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Showing 1 to 20 of 285 Records
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1993 (2) TMI 346 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sons, the product of agreement of share the profits of a business. 'Firm' is a collective noun a compendious expression to designate an entity, not a person. Likewise, in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, the Court took the view that a firm of the partnership is not a legal entity separate and distinct from partners and is only compendious description of individuals who compose the firm. 23. In view of the above, the petitions as drawn, are incompetent having been filed in the name of firm which is neither natural nor juristic person. 24. Though, the petitions, for the reasons stated heretofore, are held to be incompetent, as they stand, but the interest of justice demands that an opportunity be provided to learned counsel for the petitioners to rectify the defects regarding maintainability in the name of firm. The learned counsel for the petitioners, accordingly, if they choose to do so, may amend their respective petitions, within three days. 25. Order accordingly.
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1993 (2) TMI 345 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... shable under S. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code stands confirmed. 59. The acquittal of accused No. 1 in respect of the offence of criminal breach of trust by the trial Court is set aside. Accused No. 1 is convicted of the offence punishable under S. 406 of the Indian Penal Code and it is directed that he should undergo a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years and that he pay a fine in the sum of Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Lacs only), in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for nine months. The substantive sentences to run concurrently. 60. Having regard to the quantum of the fine imposed on accused No. 1, accused No. 1 is granted time of 12 weeks to deposit the fine amount in this Court. The operative part of this order shall be stayed for a period of 12 weeks even as far as the jail sentence is concerned. Office shall furnish to accused No. 1 a certified copy of this judgment on a priority basis. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. 61. Order accordingly.
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1993 (2) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dhary (supra) has deprecated the practice of staying criminal trials and police investigations except in exceptional cases and the present case is certainly not one of these exceptional cases. 4. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in quashing the prosecution launched against the respondent for offences under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120B, I.P.C. The judgment of the High Court cannot, thus be sustained. This appeal is consequently allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The case shall proceed to trial expeditiously. 5. We hasten to add that our observations made hereinabove are limited only for the purpose of determination of the question of exercise of powers by the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C, and nothing said by us should be construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the case, It shall be open to the respondent to raise all such pleas as are available to him in law in his defence during the trial.
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1993 (2) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... einbefore with reference to the order of this Court and the report of the Receiver. Accordingly, we reject the apology tendered in para 3 of the further affidavit. 18. For the above reasons, we hold the second respondent guilty of Contempt of this Court. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we impose a sentence of one month's imprisonment in addition to a fine of Rs. 2,000/- upon the second respondent. The fine shall be paid into this Court within two weeks from today, in default thereof the second respondent shall undergo a further imprisonment of two weeks. The second respondent shall also pay the costs of the respondents in this Contempt case which are assessed at Rs. 5,000/- within two weeks from today. In case of failure, the Respondents are free to execute this order as a decree of Court and recover the same from the Respondents. Mr. H.N. Bhan, who is present in the court, be taken into custody forthwith to undergo the sentence of imprisonment.
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1993 (2) TMI 342 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1st May, 1962 when the impugned proceedings were started only in the year 1985. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs. 21. At this stage the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 submits that the Respondent No. 1 has already quantified the liability of the petitioners in pursuance of the impugned order and the petitioners should be required to deposit at least part of the amount with Respondent No. 1 as a condition of participation by the petitioner in the proceedings on remand. It is not possible to accept this submission, as I have reached the conclusion that the impugned order suffers from error of law apparent on face of record, and the relevant tests have not been applied by Respondent No. 1. 22. I am not persuaded to pass any order of interim deposit against the petitioner at this stage. All contentions of both sides on merits of the main issues formulated in opening part of this judgment are kept open. 23. Issue of certified copy is expedited. Order accordingly.
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1993 (2) TMI 341 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion 438, without first moving the Court of Session, to consider all the circumstances, and if the situation warrants, this Court can direct the party to move the Court of Session. Passing of such an order in consequence of exercise of discretion is different from insisting upon the party to move the Court of Session in the first instance as an inflexible rule of practice. The existing practice of the Registry in returning applications filed under Section 438 on the ground that the Court of Session is not moved in the first instance, is clearly impermissible in law. 29. In view of our answer to the reference, we direct the Office to number the petitions if otherwise the same are in order and post them before a learned single Judge for disposal in accordance with law. 30. We gratefully acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered by Sri. K. G. Kannabhiran, Senior Advocate, who readily acceded to our request to argue the case as Amicus Curiae. 31. Reference answered accordingly.
