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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 252 Records
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1995 (4) TMI 321 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and intimation that it was being deposited towards principal it was for the decree- holder to appropriate it towards the dues. That is what was laid down in Meghraj case (supra). 4. There is yet another reason for setting aside the order of the High Court. Once the appeal was decided and it was held that the amount awarded under the amended Act, 1984 did not suffer from any error of law except the amount under Section 23 (1-A), the parties were relegated to the same position as they were on the date when the interim order was granted. In other words, the amount due was to be paid on the principal amount and it cannot be urged that since the respondent had deposited the amount the principal stood paid and, therefore, no interest or solatium could be calculated on the principal amount. 5. In the result, these appeals succeed and are allowed. The Order passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the Executing Court is restored. The appellant shall be entitled to his cost.
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1995 (4) TMI 320 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... alid for non-compliance of Section 7(2) of the Act. (ii) The compulsory contribution amounts to denial of minimum wages. (iii) The amendment is impracticable and unworkable. (iv) The amendment is ultra vires the Act and Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 3. By a detailed and well reasoned judgment, the High Court has rejected all the four contentions noted above. We see no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court. We agree with the reasoning and the consequences reached by the High Court therein. 4. The special leave petitions are dismissed 5. Intervention applications are dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 319 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... RA REDDY, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed
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1995 (4) TMI 318 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... amount to a breach of Sections 31 and 37, as the case may be, of the Act. That necessarily means, that in the instant case the increase in the FSI to 2 without obtaining approval of the State Government, is not only a breach of regulation 159 but also of Sections 31(6) and 37(2) of the Act. In that view of the matter and in view of the well settled law that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the public bodies or the Government to carry out the representation or promise which is contrary to law or which is outside their authority or power, none of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant can be entertained. 11. On the conclusions as above, we hold that the reliefs sought for in the writ petition are not available to the appellant for it is trite that before one can seek a writ of mandamus he has to prove that he has a legally protected and judicially enforceable right. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1995 (4) TMI 317 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... volved is small, we are not inclined to interfere in this matter. Appeal is dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 316 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... employment to travel from the staff quarters to the South Block in the SPG vehicle according to the official arrangement. In our opinion, the meaning of the expression "actual VIP security duty" in the above circular must be the same as that of the words "in the course of the employment" in the Workmen's Compensation Act; and, therefore, the test for determining the liability for payment under the circular should also be the same. In our view, the tribunal was in error in making an unduly strict and narrow construction of the expression used in the circular. 14. We are constrained to observe that the concerned authorities must adopt a humane approach and construe the circular liberally to advance its object instead of taking such a rigid and pedantic stand. Unless properly implemented, the scheme in the circular would be frustrated resulting in failure to achieve the avowed purpose. 15. Consequently, the appeal is allowed with ₹ 10,000 as costs.
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1995 (4) TMI 315 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... writ appeal deserves to be allowed, it hereby dismissed as having become infructuous, as the writ petition itself is hereby finally disposed of. No costs either in the writ petition or in this writ appeal. 7. Immediately after pronouncing the judgment, learned counsel for the first respondent herein, i.e., writ petitioner, made an oral request for a certificate of fitness to file appeal before the Supreme Court. 8. We are of the view that no substantial question of law of general importance is involved in the case. Therefore, the leave prayed for is rejected. 9. It was further requested by learned counsel for the writ petitioner that at least for a period of two weeks from today the operation of the present judgment of this court may be stayed so as to enable the writ petitioner to move a special leave petition in the Supreme Court and to obtain appropriate interim relief. 10. The prayer is allowed with the clear understanding that this period shall not be extended in future.
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1995 (4) TMI 314 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... trued to mean that the High Court in deciding the question of winding up of the company has to take into account the opinion of the Board forwarded to it under sub-section (1) and is not to abdicate its own function of determining the question of winding up. So read, sub-section (2) does not suffer from any infirmity. This in substance is the view taken by the High Court in the impugned order. 3. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 313 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be bound by the judgment in the earlier declaratory suit but if he finds that such an inference cannot be drawn he would be bound by the said judgment till it is set aside by the competent Court in an appropriate proceeding. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court dated February 23,1982 as well as the order dated June 8,1971 passed by the Deputy Director (Consolidation) dismissing the revision filed by the respondent are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Deputy Director (Consolidation), Sadar, Pralapgarh, to decide the revision in the light of his finding on the question whether an inference of fraud or collusion can be drawn in view of the finding recorded by him in his order dated June 8,1971, that there was gross negligence on the part of Smt. Btidhna, the next friend of the appellant, in the earlier declaratory suit filed under Section 229B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, There will be no order as to costs.
