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Showing 1 to 20 of 359 Records
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1991 (3) TMI 405 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... discharged the heavy burden by tendering strict proof of the fact in issue. The High Court failed to consider the standard of proof required and has proceeded on no evidence whatsoever in determining the question against the appellant. We are, therefore, unable to agree that the appellant is not entitled to maintenance. 4. We find that there is no dispute that the appellant was married to the respondent in the customary form. They lived together as husband and wife and of late the respondent had neglected to maintain her. The respondent has no case that the appellant has means to maintain herself or that the amount she has claimed is not commensurate with the means of the respondent. The learned magistrate was, therefore, justified in awarding an amount of Rs. 400 per mensem towards the maintenance of the appellant. That order of the magistrate has to be restored. 5. In the result, we allow the appeal, set-aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the trial court.
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1991 (3) TMI 404 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... idders who participated in the auction, the upset price was fixed at Rs. 1,000. The auction was started with the bid at Rs. 1,000 and ultimately at 20th knock the highest bid of the respondent was at Rs. 5,000. Thus, the facts demonstrate that the agreement between the appellant and the respondent was only a combination to participate at an auction of the evacuee property. There is no intention either to peg down the price or to defraud the Government to knock out the sale at a lower price. Thus, the object of the agreement is not opposed to public policy, and therefore, it is not void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. 9. Thus, on the facts of this case we have no hesitation to conclude that the impugned agreement between the appellant and the respondent is lawful Contract. The Courts below committed no error of law warranting interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs as we did not call upon the respondent to argue the case.
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1991 (3) TMI 403 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . He placed reliance on the decision of this Court on Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (1991)ILLJ29SC . It is true that this Court has held that if inquiry report is not supplied to the delinquent employee before passing the order of punishment, the order would be rendered illegal. But the decision of this Court is given a prospective effect, it will not affect the orders passed prior to the date of rendering of the judgment (November 29, 1990) as would be clear from para 17 of the judgment. 4. As regards other questions raised in the petition we find no merit in the same. We, accordingly, dismiss the petition. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 402 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 2. We have unable to approve the decision of the Learned Single Judge reported in (1988) 2 Cal HN 455 in which the learned Single Judge even though he found that only the sanction under Section 137(i) of the Customs Act was necessary he quashed the proceeding on the ground that the sanction was accorded for prosecution of the accused and that it was not a sanction for taking cognizance. In the result we are unable to hold that the sanction order issued by the Collector of Customs in this case under Section 137(1) Criminal Procedure Code Customs Act is in any way invalid. Therefore, the taking cognizance by the Learned Magistrate on the basis of such sanction order is not in our opinion invalid. 23. As none of the contentions raised by the petitioner is acceptable, we find no merit in this petition. The petition is rejected. Let the Lower Court record be sent down to the Learned Magistrate for disposal of this case as expeditiously as possible. Manabendra Nath Roy, J. I agree.
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1991 (3) TMI 401 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... #39;s daughter" is a relative specified as an heir under sub category (4) of category IX in Schedule II of the Hindu Succession Act. The petitioners who are the daughters of the sister of the deceased are therefore his heirs. Therefore, they represent the estate of the deceased Velayudhan. 18. In view of what I have held in the foregoing paragraphs the petitioners are the legal representatives of the deceased. 19. The nature of the interest of the deceased in the subject-matter of the suit has been referred to by me, for the limited purpose of determining whether the petitioners are the legal representatives and not for the purpose of deciding merits of the case in the appeal. 20. For all these reasons the revision petition is allowed with costs. The impugned order of the learned District Judge, Trichur in LA. No. 1956 of 1987 in A.S. No. 61/86 is set aside. The petitioners shall be brought on the record of the case as the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff.
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1991 (3) TMI 400 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ection, (a) 'company' means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals ; and (b) 'director', in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm." 11. We are of the view that the contention of the opposite party is correct. In the petition of complaint, the present petitioner being the director is being prosecuted under Section 141 of the Act along with the company. Therefore, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Roy that a separate notice upon the petitioner-director is required to be given under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for prosecuting him along with the company for the offence alleged to have been committed by the company under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In the result, we are unable to hold that there is any ground for this court to quash the proceeding even against the present petitioner. In the result, the revision petition fails. M.N. Roy, J. 12. I agree.
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1991 (3) TMI 399 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and even in the latter case, the affected person may move the Central Government under Sub-section (ID) by explaining the circumstances under which the delay occurred and the hardship that results by the non-recognition of the transfer. While understanding the scheme of Section 108, the court has to bear in mind that trivialities would not render an act futile and technical formalities required to be complied with for a valid transaction cannot outweigh the importance to be given to the substance of the transaction. 17. Therefore, I conclude that the petitioners are not entitled to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of this court under Section 155 of the Act and, even otherwise, their contention under Section 108 of the Act has no factual basis. Similarly, the transaction in question does not contravene Article 7 of the articles of association. 18. Consequently, this petition fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. C. A. No. 185 of 1991 also is rejected.
