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Showing 1 to 20 of 202 Records
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1994 (5) TMI 291 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the petitioner all these 15 years. The correspondence with the D.D.A. forms part of as many as three volumes in its record, which was shown to us at the time of hearing. It is unfortunate that so much paper work has gone into without any benefit to the petitioner. The D.D.A. has been constituted to promote and secure the development of Delhi according to plan and for that purpose various powers have been conferred upon it. It is, thus, constituted for the benefit of the people. When it is allotting a plot or transferring the leasehold rights in plot in favor of other persons, it is not showing any favor or giving any dole, or conferring any special benefit on them. Rather, its instrumentalities should act with a feeling that they are serving the people and they should not by their actions or otherwise thwart the rights of the people which they have under the law. In the circumstances of this case we award Rs.5,000.00 as costs to the petitioner. (12) Rule is made absolute.
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1994 (5) TMI 290 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r reliefs. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of this Court in Union of India and Ors. v. K.V. Jankiraman and Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 109. 11. It will be noticed that Jankirman's matter relied to a case where the point involved was as to what benefits an employee, who is completely or party exonerated in disciplinary/criminal proceedings, is entitled to and from which date in case involving sealed cover procedure. The Bench in Jankiraman's case was not dealing with the case of due date of promotion on revision of seniority as a result of any decision of the Court effecting thousands of employees and revised seniority list being prepared in pursuance thereof and notional promotion being granted with retrospect effect. The Special Leave Petition No. 16698 of 1992 is accordingly dismissed. 12. All the connected Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petitions are disposed of in the light of the aforesaid judgment. There is, however, no order as to costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 289 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... llaneous appeal lies under Order XLIII, Rule 1(1) and not a revision. But, to meet that, Shri Roman has filed an application for converting this revision into a Misc. Appeal as the limitation for both and the court-fees payable is the same and the petitioners have filed the revision within time, hence, he conversion can be allowed. Therefore, it would not make any difference, hence, it is not necessary for me to deal with this question. 18. In the result, the revision is allowed with no order as to costs. The order of the trial Court is set aside and the case is sent back to it to reconsider the application under Order I, Rule 10 and under Order XXII, Rule 10, CPC and dispose it of afresh in accordance with law. While considering the application, the plaintiff shall also be free to demonstrate that the transfer is null and void and, therefore, addition of parties under Order I, Rule 10 or under Order XXII, Rule 10, CPC because, the interest has not devolved, is not necessary.
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1994 (5) TMI 288 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the property had not been allotted in favour of the first defendant in the partition. That is very different from holding that the case of partition had not been accepted by the first appellate court. This being so, a decree for partition could not have been passed on a mere application for amendment. In fact, as rightly urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the causes of action are different and the reliefs are also different. To hold that the relief of declaration and injunction are larger reliefs and smaller relief for partition could be granted is incorrect. Even otherwise, a suit for partial partition in the absence of the inclusion of other joint family properties and the impleadment of the other co-sharers was not warranted in law. Thus, we find no difficult in allowing these appeals which are accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court are restored. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 287 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... roach of the High Court in dealing with the matter which we have already noticed, we further find that instead of adverting to and confining its attention to the documents referred to in Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. the High Court has dealt with the rival contentions of the parties raised through their respective affidavits at length and on a threadbare discussion thereof passed the impugned order. The Course so adopted cannot be supported; firstly, because finding regarding commission of an offence cannot be recorded on the basis of affidavit evidence and secondly, because at the stage of framing of charge the Court cannot usurp the functions of a trial Court to delve into and decide upon the respective merits of the case. 9. On the conclusions as above we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the High Court to dispose of the petitions of the accused-respondent in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinbefore.
