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Showing 1 to 20 of 297 Records
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1994 (7) TMI 378 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ranted bail . We have also noted that, as the record now stands, the allegation against one accused, who has already been released on bail, is probably graver that the applicant before us. 9. It may be noted that while the learned Counsel for the State opposed the application for bail on the first date, on the second date, however, he has submitted that he has no objection to the grant of bail. Granting of bail, however, is a matter of serious concern to the Court which has got to carefully weigh and balance the interest of the society in proper prosecution of offences and the rights and interest of the accused and in such a case, while the Court may take note of any such concession made by the prosecution, it cannot govern itself solely thereby but must come to its own decision on merits in each case. 10. For the reasons indicated hereinabove, we are satisfied that the accused-applicant deserves granting of bail and we have granted him bail by our earlier order passed today.
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1994 (7) TMI 377 - CESTAT DELHI
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... ... ..... s and as such, there was no justification for the confiscation of the goods and levy of penalty and as such, the impugned order is to be set aside and the appeal is required to be allowed with consequential relief as held by the Member Judicial. 53. In view of the above observations, I agree with the conclusions arrived at by the Member Judicial. Accordingly, I direct the Registry to place the matter before the regular Bench for passing appropriate orders in accordance with law. Sd/- (Harish Chandar) Dated 11-07-1994 President FINAL ORDER In view of the majority opinion the item imported is a composite machine classifiable under Heading 84.43 and entitled to benefit of Notification No. 114/80-Cus. The goods were covered by OGL. There was no cause for confiscation of goods and imposition of penalty. As such the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief if any due. Sd/- Sd/- (Jyoti Balasundarama), Member (J) (S.K. Bhatnagar), Vice-President
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1994 (7) TMI 376 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... des evidence collected during investigation and does not mean evidence recorded during the trial, is not correct, in view of the law laid down in Kishnu's case (supra), where it has been held that the word 'evidence' occurring in Section 319 means evidence recorded during the trial or any, inquiry by the court. But the fact that the learned Magistrate has wrongly decided that he was empowered under section 319 to summon the petitioner, will not effect the outcome of the case as dehors Section 319 the Magistrate has the power to summon the petitioners. 32. In view of the above discussion, the summoning order qua petitioners 2 to 4 is maintained while the same is set aside qua petitioner No. 1 with the direction that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate will consider the question of summoning petitioner No. 1 afresh in the light of the material on record. 33. Accordingly, the petition succeeds to the extent above and is accordingly disposed of. 34. Order accordingly.
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1994 (7) TMI 375 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... so made has a nexus with the object which the Act intends to achieve namely not burden such establishments run in public interest, with an additional liability by way of payment of Bonus. The challenge to the Constitutional validity of the provisions of Section 32(iv) must therefore fail. 60. In the result, I make the following order - (a) Writ Petition No. 19528/1984 filed by the Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board is allowed and the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 27-12-1983 in so far as the same holds the employees of the Board working at its Pumping Stations and the Treatments Plants entitled to payment of Bonus is hereby quashed. (b) Writ Petitions Nos. 4550/85 & 16210/84, filed by the Workmen of the B.W.S.S.B., claiming a right to payment of Bonus from the Board are dismissed; (c) The Reference made to the Labour Tribunal shall stand answered in the negative and the claims of the employees rejected. 61. The parties shall however bear their own costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 374 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... way helped or aided the Court in granting the main relief sought in the writ petition. The said interim orders, therefore, not being those made to maintain the status quo or undo an order, the review of which is sought, so that the ultimate relief to be granted to the party approaching it, may not become futile, they become wholly unsustainable. Such interim orders are made by the High Court, to say the least, without realisation that they had the effect of putting the Chairman and its Members to ridicule in the eyes of the general public and making a constitutional institution of the BPSC a mockery. For the said reasons, the interim orders impugned in the S.L.P.s cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside. 39. In the result we grant leave in the S.L.P.s allow the appeals, set aside the interim orders appealed against and dismiss the Writ Petition (Transferred Case). However, in the Circumstances of these appeals and the transferred case, we make no order as to costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 373 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n Law. But in our view a marriage between baptised Christian and a person not baptised is not a nullity under the Divorce Act and therefore cannot be declared as void under the provisions of the Divorce Act. Such a marriage, if properly solemnised, would imbibe all attributes of a valid marriage. Theological faith of one of the parties does not matter in the validity of a marriage. The dictum to the contrary contained in Sujatha v. Jose Augustine, (1994) 2 Ker LT 4 is, therefore, not correct and it stands overruled. 27. Our conclusion is the legal position laid down by the Division Bench in Jose v. Alice, (1988) 2 Ker LT 890, vis-a-vis the Canon Law is the correct position and requires no change. The decree of nullity passed by the learned District Judge has to be set aside and we do so. We direct the District Judge to conduct an enquiry into the allegation relating to the subsistance of the former marriage and pass a decree in the light of the legal position set forth above.
