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Showing 1 to 20 of 240 Records
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1993 (1) TMI 316 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . When the list was published in 1985 nothing prevented them to approach earlier. This is the point to be put against them. 44. That this position was known to the direct recruit (Prakash Chandra Mishra) is clear from paragraph 18 of his petition before the Tribunal. It reads thus 18. Therefore, placement of Respondent Nos. 42 to 94 as per Civil List corrected upto 1982 published in the year 1985 by the State Government who are promotees from amongst the Forest Rangers insubordinate Service to Class II Service as Assistant Conservator of Forests in the year 1980 when this applicant was undergoing training at Burnihat, Assam, is patently illegal and an act without jurisdiction by the State Government of Orissa. (Emphasis supplied) 45. We do not want to unsettle settled matters which will lead to several complications. 46. In view of the foregoing discussion, we set aside the judgment of the Tribunal. The appeals will stand allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1993 (1) TMI 315 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n all cases Tribunal should grant to the claimants liberty to apply for withdrawal in case of an emergency. To meet with such a contingency, if the amount awarded is substantial, the Claims Tribunal may invest it in more than Fixed Deposit so that if need be one such F.D.R. can be liquidated. These guidelines should be borne in mind by the tribunals in the cases of compensation in accident cases. 18. In the result this appeal succeeds in part and the compensation is determined at Rs. 2,25,000/-. The judgment of the High Court is modified accordingly. No Costs. 19. The Tribunal will take all this into account and invest as much of the amount as it thinks reasonable in several deposits yielding adequate returns permitting the claimants to withdraw the interest periodically to be used for their maintenance and up-keep. The Tribunal will make appropriate orders within two months from the date of the deposit of the balance to be made by the appellant with interest @ 12% per annum.
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1993 (1) TMI 314 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not valid. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that the applicant had no interest in the litigation to represent the estate of deceased Roopi Devi in the appeal. It is true that by representing Mst. Roopi in the appeal, he is not absolved from getting his right as a legal heir to Mst. Roopi, to be determined in appropriate proceedings to establish the validity of will and rights flowing therefrom. Though decision on merits of the appeal shall be binding on the estate of deceased. 8. As a result, the Revision is allowed. The order of Addl. District Judge No. 1, Sriganganagar dated 17-8-1991 in Appeal No. 14/82, is set aside. The application of petitioner Kalu Ram is allowed and it is ordered that he be impleaded as appellant-legal representative of Musammat Roopi Devi, in the aforesaid appeal in the court of Addl. District Judge No. 1, Sriganganagar. As a consequence thereof, the order of abatement of the appeal is also set aside. 9. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1993 (1) TMI 313 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is Act liable for anything done by or under the authority of any Official Trustee before the commencement of this Act. In view of these provisions, it is clear that the appellant could not be made personally liable for the breach of trust committed by him. Although it is disputed on behalf of respondent No. 3 that this point was urged before the Division Bench, it is stated on behalf of the appellant that the point was very much canvassed before the Bench but was unfortunately not noticed by it. Whatever the controversy, we are of the view that in view of the clear provisions of the Act, the legal question cannot be ignored by us. This is particularly so when no further evidence is necessary to answer it.' 17. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decision of the High Court is set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1993 (1) TMI 312 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mediately and rather the detention order was passed on 8-10-1992 after three months from the release of the petitioner on bail. It shows that there is no nexus between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention and the delay in passing the detention order cannot be overlooked. (8) The respondents have not adequately explained the delay in passing the detention order which has vitiated the impugned detention order. This detention order was passed mechanically without application of mind and without considering the fact that the passing of detention order at such later stage would serve no purpose when particularly there was no material before the concerned authority that during the period of his release on bail on 7-7-1992 and until 8-10-1992 there was any instance of any prejudicial activity involving this petitioner. (9) In these circumstances, the writ petition is allowed, Rule is made absolute and the impugned detention order dated 8-10-1992 is hereby quashed.
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1993 (1) TMI 311 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... f the aforesaid rule is applicable to a case having business income from contract receipts. The said rule is not at all clear. At any rate the assessee made out a case that he did maintain such books of accounts and other documents which enabled the AO to compute his total income in accordance with the provisions of this Act. I further find that assessee's income was computed on the basis of similar books of accounts in the last several years and even in the year under consideration the assessment was made under s. 143(1) of IT Act without any difficulty and, therefore, it is not possible to hold that non-maintenance of cash book and ledger in any way affected computation of assessee's total income for purposes of s. 44AA of IT Act. The Revenue, therefore, failed to prove that provision of s. 271A was applicable in this case and levy of penalty was justified. For the aforesaid reasons, I cancel the penalty in question. In the result, assessee's appeal is. allowed.
