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1991 (8) TMI 349 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... for encashment of bank guarantee is of little consequence to the liability of the Bank under the guarantee. The demand by GETSCO is under the Bank guarantee and as per the terms thereof. The Bank has to pay and the Bank was willing to pay as per the undertaking. The Bank cannot be interdicted by the Court at the instance of respondent-1 in the absence of fraud or special equities in the form of preventing irretrievable injustice between the parties. 11. The High Court in the absence of prima facie case on such matters has committed an error in restraining the Bank from honouring its commitment under the bank guarantee. 12. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The appellant is entitled to costs in this Court. S.L.P. (Civil) No. of 1991, (In CC-13153/91) 13. Since we have set aside the order of the Division Bench of the High Court this Special Leave Petition does not survive and is accordingly dismissed. 14. No costs.
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1991 (8) TMI 348 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ring process', while the process/ activities of 'cleaning', 'oiling', 'washing', 'lubricating' or 'repairing' of the vehicles at the service station, run by the petitioner, are covered by the above definition of 'manufacturing process'. In the said process, if the requisite number of workers are employed as mentioned in Section 2(m) of the Act, then, the premises is a factory and for running such factory a licence is necessary under Section 6 of the Act. 17. Consequently, this petition is allowed partly. The view of the Courts below with regard to petrol/diesel pump of the petitioner is set aside, but the same is maintained with regard to running of a service station by the petitioner. As the petitioner was found running service station in violation of Section 6 of the Act, he was rightly convicted and sentenced by the Courts below. The sentence of fine awarded to the petitioner is quite lenient and requires no interference.
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1991 (8) TMI 347 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... d the Rules. They do not also require that inspection can be done only once. 10. Consequently, the application of the petitioner No. 30 P.S. Nanawati and No. 31 N.S. Chhajer for the inspection fetch account books and other records and papers of the Respondent-company is allowed. The respondents will allow the applicants P.S. Nanawati and N.S. Chhajer, jointly or severally to inspect the books of accounts and files, documents and papers of the Respondent company M/s Hindustan Processors Ltd., Bhilwara during the office hours & take notes therefrom, in presence of a responsible officer of the respondent company. 11. Before commencement of the inspection, the Respondent-company will page all account-books, files and papers, if not already paged, and prepare their list mentioning the number of pages and the period in respect of which they relate. A copy of this list will be given to the applicants under the receipt. Inspection will commence from 10 A.M. of September 16, 1991.
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1991 (8) TMI 346 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... le 1, refers to permission to withdraw a suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit after the first one has been withdrawn. Order 23, Rule 1, cannot be read so as to bar a suit which has already been instituted before the other suit has been abandoned or dismissed. The rule is clear and can only be applied to suits instituted after the withdrawal or abandonment of previous suits". In Girdharilal v. Chairman, BBM Board, AIR 1985 P&H 210 the above decision was referred to and approved and it was held that where the second suit was filed before the first suit was withdrawn, then Order XXIII, Rule 1, C.P.C. would not be attracted and the second suit could not be dismissed under Order XXIII, Rule 1(4), C.P.C. 10. In my view, the courts below went wrong to deny the plaintiff the relief he had sought. The impugned judgment is set aside. There would be a decree as prayed for. The Second Appeal is accordingly allowed; but, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.
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1991 (8) TMI 345 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... jha, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (8) TMI 344 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... awant, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (8) TMI 343 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ermination of the tenancy and it is merely a security against the nonpayment of rent. The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act does not empower theCorporation, in normal circumstances, to regard any income accruing on the security deposit so received and further to permit such frictional or actual income to be regarded as a part of the rent receipt. Normally any income from out the security deposit cannot be regarded as being ' a part of the rent. The conclusion of the Additional District Judge with regard to this aspect is, therefore unassailable. (8) For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is partly allowed. The order of the Additional District Judge, Delhi in regard to the valuation of the land and the building is set aside. We also set aside the original assessment order of the Deputy Assessor & Collector and we permit the Assessor & Collector to make a fresh assessment in accordance with law after notice to the respondents. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (8) TMI 342 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... all nor does it make any comparison between 0. 8, R. 9 and 0. 22, R. 4. It also does not say why grant of leave was considered necessary especially when it was recognised in the judgment itself that the legal representative had the "right" to make the defense. In fact, the order was passed in the absence of the legal representatives brought on the record. The point agitated before me was thus nowhere near that case. 10. As the defense raised by the substituted defendants was appropriate to their character as legal representatives of the deceased defendant, their written statement has to be taken note of. However, even if it be assumed that 0. 8, R. 9 would apply and consequently leave of the Court would be required, keeping in view the nature of the defense raised and the fact that the additional written statement has been on record for the last so many years without there being any objection from the side of the plaintiffs, leave is granted. 11. Order accordingly.