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1994 (7) TMI 372 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n whether it is plus factor or minus factor, the market value of the acquired land is determined either by increasing its price or decreasing its price vis-a-vis the price fetched for land under comparable sale. What applies to comparable sale, equally applies to comparable award, if such award is relied upon as that furnishing a price-basis for determination of the market-value of the land, cannot be disputed." 16. The result of above discussion is that there is no merit in these appeal as well as cross-objections and these are dismissed. There is no order as to costs. 17. This judgment is being signed and pronounced by one of the (Kamlesh Sharma, J.) because the other member of the Bench Hon'ble V. Ratnam, C. J., is not available on his appointment as Governor of Himachal Pradesh on 10-7-1994 and demit-ting his office of Chief Justice on 31-7-1994. However, in his capacity as Chief Justice, his Lordship has agreed to the judgment and consented to its pronouncement.
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1994 (7) TMI 371 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ive operation of the amended Rule 13 cannot be sustained. We are satisfied that the retrospective amendment of Rule 13 of the rules takes away the vested rights of Mohanty and other general category candidates senior to respondents 2 to 9. We, therefore, declare amended Rule 13 to the extent it has been made operative retrospectively to be unreasonable, arbitrary and, as such, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. We strike down the retrospective operation of the rule, In the view we have taken on the point it is not necessary to deal with the other contentions raised by Mohanty. 16. The appeal is dismissed with cost. We quantify the cost as ₹ 10,000 to be paid by the Union of India to Mohanty - respondent 1. Order 17. We have pronounced judgment in Civil Appeal No. 3844 of 1989 titled Union of India and Ors. v. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty today. For the reasons given and the conclusions recorded in the said appeal, this appeal is dismissed. No, costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 370 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... only to changes caused by reasonable wear and tear, it will not authorise the tenant to put up any construction and the Rent Control Court did not give any such right on him. We did not find anything in the said decision contrary to the position adverted to by us. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to get the relief of mandatory injunction. 33. In the result, we set aside the judgment of the court below and the appeal is allowed in part. The relief in the plaint seeking recovery of the property is refused. Plaintiff is at liberty to seek appropriate remedies for evicting the appellant through court of law. But, he is given a decree for mandatory injunction to remove the structure put up by the appellant. Appellant is directed to remove the same within one month from the date of this judgment and in case he fails to do so, plaintiff is permitted to remove the same in execution. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct both parties to suffer their costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 369 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g the regulation of mines and the development of minerals. Parliament's policy is clearly discernible from the provisions of the Act. It is the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals, with a view to secure maximum benefit to the community. There are clear sign posts to lead and guide the subordinate legislating authority in the matter of the making of rules." We are, therefore, of the opinion that Section 5 cannot be faulted either on the ground that it delegates essential legislative functions to the State Government or on the ground that it confers rule-making power upon the State Government without furnishing any guidance and without laying down any policy in that behalf. In this view of the matter, it is not possible to agree with the decision of the Allahabad High Court in M/s. Rameshwar Prasad Kishan Gopal. 38. For the above reason, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee quantified at ₹ 10,000.
