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Showing 1 to 20 of 266 Records
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1994 (1) TMI 318 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rovisions of the Act were at all times in force. It appears to us that the High Court was under the impression that since it had pointed out in a string of cases the effect of nonpublication of notice, its decision could not be upset by the Validation Act. This impression of the High Court was obviously wrong for the Validation Act had not directly attacked the judgments of the courts, but knocked off their basis by validating the non-publication to be as if valid publication. The defect having been removed, the basis of the set of cases decided by the High Court stood Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4828 of 1993 knocked off and hence the Validation Act had a field to role over so as to justify the levies and the collections. 3. In this view of the matter, the appeal necessarily has to be allowed and accordingly we do so, setting aside the impugned order of the High Court declaring the fees levied and collected or to be levied and collected from the respondents as valid. No costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 317 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... A.G.A. The law is equal for every body. The provisions of statute equally apply to every accused whether involved in minor offence or major offence. But the law cannot be interpreted differently for minor offence and major offence. As such, simply because the revisionist is involved in a case of murder the interpretation of the Statute cannot be other than what has been discussed above. 51. In view of what has been discussed above, in the absence of order of remand by the Court the detention of accused becomes illegal and as such he is entitled to be bailed out in this case. 52. The revision is accordingly allowed and it is directed that the revisionist, Rajesh Mishra, shall be admitted to bail on furnishing two sureties and a personal bond in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad in case crime No. 324 of 1993 under Section 302 IPC and case crime No. 328 of 1993 under Section 25/27, Arms Act, police station Kidganj district Allahabad.
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1994 (1) TMI 316 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aforesaid discussion, since the patent infirmity noticed in the report of Public Analyst is found to be fatal to the prosecution, it is indeed not possible to uphold and sustain the order of conviction and sentence against the appellant-accused, and accordingly, he deserves to be given benefit of doubt and acquitted. 13. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of conviction passed against the appellant is quashed and set aside. The appellant-accused is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, unless his presence is required in Jail in connection with any other case. Office is directed to send a copy of this judgment to (i) The Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, (ii) The Director General, Narcotics Control Bureau, New Delhi, (iii) The Secretary, Home Department, Government of Gujarat, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar, and (iv) The Director General of Police, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad, for information and necessary action.
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1994 (1) TMI 315 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ard and fast rule can be laid down. In the instant case, we have found that the impugned order is without jurisdiction. Hence, having regard to the above fact and all the facts and circumstances of the case, we find this a fit case to exercise our powers under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 32. In the result, rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). 33. At this stage, Shri Lambay applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 134A. He has also prayed for stay of our order. Having considered all the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find this a fit case for grant of certificate as prayed for. As far as the prayer for stay is concerned, the stay of the impugned order granting police custody is in operation from 30th of November, 1993 by virtue of our present order and there can, therefore, be no question of stay of the present order. Both the prayers are rejected. Expedite the issue of certified copy. 34. Order accordingly.
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1994 (1) TMI 314 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ision petitioner (tenant) to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the petition schedule buildings to the respondent (landlord) on the following conditions The tenant shall file an affidavit in the execution court within one month from today unconditionally undertaking to vacate the premises within three months from the date of this judgment. He should pay arrears of rent, if any, along with the affidavit and continue to pay the monthly rent regularly during the period he is permitted to occupy the premises. He should not sublet the building or induct any other person in the building. The undertaking should contain a statement to this effect also. In case any of these provisions is not complied with, the landlord will be free to evict the tenant immediately thereafter and get vacant possession in accordance with the order of eviction in this proceedings. C.R.P. dismissed with the above directions. There will be no order as to costs. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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1994 (1) TMI 313 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nts of this Court. I am told by the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondent that at present the respondent has been manning a responsible position requiring him to perform quasi-judicial functions. It would, therefore, be in the fitness of things to direct the Registry to serve a copy of this judgment of mine to the respondent after ascertaining from the concerned Assistant Government Pleader where he is working at present so that he would realise the consequence of bypassing or disregarding the judgments of this Court in the manner and fashion he has done as reflected in his communications at Annexures G and I to this petition. 7. In the result, this petition is accepted. It is hereby declared that the communications at Annexures G and I to this petition are of no consequence. They have to be ignored. They will be treated as non-existent in the eyes of law. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs. (NAP) Petition allowed.
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1994 (1) TMI 312 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... shines visible to all eyes in Guruvayur, that very verity of Brahman; the embodied Supreme, of the nature of bliss entire and knowledge, the incomparable, untrammelled by the limits of time and space, the ever-free; that shines through a hundred thousand scriptures and (still) is indistinct, but that, (to the pure), the very moment when seen, is of the nature of the highest goal of human life realised " (Translation -- Narayaneeyam by Shri P. N. Menon). The temple and the idol of Guruvaryur is the very Brahman itself, so easily obtained, which can, in the ordinary course, be obtained only after undergoing all trials and tribulations. That is the greatness of this Lord of Guruvayur (Sree Krishna), the temple sought by millions all over and about which every Hindu holds a candle, but alas its administration has sunk to low levels, to be ashamed of. We hope and pray that this litigation will give a turning point for the improvement and better administration of the Devaswom.