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1991 (3) TMI 398 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se since it is not a formal defect. If the plaint is treated as a void plaint the question of granting permission does not arise at all. As stated above the plaint was filed on 9.2.1987. However, the plaintiff has filed the present suit and also impleaded other defendants and obtained various interim orders on the basis of a void plaint. The defendants have been made to incur legal expenses and oppose the plaint and other interim applications, time and again on the basis of a void plaint. Hence, in my opinion, the defendants have to be compensated with costs. I order a sum of ₹ 1,000 to the first defendant and ₹ 1,000 to defendants 3 to 5 as costs. Thus I hold that the suit filed is void and hence the permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action is not necessary. Both the application and the suit are dismissed with costs as stated above. All the interim orders passed by this Court pending suit, are hereby dissolved.
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1991 (3) TMI 397 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Indian Forest Service and Indian Police Service, and that the said classification was founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes them from other officers and that the classification has rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Rules inasmuch as it has been made for the purpose of compensating the ECOs/SSRCOs for the lost opportunity because of their joining the Army service. The said decision may have a bearing in the event of rule being framed making provision for giving the benefit of Army service in the matter of fixation of seniority of the petitioners and other persons who have joined the Commercial Tax Service of the State of Tamil Nadu. Since there is no such rule, the petitioners cannot derive any assistance from this decision. 12. In the circumstances, we find no ground to interfere with the decision of the High Court. The appeal as well as the special leave petitions are, therefore, dismissed but with no orders as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 396 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... may state that the petitioner will have the access to the documents produced by the petitioner before the Asstt. Director. The petitioner may have the photo copies of the needed documents and the Assistant Director shall produce or cause to be produced the original documents before the Assessing Authorities as and when the Asstt. Director is called upon to do so by the Assessing Authorities. 8. Apart from that, sufficient time has already elapsed. The summons were issued on 3rd July, 1990. The proceedings were stayed by this Court on 1st February, 1991. Even before the stay of the proceedings by this Court, there was sufficient time available with the Assistant Director to complete the inquiry. We, therefore, direct the Asst. Director to complete the inquiry within a period of three months and we further direct the petitioner to co-operate with the Asstt. Director or other authorities in inquiry. 9. The writ petition is disposed of with the above observations and directions.
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1991 (3) TMI 395 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... loan advanced as held in Para 14 of this Order. (3) Respondents are also directed to pay Interest at the prevailing rate of interest payable by a Scheduled Bank on the fixed deposits for a period of one year on the amount deposited as security. The State Government shall be at liberty to make appropriate Rules in this behalf and such Rule may also provide for payment of accrued interest only at the time of refunding or adjusting the deposits for subsequent years and for forfeiting the interest together with deposit, in cases where the deposit is forfeited. (4) Respondents are also directed to adjust the amount of deposit made during any particular year towards the amount of deposit required to be made for the succeeding year by any of the money lenders or pawn brokers. (5) Respondents are also directed to refund the amount of deposit either in the event of any person discontinuing the business or in the event of licence being refused. (6) There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 394 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inarily come to the market to be sold and bought. But at the shell stage, it can neither be bought nor sold in the market. Box has a definite meaning as understood in the common parlance. Therefore, this mere outer shell by itself cannot be put in that category. To be called a "box" it must answer to the description of a "box". An article cannot be called a "box", if it assumes the shape after some other things are put into it i.e., the slide in this case. The outer shell to be described as a box must have a separate and independent existence from the slide, but that is not the case. 19. For the reasons stated above we hold that the "shells" of cigarette packets manufactured by the petitioner are not excisable under Entry 17(4) of the First Schedule as introduced by Finance Act, 1982. Impugned orders dated 7th April, 1982 and 30th April, 1982 are quashed and set aside. 20. Writ petition is allowed with costs. 21. Rule is made absolute.
