|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 268 Records
-
1994 (2) TMI 329 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ent two scales of pay for two categories of Pharmacists Grade-B. It does not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution calling for interference by this Court. 10. Although we have held that the petitioners were entitled only to the pay scale of Rs. 330-480 in terms of the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission w.e.f. 1.1.1973 and only after the period of 10 years, they became entitled to the pay scale of Rs. 330-560, but as they have received the scale of Rs. 330-560 since 1973, due to no fault of theirs, and that scale is being reduced in the year 1984 with effect from 1.1.1973. it shall only be just and proper not to recover any excess amount which has already been paid to them. Accordingly we direct that no steps should be taken to recover or to adjust any excess amount paid to the petitioners due to the fault of the respondents, the petitioners being in no way responsible for the same. 11. The petitions are allowed in part. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1994 (2) TMI 328 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... h September 1992 the prayer of the plaintiff to carry on with the agreement cannot be granted. If this prayer cannot be granted contrary to the specific agreement of the parties, the question of balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury, pale into insignificance and need not be adverted to. The contract itself does not survive. If the Court allows the contract to operate it will mean re-writing of the contract contrary to the will of the parties expressed in the shape of the Supplemental Agreement. No relief can be granted contrary to the specific terms of the contract between the parties. Therefore, the plaintiff's applications (I.A. No s.l2158 and 12250 of 1992) under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure are liable to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. The parties are left to bear their respective costs. (39) I may add that that the above is an expression of prima facie opinion. The same will be subject to the final decision of the suit.
-
1994 (2) TMI 327 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... ngh, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
-
1994 (2) TMI 326 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... h Court would take into account that part of enhanced rate of fair wage which was, if at all, above the rate of minimum wages prevailing at the relevant time. We have said so because conceptually fair wage is higher than minimum wage and is required to be so. We also state that the total sum to be determined by the High Court would not, in any case, exceed sum of ₹ 236 lacs, which is the amount awarded by the arbitrators on the second occasion also. 35. We have another observation to make. The same relates to the rate of interest. According to us, in the facts and circumstances and the equities involved, the rate of interest on the sum which would be found due as aforesaid should be 9% instead of 12% as awarded. The interest would be calculated from 14th day of September, 1987 what is the date of the second award. It may be stated that the arbitrators have also made the interest payable from the date of award. 36. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.
-
1994 (2) TMI 325 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... wed and the judgment and order under appeal is set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the respondent is allowed only to the extent that it is declared the instrument executed by them in Form VI of the Distillery and Warehouse Rules made under the provisions of the Kerala Abkari Act shall be liable to stamp duty under Entry 32 of the Schedule to the Kerala stamp Act. There shall be no order as to costs. We are informed the respondent in pursuance of the interim order passed by the High Court had paid duty on the document to the State Government as one payable under Article 13 of the Schedule to the Kerala Stamp Act. Since we have held that the document was only indemnity bond, the amount of duty payable by the respondent was much less than what was paid by it. In the circumstances, the appellant is directed to refund the excess amount, if any, paid by the respondent. The amount shall be refunded, as requested by the learned Counsel for the State, within three months from today.
-
1994 (2) TMI 324 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lication but it should be done within limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Since no Article expressly prescribed the limitation to make such application, the residuary Article under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted. Thus, it could be seen that in the absence of any special period of limitation prescribed by Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, the application should have been made within three years from the date of expiry of 90 days prescribed in Section 18(3)(b) i.e. the date on which cause of action had accrued to the respondent-claimant. Since the applications had been admittedly made beyond three years, it was clearly barred by limitation. Since, the High Court relied upon the case in Municipal Corporation of Athani , which has stood overruled, the Order of the High Court is unsustainable. The appeals are accordingly allowed, and the application made to the Court by the respondent stands rejected.
-
1994 (2) TMI 323 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... may also have significance together with the other circumstances alleged against the respondent relating to terrorist activities. This is, however, a matter of appreciation of evidence at the trial and it cannot be said that the allegations made against the respondent in the chargesheet can constitute merely an offence punishable under the Arms Act and not under TADA Act. The view taken by the High Court on this aspect is contrary to law apart from being unjustified and impermissible in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 18.1.1994 of the Bombay High Court is set aside resulting in dismissal of Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 902 of 1993 filed by the respondent in the High Court. The result is that the prosecution of respondent Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed in the Designated Court shall continue in accordance with the provisions of TADA Act and cancellation of his bail is confirmed.