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1994 (1) TMI 311 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... learned Judge has pointed out that there is a patent violation of provisions of Section 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in that more than three transactions within a year form part of this prosecution. The learned Judge proceeds further and has laid as follows On that ground, the impugned prosecution cannot be quashed. However, the respondent will have to choose on which of these five cheques, he would have the prosecution maintained. That shall be stated before the concerned Magistrate. Subject to this limited observation, on the second ground, this petition, shall stand dismissed. Thus, the learned Judge had rejected this submission while that was projected for dismissal of the complaint at the threshold. With respect, I am in total agreement with the view expressed by Justice Arunachalam. 9. Since none of the submission urged for allowing this petition finds acceptance with me, the inevitable result is that this petition is to be dismissed and shall stand dismissed.
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1994 (1) TMI 310 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ty, Be that so. 11. In spite of the specific directions dated 10.6.1993 requiring the surrender of unfilled seats to State quota. We do not know how there could be a disobedience thereof. Then again, there is disobedience of directions dated 10.6.1993, in that Kumari Jaya, (rank No. 703) and Mr. Anup Kumar (rank No. 575) were not in the list of eighty candidates, the list which came to be submitted to this Court, Lastly, in relation to Kumari Namita Jhamb (rank No. 1465) the application is prior to 28.12.1992 while it is sought to be made out that the candidates who had applied after 28.12.1992 were included in the list dated 10.6.1993. This statement is misleading. 12. Accordingly, we direct issue of notices to the Director General of Health Services and Dr. Girish Tayal, Assistant Director General (Medical Education) to show cause why they should not be proceeded against under Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and be punished under Section 12 of the said Act.
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1994 (1) TMI 309 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... e find that although the provisions of s. 263 empower the CIT to make or cause to be made such enquiry as he deems necessary, the learned CIT has brought nothing on record to show that the information furnished by the assessee before the Assessing Officer was false or incorrect which made her order erroneous in so far as it became prejudicial to the interests of Revenue. We agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the assessee that he set aside the order of the Assessing Officer on the basis of suspicions, conjectures and surmises and by making observations e.g. regarding the cost of the boiler at ₹ 7,77,535 which are not supported by anything on record before us. We, therefore, hold that the learned CIT Jaipur has failed to establish that the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer was erroneous in so far as it was prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue and hence his order under s. 263 is cancelled. 6. Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1994 (1) TMI 308 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ect one. Even so we are not satisfied that the appellate order is not a speaking order. We have already extracted the appellate order in full hereinbefore, which shows that it considered at length the facts of the case including the fact that the appellate authority (sic disciplinary authority) had differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the two charges. The appellate authority then says that it considered the relevant grounds of appeal and after considering the facts of the case came to the conclusion that there was no substance in the appeal. In view of the fact that it was an order of affirmance, we are of the opinion that it was not obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to say more than this as the order as it is, shows application of mind. The order cannot be characterised as a non-speaking order. 9. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and the order of punishment is restored. No costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e to be construed. ... That in each case you must look to the subject-matter, consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory.” 15. Likewise in State of Kerala v. Alasserry Mohammed16 Hon'ble Untwalia, J. speaking for the Supreme Court and while holding that Rule 22 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules is only directory, held that “if the object is not frustrated and is squarely and justifiably achieved without any shadow of doubt, then it will endanger public health to acquit offenders on technical grounds which have no substance.” 16. Therefore we are of the view that Rule 7(3) is only directory and not mandatory. No interference is called for in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. October 13, 1963 according to the petitioner and on June 1.
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1994 (1) TMI 306 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Appellate Authority against the relevant orders passed by the Revenue Officer concerned in the relevant proceedings. 49. In view of the discussions above, the appeal fails. The impugned order passed by the Court below stands confirmed. The writ Petitioners-Appellants shall be at liberty to prefer appeal to the Appellate Authority with liberty to urge all the points taken in the writ petition in terms of the order of the Court below. If any such appeal is preferred by them within a period of one month from this date, the Appellate Authority shall entertain the same without raising any question of limitation ; and shall dispose of the same with reasoned order within a reasonable period by giving the parties concerned all reasonable opportunity of being heard. 50. In the facts and circumstances of the matter and in view of the questions of law of the first impression raised herein, we direct the parties to bear their respective cost of the hearing. Suhas Chandra Sen, J. I agree.
