diesel oil are being stored by respondent No. 1 in tanks on the premises in dispute. It will be open to respondent No. 1 to remove the said petrol and diesel oil from the premises in dispute. The appellants as well as respondent No. 2 would accord the necessary facilities to enable the respondent No. 1, to remove the same. The said work of removal of petrol and diesel oil from the premises in dispute shall be completed within the period of four weeks from the date the said facilities are made available to him.
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1990 (8) TMI 415 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... this deep-seated fraud should be brought to book without any delay. Purity of the judicial stream should not be allowed to be polluted by such a clandestine move and citizens should not be misled by actions of the conspirators . We, therefore, direct that the Central Bureau of Investigation shall step in forthwith and complete the investigation within two months and provide a copy of the report containing the result of the investigation to this Court. A copy of the report shall simultaneously be submitted to the learned Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court. The appeal is allowed with costs. As and when the respondents who are said to be petitioners in Writ Petition No. 5267 of 1990 are identified shall be made to pay the costs of this appeal which we assess at ₹ 10,000/-. Out of the costs as and when recovered, the appellants shall be entitled to a sum of ₹ 3,000/-and the remaining sum of ₹ 7,000/-shall be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee.
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1990 (8) TMI 414 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nment under S. 36 of the Act which inter alia provides that Central Government may give such directions to any State Government as may appear to it to be necessary for carrying into execution in the State any of the provisions of the said Act or of any rule made there under. It is, therefore, obvious that the State Government cannot issue any directions which are inconsistent with the directions issued by the Central Government under S. 36 of the said Act. Any power to impose penalty must be statutorily warranted and executive Government cannot create penal provisions by issuing circulars when there is no authority to impose such penalty flowing from any provision of law. 5. In this view of the matter the impugned order dated 19-10-1979 at Annexure-H to the petition in so far as it purports to impose penalty while granting exemption under S. 20(1)(b) of the said Act is set aside to that extent. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. 6. Order accordingly.
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1990 (8) TMI 413 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s principle has no application if the transfer is invalid. The transfer under the deed of 23.11. 1943 became inoperative not on account of any fraudulent or erroneous representation. The settlement was invalid and inoperative on account of the subsisting lease in respect of the land and as the landlord could not super impose a second lease in respect of the tenanted property, no interest could be created in favour of the appellants under that document and, therefore, there is no question of feeding the estoppel. The execution of the deed dated 30.7. 1945 in favour of the respondents negatives the claim of the appellants having acquired any right after the property was taken delivery of in 1944. We therefore reject the contention. We accordingly hold that there is no valid ground to interfere with the decision of the High Court. We therefore dismiss the appeals. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 412 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n indigent person which was dismissed cannot be excluded. The exclusion is available only in the same proceedings which gets converted into a suit or appeal on -payment of court-fee. Court cannot enlarge the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act and permit a time barred suit to be admitted. What is permitted is only exclusion of time by treating the same suit or appeal as having the force and effect as one filed at the first instance as if court-fee was paid then. Section 13 is permissible only for converting the same proceeding into a regular suit or appeal on payment of court-fee and it is not available when a fresh suit independent of the original proceeding is filed. The fresh suit which is filed as an independent proceeding later on payment of court-fee cannot be treated under Section 13 as having the force and effect as if court-fee was paid at an earlier date. The suit was therefore rightly dismissed as Out of time. Appeal is dismissed without costs.
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1990 (8) TMI 411 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... decision of the Supreme Court in Durga Das Khanna 1969 72 ITR 796 as applied by the court in Purnendu Mullich 1979 116 ITR 591 will govern the instant case. The premium or salami paid in this case is a capital receipt. In that view of the matter, the question referred to this court is answered by saying that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the sum of ₹ 2 lakhs received by the assessee was a capital receipt. But the Tribunal did not consider whether the receipt, although capital in nature, was liable to tax as capital gains or not. Even if it is not taxable as a revenue receipt, the question still remains whether the capital receipt by way of salami or premium will be liable to tax as a capital gain in the hands of the assessee or not. The Tribunal will, therefore, deal with and dispose of the contention as to whether the receipt in question is chargeable to tax as a capital gain or not. There will be no order as to costs. Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee J.-I agree.
