|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 364 Records
-
1995 (2) TMI 479 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o-operating with each other to sec that the probate of the Will is obtained expeditiously and the terms of the Will are implemented, have been litigating and thus frustrating the object of the deceased in making a Will. Though the Court as well counsel appearing for the parties repeatedly suggested to both parties to come to some understanding and to ensure the implementation of the terms of the Will they did not conic to any workable arrangement. 23. On the material on record it cannot be said that any strong ground which warrants removal of respondent as executor is made out. This petition has therefore to fail. If the petitioners and respondent do not co-operate with each other and implement the terms of the Will the question of removing all of them may have to be considered in the interest of the estate and the beneficiaries in separate proceedings if initiated by any competent person. 24. For the above reasons this petition is dismissed. No costs. 25. Petition dismissed.
-
1995 (2) TMI 478 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 106 1952 Cri.L.J. 656, Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi 1953 SCR 652 AIR 1953 SC 277 1953 Cri.L.J. 1113 and A.K. Gopalan v. Govt. of India (1966) 2 SCR 427 AIR 1966 SC 816 1966 Cri.L.J. 602. On the date when the High Court entertained the petition for bail and granted it to the Accused-Respondents, undeniably the challan stood filed in court, and then the right as such was not available. 5. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid two grounds, finding the orders of the High Court as erroneous, we allow this appeal and upset the order of the High Court and remit the matter back to it for consideration of the application for bail of the Accused-Respondents oh merits, if pleaded. The Accused-Respondents shall remain enlarged on bail for a period of four weeks from today. Let the order be communicated to the High Court forthwith who shall put to notice the Accused-Respondents to press their prayer for bail, if interested, and abide by the result of the deliberations of the High Court.
-
1995 (2) TMI 477 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... se, the argument does not appeal to us. The High Court itself, after considering the facts of the case, came to the conclusion that the delay was not attributable only to the prosecution and that the respondent had himself 'handsomely contributed' to the delay. We agree with the above finding of the High Court which is based on facts and hold that on the ground of delay, not attributable only to the prosecution, the respondent cannot challenge his prosecution for various offences for which he was standing trial before the Special Court. The respondent, having himself contributed to the delay in the disposal of the trial, in no small measure, cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong and take shelter under 'speady trial' to escape from prosecution. As a result of the above discussion these appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The trial court shall proceed with the case and conclude it expeditiously.
-
1995 (2) TMI 476 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ourt. Special Leave Petitions against the order of the High Court have also been dismissed by this Court. It was urged that in this background the High Court should not have quashed the notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, so far the acquisition for the appellant society is concerned. The stand taken on behalf of the appellants, in these appeals was not challenged on behalf of the respondents. The special feature of the present case as already pointed out above is that the appellant society had not entered into any agreement with any agent or contractor to get the lands acquired. It was not stated that there was no prior approval of the appropriate Government to the scheme in question. According to us, the facts of the present case are different from the others, which have been disposed of by this Court. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court so far it relates to the appellant society, is set aside. No costs.
-
1995 (2) TMI 475 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... roversy on which the grant of that relief depends. In these circumstances, granting of the final relief in the form of interim relief was wholly unwarranted. The impugned order dated 1-11-1993 has therefore to be set aside. The question of grant of relief claimed in the writ petition would be considered on its merits by the High Court and that relief to which the writ petitioner is found to be entitled may be granted at the time of decision of the writ petition. No such interim order of the kind which has been made is called for.11 4. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. No costs.
-
1995 (2) TMI 474 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... gh, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
-
1995 (2) TMI 473 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ng appeal is not condonable when there is no bona fides in the application and the delay is not satisfactorily explained. The Appellate Tribunal had also held that as regards service of notice, if notice is served by registered post it will be treated as served’. The Appellate Tribunal had further held that in case of two applications giving inconsistent statements for delay in filing appeal, averments in the application supported by sworn affidavit is to prevail over supplementary application not supported by any affidavit.
