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Showing 1 to 20 of 332 Records
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1994 (3) TMI 410 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ) of the Cr.P.C. and does not in any manner advance the case of the petitioner). If that were the intention, there was no necessity for constituting a separate Corporation at all. The very purpose of constituting the Corporation appears to have been to afford flexibility in its Management on business principles, subject of course to the permanent interests of the producer and the consumer. The properties of the Corporation are not therefore immune from tax under Article 285(1) of the Constitution. 18. This is sufficient to dispose of these two writ petitions, in which all the buildings concerned belong to the petitioner Food Corporation, and in respect of which the petitioner has been withholding payment of the property/building tax due to the Municipality and the Panchayat. The refusal to pay the tax demanded from the petitioner is not warranted by Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India. 19. The writ petitions are therefore dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 409 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nner in which the various features are harmonized with other of them, may give rise to a claim of the label being artistically made, and actually being so, and, thus, by itself being copyrightable matter. (Para 45)(ii) Passing off-Compare the whole labels - Similarities - Defendant wished to make its label a close approx mareputation-Especially sotion of the label of the plaintiff -Likelihood of deception-Would lead to erosion of the reputation-Especially so in. the case of potable products which cannot bear a mark and only their containers can have label - Glen Fiddich whisky -Existed prior in time - Whether entitled to protection of reputation? - (Yes).Held In view of what I have stated above, I think that in cases of trans-border reputation, the question of likelihood deception losses it significance in passing off action ,and what becomes more important, is whether use of something by the defendant ,out of the whole used by the plaintiff, is deceptively similar to what is
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1994 (3) TMI 408 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... income. Hence, the interest paid to the bank during the accounting year in which the interest on delayed payment was received must be taken to have been incurred for getting the said interest. That portion of the interest, which was paid during the accounting year, must be deducted from the amount received. This is more so since the assessee was following the cash system of accounting after the termination of the business. Therefore, the assessee is not entitled to claim deduction of the interest paid to the bank during the previous assessment years. In this view of the matter, we answer question No. 3 in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We also answer question No. 4 referred at the instance of the Department in the affirmative, against the Department and in favour of the assessee. 14. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1994 (3) TMI 407 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tate or otherwise, that the permission under section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, is a condition precedent for the sale. Mr. Nakhwa also relies on an extract from the standard commentary on the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code by Gupte and Dighe's, II Edition, 1994, at page 202, whereby the learned Authors have extracted the principles referred to by me in Gulabchand's case and reiterated that the grant of permission by itself does not constitute the commencement of the N.A. use but that the same would be from the point of time when it actually takes place. 13. Having regard to the aforesaid position in law, the sale entered into by the plaintiff on 20-3-1965 will have to be ignored and to my mind the finding recorded by the Appeal Court will have to be upheld. The appeal consequently fails and stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Interim orders, if any, to stand vacated. Certified copy expedited.
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1994 (3) TMI 406 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s are answered as follows a) the suit is maintainable; b) the levy of cess is illegal; c) there will be decree for ₹ 1,05,745.25 p., there will also be decree in terms of prayer (b) of the plaint. 44. A contention was raised that the plaintiff is not entitled to interest but this contention cannot be accepted. In Elpro International Ltd. and Ors. v. Joint Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Finance and others, reported in 1985(19)ELT3(SC) , the Supreme Court awarded interest at the rate of 12% on duty which was wrongly collected. In Metal Distributors Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1984(18)ELT269(Bom) (printed at page 114 infra) and in Atul Products Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1985(22)ELT714(Bom) , the Bombay High Court has awarded interest at the rate of 12% per annum on duty illegally collected. There will be decree for interim interest and interest on judgment at the rate of 12%. The plaintiff will be entitled to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 405 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sonal immunity extends to such a case as well. 15. As pointed out by me earlier, Article 361 of the Constitution of India, is absolute in terms and even in the case of mala fide the protection of immunity will apply. Courts have considered the question of admissibility of news items appeared in press reports in the newspapers in the two Supreme Court judgments referred to supra, as observed by the Supreme Court, I cannot take judicial notice of the facts stated in the news items they being in the nature of hearsay secondary evidence which is not proved by any other material. Since the statement of fact contained in the newspaper is merely hearsay, the same is inadmissible in evidence. The petitioner has also failed to let in any other material in proof of the facts contained in the newspaper. Further, the learned Counsel has not also put forward any other points before this Court. The writ petition therefore fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 404 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al position, I find considerable force in the submission of Mr. A. Sarma and hold that the proposed punishment is not in accordance with law. 12. According to Mr. Sarma the appointing authority of the Petitioner, namely, Executive Committee of the District Council has not passed any order and all actions are being taken at the official level, Therefore, the writ petition is allowed to the extent that Respondents shall place the entire matter before the Executive Committee of the District Council within 1.5 days from the receipt of this Judgment and order and the Executive Committee shall pass final orders in accordance with law. While passing such orders, the Committee shall apply its independent mind and shall also keep in view the above law, namely, that two punishments cannot be awarded. 13. The Petitioner shall also be re-instated after the final orders are passed by the Executive Committee within 15 days as stated above. The petition is disposed of. No order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 403 - ITAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... for the benefit and the quantum of relief admissible to it as held by the Tribunal in the case of Veena Organics 1992 (59) E.L.T. 87 . In the case of Haryana State Electricity Board v. Collector of Central Excise 1988 (37) E.L.T. 81 , the Tribunal held that it would not be proper to deny the benefit available to the appellants under Notification No. 201/79 only for the reason that the procedural part had not been complied with and held that the benefit should be granted if established by acceptable evidence. In this case also, Modvat has been availed of on the basis of the records evidencing payment of duty on the drums. 11. In the light of above discussion, we hold that in the peculiar facts of this case, the appellants are entitled to Modvat credit on Selenium drums used in the manufacture of Photo-copying machines cleared during the period April 1986 to April, 1987, set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal with consequential relief, if any, due to the appellants.