-
1994 (2) TMI 322 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... fective check by the appropriate Government on the exercise of power by subordinate officers like the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police. Therefore, if the appropriate Government has considered the representation of the detenu it cannot be said that there is contravention of Article 22(5) or there is failure to consider the representation by the detaining authority." (emphasis supplied) 20. Therefore even in the context of Article 22(5) the scheme of the particular Act has to be examined to find out the authority to whom a representation can be made. The observations made in Ibrahim Bachu Bafan case10 and Amir Shad Khan case' I under COFEPOSA Act do not change the legal scenario under the other Acts where the legal implications in the context of Article 22(5) are of different nature but in conformity with the spirit and avowed object underlying Article 22(5). 21. For all these reasons both the writ petition and the special leave petition are dismissed.
-
1994 (2) TMI 321 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
... ...
... ... ..... rous imprisonment for one year each. Out of the fine, when realised, ₹ 2000/- would be paid to Ram Lakhan PW1 and the balance of ₹ 6000/ - to the widow of Halke deceased. 10. Ram Sahai (accused No. 4) has not filed any appeal against his conviction and sentence. However, we find that his case is identical to the case of the appellants and there is no distinguishing feature. In our opinion it is therefore appropriate that the benefit of our judgment should also be made available to Ram Sahai. His conviction is also altered from the one under Section 302/149 IPC to one under Section 304 Part II read with Section 149 IPC. He is also sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₹ 1000/-. In default of payment of fine, he shall suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one year. The fine when realised from Ram Sahai shall be paid to PW7 Sahodara Bai. 11. With the above modification in the conviction and sentence, the appeal is partly allowed.
-
1994 (2) TMI 320 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ll-settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts that if two views are possible, the view which is favourable to the tax-payer must be accepted while construing the provision of a taxing statute. Even if there were any doubts as regards the interpretation, the benefit must go to the assessee. In view of the above position, I do not find any merit in the above contentions and reject the same. 20. In the result, this writ petition is allowed. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 21. The counsel for the BMC prays for stay of this order for eight weeks. The Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that they have furnished the bank guarantee which they shall maintain for 60 days hereafter. The petitioner also submits that it shall file bank guarantee in respect of any consignment received by it within a period of two months. In that view of the matter no order is called for stay of the order.
-
1994 (2) TMI 319 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... cha, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
-
1994 (2) TMI 318 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... w the area of justiciability is reduced in the sphere of judicial review of transfer of Judges. 22. Ms. Indira Jaisingh also submitted that any such litigation should lie only in the Supreme Court of India and not in any other court to prevent embarrassment to High Court Judges. We consider it sufficient to observe that the limited area of justiciability in this sphere being clearly declared in the Judges Case-II and also herein while making it clear that no one other than the transferred Judge himself can question the validity of a transfer, it is unnecessary to provide any further safeguard. We have no doubt that if any other court in the country is called upon to decide such a matter, it would promptly consider the option of requesting this Court to withdraw the case to this Court for decision to avoid any embarrassment. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, we must hold that there is no merit in any of the points raised in these matters. Accordingly, both matters are dismissed.
-
1994 (2) TMI 317 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... issions made by rival counsel. Regarding submission No. 1, I have already held in Crl.O.P. 6083/90 and other cases today that the payee represented by the power agent can very well file a complaint for offence under Section 138 of the Act and hence this ground is not available to the petitioner. Regarding submission No. 2, in Sheoratan Agarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh , while considering the criminal liability fastened on a partner because of his being a partner in a firm which had committed an offence under section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, the apex court had held that they can be prosecuted without impleading the firm as accused. The language of Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act is the same as the language of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Hence the ration of the above ruling applies to this case. So this ground also has to necessarily fail. 6. In the result, the petition fails and therefore stands dismissed. 7. Application dismissed.
-
1994 (2) TMI 316 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... is shown that the detention of a particular person is valid presently, mere fact that his detention had been invalid earlier would not entitle such a petitioner to have any redress in habeas corpus petition. 49. In the present case, however, we have already held that the detention of the petitioner at no point of time was invalid and in case his detention was invalid for some period when the matter was being dealt with by the Metropolitan Magistrate, his detention became valid after he was committed to face trial before a Court of Session admittedly during the trial Court of Session under the Criminal Procedure Code has the competency and the power to keep such an accused in judicial custody till the trial is over. 50. In view of the above discussion and the law laid down by us on both the legal points, we find no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed but in view of the legal questions involved, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. 51. Petition dismissed.