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1990 (8) TMI 410 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... spute within the purview of that Section would be maintainable before the Registrar takes away the right of Members of the Society to claim relief otherwise outside the purview of Section 25 on the basis of their right to seek remedy for their grievance. It is not the contention of Mr. Mukhoty that the relief claimed is not one which would come within the ambit of Section 9 of the CPC. That being so, we are of the view that the bar of Section 25 is not applicable to the facts of the case. Therefore, the conclusion reached in the Courts below is correct and the suit is maintainable. 6. We pointed out to Mr. Mukhoty that the relief against election of office bearers must have become infructuous with the passage of time as the election is annual. It is for the trial Court now to dispose of the suit taking into consideration the changes in the situations that may be brought before it. We dismiss the appeal and direct the trial court to expedite the disposal of the suit. No costs.
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1990 (8) TMI 409 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ee. There is no material to hold that there was a reduction in the rent because of the right given to the two lessees to construct the said two floors and to complete the construction thereof and to sub-let such floors to the sub-tenants. Unless there is material to show that the rent which was charged by the assessee was not a fair rent or reasonable rent and indirectly the lessor received from the lessees an advance by way of rent, it cannot be held that the investment made by the lessees in terms of the agreements would represent rent in the hands of the assessee. At best the amounts spent by the lessees would be treated as a capital receipt in the hands of the assessee as the said investments were made on behalf of the assessee. We do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal and, accordingly, we answer the question referred to this Court in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 9. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J.-I agree.
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1990 (8) TMI 408 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l pay the transfer fee to Mathrubhumi in respect of shares Nos. 1868 to 1715 (transferor, K. V. Govindankutty Nair) as well as shares Nos. 421 to 423 (transferor, T. V. Balathilaka Kuru ). Mathrubhumi will give notice of the rectification to the Registrar under Section 156 of the Companies Act within 30 days of this order. They will also file a copy of this order before the Registrar of Companies along with Form No. 21 set out in Appendix I of the Companies (Central Government) General Rules and Forms within thirty days. Time taken for drawing up the judgment and in obtaining a copy of the judgment shall be excluded in computing the period of 30 days. If they fail to comply with the above said directions within the time specified, the petitioners will be entitled to have this judgment executed and the acts required to be done by the Mathrubhumi done so far as practicable through an officer appointed by the court at the cost of Mathrubhumi. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (8) TMI 407 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n this proceeding shall, during the pendency of the suit, be paid to and retained by the Respondent- Plaintiff subject to the condition that if ultimately Respondent-Plaintiff fails in his suit he shall be liable to restitute the said sum of ₹ 20,000/- to the Appellant- Defendant with interest thereon at 9 per cent per annum. 5. The order of the High Court dated 17-10-1989 and of the trial Court dated 24-7-1989 are both set aside and leave to defend granted on the aforesaid terms. 6. We must advert to one another submission made on behalf of the Appellant. It was stated that the Appellant had from time to time during the pendency of the matter at the trial Court deposited in that Court certain sums towards the suit claim. If that be so the Appellant shall be entitled to withdraw those deposits. However, Plaintiff-Respondent shall be entitled to withdraw the sum of ₹ 20,000/- deposited in the Registry of this Court. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.
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1990 (8) TMI 406 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
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... ... ..... proviso." 17. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Their Workmen, it is reiterated that on a transfer of ownership or management of an undertaking, the employment of workmen engaged by the said undertaking comes to an end, and compensation is made payable because of such termination. In all cases to which 25-FF applies, the only claim which the employees of the transferred concern can legitimately make is a claim for compensation against their employers. No claim can be made against the transferee of the said concern. 18. In view of the law being settled, this Court cannot give a special direction to the respondents to transfer the ownership of the first respondent to third respondent subject to the third respondent absorbing and continuing the services of the workmen working in the first respondent-company at Raichur and its registered office at Bangalore. 19. In view of the foregoing, this writ petition is dismissed. 20. There is no order as to costs.