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1993 (1) TMI 310 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ction 26 for the benefit of all the employees will again be thwarted if such a construction is put. We cannot also accept the finding of the High Court that because Ext. P3 notice was issued on 23.6.88 after the closure of the respondent establishment on 31.3.88, the appellant was not justified in proceeding against the respondent. The proceeding for the recovery is of the dues of contribution which arose prior to the closure on 31.3-88. Therefore, it matters little when notice was issued, calling upon to pay the contribution. In our considered view, such a notice is only a reminder to the employer to discharge his statutory obligation. For all these reasons, we have little hesitation in setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court which in turn upholds the order of Employees' State Insurance Court. The appellant will be entitled to proceed with the recovery proceedings in accordance with law. Accordingly, the appeal will stand allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1993 (1) TMI 309 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... but this point was neither raised nor considered. The decision in Dr. Sewa Singh cannot be treated as an authority for the view that change of user of a part of a residential building let out for use solely as a residence, for a scheduled purpose without the written consent of the landlord does not constitute the ground for eviction under section 13(2) (ii) (b) or that the ground of eviction based on personal need of the landlord contained in section 13(3) (i) (a) is not available to the landlord for that reason. If the logical inference from Dr. Sewa Singh appears to be that, then, with respect, we are unable to agree with the same. As a result of the above discussion, this appeal is allowed and the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside resulting in restoration of the order of eviction made by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the appellate authority. The respondent will also pay cost to the appellant. Counsel's fee ₹ 3,000. V.P.R. Appeal allowed.
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1993 (1) TMI 308 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... reme Court in K.K. Shukia's case (5 supra), we are of the view that the decisions relied upon by the leamed counsel for the appellant have no relevance. 24. However, since we have held that the order of termination is passed without jurisdiction, the same is liable to be quashed and the appellant is entitled for reinstatement into service. 25. During the course of arguments, it was brought to our notice that from 1983 to November, 1990, the appellant was paid full salary by virtue of the order of the Supreme Court and from December, 1990 he was being paid subsistence allowance. Since the appellant is to be reinstated into service, he is entitled to be paid full salary with effect from December, 1990 till the date of reinstatement. 26. The impugned order of termination dated 2-1-1978 is quashed and the order of the learned single Judge dated 3-1-1979 is set aside and the Writ Petition is allowed, 27. Writ Appeal is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1993 (1) TMI 307 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... have to be released on bail as a matter of right. Counsel for C.B.T.very fairly stated that the C.B.T. is not likely to file chargesheet within the stipulated period of sixty days which is going to expire after about 2/3 days. (11) Having regard to the totality of the circumstances the petitioner has made out a case for his release on hail. Accordingly. T direct that the petitioner be released on bail on his furnishing a bond in the sum of ₹ 2lakhs with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Special Court subject to the following conditions (1)The petitioner will not tamper with the evidence. (2) He would join the investigation as and when required. (3) The petitioner would not leave India except with the permission of the Court. (4) As and when the petitioner leaves Delhi he will inform the Investigating Officer as to the place of his visit and address there and the date of return. (12) The bail application is allowed in above terms, petition allowed
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1993 (1) TMI 306 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or had not expired on the date the petition for winding up was filed or the winding up proceeding commenced has to be determined. In the event it is found that as per the period of limitation prescribed by the relevant article applicable to the claim, the period of limitation had not expired on the date the winding up proceeding commenced, to that period of limitation, the two periods described in section 458A of the Act, are to be added and the question as to whether on the date the application filed under section 446(2)(b) of the Act was within time or not, has to be determined. In other words, in the period computed from the date the limitation commenced as per the relevant article in the Schedule to the Limitation Act till the date of filing of the application under section 446(2)(b) of the Act, the two periods stated in section 458A of the Act are to be excluded." 54. These cases shall now be decided by a Division Bench, in the light of the opinion rendered by us.
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1993 (1) TMI 305 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s filed was well within time. Be that is it may be. 4. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International 1979(4) ELT 396 (SC), the plea of limitation should not have been invoked by the Asstt. Collector. It is contrary to the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the Madras Port Trust (supra) submitted that it does not behove the State to invoke such pleas of limitation in order to defeat otherwise a just claim. 6. Following the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court the impugned order dated 13.1.1988 (Ann.8) is liable to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. Consequently, the respondent No. 2 is directed to consider the petitioner's claim on merits and decide the same in accordance with law. With this direction the petition stands finally disposed with no order as to costs. The security amount be refunded after verification.
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1993 (1) TMI 304 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... isfied vesting the Court of Session with the fullest jurisdiction to summon and individual accused of the crime." We are in respectful agreement with the distinction brought out between the old section 193 and the provision as it now stands. For the reasons stated above while as are in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the stage for tile exercise of power under section 319 of the Code had not reached, inasmuch as, the trial had not commenced and evidence was not led, since the Court of Session had the power under section 193 of the Code to summon the appellants as their involvement in the commission of the crime prima facie appeared from the record of the case, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order as it is well-settled that once under it is found that the power exists the exercise of power under a wrong provision will not render the order illegal or invalid. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1993 (1) TMI 303 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on of this Court. A reference to the pleadings in paras 7 of- the return will show that summons were sent to the petitioner at his Ambala address which were- stated to have been received back with the postal remarks that the addressee was not available at his shop inspite of repeated visits. Even in the detention order Annexure P-1, the petitioner has been described with his two addresses one is 7/4, Roop Nagar, Delhi and the second is 66, Mall Road, Ambala Cantt. The authorities had thus, gone after the petitioner both at his Delhi address as well as at his Ambala address. It cannot, thus, be gainfully said that no cause of action arose to the petitioner within the jurisdiction of this Court. This contention of the learned counsel is refuted. In view of the findings recorded above about the delay in passing of the detention order, 1, hereby, allow the petition and hold the detention order to be bad in law and quash the same. The petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith.