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1994 (5) TMI 286 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the State should be able to recover the tax from' the person really effecting the sale. The expression "reason' to believe" is a well known term in the law of taxation (vide Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961) and in administrative law and has never been understood as an' expression of nebulous content, afflicted with the vice of arbitrariness. I hold that Section 19C does not confer any arbitrary or unguided power, making it offensive of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. I have no doubt that this writ petition is but Anr. attempt of the Petitioner to protract the assessment proceedings, the other one being the futile, unnecessary appeal which it filed before the Appellate Tribunal against what evidently was an open remand after setting aside the assessment made on it, without deciding or concluding any point in controversy. I do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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1994 (5) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... counsel for the State to support the judgment of the tribunal by satisfying us that the finding that the rule of natural justice has been violated, was not correct. The learned counsel was not able to satisfy us. During the pendency of the appeal the delinquent had passed away. The exact date of his retirement is not known and therefore the direction which we can give is as under. 5. The order of dismissal is set aside and, therefore, the delinquent would be entitled to wages and allowances up to the date of his retirement or demise, whichever is earlier. If the date of his demise is subsequent to the date of retirement, he would be entitled to pension up to the date of his demise. Thereafter, his legal representatives would be entitled to family pension under the rules. We direct the respondent-State to work out the monetary benefits available to the appellants within three months from today and grant the same to the appellants. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 284 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aforementioned question Nos. 1 and 2 do arise out of the order of the Tribunal. 6. We do not agree. Apart from the fact that the above findings of the Tribunal on both the grounds for rectification are pure findings of fact, it is also clear from the relevant portion of the order of the Dy. CIT(A), extracted above, that he was dealing with the question of market value of the shares of M/s Jain Tractors & Auto Spares (P) Ltd., and, therefore, whether the statement was made by the counsel in assessed's appeal or in sister trust's appeal is immaterial because the shares involved in both the cases were of the same company. We are of the view that no question of law arises out of the Tribunal's order as there is no error apparent from the record. We feel that in the garb of an application for rectification, the assessed wants to reopen and reargue the whole matter, which is beyond the scope of s. 254(2) of the Act. 7. Dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 283 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ioned question Nos. 1 and 2 do arise out of the order of the Tribunal. 7. We do not agree. Apart from the fact that the above findings of the Tribunal on both the grounds for rectification are pure findings of fact, it is also clear from the relevant portion of the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), extracted above, that he was dealing with the question of market value of the shares of Jain Tractors & Auto Spares (P.) Ltd. and, therefore, whether the statement was made by the counsel in assessee's appeal or in sister trust's appeal is immaterial because the shares involved in both the cases were of the same company. We are of the view that no question of law arises out of the Tribunal's order as there is no error apparent from the record. We feel that in the garb of an application for rectification, the assessee wants to re-open and reargue the whole matter, which is beyond the scope of section 254(2). 8. Dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 282 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d Rule 6 thereof prescribes the qualifications as enumerated above. Graduation in mechanical engineering is one of the higher qualifications than diploma. Since Section 213(4) gives such power, to the State Govt. by operation of Section 217 of the Act, the statutory rules remain valid and operate in the field without colliding with the Central Rules. Both the Rules would operate harmoniously and effect can be given to both the Rules. Thus the question of inconsistency or repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution does not arise. Therefore, we do not find that there is any conflict in the exercise of power by both Central and State Governments ; or inconsistency in operation of the provisions of the statutory rules made by the Governor under proviso to Article 309 and the rules made by the Central Govt. under Section 213(4) of the Act. The recruitment as per State Rules is valid and legal. 9. The appeals are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 281 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which are raised in the present reference were clearly answered by His Lordship, Mr. Justice Venkatchaliah (as he then was), as pointed out at an G. Ramegowda's case. Apart from laying down the propositions of law, the delay by the State for over a year, which could not be said to be for reasons beyond its control, was condoned, so that the 'stream of justice remains pure and clear' and the examination of the merits of the controversy takes place. I do not think that it is possible for me to put it in any better way. 55. For the reasons stated above, I beg to differ with my brothers, M. B. Shah, J. and Y. B. Bhatt, J. and answer the two issues framed in paragraph 4 of this judgment as follows -- (a) Small delays in the filing of appeals and applications by public bodies should be generally condoned. (b) While considering an application for condonation of delay filed by a public body, the merits of the main matter should also be considered as a predominant factor.
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1994 (5) TMI 280 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 5000 and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years as recorded by the Designated Court. The conviction and sentence of Sukhvinder Singh for the offence under Section 120 B IPC is, however, set aside. As a result of the above discussion the appeal in so far as Mohan Singh, Surjit Kaur, Puran Chand and Sukhdev Paul appellants are con-cerned, is accepted and their convictions and sentences are set aside. The appeal of Sukhvinder Singh is partly allowed and his conviction and sentence under Section 3 of TADA and Section 120-B IPC is set aside. In all other respects his appeal fails. For his conviction for an offence under Section 302 IPC, fee is sentenced to imprisonment for life audio pay a fine of ₹ 5000 and in default of payment of fine to suffer four years rigorous imprisonment. The four acquitted appellants, other than Sukhvinder Singh, shall be released from custody forthwith, if not required in any other case.
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1994 (5) TMI 279 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... not to do so. The post is not offered to cater to his status but to see the family through the economic calamity. 6. For these very reasons, the compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable period which must be specified in the rules. The consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over. 7. It is needless to emphasise that the provisions for compassionate employment have necessarily to be made by the rules or by the executive instructions issued by the Government or the public authority concerned. The employment cannot be offered by an individual functionary on an ad hoc basis . 8. For the reasons given above, we dismiss the special leave petitions.