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1991 (3) TMI 393 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t is on the insurer. The reason is that upon proof by the claimants of the three facts set out above and in the absence of any evidence proving the fact that the vehicle was driven by an unlicenced driver, the claimants must succeed and the insurer must fail. 15. For all these reasons, we have no doubt that the burden of proving the fact which excludes the liability of the insurer to pay compensation lies on the insurer alone and no one else. In our opinion the insurer has failed to discharge this burden. 16. The claimants have filed cross objects to this appeal. The appellant, insurer, merely indemnifies the insured with whom he has contract of insurance. The claimants are not entitled to maintain cross objections in such an appeal by a party who is a mere indemnifier. In our opinion, the cross objections by the claimants are incompetent. For all these reasons, the appeal is dismissed with costs. The cross objection too is dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 392 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cient safeguards against pollution of air, water and environment have been insisted upon in the conditions of grant However, in order to allay the apprehensions on the part of the petitioners that the company may seek and obtain relaxations or modifications of the conditions that may prove detrimental to environment, we direct that the condition requiring the installation of a FGD plant should not be relaxed without a full consideration of the consequences and that, if there is any proposal from the company to relax this or any other condition subject to which the plant has been cleared, neither the State Government nor the Union Government should permit such relaxation without giving notice of the proposed changes to the petitioner groups and giving them an opportunity of being heard. 12. Subject to the directions contained in sub-paras (4) and (6) above we agree with the decision of the High Court and dismiss these special leave petitions. We make no order regarding costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 391 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uggests that where the disciplinary officer feels that it is not possible to adhere to the time-limit, a report should be made regarding the additional period needed for completing the same. That has also not been done in this case. But this itself indicates that the three months limit indicated is relaxable if the circumstances justify it. It cannot be treated as a condition, non-compliance with which will invalidate the order of punishment of the disciplinary authority. It is very difficult to construe this memorandum as imposing a rigid time-limit for the imposition of the order of the punishment as held by the Tribunal. Therefore, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and restore the application before the Tribunal for hearing on the merits. If the respondents has anything to urge against the order of punishment, it will be open to him to do so before the Tribunal. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, we make no order regarding costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 390 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed the CIT(A) to reconsider the matter on the basis of the directions given in the appellate order of the Tribunal. In such a case it cannot be said that the issue was not considered by the ITO. This is a case where the order of the ITO merged with (that of) the CIT(A) as appeal was preferred and decided on the identical issue. In any event, this question has become purely academic in view of the fact that on merits the assessee was entitled to succeed. 4. Division Bench of this Court in Rupanjuli Tea Co. vs. CIT (1991) 92 CTR (Cal) 37 (1990) 186 ITR 301(Cal) held that s. 44C had no application to the case of an assessee who does not carry on any business outside India. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar and, accordingly, s. 44C had no application to the case of this assessee. For the reasons aforesaid we answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN, J. I agree.
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1991 (3) TMI 389 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e penal provisions more stringent with a view to check the growth of arrears. Therefore we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that Sections 14(IA) and 14(2A) are inapplicable to exempted establishments. From the above discussion, it emerges that atleast Sections 14(IA) and 14(2A) are attracted to the facts in the present case and therefore it cannot be said that there is no prima facie case and consequently the accused cannot claim any acquittal, even before the conclusion of the trial under Chapter XX Cr- P.C. dealing with trial of summons cases. Other Sections like 14(2), 14A(l) and 14A(2) and paragraph 76 of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme 1952 will not apply to the facts of the present case. Therefore the trial court may proceed with the trial for the offences punishable under Sections 14(IA) and 14(2A) against the appellants and dispose of the matter in accordance with law. Subject to the above directions, these appeals are disposed of. Appeals disposed of
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1991 (3) TMI 388 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... essional statement by the detenu before the detaining authority and non-consideration of the same while arriving at his subjective satisfaction in making the order of detention goes to the root of the order of detention and in our considered opinion makes the order of detention invalid. 4. In these circumstances we do not think that the decisions of this Court in Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commr. and Secy. Govt. of Kerala as well as Madan Lal Anand v. Union of India are applicable to the instant case. We have also considered another aspect of the matter i.e. the detenu is under detention for over eight months and the order of detention is for a period of one year. Considering this aspect also along with the" other aspect mentioned hereinbefore we think it just and proper to quash the order of detention and direct for the release of the detenu appellant forthwith provided he is not wanted by any other order. The appeal is thus allowed and the order of detention is quashed.
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1991 (3) TMI 387 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hrough Heads of their respective schools. In this regard the Board shall inform all the concerned schools and will also give due publicity in the two local newspapers within 3 days. The Board was further directed to consider the cases of such candidates out of 283 who are similar to the nine named candidates other than respondent No. 17, Deepa V. Agarwal and in their cases also the untampered result shall be declared on or before 6th February, 1991 and we are informed that results of 18 more candidates were declared. The notification dated August 31, 1990 is upheld subject to above modification and shall be operative between the parties. Before parting with the case we impress upon the appellant to have indepth investigation made expeditiously, if need be, with the assistance of C.B.C.I.D., of the racket of fabrication and bring the culprit to justice. The appeals are allowed accordingly, but in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeals allowed.
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1991 (3) TMI 386 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stion is whether the assessee can do it. Here again, in our judgment, whenever there is a change of method, something of this kind is bound to happen in the year of change of method. In case the assessee had changed its method from mercantile system to cash system, it might have been that in the year of change no deduction whatsoever could have been claimed or allowed. However, that will be no reason for not allowing the claim on the basis of changed method so far as the change is concerned and on the earlier method if the liability in regard thereto has not already been allowed as deduction. Accordingly, we are in agreement with the Tribunal that the assessee was entitled to the deduction for this year both as regards the provision for bonus as also the bonus actually paid during the previous year. The first question referred to us at the instance of the Commissioner is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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