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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 310 Records
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1995 (7) TMI 444 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rfected title by adverse possession was negatived by all the Courts. No question of adverse possession arises unless it is pleaded and proved that after the possession was taken and handed over to the 3rd respondent, the petitions have asserted their own right to the knowledge of the 3rd respondent and it had acquiesced in it and remained in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment, nec vi, nec clam and nec precario. That was not the case. Therefore, they cannot have any semblance of right by prescription. It is rather unfortunate that State filed a suit for possession. They should have resorted to summery eviction under the Public Premises Act etc.; instead they have gone to the Civil Court. All the courts granted decree in favour of the Government and the Society. We do not find any ground warranting interference with judgment and decree in S.A. Nos. 146, 147 and 150 of 1982 dated October 11, 1994 of Bombay High Court at Nagpur Bench. 2. The S.L.Ps. are accordingly dismissed.
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1995 (7) TMI 443 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nexure P/XIV. There is no provision under the Act which requires approval to be given. Once the Registrar was notified with information regarding to holding of the election, that was the end of the matter. Registrar as noticed above could not appoint ad hoc committee. 9. Apart from the fact that there is no power with the Registrar to pass the order contained in annexure P/XVI there is another infirmity. Order annexure P/XVI was passed without hearing the elected members. The propriety required that persons who were elected should have been given an opportunity of hearing. Thus there is no alternate but to quash order annexure P/XVI. Petition is allowed with costs. Costs awarded ₹ 1,000/-. The costs to be paid by the person, personally who passed the order annexure P/XVI. The net result would be the elected body would come into existence. It will have its normal tenure. The period during which the elected body was kept out of office would not be counted for the purpose.
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1995 (7) TMI 441 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... shown that the wooden containers were durable and returnable. It appears that the authorities below had negatived the contention that they were durable and returnable but the High Court did not go into it on account of the law as it then stood. The issue now would have to be gone into to determine whether or not the assessee is entitled to deduction of the value of the wooden containers. It is, therefore, necessary to remit the matter to the High Court with a view to enable it to decide whether or not on the evidence laid, the containers could be described as durable and returnable. The High Court may give an early hearing since the issue is a narrow one. The appeals are allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.3
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1995 (7) TMI 440 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... 50,000 under the Amnesty Scheme. The Assessing Officer finally made an addition of ₹ 3,17,219 and the net addition after considering the amount surrendered at ₹ 50,000, came to ₹ 2,67,219. We have deleted the above addition in its entirety. The position, therefore, is that ₹ 50,000 offered by the assessee is more than what had been added originally by the Assessing Officer. In our opinion under these circumstances, a lenient view would suggest that no interest under sections 139(8) and 217 would be chargeable, we may have given a finding for charging of interest on the basis of the income finally assessed but looking to the facts of the case and taking into consideration the Amnesty Scheme and the circular issued by the Board in this regard, we hold that no interest under the aforesaid sections was chargeable at all because of the lenient view to be taken. This ground is accordingly accepted. 26. In the result, the appeal is allowed in the above terms.
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1995 (7) TMI 439 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llant ishwar and others and on a threadbare discussion thereof found that the participation of the appellants before us in the incident stood proved beyond all reasonable doubt, while acquitting others on grounds which were available to them only. Having carefully considered the evidence against each of the appellants we do not find any reason to take a different view from the one taken by the trial Court so far as the appellants are concerned except appellant Jai Narain as we feel that the trial Court having acquitted those whose names old not find place in the F.I.R. ought to have recorded an order of acquittal in his favour also as he stood on the same footing. In the result we dismiss this appeal of all the appellants except appellant Jai Narain, whose appeal we allow. Since all the appellants are on bail, Jai Narain will stand discharged from his bail bond while others will now surrender to their bail bonds to serve out the sentences imposed upon them by the trial Court.
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1995 (7) TMI 438 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... C. Sen, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (7) TMI 437 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dea of entering into an agreement with the first defendant alone when the plaintiff appellant was already informed about the death of Dr. R. Surya Rao and the devolution of his interest upon the first defendant, his mother, his brothers and his sisters, was to somehow or other enter upon the property, but, the stipulated rent also was not paid by the plaintiff to the defendants. The trial court has noted that there was no legal necessity for the defendants to part with the suit property and held against the plaintiff that the very contract was speculative in nature and entered into by the plaintiff who has been dabbling in real estate transactions without the means to purchase a substantial immovable property like the suit property and we agree with the same." This finding is well supported from the facts and circumstances and being a finding of fact, we see no infirmity in the judgement warranting granting of leave. Accordingly, the special leave petition is dismissed.