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1994 (1) TMI 305 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... with his reasoning faculty and power. When the administrative authority has used its discretion taking all aspects into consideration, Court cannot supplant it by its decision particularly when the Statute does not confer any role to the Court to interfere with the discretion exercised by the authority. 8. There is nothing like an absolute and unfettered discretion immune from judicial review. The exercise of discretionary power by the administrative authority can be challenged on the ground of gross arbitrariness, discrimination or mala fides or when the power is exercised at the dictates of someone else. Petitioner could not establish that the discretion exercised by the second respondent suffers from any such vice. The discretionary power exercised by the second respondent cannot be challenged merely because the petitioner did not get the reward he expected. Petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought in the Original Petition. O.P. is dismissed. No costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 304 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... did not spring into absolute right of Seethamahalaxmi and as Section 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is applicable in so far as the said Item No. 3 is concerned, we affirm the findings of both the trial court and the learned single Judge that the plaintiff is the owner of Item No. 3 of suit schedule property and shall be entitled to recover possession thereof together with mesne profits, both past and future, right from 4-4-1982 (date of death of Seethamahalaxmi) till eviction. We also make it clear that if any amount/s have either been paid to the plaintiff or deposited in the Court, the same shall be adjusted towards the said mesne profits. The judgments and decrees rendered by the trial court and the learned single Judge of this court are set aside in so far as Items 1 and 2 of suit schedule properties are concerned and are affirmed in so far as Item No. 3 thereof. The Letters Patent Appeal is allowed in part. Each party shall bear their own costs. 15. Appeal allowed.
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1994 (1) TMI 303 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... learned counsel for the respondents submits that the stamp duty of ₹ 10 paid by the petitioners falls share of even the stamp duly chargeable under Art. 15 and at least to that extent the concerned authorities are empowered to demand ₹ 10 being difference of duty and the penalty thereon. I do not propose to go into this matter. If the petitioners have not complied with the re quirements under Art. 15, the concerned authorities shall be at liberty to demand from the petitioners deficient stamp duty in accordance with law. 9. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the clear opinion that the impugned order of the Assistant Stamp Superintendent levying duty on the deed of cancellation at the rates specified in Art. 25 of Schedule I to the Act is not tenable in law and the same is, therefore, set aside and quashed. 10. In the result, this writ petition is allowed Rule is made absolute. 11. No order as to costs. 12. Certified copy expedited. 13. Petition allowed.
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1994 (1) TMI 302 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which according to him is due on the basis of information supplied in the return filed by him, there would be no default on his part to meet his statutory obligation and it would be difficult to hold that the 'tax payable' by him is not paid to visit him with the liability to pay interest. In my view, therefore, the dealer having not admitted the liability to pay tax in respect of the purchases in question and there being nothing to show that his denial was absolutely without any basis the disputed tax could not be treated as the tax admittedly payable by it. Therefore, no interest was leviable. 6. For the above reasons, the revision petition is partly allowed and it is held that the dealer was not liable to interest under Section 8 (I) of the Act in respect ofthe levy of tax on the turnover referred to above. To this extent the Tribunal's order is set aside and the Tribunal is directed to pass an order in the dealer's appeal in accordance with this judgment.
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1994 (1) TMI 301 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing the cash equivalent of leave salary due to a Chief Justice or Judge of the High Court. The amount deposited in this Court calculated after including the money equivalent of the aforesaid allowances and withdrawn pursuant to this Court's order dated August 1,1991, shall be refunded by the original petitioner within three months from today failing which the government shall be at liberty to recover the same with interest at 15 per annum on the expiry of the said period. We reject the government's plea for grant of interest from the date of withdrawal till refund. There will be no order as to costs throughout as this is a litigation of a representative character. We may, however, clarify that since we have approved the High Court's order in regard to payment of compensation for failure to supply staff car in terms of Section 22B; the original petitioner will be entitled to retain the amount received under that head. The appeal will stand disposed of accordingly.
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1994 (1) TMI 300 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ales tax and other taxes, if any, payable on such goods. By explanation it is stated that the amount of the duty of excise payable on any excisable goods shall be the sum total of the effective duty of excise payable on such goods under this Act. Therefore, if in the price, duty is included then, for determining the assessable value as per the authority of this sub-section the amount of duty of excise has to be deducted. In the present case, the appellants quoted the price not inclusive of duty but without any excise duty, because they were under the impression that no excise duty is payable and consequently paid no excise duty on their sales of the above three articles. Therefore, when nothing is payable and included by them, it is not possible to allow any deduction.” 14. We agree with the said reasonings and findings of the authorities below. consequently, we reject this contention also. 15. In the result, the appeal is dismissed being devoid of any merit.
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1994 (1) TMI 299 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y must have been aware of what are the reliefs claimed in that petition. The consent letter itself should indicate that the signatories/shareholders had applied their minds to the allegations to be made and the reliefs to be sought in the proposed action and have given their consent for seeking those reliefs. The consent letter cannot be treated as a letter creating agencies. And there is no indication that the consenting shareholders subscribed their consent to this particular action in the form and substance as projected in the company petition. I, therefore, hold that annexure A-2 does not constitute valid consent in writing under section 399(3) of the Act. And the company petition has to fail also for the reason that Mr. C. P. Sodhani had no valid authority to present the company petition. 21. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the Company Law Board dated May 14, 1993, is set aside and Company Petition No. 59 of 1992 is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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