-
1994 (2) TMI 315 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er for further period in respect of said trailers held by it. The learned counsel wants it to be made clear that they will be at liberty to take proper action in accordance with law for the levy and realisation of tax also for the period subsequent to the period which is subject-matter of this writ petition. I do not think any such clarification is required. The respondents are always at liberty to take all such actions which are permissible under the law to realise the revenue lawfully due to them from the petitioner. 12. It is thus made clear that all interim orders protecting the respondents shall continue for the period of eight months from today to enable them to complete fresh assessment in accordance with law on the lines indicated above and to do the needful. 13. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The Rule is made absolute. 14. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 15. Certified copy expedited. Petition allowed.
-
1994 (2) TMI 314 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ll that the party concerned must put the other side on notice by asserting the right within a particular time as provided in the agreement to enable the other side not only to comply with the demand but also to put on guard that in case it is not complied it may have to face proceedings in the court of law. Since admittedly the Corporation did issue notice prior to expiry of six months from the termination of contract, it was in accordance with the Fidelity Insurance clause and, therefore, the suit filed by the appellant was within time. 18. In the result, these appeals succeed and are allowed. The judgment and order of the Madras High Court are set aside and the decree passed by the Trial Court shall stand restored. ORDER For reasons given by us in our separate but concurring orders (Sahai, J. and Venkatachala, J.) the appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and that of the Trial Court is restored. We, however, make no order as to costs.
-
1994 (2) TMI 313 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... wo in One Dry Gin & Lime", "Rainbow Gemlet Gin & Lime" etc. In my opinion, there is no possibility of any confusion in this case at all. 7. There is one more reason for refusing to grant injunction. The plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence of sales in respect of their product "Blue Riband Tango Gin N Orange" and as far as their sales in respect of the other products, namely, "Blue Riband, Duet Gin N Lime" is concerned, the plaintiffs have produced invoices only of the year 1993. On comparison of the labels of the two products. I am also satisfied that the defendants' labels are different than the plaintiffs'. The colour scheme, lettering and devices are different in many respects. In my opinion, there is no substance in the plaintiffs' claim of alleged infringement of copyright. No case has been made out for grant of any interim relief. Hence Notice of Motion dismissed with costs. 8. Notice of Motion dismissed.
-
1994 (2) TMI 312 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e to be determined having regard to the provisions contained in clauses (2), (3) and (4) of article III of the DTA. A perusal of the scope of technical and engineering services to be provided by the French firm to the assessee-company shows that the French firm will also assist the Indian company in the installation of the plants being sold by them to the assessee-company. This part of the matter has not been considered either by the Commissioner (Appeals) or by the Tribunal. In our view, this aspect requires consideration. 14. We, therefore, decline to answer the questions referred to us and remand the matter to the Tribunal and direct it to consider this aspect of the matter as well. Both the assessee as well as the revenue shall be entitled to place facts as may be considered necessary by the Tribunal for considering this aspect of the matter. The Tribunal will re-decide the matter afresh in the light of the observation made by us in this judgment. Banerjee, J. - I agree.
-
1994 (2) TMI 311 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nd satisfaction of the claim relating to labour escalation charges. Thereby there is no further arbitrable dispute in that behalf. Shri Madhava Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that in view of the letter dated 3-3-1989 the respondent had accepted to withdraw the entire claim in respect of Item 1 and that therefore there is no arbitrable dispute in that behalf. We find no substance in the contention. In all the letters the respondent had specifically referred at various stages that his acceptance was only in respect of labour escalation. Therefore, any other claims which the respondent made in the suit, the court is to consider whether arbitrable disputes arose under the contract for reference to arbitration and if so whether the respondent is entitled to any amount so claimed. These are the matters to be gone into. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part as stated earlier, but in the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
-
1994 (2) TMI 310 - HOUSE OF LORDS
... ...
... ... ..... ications of the scheme are different from those which their inspector was so ready to concede. Your Lordships being unanimous in giving a negative answer, it will be for another tribunal to decide how the scheme should be taxed, and I offer no opinion upon it. As to the answer I feel no doubt. Others of your Lordships have concentrated on one aspect or another of the appellants' dealings with the revenue. I give these full weight, but prefer to approach the problem on a broader front, taking into account all aspects of the exchanges between the appellants and the authorities. Their timing, the level of communication, the complexity of the scheme and its documentation, the guarded terms of the letters all speak for themselves. In my opinion not only is there no injustice in permitting the revenue to depart from its inspector's assurance, any other course would be positively unjust. Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors Theodore Goddard ; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
........
|