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1993 (1) TMI 302 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... earing in any examination of another versity. ( 10. ) There is another aspect of the matter. So far as the Punjabi University is concerned, it had already admitted the petitioner to B. A. Part II Course in the year 1987. He has declared to have passed B. A. Part III Examination in the year 1989. It had conferred the degree of B. A on him. Once that had happened, the petitioner was appearing in B. A. Part I Examination only in order to comply with certain requirements which were in force in his native country. In such a situation, there was no justification for the University to withhold the petitioner's result or to refuse to issue the certificates. ( 11. ) Accordingly , this writ petition is allowed. The respondent- University is directed to supply the requisite certificate to the petitioner within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner will also be entitled to his costs which are assessed at ₹ 5000/ -. ( 12. ) Petition allowed.
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1993 (1) TMI 301 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... bail on 3-4-1992, then in our opinion the impugned order issued on 3-4-1992 cannot be branded either as a delayed order and/or based on stale incidents which have no nexus to the impugned order. 6. We see no infirmity in the above quoted reasoning of the High Court in respect of the two grounds urged before us. 7. There is no force even in the third contention of the learned Counsel. The detaining authority in its affidavit before the High Court stated that he had gone through all the documents placed before him and after full application of mind, he culled out the grounds of detention. There is no material on the record to support the contention of the learned Counsel and as such we see no reason to reject the statement of the detaining authority made on oath before the High Court. Even otherwise the High Court examined the original records and satisfied itself that there was proper application of mind in issuing the detention order. 8. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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1993 (1) TMI 300 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s relating to awarding of contracts are entertained for judicial review of the administrative action, such applications remain pending for months and in some cases for years. Because of the interim orders passed in such applications, the very execution of the contracts are kept in abeyance. The cost of different projects keep on escalating with passage of time apart from the fact that the completion of the project itself is deferred. This process not only affects the public exchequer but even the public in general who are deprived of availing the facilities under different projects. As such, it need not be impressed that while exercising the power of judicial review in connection with contractual obligations Courts should be conscious of the urgency of the disposal of such matters. Otherwise the power which is to be exercised in the interest of the public and for public good in some cases become counter productive by causing injury to the public in general. Appeal dismissed.
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1993 (1) TMI 299 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o that the businessman can know the correct position and act accordingly. A businessman should not be kept on tenterhooks in the matter as has been done in this case, otherwise the time and skill which he would apply for developing his business will have to be diverted to looking after judicial matters. This will be against the interest of the nation which requires encouragement and development of business and industry. In the present case we can see that several remand orders have already been passed and the Tribunal as a high judicial authority should have decided the matter on merits finally instead of again throwing the ball back into the Court of the lower authorities. 2. In the circumstances I set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 17-10-1992 and direct the Tribunal to dispose of the petitioner's and department's appeal which they have filed within three months of production of a certified copy of this judgment. The petition is allowed. No order as to costs.
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1993 (1) TMI 298 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... controversy whether the two limbs of the old section are independent or integrated. No doubt s. 5 would now apply where s. 29(2) is applicable to even applications and petitions, unless they are expressly excluded. Even assuming that the Limitation Act applies to election petitions under the Act, what has to be seen is whether s. 5 is excluded from application to such petitions." The Division Bench then proceeded to examine whether the applicability of Section 5 is excluded in the matter of filing of an election petition and came to the conclusion that it was so excluded. This aspect has already been dealt with hereinabove. So far as the decisions of the High Courts are concerned, we cannot agree with them in so far as the applicability of Section 5 to filing on election petition and/or recrimination notice is concerned in view of the decision of this Court in H.N. Yadav. For the above reasons, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1993 (1) TMI 297 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nment has chosen to do so, the Legal Remembrancer can hardly be blamed for the same. Certainly he does not deserve the kind of compliments which the High Court has chosen to pay him. The comments and observations made against him are, therefore, both unjustified and unfortunate. 23. In the result, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and declare that both the orders dated July 23, 1990 and May 26, 1990 are valid and proper. We further hold that the termination of the appointment of the respondents-law officers was valid and proper. We also hold that the direction given by the High Court to the Government to continue the system of Brief Holders is unjustified and the same stands quashed. We also set aside the order of the High Court quashing the fresh appointments and directing payments to the officers whose appointments were terminated. The appeals are allowed accordingly. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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