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1995 (7) TMI 436 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... yee as a consequence of the Industrial Court's Order dated 30th January, 1987 made in Appeal (IC) No. 60 of 1986 and further that the first respondent, by not giving the petitioner the status of permanency and the consequential benefits, has engaged in an "unfair labour practice' within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. I am informed by Dr. Kulkarni that the petitioner has retired from service with effect from 15th July, 1991. He will therefore, be entitled to the monetary benefits, if any, which may accrue as a result of his being treated as a permanent employee from 30th January, 1987. The aforesaid benefits shall be made available to the petitioner within a period of three months from today, failing which they shall carry simple interest at 12 per annum, apart from other legal consequences. 20. Rule, accordingly, made absolute. The first respondent to pay the costs of this writ petition quantified at ₹ 500/-. 21. Certified copy expedited.
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1995 (7) TMI 435 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he defence raised by the Company cannot, therefore, be said to be bona fide and for this reason as well I hold that the Company is unable to pay its debts. The amount worked out and claimed by the petitioner under the agreement has not been disputed by the Company except on the ground that the interest claimed was excessive and, therefore, hit by the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act as referred to above. The amount due is admittedly more than ₹ 500/- which the Company has on receipt of a notice neglected to pay or secure or compound the same to the satisfaction of the petitioner. It must, therefore, be held that the Company is unable to pay its debts. 9. In the result, the petition is admitted. It is ordered to be advertised not less than 14 days before the next date of hearing in the Official Gazette of the State of Haryana and in one issue each of the Daily Tribune (English) and Jan Satta. 10. To come up for further proceedings on 11-8-1995. 11. Petition allowed.
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1995 (7) TMI 434 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rt is competent to amend the scheme if the circumstances so require. The Supreme Court observed, thus it is open in a suit under Section 92 where scheme is to be settled to provide in the scheme for modifying there and when necessity arises by inserting a clause to that effect. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, the Supreme Court made that the amendment should relate to the administration of the trusts and should not in any way affect the private rights of the parties. Here, in this case, the petitioner has not prayed for amending the scheme. All the reliefs, sought by him in paragraph 12 of the petition relate to his personal claims. The provision of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked for personal claim. I, therefore, hold that the petition was not competent. 11. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order passed by the learned trial Judge is set aside. The petition filed by the petitioner is rejected. We leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1995 (7) TMI 433 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pective contentions raised by the parties based on various judgments of the High Courts and the Supreme Court are about the question of winding up which shall be considered when the matter of winding up shall be taken up by this court. However, at this stage, it is a fit case which deserves admission." 11. In view of the nature of order passed, it is not necessary to decide the question of tenability of this appeal. The fact remains that the order under challenge is one of admission and the matter is still to be heard and decided by the Company Judge. The merits of the matter are yet to be examined. There is yet no order or decision concerning the matter of winding up of the company one way or the other. The order does not prejudice the appellant. 12. On perusal of the order, we find that this appeal is devoid of substance. 13. In the result, we decline to interfere at this interlocutory stage and, ex-consequenti, dismiss this appeal, but without any orders as to costs.
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1995 (7) TMI 432 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t to say that H. D. P. E. fabrics have been singled out for discrimination. We are, therefore, of the view that the denial of exemption from sales tax to H. D. P. E. fabrics is based on reasonable and rational classification and is not violative of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. 14. Sales tax is a State subject. The mere fact that other States have exempted H. D. P. E. fabrics from sales tax along with other types of fabrics, cannot, therefore, avail the petitioner for challenging the levy. The situation in Ayurveda Pharmacy (supra) was different and that case too does not advance the petitioners' case. On the other hand the observations quoted above support the Government's action inasmuch as it also recognises the States power to discriminate rationally and reasonably. 15. For the above reasons, we find no force in the present petition and the same is dismissed with costs that we assess at ₹ 5,000/-. Interim order dated 18-5-89 is vacated.