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1991 (8) TMI 341 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ), of s. 14, the right to maintenance being a pre-existing right over property "red ad rem" s. 14(1) would apply. The testamentary succession with a restrictive conditions in the will was obliterated. She became an absolute owner on or after June 17, 1956. Accordingly I have no hesitation to hold that, though the will created a restrictive covenant, s. 14(2) does not apply. Section 14(1) enlarged the widow's limited estate held by Manikyamma into an absolute ownership as full owner with a right to disposition by testamentary instrument or otherwise. As regards the claim in S.L.P. No. 2113 of 1980 is concerned, admittedly the decree was granted with restrictive covenant to remain in possession of a portion of the house and enjoyment for life and by operation of the ratio in Tulasiamrna's case the restrictive covenant has enlarged into absolute estate. The appeal and special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal and Petitions dismissed.
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1991 (8) TMI 340 - COMPANY LAW BOARD WESTERN REGION BENCH, MUMBAI
... ... ... ... ..... ces of the case while rejecting the transfer only on the ground that the transfer of these shares was earlier rejected in 1982 when they formed part of a lot of 20,562 shares proposed then to be transferred. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. N.K. Firodia 1971 41 Comp Cas 1 (SC) ; AIR 1973 SC 321, the discretion given in the articles to the board of directors to decline registration of transfer of shares does not mean a bare affirmation or negation of a proposal. 22. In the circumstances and for the reasons set out above, we hold that the refusal to register the transfer of shares by the respondent-Sangli Bank is unjustified and, therefore, this appeal is allowed in accordance with the provisions of Section 111(5) of the Companies Act and we hereby direct that the respondent-Sangli Bank shall register the transfer in respect (if the 50 shares comprised in this appeal within ten days of the receipt of this order. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (8) TMI 338 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... tter either on the ground that there was a reasonable apprehension of likelihood of bias or on any similar or other grounds, the decision on it is exclusively that of the particular Judge or the bench of which he is a member. At that stage, another co-ordinate bench cannot be invited to examine and pronounce on this question. It is for that bench and that bench alone to decide that question. Judicial propriety and discipline as well as what flows from the circumstance that each Division Bench of this Court functions as the court itself renders any interference by one bench with a judicial matter before another lacking as much in propriety as in jurisdiction. However, different considerations might apply to the prayer according as the final outcome of the main writ petition. At this stage it would be premature to predicate such outcome. FOR these reasons, we decline to consider the prayer in I.A. 4 of 1991 at this stage. I.A. No. 4 of 1991 is dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1991 (8) TMI 337 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... worked triple shift for 105 days. It claimed100 per cent of the normal depreciation allowance for the triple shift. The ITO allowed the extra shift allowance to the extent of 105 days to 300 of the normal depreciation allowance. This view was upheld in the appeal by both the appellate authorities as well as by this Court. 13. In view of the said authority, therefore, the last question No. 5 has got to be answered in the affirmative by holding that for the extra shift depreciation allowance for double and triple shift working in the case of the assessee's factory, is not to be calculated at 100 per cent of the normal depreciation allowance but for the proportionate period for which the assessee's factory had worked for the triple shift. 14. All the above questions referred to above are, therefore, answered as indicated above. 15. Since the assessee has largely succeeded in the present reference, the assessee is entitled to the cost of ₹ 300 from the department.
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1991 (8) TMI 336 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... an Penal' Code by the same Amendment Act is' another pointer in this direction. This contention is, therefore, rejected. In follows that the view taken by the High Court that the respondents cannot be tried and punished for the offence provided in section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code which is a new offence created subsequent 'to the commission of the offence attributed to the respondents does not suffer from any infirmity. However, as earlier indicated, in case the accusation against the respondents discloses commission of any other more stringent pre-existing offence by the respondents than section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant would be entitled to raise that question and the Court will then consider and decide it on that basis. No such argument having been advanced before us or any of the courts below so far, the same does not arise for consideration in the present proceeding. With these observations, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (8) TMI 335 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... be reasonable. In fact in The Tehsildar, Land Acquisi- tion, Vishakapatnam v.P. Narasing Rao & Ors., 1985 1 A.P.L.J. 99, a Division Bench of the High Court surveyed judgments of the High Court relating to housing schemes of Vishakapatnam upholding deduction of 1/3 to be reasonable. Accordingly we hold that 1/3 of the market value should be deducted for development of the lands. The High Court com- mitted greivous error in giving a curious reasoning of valuing at ₹ 12 and upholding Rs. I0 to be the market value after deduction, though he market value was deter- mined at ₹ 10. Accordingly the appeal is allowed. The market value is determined at ₹ 6 per sq. yard and after deducting 1/3 the market value is ₹ 4 per sq. yard. The respondents are entitled to 15 per cent Solatium on market value and 4 per cent interest thereon from the date of dispossession. But in the circumstances parties are directed to pay and receive their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (8) TMI 334 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e allowed. So does IA No. 1/89 also which has been made by the same category of members Who have made IA No. 13/91. The applicants in IA Nos. 6 and 8/89 have taken the same stand as the appellants and their learned counsel has before us also adopted the arguments made by learned counsel for the appellants. Since the appeal is being dismissed, no further order on IA Nos. 6 and 8/89 is necessary. The appellant in IA Nos. 4 and 5/89 was really aggrieved by the interim order passed by this Court in the special leave petition on 19th July, 1989 and since with the dismissal of the appeal the said interim order will automatically stand vacated, no further order in these applications also is necessary. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Orders on the interim applications aforementioned shall be as already indicated hereinabove. They are disposed of accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs., Y.Lal. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (8) TMI 333 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... itself has left the question of title open to be decided in appropriate proceedings. It was for the protection of possession of Ramasamy that the grant of injunction became necessary and having regard to the facts and circumstances, the plaintiff-Ramasamy was given relief on the basis of the case set up by him and supported by evidence. The High Court had thus no jurisdiction either to reassess the evidence or without reassessing as such find any infirmity in it. The measure of proof is within the domain of the two Courts of fact in the hierarchy. Sufficiency of proof can be no ground for the High Court to interfere in a finding of fact. Thus we are of the considered view that the High Court fell in a legal error in this case reversing the judgments and decrees of the Courts below and dismissing the suit of Ramasamy. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and the decree of the trial Court is restored. There shall be no order, however, as to costs in this Court.
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1991 (8) TMI 332 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... no reason why he should find it disadvantageous or difficult to file a suit at such place. Equally, the corporation, having a subordinate office at the place, will suffer no disadvantage. In this view of the matter since in the instant two cases clause (c) is not attracted to confer jurisdiction on courts at Bombay and the appellant has admittedly its subordinate offices at the respective places where the goods in these two cases were delivered to it for purpose of transport the courts at Bombay had no jurisdiction at all to entertain the suits filed by the respondents and the parties could not confer jurisdiction on the courts at Bombay by an agreement. Accordingly no exception can be taken to the findings in this behalf recorded by the trial court and the High Court in these two cases. In the result, we find no merit in any of these two appeals and they are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. Appeals dismissed
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1991 (8) TMI 331 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ate Government could not publish final notification. Explanation to Section 100(4) of the new Act lays down that in computing the period of one year any period during which the publication of the approved scheme under Section 100 is held up on account of any stay or order of any court, shall be excluded. On the application of the Explanation the period during which the appellant had obtained stay order against the State Government is liable to be excluded in computing the period of one year. Admittedly in the instant case stay order passed by the High Court remained in force from May to 9th August, 1990. On the exclusion of that period the final notification issued by the State Government under Section 100(3) of the new Act on 29.8.1990 was well within the prescribed period. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the High Court rightly dismissed the appellant's writ petition. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (8) TMI 330 - SUPREME COURT
Whether failure on the part of the Detaining Authority as well as the State Government to accede to the request of the appellants to take out copies of the representations and forward the same to the Central Government for consideration has resulted in violation of their constitutional/statutory right to have their representation considered by the Central Government?
Whether the detention orders are liable to be quashed on that ground?
Held that:- the Detaining Authority as well as the State Government were not justified in taking a hyper-technical stand that they were under no obligation to take out copies of the representations and forward them to the Central Government. We think that this approach on the part of the Detaining Authority and the State Government has robbed the appellants of their constitutional right under Article 22(5) read with section 11 of the Act to have their representation considered by the Central Government. The request of the detenus was not unreasonable- On the contrary the action of the Detaining Authority and the State Government was unreasonable and resulted in a denial of the appellants' constitutional right. The impugned detention orders are, therefore, liable to be quashed. Appeal allowed. Set aside the order of the High Court and quash the detention orders on this single ground.
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1991 (8) TMI 329 - SUPREME COURT
Whether fixation of the price of the plants and machinery at Ujjain and the attached ware- houses and stock in trade and payment thereof to the appellant is a condition precedent to take possession and delivery thereof to the respondent on August 28, 1981?
Held that:- Prior valuation of plant and machinery in the distillery, stock in trade therein or the value of the machinery in the ware- houses and stock of the liquor stored therein and payment thereof before taking possession and handing them over to the incoming licensee is not a mandatory, nor a condition precedent. Therefore, taking over possession from the appellant on August 28, 1981 and handing over the plant and machinery, etc. to the respondent is not illegal.
In this case admittedly the conditions of licence are not questioned, but expressly given up in the High Court. Even before us the validity of the valuation has not been questioned. It cannot cut the branch on which the appellant sits to assail the constitutional validity of the conditions of the licence. Accordingly we have no hesitation to hold that the appellant is not entitled to the restitu- tion of the plant and machinery of the distillery at Ujjain and the attached warehouses.
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