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1994 (3) TMI 402 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n eyes failed to adduce that evidence, the caw should not be remanded to give a second chance to the party to adduce that evidence. The policy of the law is that, once the matter has been fairly tried between the parties, it should not, except in special circumstances be reopened and retried. In a recent decision their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that power to order retrial after remand, where there has already been a trial on evidence before the Court of first instance, cannot be exercised merely because the appellate Court is of the view that the parties who could lead better evidence in the Court if first instance have failed to do so. A Sankaramiah v. M. S. Lakshminarayanamoorthy, 4 S. C. Note (Note No.) 415. In this view of the position on the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not accept the plaintiff's submission that the case should be remanded. 7. The decision of the learned lower appellate Court is upheld. This appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 401 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e plea of election in subsequent proceedings to claim the benefit under Section 106 of the Kerala's Land Reforms Act. 13. We have already seen that the Land Reforms Act is a beneficial legislation and has conferred certain benefits on the tenants. The tenant is expected to raise all the pleas available under the statute at the relevant time. It is a sheer abuse of the process of the court to raise at each successive stages different pleas to protract the proceedings or to drive the party to multiplicity of proceedings. It would be fair and just that the parties raise all available relevant pleas in the suits or the proceedings when the action is initiated and the omission thereof does constitute constructive res judicata to prevent raising of the same at a later point of time thereby it must be deemed that they are waived. 14. Accordingly we hold that the High Court is right in rejecting the claim of the appellant and the appeal is accordingly dismissed but without costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 400 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... order being made in this regard. The respondent has been directed to furnish indemnity bond in the sum of ₹ 12.00 lakhs which admittedly covers the price of the tooth paste. It would also be necessary to get the undertaking from the respondent that they would deposit the amount covered by the indemnity bond if ultimately, the Appropriate Authority comes to the conclusion that the tooth paste was liable to confiscation. 15. In view of my aforesaid discussion, the order of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, is' modified to the extent that besides giving of indemnity Bond, Shri Ashok Kumar Chakraborty will also give an undertaking before the learned Acmm for the payment of the amount to the Customs Department, if a decision to that effect is taken by the Appropriate Authority and that one carton of Close-Up would be retained by the department to be produced during trial. 16. The petition stands disposed of with the aforesaid modification.
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1994 (3) TMI 399 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inst the statute and strike down the assessments on the ground of alleged unreasonableness in their completion, thereby cutting down the period prescribed by the statute itself for the completion of such assessments. The assessment in this case is well within the time prescribed by the second proviso to Sub-section (6) of Section 17. 2. The other question which the Petitioner raised was on the allegation that she was a partner of the firm in question only for a few months in 1983 and she cannot be made liable for the tax demanded for the years in question. That is a matter which she should agitate before the appropriate authorities as it is essentially a question of fact. It is for her to bring it to the notice of the authorities concerned to get exoneration from liability if she is entitled to it for any reason. Suffice it to say I do not find any reason to entertain this original petition particularly on the ground of unreasonable delay in the completion of the assessment.
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1994 (3) TMI 398 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... visit with the penalty for being members of an unlawful association, for dealing with funds of such association, and prescribes punishment for the unlawful activities of such persons, respectively. 15. We are, therefore, of the view that the Government has failed to justify the immediate ban imposed on Jamaat-e- Islami Hind under the proviso to Section 3(3) of the Act. Accordingly the part of the notification, viz., "and directs, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to sub-section (3) of 1 (1993) 1 SCC 78 that section, that this notification shall.. have effect from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette", is bad in a law and is struck down. We express no opinion on the validity of the rest of the notification which is the subject-matter of adjudication before the Tribunal. 16. The decision of the High Court is set aside. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition and the civil appeal are accordingly allowed with no order as to costs
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1994 (3) TMI 397 - COMPANY LAW BOARD NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the view that as per Section 2 of the Ordinance, the proceedings before us automatically stand transferred to Special Court with effect from January 25, 1994, and our jurisdiction is barred as provided under Section 3 of the Ordinance which reads as follows "(3) On and from the commencement of the Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to Transactions in Securities) Amendment Ordinance, 1994, no court other than the Special Court shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to any matter or claim referred to in Sub-section (1)". Therefore, we are of the view that we have no jurisdiction at this point of time to proceed with this case. 10. We may also note, in passing, that the main contention of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 has all along been, that the petition is not maintainable and falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Court, which issue we have been examining but has become infructuous in view of the Ordinance.