-
1995 (2) TMI 472 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ince there is no question of reversing the award in the sense of calling upon the widow and the child to refund the amount of compensation already received. The main emphasis was to decide the question of law as it was apprehended that similar cases which have become time barred under the 1988 Act may be taken to the National Commission under the 1986 Act even though that body had no jurisdiction whatsoever. We should, therefore, rest content by deciding the question of jurisdiction and holding that the National Commission had no jurisdiction whatsoever and was entirely wrong in exercising jurisdiction and awarding compensation. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case while we reverse the order of the National Commission by allowing this appeal we direct that the appellant will not be entitled to recover the compensation money already paid to the widow and the child under this Court's order. The appeal will stand disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
-
1995 (2) TMI 471 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r giving such a direction. In the circumstances we are unable to uphold that said interim order passed by the High Court. 14. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the interim order passed by the High Court regarding crediting the sum of ₹ 95,000/ - in the current account No. 318 of the respondents is set aside. Since the appellant-bank has already deposited the said amount of ₹ 95,000/- in the current account of respondents in pursuance of the said directions of the High Court it is directed that the respondents will refund the said amount to the appellant-bank within a period of one month and on their failure to do so the High Court will take steps to enforce the undertaking that has been furnished by the respondents in pursuance of the said interim order. It will be open to the learned Counsel for the parties to request the High Court for an early disposal of the Writ Petition and the High Court will give due regard to such a request if made. No order as to costs.
-
1995 (2) TMI 470 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d.” From this it is clear that there is a presumption against the dealers. In view of that presumption, it is open to the appellants-Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti to raise demands against the dealers before passes could be issued. If there is a valid rebuttal in that the sale did not take place within the notified market area, the dealers will be entitled to the passes, otherwise not. Of course, even the dealers are compelled to pay the market fee as demanded. It is open to them to challenge it in the manner provided under the Act. 3. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.
-
1995 (2) TMI 469 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d Act. This grievance also cannot be justified. The offences which are enumerated under Section 3 are offences which, to say the least, denigrate members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the eyes of society, and prevent them from leading a life of dignity and sell-respect. Such offences are committed to humiliate and subjugate members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes with a view to keeping them in a state of servitude. These offences constitute a separate class and cannot be compared with of fences under the Penal Code. 12. A similar view of Section 18 of the said Act has been taken by the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Jai Singh v. Union of India. AIR 1993 Rajasthan 177 and we respectfully agree with its findings, 13. In the premises. Section 18 of the said Act cannot be considered as violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. 14. The appeals are accordingly allowed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1995 (2) TMI 468 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ate of birth altered for more than thirty years and woke up from his deep slumber on the eve of his retirement only. The law laid down by this Court in Harnam Singh's case (supra) was, thus, fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case of the respondent and the Tribunal failed to follow the same without even pointing out any distinguishing features on facts. Stale claims and belated applications for alteration of the date of birth recorded in the service book at the time of initial entry, made after unexplained and inordinate delay, on the eve of retirement, need to be scrutinised carefully and interference made sparingly and with circumspection. The approach has to be cautious and not casual. On facts, the respondent was not entitled to the relief which the Tribunal granted to him. The order of the Tribunal is erroneous and the directions issued by it cannot be sustained. We, accordingly, set aside the order of the Tribunal and allow this appeal. No costs.
-
1995 (2) TMI 467 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
... ...
... ... ..... this that though they were last three in the list of eligible candidates, they were preferred over their seniors. The fourth person, namely RK Birendra Singh, is the senior most among the eligible candidates and it is because of this that of the remaining live his name was recommended. The appellant was immediately below RK Birendra Singh in the list of eligible candidates and had been rated as "goods", as was RK Birendra Singh; but as the Selection Committee could have recommended only four names, his name could not be recommended. 11. The aforesaid shows that no illegality had been committed by the Selection Committee or injustice had been caused in not recommending the name of the petitioner prior to 1981 for his promotion to Indian Administrative Service. We, therefore, do not read any infraction of Article 16 in the appellant having been promoted pursuant to the recommendation made in 1981 only. So, the appeal has to be dismissed, which we hereby do. No costs.
-
1995 (2) TMI 466 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lic notice, which is the mandate of law, required to be published under Section 32(3) of the Partnership Act, the firm is bound by the acts of defendant No. 3 to the third parties, as the third parties could not know that defendant No. 3 stood retired. The firm even in equity would not be permitted to take advantage of its own fault. The defendant No. 3 would be deemed to be a partner of the firm. We accordingly hold that the acknowledgment given by Lalit Kumar, defendant No. 3 is binding on the firm and the firm is answerable to the claim of the plaintiffs. 28. it was next urged that from Ex. D-92, it is clear that the plaintiff is a money lender. Ex.-D-32 is not conclusive proof of the fact that the plaintiff is/was a money lender. It may be relevant factor, but as we have held that the transaction between the parties was only a transaction of deposit, Ex. D-92 does not help the defendants. 29. For the above reasons, we find no merits in appeal. It is dismissed with costs.