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1995 (4) TMI 312 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... he Tribunal. Therefore, while we dismiss this appeal in the facts of this case we must make it clear that in an appropriate case where the evidence is properly laid the issue may require serious consideration. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1995 (4) TMI 311 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Reddy, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 310 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... . The disallowance was made by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the sister-concerns have been held to be non-genuine concerns and income of the said sister-concerns was clubbed in the hands of the main firm. Consequently, interest paid to them was also disallowed after considering the interest received from such inter-firm. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the said disallowance on the ground that all the four sister-concerns have been held to be genuine concerns and their income has been held to be separately assessable in their respective hands on substantive basis. We have confirmed such findings given by the Commissioner (Appeals) and, accordingly, the deletion of disallowance made in respect of interest paid to the sister-concerns is also considered to be justified. The view taken by the Commissioner (Appeals) in relation to such a ground in all the aforesaid appeals is, therefore, also confirmed. 14. In the result, all the appeals by the Revenue are dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 309 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... wami, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hed. Interlocutory orders are interfered with. At every step, there will be revisions and applications for quashing and writ petitions. In short, no progress is ever allowed to be made. And if ever the case reaches the stage or trial after all these interruptions, the time would have taken its own toll the witnesses are won over; evidence disappears; the prosecution loses interest - the result is an all too familiar one. We are sad to say that repeated admonitions of this Court have not deterred superior courts from interfering at initial or interlocutory stages or criminal cases. Such interference should be only in exceptional cases where the interests of justice demand it; it cannot be a matter of course. In the circumstances, we cannot acceded to the said contention. 18. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The case shall now proceed according to law and as expeditiously as possible in the circumstances of the case.
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1995 (4) TMI 306 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... anohar, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 305 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se in this case from different persons including lawyers and published them even before arguments before us began. A few others indulged in yellow journalism and started gossiping about the Chief Justice as well as this Bench. Their object was very clear. We are, the least interested in bouquets to brickbats but we are keen on upholding the majesty and dignity of this Court. We cannot tolerate publications which scandalise or tend to scandalise or lower or tend to lower the authority of this Court or interfere or tend to interfere with the administration of justice in any manner. We will initiate separate action against those who are guilty of such contempt. 39. We are not here referring to newspapers or journals which have only reported the proceedings in the court. No exception can be taken to the same. But we would earnestly remind the fourth estate which professes to be one of the main pillars of democracy that freedom of expression does not enable it to commit contempt.
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1995 (4) TMI 304 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... and circumstances of the case, we decline to admit the appeal.
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1995 (4) TMI 303 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... el, there can be no distinction between actual interest paid and accrual notional interest. 17. We are unable to concede this submission. According to us, no tenant would be prepared to pay to a landlord, who makes construction from his own fund, but would like to charge higher rent on the ground that if he would have invested the amount elsewhere he would have earned interest. As the landlord would be earning rent on the investment made by him in the construction of the building, we are of the view that it would not be acceptable to a tenant to pay higher rent on the ground of loss of interest. 18. We are, therefore, of the view that the inclusion of items (f) and (g) as cost of construction was not permissible. CONCLUSION 19. The appeal is, therefore, allowed by ordering for exclusion of the cost incurred under items (a), (b), (f) and (g). The rateable value would be fixed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1995 (4) TMI 302 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o p /o p (iv) Even though the order issued by the State Government determining price for each factory is upheld but since in consequence of the order passed by the High Court an interim order was granted by this Court and the factories were directed to pay ₹ 600/- to the cane growers and they were directed to furnish bank guarantee for ₹ 145/- it is directed that the amount paid by the factories shall not be liable to recovery from the cane growers. But the bank guarantee furnished by the appellants or sugar factories shall stand discharged. o p /o p (v) It is made clear that the direction not to recover ₹ 600/- from non-growers would not entitle any member of the cooperative society or the cooperative society itself to claim that it was entitled to be paid ₹ 600/- for its cane during the years in dispute. o p /o p 39. For the reasons stated in the order these appeals are disposed of with above directions. Parties shall bear their own costs. o p /o p
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1995 (4) TMI 301 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... nkataswami, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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