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1993 (2) TMI 340 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... required to be pleaded in the plaint itself to give cause of action to the landlord to enable him to file a suit for eviction of the tenant on the ground of his bona fide personal requirement. The High Court was not right in going into the question of neglect by the tenant of the demanded arrears of rent. Once the arrears are admitted, it is implied that the tenant gave up the plea of tender. Surely the executing court could not be justified to permit the tenant to lead evidence of tender by him before the filing of the suit in compliance of the notice of demand as contemplated by Section 12(3)(a) of the Act after the decree. For the aforesaid reasons the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgments of the lower appellate court as well as the executing court are restored. The appellant/landlord would be entitled, in the circumstances of the case, to warrants of possession forthwith. The appellant is also entitled to the costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 339 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... discussed the matter with officers of the state Governments and met provisions representing different textile sectors. Apart from the reports received from the sub-committees, the representations received by the Government from various textile interests were duly considered by the Advisory Committee before making their recommendations. It is therefore, incorrect to say that proper opportunity was not provided to the petitioners for making representations. 69. It is important to note that in the Advisory Committee the representatives from the powerloom sector, mills sector and powerloom silk sector have been specifically included. Therefore, it is meaningless to state that no opportunity was afforded to powerloom sector and that under Section 3 of the impugned Act regard is had only to the handloom industry while under Clause 20 an over all view of all the industries could be taken. 70. In view of the foregoing discussion, we dismiss the writ petition and the connected cases.
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1993 (2) TMI 338 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and PW 4, the children of the deceased or of PW 1 and PW 2 who are also related to the deceased, by itself is not enough to discard their testimony and that the relationship or the partisan nature of the evidence only puts the Court on its guard to scrutinise the evidence more carefully, we find that in this case when the bona fides of the investigation has been successfully assailed, it would not be safe to rely upon the testimony of these witnesses either in the absence of strong corroborative evidence of a clinching nature, which is found wanting in this case. 6. Keeping in view these circumstances and being of the opinion that the findings recorded by the High Court while acquitting A-1 to A-3 and A-6 to A-8 are borne out by the evidence and are otherwise also reasonable and sound, we do not find any justification to interfere with the order of acquittal. Consequently the State appeal fails and is dismissed. The respondents are on bail. Their bonds shall stand discharged.
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1993 (2) TMI 337 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... petition under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956, in February, 1992. Inordinate delay has taken place in filing the petition and for which no adequate explanation has come forth from the petitioner. 10. Taking into consideration all the above facts, it is clear that the dispute relates to the question whether Mr. Hemant Bhutta or his wife has the right to act as natural guardian and Mr. Bhutta can seek his remedy against his wife in the appropriate court. As far as the record of the respondent-company is concerned, Mrs. Vibha H. Bhutta was acting as natural guardian of Master Jonas Bhutta and only her signature was on record. Under the circumstances, when properly executed transfer deeds under her signature were submitted to the company and the transfer is effected, it cannot be said that the entries made in the register of members are without sufficient cause. No case for rectification of the register of members is accordingly made out. Thus, the petition is dismissed.
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1993 (2) TMI 336 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ect I agree with the view of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. 7. In as much as I have held that the property furnished by a third-party can be accepted as security, the next stage would be whether it would be sufficient enough to discharge the decree that may be passed, if the defendant fails to produce the property which is sought to be attached or value of the same. So, the matter has necessarily to be remitted back to the trial court and the trial court shall consider whether the property offered by the security is enough to discharge the decree that may be passed if the defendant fails to produce the property which is sought to be attached or value of the same, after hearing the objections in this regard by the plaintiff. 8. In view of the above, both the C.R.P. and the C.M.A. are allowed and the orders of the court below are set aside and the matters remitted back to the court below for fresh disposal according to law in the light of the observation made in this order.
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1993 (2) TMI 335 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ducated businessmen who know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not disposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. May be, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. May be not. But one thing is clear - they chose to non-cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the Court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted. 9. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 3.3.1992 is set aside and its order dated 8.7.1991 is restored. The company-defendant shall bear the costs of the appellant in this appeal which are assessed at ₹ 5,000/-,
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1993 (2) TMI 334 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ons Industries Pvt. Ltd. or any of its assets. In that event, the company will also cease to have any interest in the defense Colony, New Delhi property which will become inclusive property of Narender Nath or his nominee. 24. I.A. Nos. 1490, 2921, 4602, 6157 of 1990, 1332, 1506, 6349, 6890, 6893, 7979, 8028, 8703 and 12012 of 1991 These applications were moved by the parties for purposes of interim directions while the matter was pending in court on consideration of the report of the valuers. Now, that the matter has been finally disposed of with directions regarding implementation of the settlement, the applications do not survive. They are dismissed with no order as to costs. 25. Crl.M. No. 195 of 1991 During the course of hearing of the main case, counsel for the applicant did not make any submissions regarding this application nor it was even referred to. It appears that the applicant was not interested in pursuing the same. 26. The application is accordingly dismissed.