-
1995 (2) TMI 465 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... extension of time either to furnish the bank guarantee or to make the payment as aforesaid, will be entertained by this Court. (5) The contemners shall not leave the country without the express permission of this Court. (6) List of properties given by the contemners is taken on record. The contemners will also file a list of properties held by their sons and unmarried daughters within one week from today. (7) If and when any property that is attached under this Order is sought to be alienated or encumbered to raise money to pay the liability of ₹ 11 crores stated above, the contemners will be at liberty to approach the Court for permission to do so. (8) The attachment of the properties and the bank accounts shall stand raised on the contemners furnishing the bank guarantee as aforesaid. (9) The order with regard to the disbursal of the amount deposited will be passed after the amounts are deposited as aforesaid. 71. The Contempt petition is ordered in the above terms.
-
1995 (2) TMI 464 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... have passed an interim order giving such a direction. In the circumstances we are unable to uphold the said interim order 14.The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the interim order passed by the High Court regarding crediting the sum of ₹ 95,000/in the current account No. 318 of the respondents is set aside. Since the appellant-bank has already deposited-the said amount of ₹ 95,000/- in the current ac- count of respondents in pursuance of the said directions of the High Court it is directed that the respondents will refund the said amount to the appellant-bank within a period of one month and on their failure to do so the High Court will take steps to enforce the undertaking that has been furnished by the respondents in pursuance of the said interim order. It will be open to the learned counsel for the parties to request the High Court for an early disposal of the Writ Petition and the High Court will give due regard to such a request if made. No order as to costs.
-
1995 (2) TMI 463 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... kms. away, came to the shop of the accused, sold the tins with the label and also issued a bill having the warranty. The accused in turn sold the article in the same form to PW3. At that juncture no knowledge about the non-existence of the firm could be attributed to the accused and he could not be expected to verify as to what the actual position was regarding the existence of the firm at a place which was 200 kms. away. It may be that the firm was in existence and if for any reason subsequently the firm does not exist, the accused cannot be deprived of the defence to which he is entitled to under Section 19(2). Therefore, in the facts of the case it must be held that the accused has duly discharged the burden to the extent necessary under the above mentioned provisions. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the conviction and sentence awarded and allow the appeal. The fine, if already paid, shall be refunded. The appellant is on bail. The bail bonds stand discharged.
-
1995 (2) TMI 462 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... gh, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
-
1995 (2) TMI 461 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... as done prior to the amendment. 34. Even though we have come to the conclusion that an aggrieved transferor or transferee can invoke the provisions of Section 111(4), we do appreciate the point raised by Shri Shanti Bhushan that if in one section there are two provisions, one fixing a time limit and the other without any time limit, and if both are applicable in a given situation, then it would make the provision fixing a time limit redundant. However, the legal provisions remaining as they are, and the intention of the Legislature being patently clear in view of our analysis as above, we hold that the petition is maintainable under Section 111(4) and we order accordingly. In view of this decision, we are not discussing the point raised on whether the time limit prescribed under Section 111(3) is mandatory and whether we have powers to condone, etc. The main petition will come up for hearing on April 10, 1995, at 10.30 a.m. and shall continue on April 11, 1995, at 10.30 a.m.
-
1995 (2) TMI 460 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e. Similarly, the question that the separate property of a Hindu co-parcener ceases to be his separate property and acquire the characteristic of his joint family or ancestral property not by mere act of physical mixing with the joint family or ancestral property, but by his volition and intention by his waiving or surrendering his special rights in it as separate property, have to be gone into on merits. The relevance of the declaration made by defendant No. 1, these questions require evidence and have to be decided on merits. Therefore, as per Mr. Shanti Bhushan's own contention, that unless volition or intention of defendant No. 1 is shown or proved, the properties by mere declaration will not become a Joint Hindu Family property, is a cause which requires consideration. Therefore, for the reasons stated above it can be said that the plaint does disclose a cause of action which requires adjudication. The application is accordingly dismissed. 14. Application dismissed.
........
|
