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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 305 Records
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1994 (12) TMI 354 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion against the defaulting officials. It is necessary for the Police Commissioner to find out as to how and why such grave lapses have taken place at the level of not only Investigating Officer but even at the level of Deputy Commissioner of Police which have unfortunately resulted in acquittal of the appellants who were allegedly found to be in possession of huge quantity of charas. (35) In view of the above discussion, we hold that the convictions and sentences of the appellants in the present case cannot be sustained. (36) We allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the Additional Sessions Judge and also set aside the convictions and sentences of the appellants and we acquit the appellants of the charges and direct that they be set at liberty forthwith, if not required to be detained in any other case. We require that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Police Commissioner by name by the Registry at the earliest for his information and necessary action.
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1994 (12) TMI 353 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . effect of the term cattle-feed beyond the shadow of doubt, and to clarify that it also includes de-oiled cake . The Rajasthan High Court in S. B. Sales Tax Revision Petition No. 14 of 1991 (Commercial Taxes Officer v. M/s. Sunil Trading Company) held that de-oiled cake is cattle-feed. The entry was catle-feed excluding gowar, cotton-seeds and oil cakes . It was held that cattle-feed includes de-oiled cake. The matter was assailed by the Revenue in S. L. P. (Civil) Nos. 17515 of 1993 and 14428 of 1993, i.e., Commercial Tax Officer v. Sunil Trading Co. and Commercial Tax Officer v. Shriram Oil, Extractions respectively, before the apex Court, which dismissed the S. L.Ps. 10. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the stand of the Revenue that the de-oiled cake is not cattle-feed prior to 1-4-1991 is not sustainable. Assessments made on the basis of such conclusion are set aside. The writ applications are allowed to the extent indicated above. B.N. Dash, J. 11. I agree.
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1994 (12) TMI 352 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the patients and protection of their interest and not the hardship that may be caused to the medical store keepers who may be having their shops outside the hospital campus. Thus the intention of the appellants to open a medical store within the hospital campus is to salvage the difficulties of the patients admitted in the hospital and this object of the appellants has direct nexus with the Public Interest particularly that of the patients and, therefore, the High Court should not have interfered with the decision of the State Government to settle the holding of a medical store in the Hospital premises. However, if the respondents so choose, they may keep their medical stores also open day and night. Consequently the impugned order could not be sustained. 7. In the result the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order of the High Court dated 27.9.93 is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondents is dismissed. We, however, make no order as to costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 351 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... imited and passed the order to that effect which has been filed as Annexure-B in this appeal. But it appears that the High Court ignored the said order of the State Government while observing that no material in support of the contention that the Government has issued instructions not to make appointment was produced by the appellant. 8. It is not worthy that Shri K.P. Thakur, the then Managing Director himself was retiring on 31.7.89 and in hot haste he issued the orders of appointment of the respondents on 6.7.89 and 8.6.89 inspite of the instructions of the State Government to the contrary. In these facts and circumstances the impugned order passed by the High Court quashing the termination of service of the respondents can not be sustained. 9. In the result the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 1.12.93 passed by the High Court in Misc. Petition No. 3973/89 is set aside and the said writ petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the High Court without arguments nor challenge made to it, has no substance. From the judgment it is clear that category (iii) persons who had vacated the houses were treated on par with category (vi) employees transferred from the capital to the districts. From the material on record it would appear that the eligibility of category of (vi) employees was also questioned. Though some of them managed to remain in possession, they cannot claim right to allotment under hire purchase scheme. Therefore, the High Court has rightly considered that when category (iii) employees were excluded on the ground that they shifted their residence from Pahari to Gandhinagar, the same parity should be applied to category (vi) employees who have been transferred from the capital to the districts. 14. In these circumstances, we do not find any illegality in excluding employees of categories (iii) and (vi) for allotment under hire purchase scheme. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 349 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... scharging him of all the claims of the appellant-bank against him. Shri Ajit Jain shall further pay a sum of ₹ 5,00,000/- to the judgment-debtor. The amount of ₹ 3,00,000/- withdrawn by the judgment debtor from the rent deposited shall not be adjusted towards this payment. Remaining amount in deposit shall be paid to the judgment- debtor. Shri Jain shall deposit balance amount, that is, Rupees Five Lakhs minus the amount which is lying in deposit towards rent and Rupees Fifteen Lakhs minus Rupees One Lakh Ninety Thousand, the auction amount as we are informed this amount is lying in deposit with the Court. All these amounts shall be deposited within three months from today. The bank and the judgment-debtor shall be entitled to withdraw the same. 6. In case of failure to deposit the judgment and order of all the courts including auction sale held on 15th June 1979 shall stand set aside. 7. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 348 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion case is intrinsically inherently, improbable or so to say in substance, it is the 'cock and bull' story, like the present one where the complaint is filed only with a view to counter-blast and wreck the personal vengeance on the accused public-servants so as to demoralize and deter them from discharging their lawful duties, it is indeed the paramount duty of the Court to step-in and bring to an end the malicious proceedings by quashing and setting aside the process issued pursuant thereto 13. In the result, this Misc. Criminal Application is allowed. The process issued pursuant to the complaint filed by Vinod Brahmbhatt and the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 548 of 1992 pending before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 19, Ahmedabad is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute. 13.1 The Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Chairman, Bar Council of Gujarat,. Ahmedabad immediately for necessary action. Petition allowed.