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1994 (3) TMI 396 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... existing member or his legal heir or children. 29. We, therefore, find no merit in the submission made by Mr. Raghavan, on the merits of the interpretation placed by him upon articles 7 and 9 (supra). 30. In the result and keeping in view the totality of the circumstances set out hereinabove, we see no reason to interfere with the judgment impugned, dismissing the petition under section 155 of the Companies Act. In our opinion the learned company judge was perfectly justified in holding that the appellants-petitioners before him had not made out any case for grant of relief under the provision mentioned above. We, however, leave all other questions urged before us including the question whether section 108(1A) of the Companies Act, is mandatory in character, open; for we feel that in the light of the view taken by us, it is unnecessary to pronounce upon the said questions. The appeal, therefore, fails, and is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 395 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... urtherance of the specific power and not as enlarging specific powers so given." 6. In this case, the case of Timblo Irmaos Ltd. v. Jorge Anibal Matos Sequeira, AIR 1977 SC 734, was also cited to state that "the Supreme Court sets out the rule of construction to the effect that general words following the words conferring specifically enumerated powers cannot be construed so as to enlarge the restricted powers there mentioned". Therefore, the general power in Clause (19) cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of powers beyond the specific powers stated in Clauses (1) to (18). Even otherwise, we do not find that Clause 19 confers any authority to the power of attorney holder to exercise the right vested in the shareholders. In view of this we have to necessarily conclude that the power of attorney does not confer any powers to the holder to file these petitions on behalf of the shareholders. We, therefore, dispose of these two petitions as not maintainable.
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1994 (3) TMI 394 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... bject matter of arbitration being not covered by any of the sections of the Act dealing with arbitration; and having held that the provisions of the Act have to override what has been mentioned in the Condition, and having further held that the Act would prevail over the general law of arbitration now contained in the Arbitration Act of 1940, we would hold that though the present dispute would have been referable to arbitration because of what has been provided in Condition 29, it cannot be done, in view of the provisions in the Act which would override the stipulation contained in the aforesaid Condition. 18. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned Judgment is set aside insofar as the views taken in it on aforesaid issues 2 and 3 is concerned. It would, however, be open to respondent No. 1 even now despite delay to approach appropriate civil court seeking the relief in question, if so advised. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 393 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... copy of the stay order was produced before us for the first time during arguments and we have ordered an inquiry into its genuineness. 28. We, therefore, hold that the State of Kerala has good reasons to plead before us that it is not to be compelled to release the detenu merely because of an order purporting to be a certified copy of the stay order said to have been passed by the Calcutta High Court is, for the first time, produced after three years and when neither the original order of the Calcutta High Court nor the Court notices have been so far served on the State Government or its Officers. Point No. 2 is held accordingly. The Original Petition is dismissed. This will not, however, preclude the detenu from seeking relief on grounds other than those based on the alleged order of the Calcutta High Court. The inquiry into genuineness of the certified copy will be conducted by the Crime Branch of the State of Kerala as stated above. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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1994 (3) TMI 392 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to show that he is a tenant holding over, mere payment of rent without necessary animus not being sufficient. Such a tenant for the sake of convenience is described as a statutory tenant. It would not be open to such a tenant to urge by way of defence, in a suit for ejectment brought against him under the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act, that by acceptance of rent a fresh tenancy was created which had to be determined by a fresh notice to quit. This ratio is neither departed from nor controverted in any subsequent judgment of this Court. 15. Further, it is not correct to hold that the Rent Control Act is a beneficial enactment only to the tenant. 16. This is a case where the tenant in spite of the specific direction to deposit ₹ 3.69 lakhs did not do so. The High Court had clearly pointed out that even at the revisional stage, he had not deposited the amount. 17. Accordingly, we conclude that there are no merits in this appeal which stands dismissed with costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 391 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e facts and circumstances of each case. There is no period prescribed either under the Constitution or under the concerned detention law, within which the representation should be dealt with. The requirement however, is that there should not be supine indifference slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of representation would be a breach of the constitutional imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal." (25) The delay in the instant case remains unexplained; even administrative reasons are not forthcoming. In the circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the continuation of the petitioner's detention (who has already undergone about 10 months' detention) will be illegal. Consequently, we direct the release of the petitioner forthwith, unless he is required to be detained under any other order or proceedings. The Letters Patent Appeal is allowed accordingly.
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