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1994 (7) TMI 368 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... accepted as an additional ground for sustaining the competency of the State legislature to enact Article 15 of Schedule 1 to the Act. The contention of Mr. Bharuka, therefore, must be rejected. We do not express any opinion of the interpretation given by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court to Entry 43 of List III. We, however, uphold the judgment of the Division Bench on the reasoning quoted above based on Entries 11-A and 13 of List III. 28. For the reasons given above we uphold the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Harish Tara Refractories (P) Ltd. v. The Certificate Officer and Ors. (supra) and of the Patna High Court in Sawar Mal Choudhary and Ors. v. State Bank of India and Ors. (supra) and as such dismiss the transferred cases. The writ petitions/appeals filed by the petitioners in the transferred cases in the High Court shall stand dismissed with costs. We quantify the costs as ₹ 5,000 to be paid by each of the petitioners in these transferred cases.
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1994 (7) TMI 367 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion mentioned in the schedule shall be deemed to include and deemed always to have included, the amount required to be paid to such owner in respect of all coal in stock on the date immediately before the appointed day. As such the earlier Judgment of this Court is of on help to the petitioner. 14. Accordingly the Writ Application is dismissed. But in the facts and circumstance of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 15. Writ Petition Nos. 1238/90, 96/87, 830/86, 834/86, 2/87, 1384/87, 1385/87, 659/87, 1594/86, 95/87, C.A. Nos. 822, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1115, 1116, 1117 of 1988. C.A. No. 1532/90 And SLP No. 1194/86. 16. For the reasons mentioned in the case of Bhubaneshwar Singh and Anr. v. Union of India of India and Ors. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1642 of 1986, disposed of today, all the above-mentioned matters are dismissed. But in the facts and circumstances of the cases, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 366 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ge 1118 it is stated thus "(iv) that the scheme underlying s,58(3) is that every matter to which the new Act applies has to be treated as arising, and to and to be dealt with, under the new law except in so far as certain consequences have already ensued or acts have been completed prior to the new act, to which it is the old law that will apply." If, therefore, as pointed out above, no right or privilege could operate beyond 31.5.1993, the benefit of Section 8 of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act cannot be had before we leave the case one post - scriptum "Intoxicating drinks have produced evils more deadly, because more continuous, than all those caused to mankind by the great historic scourges of war, famine, and pestilence combined," William Gladstone. In view of the foregoing discussion the appeals and writ petition deserve to be dismissed. Accordingly they are dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 365 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... concerned to adopt a different procedure when the statute prescribes a particular procedure. 22 Learned Counsel for the first respondent contends that under Section 3 of the Act, the removal can be done only by a person who has permission or was permitted by the Estate Officer in that behalf. According to him there is no estate officer, who has passed the order for removal. This contention omits to take note of the definition of "Estate Officer" in the Act. The appellants have acted only on the orders issued by the concerned authorities and there is no case that the appellants have acted contrary to the orders of the concerned authority. There is no merits in this contention. 23. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed; the order of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 2301 of 1993 is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. The first respondent shall pay the costs in the writ appeal to the appellants. Counsel's fee ₹ 3,000 (rupees three thousand).
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1994 (7) TMI 364 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , as submitted by the applicant, will abide by the final result of the scrutiny of offers. It will also be open to the applicant to give his fresh offer and in that case, he will not be required to make a fresh deposit because ₹ 1,00,000 is already lying with the respondent. In case the applicant does not ultimately emerge as the highest offerer and his offer is not accepted, then it will be open to the learned company judge to pass appropriate orders regarding repayment of ₹ 1,00,000 to the applicant. It will also be open to the respondent-corporation to resist the said application in accordance with law. It will be for the learned company judge to decide the claim in such a future application even if such an eventuality would arises. 4. In view of the aforesaid clarification and reserving the liberty to the applicant as aforesaid, the application - I.A. No. 2 stands disposed of. Consequently, both the O.S.A. Nos. 13 of 1990 and 1 of 1991 also stand disposed of.