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1994 (12) TMI 347 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... at no case is made out for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. The special leave petition is dismissed accordingly.
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1994 (12) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed with, but they are an exception.) It is upto the competent authority to decide whether in the given circumstances the opportunity to be provided should be a prior one or a post- decisional opportunity. Normal rule, of course, is prior opportunity. 8. In the case before us admittedly prior opportunity of hearing or to show cause against the action proposed was not given to the respondent. It was also not brought to the notice of the Tribunal or the High Court that a post- decisional hearing was given to respondent. Mr. Gaurab Banerjee sought to contend that in this case post-decisional hearing was indeed given. But in the absence of any such plea being taken either before the Tribunal or before the High Court, we are not inclined to permit the learned coun- sel to put forward the said factual plea at this stage. For the above reasons, it is not possible to agree with the decision of the Allahabad High Court in J.P. Aggarwal. 9. The Appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 345 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was not furnished with the particulars. It is brought to our notice that respondent's name was not included in the schedule appended to G.O.Ms. 928 dated 25.4.88 mentioning the names of officials responsible for falsification of accounts and misappropriation and that he is also not made an accused in the criminal proceedings initiated in that behalf. 10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment of the Tribunal is right insofar as it holds that the charges communicated to the respondent are vague. In the ordinary course we would have directed the disciplinary authority or the authority which framed the charges to particularise the charges and then to proceed with the enquiry but it appears that the respondent has hardly about seven or eight months to go for retirement. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the matter should end here. 11. Accordingly the appeals are dismissed on the ground indicated above. No costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , 1961 that it was a partnership property, could not be ignored. Apart form it, the appellant had filed earlier suit in which the claim of the appellant that these documents were obtained under duress was not accepted. Even though the suit was dismissed on ground of limitation, but the genuineness of the documents was not doubted. If that be so, then the recital in the Dissolution Deed could not be ignored. The High Court was in absence of any challenge to Ext. 48 not justified in recording the finding that recital in the Deed did not carry out intention of executants. Sri Sen was correct in submitting that once it was held that Plot No. 699 was partnership property then there was no need for registration and the appellant's suit was liable to be decreed. 5. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments of the two courts below. dismissing the plaintiff's suit are set aside and the suit for partition is decreed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 343 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... w of the matter no relief can be granted to the Petitioner. In this case, however, before parting with this case we must mention that Sri Bandopadhyay stated that the petitioner's prayer for allowing him to join in the service would not arise as he has already crossed 35 years age. Sri Bandopadhyay however has not been able to show that 35 years is the maximum age prescribed by the company for offering employment to any person. In this view of the matter we make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion in relation thereto. 82. However, we have no doubt in our mind that the respondent-company being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India would act as a model employer and pass necessary orders with regard to joining of the petitioner in accordance with law, if there does not exist any statutory bar in this regard. 83. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 342 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... -M satisfies various aspects of scrutiny for upholding reasonable restriction on the fundamental right when tested in the context of guidelines and principles indicated hereinbefore. The restriction appears necessary to us in larger public interest and to protect the interest of workmen, who, but for the restriction may be subjected to uncalled for lay- off. The application of this restriction to industrial establishments specified in Section 25-K duly takes care of the hardship which could otherwise be caused to small establishments. Directive Principles do require placing of the restriction on large industrial establishments employing large number of workmen. The impugned decision of the Madras High Court, therefore, must be held to be erroneous and the same is, set aside by upholding the vires of Section 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was introduced under the Amending Act of 1976. This appeal is, therefore, allowed without, however, any order as to costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 341 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... at the aforesaid income may be charged to tax as income from other sources and the aforesaid deductions may be allowed under s. 57(iii). 12. We have carefully considered the submissions made by both the parties on the said ground of appeal. Though we agree with the learned Departmental Representative that under the existing provisions relating to computation of income from house property, the aforesaid deductions are not allowable, yet considering the past history of the assessee and the fact that the said deductions have been allowed to the assessee right upto the asst. yr. 1991-92 and with a view to maintain consistency in the case of the assessee, we decline to interfere with the directions issued by the CIT(A) to the AO, as we feel that the deductions have to be allowed in any case to the assessee for the aforesaid services and amenities which are purely ancillary to the letting out of the buildings. 13. In the result, this ground of appeal by the Department is rejected.