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1994 (5) TMI 278 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... stated therein, this appeal also fails and is dismissed with costs. Civil Appeal No. 862 of 1989 The Appellant's godowns were subjected to tax under Tamil Nadu District Municipality Act, 1920 (for short 'the Act'). The levy was challenged in the High Court and it was claimed that the property owned by it being property of Union of India within the meaning of the expression used in Article 285 of the Constitution of India, no tax was leviable on it. It was not accepted by the High Court. We have heard the Learned Counsel for the Appellant. In our opinion, the High Court was right as the property owned by the Appellant cannot be held to be property of the Union of India in absence of any factual foundation either in the High Court or this Court nor it is liable to be exempted from payment of tax Under Section 82 of the Act for the reasons stated by us in Civil Appeal No. 267-68 of 1987 decided today. In the result, this appeal too fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 277 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uch as after agreeing to certain terms on the basis of which amended Joint Venture Agreement was prepared by the petitioner and signed by the petitioner but the respondent No. I having second thoughts declined to sign the said agreements. So, it appears that this petition deserves to be admitted. However, it is even agreed by counsel for the petitioner that this petition may be decided without at first publishing any citations in the newspapers. 31. I, hence, admit the petition but I withhold the publication of citations till the disputed questions raised in the pleadings of the parties are decided finally. I require the petitioner to file evidence by way of affidavits within six weeks. The respondents shall also file evidence by way of affidavits within six weeks thereafter and rebuttal affidavits shall be filed by the petitioner within three weeks thereafter. For directions, if any, and for arguments, the mailer shall be listed in Court on 15-9-1994. 32. Order accordingly.
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1994 (5) TMI 276 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ll ER 149). A matter of public or general interest does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement; but that in which a class of the community have a peculiar interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected, (per Campbell, C.J. R. v. Eadfordshire (1855) 24 LJQB 81 (84)). 20. Judges in the aforesaid background, we find that no ease for our interference is made out. We are satisfied that the appellant has not been able to prove his locus standi. Though a legal representative of a deceased shareholder can maintain an application, in view of our conclusion that the appellant has failed to prove that aspect, in the absence of specific pleading and proof and the document itself being of doubtful origin, no case for interference is made out. He has also not been able to prove any oppression or mismanagement. The appeal is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. R.K. Patra, J. 21. I agree.
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1994 (5) TMI 275 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t is to follow as a matter of course that the Register of Members has to be rectified. Otherwise, it will lead to strange situation wherein notwithstanding the setting aside of the allotment the name of the person to whom the shares have been allotted of transferred will continue to remain on the Register of Members. 81. Thus, on a careful consideration of the entire materials on record and of the arguments of all learned counsel, I am of the opinion that the Company Law Board has done substantial justice to the petitioner and the petitioner cannot feel aggrieved by the order of the Company Law Board in so far as it directs the Bhankerpur to return the intercorporate deposit together with interest, consequent upon the setting aside of the allotment and direction to SSPL to rectify the Register of Members to remove the name of Malleswara. 82. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. 83. Petition dismissed.
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1994 (5) TMI 274 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... 9. From the narration of the facts it is abundantly clear that the applicant has not violated the provisions of Section 299 and, therefore, does not come under the mischief of Section 283(1)(i) and, therefore, he is not liable for imposition of any penalty under Section 283(2A) of the Act and the question of compounding, therefore, does not arise. Under these circumstances, it is a fit case for the Registrar of Companies, Tamil Nadu at Madras to withdraw the prosecution already launched. This is more so, when the prosecution was filed even before the applicant was in receipt of the show-cause notice and before his reply to the show-cause notice was received by the Registrar of Companies. 10. Accordingly the application is disposed of without any order relating to compounding the offence. 11. The Bench Officer will send a copy of this order to the Registrar of Companies, Tamil Nadu at Madras specifically drawing his attention to paragraph 9 of this order for necessary action.
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1994 (5) TMI 273 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Bench also because of two decisions of that Bench itself taking different view, more so, as it was deciding a point relating to conduct of examination by an important body like Union Public Service Commission, and that also for examinations conducted for selecting IAS and IFS Officers. The reference to larger Bench was eminently called because the earlier decisions of the Tribunal were based on the Judgments of this Court in Ramjee Prasad's case in which the reasonableness of cut off date examined related to filling up posts, as in the case at hand. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, equity does not demand any favour to be shown to the respondent. The result is that appeal is allowed with costs by setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal. Cost assessed as ₹ 10,000. The respondent would not be treated or deemed to have passed the examination in question and whatever benefit of the same was given to him pursuant to Tribunal's directions shall stand cancelled.
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1994 (5) TMI 272 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ree months when direct recruitment is not available, is unsupportable. The High Court could have merely directed consideration of the claim of the respondent in accordance with the rules. It cannot direct appointment. Such a direction does not fall within the scope of mandamus. Judicial review, it has been repeatedly emphasised, is directed against the decision- making process and not against the decision itself; and it is no part of the court's duty to exercise the power of the authorities itself. There is wide spread misconception on the scope of interference in judicial review. The exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction constitutionally conferred on the apex Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution can be of no guidance on the scope of Article 226. For these reasons we set aside the judgment under appeal and remit the matter to the High Court for a fresh consideration in the light of what we have indicated above. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. No costs.
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