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1990 (8) TMI 405 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ecisions where interest had been granted on the arrears of salary and pension. The Execution Court failed to appreciate that in those decisions direction for payment of interest had been issued by the Court while granting relief for reinstatement or payment of arrears of salary or pension. None of those decisions relate to the grant of interest by the Execution Court. No doubt the Courts have power to award interest on the arrears of salary or pension or other amount to which a Government servant is found entitled having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case but that power cannot be exercised by the Execution Court in the absence of any direction in the decree. 4. In this view the executing court in the instant case acted in excess of its jurisdiction in awarding interest to the respondent-judgment debtor. 5. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Execution Court awarding interest to the judgment debtor. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (8) TMI 404 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... should not be misused or permitted to be misused creating a bottleneck in the superior Court preventing other genuine violation of fundamental rights being considered by the Court. That would be an act or a conduct which will defeat the very purpose of preservation of fundamental rights. Having regard to the ugly rivalry here, we have no doubt that between the contestants, the Court was misled and we must, therefore, proceed with caution. There was no fundamental right violation or could be violative if the allegations of the so-called champions on behalf of the society are scrutinised. We must protect the society from the so called 'protectors'. This application is legally devoid of any merit or principles of public interest and public protection. This application certainly creates bottlenecks in courts, which is an abuse of process of this Court. We have, therefore, no hesitation in dismissing this application with the observations made herein. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 403 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ause the petitioner has chosen not to file an application under s. 256 against the order passed under s. 254 can be no ground for this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Art. 226. The petitioner had adequate remedy against the orders passed under s. 254 by moving an application under s. 256 (1) and, if the said application was dismissed, by filing a further application under s. 256 (2) to this Court. If the petitioner has not been deliquent enough and has allowed the period of limitation to expire that by itself can be no ground to persuade this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226. When an adequate alternate remedy is provided to a citizen under the statue it is an exercise of sound discretion that the Court should refrain from exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 4. In view of the fact that the petitioner had alternative remedy open to it, we see no reason as to why we should interfere. 5. Dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 402 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... particular factories in a particular region, namely, in Zone No. 1 of the appellants' factories by merely the State having omitted to file the counter affidavit refuting the allegations of the alleged loss. In an individual case of administrative action, if no counter affidavit has been filed an adverse inference may be drawn and relief may be moulded as per given situation. Likely that some loss may be caused to individual factory but as pointed out by this Court in Anakapalle Coop. Agrl. and Industrial Society's case that the price fixation cannot be made unit-wise and it is not practicable to make unit as a base t6 fix the price or to place in a particular zone. The very relief in the writ petition to fix the price at ₹ 161 per quintal cannot be ordered as was already negatived by this Court. Considering from the above perspective we have no hesitation to reject the contention of the appellants and dismiss the appeals but with- out costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 401 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s neither raised, nor argued in the High Court, At the end he stated that he had elaborately argued the point of vires before the Single Judge and the Division Bench and except repetition of the same once over, he could do no better by-further arguing here. Therefore, this Court could go through the judgment and deal with the point. We deprecate this practice. When a constitutional question has been raised and does arise for consideration, unless there is a full-dressed argument addressed by either side before this court no satisfactory resolution could be made. Mere para- phrasing the judgment of the High Court in particular when it relates to the local laws is no proper decision making. Therefore, after giving our anxious consideration, we, with great anguish. decline to go into the point. Except these. no other points have been argued. Accordingly we do not find any merit in the appeal. 17. The appeal is dismissed. but in the circumstances without costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 400 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he process of hydrogenation of vegetable oil and that such workers do not form the subject-matter of the committee’s deliberations or the Government’s attention. o p /o p This contention is also without substance. We asked the learned counsel for the appellants to point out which of the employees of the Company fell outside the three categories just above specified and he was unable to name any. (obviously the said three categories exhaust the types of workers which would be employed in any undertaking, barring of course specialists and technical experts who admittedly do not fall within the category of employees embraced by the Act. o p /o p 12. It is not disputed that if the Company is an oil mill it is guilty of all the contraventions of which it has been convicted. Nor has any argument been advanced to the effect that the sentences awarded are excessive. In he result, therefore, both the appeals fail and are dismissed S.R. o p /o p Appeals dismissed. o p /o p
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1990 (8) TMI 399 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in 1967 required the declaration to be made within three years from the date of the preliminary notification. On the date the declaration was made there were hardly two days left for completion of three years and after the High Court order on 8-1-1988, the period has already lapsed but no declaration has been published and the same can no longer be made on the basis of preliminary notification at present. In the absence of challenge by the State, the order of the High Court against it has become final. We are of the view that in these circumstances it would no more be available to the State to make the requisite declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The acquisition itself is quashed but we make it clear that it is open to the State Government in case it is satisfied that acquisition is necessary in public interest, it is free to exercise its power of eminent domain and make a fresh preliminary notification. The special leave petitions are disposed of accordingly. No costs.
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