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1994 (7) TMI 363 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE (APPEALS)
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... ... ..... Rule 57F(2). It is not the department’s case that the appellant have removed the waste and scrap after the permission was withdrawn i.e. subsequent to the date of Trade Notice as above. The Trade Notice No. 8/93 also does not say that it would apply retrospectively. In the circumstances, the impugned order is not sustainable. 9. Though the appellant have not pleaded the legal point regarding jurisdiction, the impugned order also suffers from lack of jurisdiction as the Assistant Collector has no power to adjudicate a demand for over ₹ 50,000/- in terms of Board’s instructions vide Circular No. 3/92-CX. 6 dated 14-5-1992 reported in 1992 (60) E.L.T. T3 1993 (46) ECR 47C, since this is not a case relating to approval of classification list/price list for which only the monetary limits under the aforesaid circular will not apply. The impugned order does not survive on this score as well. 10. In the light of the above discussions, I allow the appeal.
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1994 (7) TMI 362 - COMPANY LAW BOARD NORTHERN REGION BENCH, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... o the civil court in a suit or to come to the Company Law Board, under the specific provisions of the Companies Act. It appears that due to the unavoidable pendency of cases in civil courts involving a long waiting period the Legislature has considered it appropriate to amend the Special Courts Act to clothe the Special Court with the powers of a civil court with the objective of expeditious disposal especially in matters where notified persons were involved. The Amendment Act, however, does not intend to disturb the proceedings before the Company Law Board as it will not in any way in conflict with the objective of amendment. We, therefore, hold that the Special Court Amendment Act, 1994, does not apply to the proceedings before us and that our jurisdiction and powers to deal with matters relating to securities as provided in the Companies Act, 1956, continue to remain with us. Accordingly, the main petition will be further heard on October 3, 1994. 10. Ordered accordingly.
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1994 (7) TMI 361 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unced. Therefore, the Petitioners have themselves come with the case not based on the cheque alone but they have come with a case of a contractual liability arising out of an agreement of sale and purchase between the parties. The fact of bouncing of the cheque is stated only by way of evidence to show that the said amount was accepted by the Respondent Company as payable to the petitioners at some point of time when the cheque was tendered. In view of this, the ratio of the decisions quoted above has no application to the facts of the present case. 5. On the facts as have come on record, the alleged debt of the Respondent Company is not recoverable prima facie from the Respondent Company in view of the bar of section 69 of the Partnership Act, and therefore cannot be considered as a debt for the purposes of the provisions of winding up of a company. 6. In the result, the Petition will have to be dismissed. Hence order The Petition stands dismissed. Certified copy expedited.
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1994 (7) TMI 360 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ble to pay its debts. Section 439 makes provisions as to application for winding up. Such petitions for winding up can be made by the Company, by any Creditor or Creditors, by any contributory or contributories, by the Registrar or by the parties as provided under Section 439 of The Companies Act. 8. In my opinion a winding up proceeding cannot be filed before the Tribunal formed under the aforesaid Act of 1993, and the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to entertain any application for winding up of a company, whether it is made by any bank or financial institution or any other parties. 9. In view of the what is stated above, the application for winding up is admitted. The petitioner will issue advertisements once in The Telegraph and once in The Bartaman and the application is made returnable 6 weeks hence, Publication in Calcutta Gazette is dispensed with. 10. All parties are to act on a singed copy of this dictated order on the usual under-taking. 11. Order accordingly.
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1994 (7) TMI 359 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dmitted that he did not send the copy of the flying ruqua to the immediate superior officer. He only sent copy of the FIR after registration of the case to the Superintendent of Police. Non-compliance of Section 42(2) is, therefore, established. The trial Court has not kept in mind this distinction between the two provisions when it found the sending of First Information Report to the superior officer the same thing as is envisaged under Section 42(2) thereby committing gross error in the trial of this case. 15. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, we did not examine other questions raised and involved in this case. The result, therefore, is that the trial stands vitiated for the non-compliance of Section 42(2) of the Act and the accused is entitled to acquittal. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The accused is acquitted of the charge. He is on bail pursuant to our order dated 20-9-1993 passed in Cr. M. P. (M) No. 809/93. His bail bond and surety bond are hereby cancelled.
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