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1995 (7) TMI 431 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... onsidered the situation of the land being far away from the outer municipal limits though situated near about the railway line, that itself would be a factor to be taken into consideration in determining the market value. Added to that, there is a possibility to impose statutory restrictions to develop the lands for building purposes. No prudent purchaser would hazard to purchase such large extent of land at the rates when small extents of lands are sold in plots. True that the purchasers hazarded to purchase lands in the neighbouring survey numbers and have taken grave risk. But it would not be safe guide to adopt the same price offered by them. Considered from this perspective and from the totality of facts on record, we are of the view that the High Court was well justified in deducting 60 of the value and giving ₹ 4/- per sq. yard. Accordingly, we do not find any justification warranting interference. The appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances, with no costs.
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1995 (7) TMI 430 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... 977 (1) E.L.T. 199, had held that in the present case also the sawn paratty and saw dust, which arise in the nature of scrap during the course of sawing of timber logs, are not excisable products since they cannot be said to have been manufactured by the appellants. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the respondent with consequential benefits.
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1995 (7) TMI 429 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . For the views I have taken, it is not necessary to deal with the other questions raised by Mr. Dutta at the Bar. Suffice, however, would be to say that driving the petitioner to take recourse to alternative remedy is a restriction imposed by the High Court upon itself, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Principle of natural justice, if violated, should not ordinarily be a bar to entertain an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India despite existence of alternative remedy. The petitioner is directed to render all co-operation in smooth conduct of the proceeding. 26. For the reasons aforementioned, this application is disposed of with the aforementioned observations. 27. Ld. Counsels for the parties are permitted to take gist of the order for communication to the authorities concerned who are directed to act on such communication. 28. The certified copy, if prayed for, be given to the parties on priority basis.
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1995 (7) TMI 428 - COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (APPEALS), BOMBAY
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... ... ..... he appellant. The appellant, at the time of personal hearing has brought out the entire sequence of events and facts which indicate without any doubt whatsoever that there was no bond executed by them and no drawback was claimed by them and that the importation is not hit by the negative list in view of the saving clause. The goods are clearly eligible for the benefit of Section 20 and the impugned order is unwarranted, whimsical and totally arbitrary in deying the benefit to the appellant. I have therefore no hesitation in setting aside the impugned order and directing the lower authority to confer the benefit of Section 20 to the appellant with full relief from all penal actions. The lower authority should also issue necessary detention certificate as the detention of the consignment is entirely due to the misconception on the part of the lower authority who passed the order assuming that the appellant had executed a bond when in fact there was none. The appeal is allowed.
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1995 (7) TMI 427 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... the Tribunal, requires no interference. The petition for special leave is dismissed.
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1995 (7) TMI 426 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the case of the assessee and the losing of the money or the assets when the petitioner has indulged into some illegal activity would not justify deduction of the amount as a business loss. To the same effect, there is a decision of our High Court in CIT v. Kodandarama & Co. 1983 144 ITR 395. In that case, some business men were paying regularly certain amount towards police welfare fund for getting permission. Those amounts were sought to be deducted as a business expenditure. The claim was turned down by this Court. 7. In view of the above discussion, the first question is answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The 2nd and 3rd questions are answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Question No. 4 is a consequential question. Therefore, it has to be answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The referred case is, accordingly, answered.
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1995 (7) TMI 425 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rdinate legislation. We do not think that there is room for implying anything in this behalf. Section 8 of the 1994 Act does not in express terms save the said Regulations, nor does it mention them. Section 8 only protect the remuneration, terms and conditions and rights and privileges of those who were in Air India’s employment when the 1994 Act came into force. Such saving is undoubtedly "to quieten doubts" of those Air India employment who were then in service. What is enacted in Section 8 does not cover those employees who joined Air India’s service after the 1994 Act came into force. The limited saving enacted in Section 8 does not, in our opinion, extend to the said Regulations. Holding as we do that the said Regulations ceased to be effective on 29th January, 1994, the very foundation of Air India’s case no longer exists. No consideration of other arguments is therefore, necessary. The appeal, accordingly, fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1995 (7) TMI 424 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the provisions which seeks to safeguard the interest of the owners of the land required for executing the schemes framed under the Act, but that does not mean that it must be given a meaning and content which it was never intended to comprehend and the language whereof is totally inadequate to mean what is sought to be attributed to it. A provision has to be read and understood in the context of the entire scheme of the enactment. We are therefore unable to agree with the said decision and accordingly over-rule it. Certain other decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court have also been brought to our notice but we do not think it necessary to deal with all of them in the light of the conclusion arrived at hereinabove which, we may reiterate, is confined to situations where the land has been acquired and the title has vested in the Trust. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The Judgment and order under appeal is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
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