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1994 (12) TMI 340 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nance Ltd.'s case (supra) and are already considered. Dictionary meaning cannot always dictate the scope of a word. In fact, the words 'carry out any work' in section 194C are the crucial words. The term 'contract' in section 194C(i) has been referred to a particular set of persons for the sake of convenience. 4. Mr. Pandey also referred to a decision of the Gujarat High Court in All Gujarat Federation of Tax Consultant v. CBDT 1994 76 Taxman 307 . It is unnecessary to refer to it in greater detail in view of the decision in S.R.F. Finance Ltd.’s case (supra). 5. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned circular to the extent it purports to govern the profession of Advocates, Architects and Chartered Accountants are declared as ultra vires the provisions of section 194C. The respondents are restrained from giving effect to the said circular to govern the aforesaid professions. 6. Writ petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. No costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 339 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Tribunal in paragraph 9 under reference, the material has not been accepted by the Tribunal. In addition to it, the manner in which this material in question has been described by the Tribunal also shows that the material would not inspire any confidence for acceptance and it is only after acceptance of the material that the ultimate amount which comes as a result of its peak could be acted upon. Additionally it cannot be lost sight of that. In such situation the ITOs have powers of taking resort to the best judgment, instead of acting upon the material which is unacceptable on the face of it. No other particulars are available and on the face of if it is not possible to reach a conclusion that the conclusion is in any way perverse or unsupportable on the material on record. For the above reasons, we endorse the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, Cochin bench. We answer questions Nos. 1 to 3 in the affirmative that is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1994 (12) TMI 338 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... qually important insofar as they are concerned. The need for making this observation has been felt because what we find is that despite an incumbent like Respondent 1 having served for more than a decade following his appointment, the stand taken is that he should be taken to have become a member of the Service from 1984 and not from 1972, being oblivious of the fact that for more than 12 years he had discharged the functions of the higher post to the satisfaction of all concerned. Denial of such long period of service for the purpose of seniority is an unjustified and arbitrary act which a model employer has to eschew. 13.The appeal is disposed of as per direction given earlier. In the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Special Leave Petition (C) No. 22013 of 1994 (CC No. 21852 of 1993) 14.This petition stands disposed of in terms of the judgment in CA No. 2481 of 1993 delivered today. 2 (1984) 4 SCC 450 1984 SCC (L&S) 657 (1985) 1 SCR 351
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1994 (12) TMI 337 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ched as above also finds support from the reasoning of the Calcutta High Court in Liquidator, Mahmudabad Properties Ltd. v. CIT 1972 83 ITR 470. It was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Liquidator of Mahamudabad Properties (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1980 124 ITR 31 though the Supreme Court has not specifically dealt with this aspect of the question. 4. As regards the second question, again provisions of section 24(ix) are quite clear and specific. The section provides that the vacancy allowance is permitted only where the property is let out and was vacant during a part of the year. But, when admittedly, the property was never let out, and the owner was in the occupation, this provision will not be attracted. To the same effect is the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in Liquidator of Mahamudabad Properties (P.) Ltd.'s case (supra). Consequently, the second question is also answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1994 (12) TMI 336 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be taxed under item-24 as it was admittedly made of jute. It has not been disputed by the dealer that Sutli is made of june but its contention has been that it being yarn would be taxed under item No. 55 unless, as specified in item-55, it was covered by any other notification. Entries-24 and 25 find place in the same notification and there is no other notification under which jute yarn or Sutli mav be covered. In entry-55 the words used are "by any other notification" while under item-35 the words used are "any other item of this list or notification issued under this Act." This shows that jute yarn will be covered by entry-55 even though it may also fall under entry-24. The rate under item-55 being lower, the rate of tax which is favourable to the tax payer will have to be adopted. 6. For the above reasons, I find no force in this revision petition and the same is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 335 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uot; - that is a finding under Clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 31 of the Act, which is as follows - "(b) in the event of any breach by the holder thereof, or by any of his servants or by any one acting on his behalf with his express or implied permission, of any of the terms and conditions thereof If the impugned suspension order is to be viewed as a final order of suspension, it is undoubtedly bad for violating the statutory requirement of opportunity under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act. (3.) IN the circumstances, the Writ Petition is allowed with costs. However, this is without prejudice whatsoever to any enquiry that the authorities may choose to initiate against the petitioner. But in view of the fact that the 2nd respondent had already arrived at a conclusion, the Officer who passed the impugned suspension order cannot initiate and conduct the enquiry under sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act. Advocate's fee ₹ 350/-.
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