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1993 (2) TMI 333 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in the total population of 3.16,385 Sikkimese of Nepali origin were 2,24,481, i.e., about 70 . In these circumstances, it cannot be said that reservation of seat for Sikkimese of Nepali origin was required in order to protect their- rights and interests and in not making any provision for reservation of seats for Sikkimese of Nepali origin Parliament has failed to give effect to the provisions of clause Article 371-F of the Constitution. For the reasons above mentioned, these cases have to be partly allowed and it is declared that Section 25-A introduced in the 1950 Act by Act no. 10 of 1976, Clause (c) of sub-s.(1A) introduced in Section 7 of the 1950 Act by Act no. 8 of 1980, the words "other than constituency reserved for the Sanghas "in clause (a) of sub-s.(2) introduced in Section 5-A of the 1951 Act by Act no.8 of 1980 and clause (c) of sub-s.(2) introduced in s.5-A of the 1951 Act by Act no.8 of 1980 are unconstitutional nd avoid. T.N.A. Petitions dismissed.
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1993 (2) TMI 332 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... actories could not be deemed to be agricultural produce is both against the statutory language and judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in statutes of other States". In Bharat Trading v. State of U.P. & Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 9982 of 1983 decided on 31st March, 1992 it was held that 'raskat' is nothing more than an inferior quality of gur and the same was held as an agricultural produce within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act. Thus we hold that gur lauta or raskat and rab-galawat and rab salawat fall within the definition of 'agricultural produce' as contained in Section 2(a) of the Act and are exigible to market fee under the Act and the view taken by the Full Bench of the High Court is not correct. In the result we allow all these appeals., set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court and as a result of which the writ petitions riled by tile respondents stand dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 331 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... filing the special leave petitions are, therefore, dismissed resulting in the dismissal of the special leave petitions as time barred. 6. The question now is of the effect of the dismissal of the special leave petitions on the tenability of Civil Appeal No. 244 of 1982. The facts stated above giving rise to this Civil Appeal clearly indicate that after dismissal of the special leave petitions resulting in finality of the common order dated 20-8-1980 relating to dismissal of Writ Petition Nos. 679 and 760 of 1974, correctness of that order relating to dismissal of the Writ Petition No. 677 of 1974 cannot be examined for the obvious reason that interference in this appeal is bound to result in the making of conflicting orders regarding tenancy rights in the same lands. This alone is sufficient to require dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 244 of 1982. 7. Consequently, the above SLPs as well as Civil Appeal No. 244 of 1982 are dismissed. No one appears for the other side. No costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 330 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is the period of 12 years. After the expiry of that period, the rates are subject to revision with effect from the commencement of the next guaranteed period and the ceiling mentioned in the first proviso is applicable to such revision. In the instant case the first revision was from ₹ 9/- to ₹ 18/- which was within the ceiling and the second revision which was after about 9 years of first revision on account of demolition of the old structure and construction of new structure, was also very much within the ceiling set out in the proviso to section 116 of the Code. 10. In that view of the matter, I do not find any infirmity in the fixation of the rates of revenue which may justify any interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 11. In view of the foregoing discussion, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed. The rule is discharged. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 329 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dent Indian students shall be admitted on the basis of merit. But in view of the different backgrounds they come from it is for the management of the college concerned to judge the merit of these candidates, having regard to the relevant factors. The fees payable by such students shall be as may be prescribed by the Committee referred to in clause (6) of the Scheme The Non-Resident Indian students admitted against these 5 seats need not however take the entrance examination, if any prescribed for admission to that course. It is made clear that the above provision does not preclude the Non-Resident Indian students from seeking admission either to free seats of payment seats along with others on the basis common to all. The observations made in Mohini Jain case Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, 1992 (3) SCC 666 in relation to Non-Resident Indian students will stand modified to the above extent (3) SUBJECT to the above, all the review petitions and IAs are dismissed. No costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 328 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ey actually did on 19.3.1973. They expressly claimed the benefit retrospectively from 15.11.1965. We are, therefore, unable to see how the Observations in Sindhu help the Management in this case. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the Division Bench was not right in holding that the Industrial Tribunal had no power to grant the relief claimed by the Workmen with effect from a date anterior to 19.3.1973 (the date on which the fresh demand was raised) notwithstanding the fact that the said demand specifically claimed the benefit from an anterior date i.e. 15.11.1965, and. which demand was referred to it by the Government. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and the Judgment and Order of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in appeal No. 247 of 1977 dated 1.9.1992 is set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the Management in the Bombay High Court questioning the award dated 3.1..1977 is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 327 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on various items mentioned in the questions. The assessment year concerned is 1973-74 and today we are in the assessment year 1993-94. In other words, 20 years have passed since this assessment was framed by the ITO. Over this 20 years, the assessee would have got full depreciation on the items mentioned in the questions. In this view of the matter, issues raised In these questions are academic in nature and it would serve no purpose to anybody even if the decisions were to be given in favour of the assessee; in that event the ITO would be required to modify/rectify assessment years right from the assessment year 1973-74 onwards, which would entail not only waste of time but also waste of public money. 4. After discussion with the learned counsel for the assessee, the counsel was fair enough to state that he would leave to the Court whether to answer these questions or not. 5. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we decline to answer these questions. 6. No order as to costs.
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