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Showing 1 to 20 of 437 Records
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1997 (3) TMI 648 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... from Hon'ble High Court. Therefore, appointment is disputed. 7. In fact, the regularisation order passed by the District Inspector of Schools also says that it was subject to the result in the writ petition. The appeal being the continuation of the writ petition, the question arises whether the respondent is entitled to claim the benefit of Section 33-B(1)(a)(i) of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission Act, 1982. We have seen that his services came to be terminated on May 30, 1988 and the amendment Act has no application. Hence, the Division Bench was not right in giving direction that his regularisation will be subject to the further order since the regularisation order itself means that it was subject to the result of the writ petition. 8. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the writ petition stands dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. If there is provision for further appointment according to rules, the bar of age may be relaxed appropriately.
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1997 (3) TMI 647 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d ordinarily would not give rise to a question of law. The Tribunal for valid reasons rejected the affidavit furnished by the assessees grandmother-in-law and assessed the amount as the assessees income from undisclosed sources. The finding of the Tribunal was a finding of fact and no question of law arose for reference". In Ashok Kumar vs. CIT (supra), a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court held "...... The question whether the assessees explanation was acceptable or not, on the facts of the case, was purely one of fact. The Tribunal had found that the assessee was the owner of the unaccounted cash found in his possession and hence, the Tribunal was justified in upholding the addition of the amount as the assessees income under s. 69A of the IT Act, 1961". We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforementioned judgments and in our considered opinion no question of law arises in this case. 6. Consequently, the petition is dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 646 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... idered that on any promise or assurance of the respondents the petitioner has altered his position to his detriment to invoke doctrine of promissory estoppel and hold the respondents bound by the same. 27. Apart from the fact that the Resolution of, 1970 did not contain any such promise nor any such assurance came into existence by any action of the competent authority in exercise of powers under rule, promissory estoppel does not enure beyond the life of Resolution 1970 itself. Once no action was taken under the 1970 Resolution on replacement of new process of allotment of Resolution dated 21-11-1991, it cannot be said that the petitioner could still hold respondents bound to consider his application under a Resolution which is no more in existence. 28. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any force in this petition and the same is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim order, if any. stands vacated. The petitioner will pay the costs of the petition.
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1997 (3) TMI 645 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he trial Court on the question of sanction is clearly illegal and cannot be sustained. 6. The learned Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Dhingra, has contended that the Magistrate came to the conclusion that it was not a part of the duty of the respondent to deal with either the preparation of the record or payment thereof. It was the duty of the cashier and therefor, the learned Magistrate was right in his conclusion that the respondent had not committed any offence. We desist to go into that aspect. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits of the case. We have only dealt with the contention as the need for sanction and as to whether the sanction becomes necessary under Section 197(1) of Cr.P.C. 7. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the above extent. The order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint is set aside. The complaint stands restored. The Magistrate is directed to proceed further in accordance with the law and deal with the case on merits.
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1997 (3) TMI 644 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... on imported copper wire bars used in the manufacture of copper strips and copper foils-available credit on the endorsed bill of entry-non-following of certain procedures, not to deny the credit. The Tribunal held that credit should not be denied merely because the appellants have not satisfied procedural condition imposed by Central Board of Excise and Customs 10. Ld. DR did not dispute the fact of admissibility otherwise of modvat on the impugned goods covered by these two bills of entry. The actual issue involved was a fact of endorsement on the Bill of Entry. 11. Following the ratio of Tribunal's earlier orders, we are of the view that once duty is paid the fact that the credit was taken on the basis of endorsed bill of entry provided the entire consignment is covered by the endorsed bill of entry, should not come in the way of grant of benefit. 12. In view of this we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal. (Order dictated and pronounced in the open Court.)
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1997 (3) TMI 643 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of records is a camouflage to defeat just and legal right or claim and interest of the raiyat, the tiller of the soil on whom the Act confers title to the land he tills. 19. Shri B.B. Singh, in these circumstances, seeks to contend that this question has not been canvassed in the courts below. Since the matter requires examination, it may be remanded to the High Court for consideration. We find that in view of the above findings recorded, the remittance of the matter would render little assistance. 20. Under these circumstance, we are constrained to allow the appeal and set aside judgment of the High Court and also of the Subordinate Judge confirming the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit. In consequence, the respondent is directed to restitute the possession to the appellant within two months from the date of the receipt of this order. In case, he fails to do so, the appellant is at liberty to have it executed with police assistance and take persuasion. No costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 642 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mother in the case. The 1st defendant also appears to have, immediately after the death of her husband, asserted, her right to the property by dealing with the same and executing the settlement deed in the name of her grandsons. Consequently, we are of the view that even on merits, the plaintiff has failed to substantiate her claim that items 1 to 4 of part III of the plaint 'A' schedule and item No. 3 of Part IV of Plaint 'A' schedule standing in the name of the 1st defendant are not self acquired properties or the benefit or the welfare of the 1st defendant by her husband Kesava Padayachi but that she had been holding the properties benami for her husband or the family of her husband. We therefore, sustain the judgment and decree passed by the learned single Judge, though not for the same reasonings but on the different findings and conclusions rendered by us on merits of such a plea of benami. The appeal therefore fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 641 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y as the issue before me is only whether the holder of the cheque can present the cheque nearly after four years by relying on Sec. 20 of the Act which is time barred. Though learned Counsel for the appellant has taken time several times to look into the legal position he was not able to cite an authority before me with regard to the presentation of time barred cheque by the payee for encashment nearly after four years. I am of the view that if time barred cheques can be encashed even after the expiry of the specified time it will create so may anomalous situations which are likely to be used by unscrupulous litigants. For all these reasons the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. 3. At this stage Counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment may not come in the way of his client in enforcing the civil liability against the respondent. Having regard to the submission, it is clarified that the judgment in this case will be limited to the facts of this case only.
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1997 (3) TMI 640 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sited by the Corporation-company. It was held that the question of refund did not arise because the corporation-company had collected octroi duty from the dealers and agents who had, in turn, passed the burden of the consumers. Following the ratio of the said decision in the case of the petitioner also, there is found no equity to allow the refund of excise duty for any of the earlier four years. The petitioner has not shown that excise duty was not collected from the buyers. Therefore, the plea of refund is liable to be rejected. 21. In the result, the writ petition partly succeeds and is allowed accordingly. The levy of excise duty on the packaging of tea is held to be outside the scope of the Act inasmuch as it is not part of manufacture. The respondents are not entitled to collect excise duty on the packaging of tea done by the petitioner. However, the petitioner’s claim for the refund of the excise duty paid in the four years is rejected. No order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 639 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... compliance thereof was on the prosecution which it has failed to discharge. Mr. Sethi states that the provisions of Section 57 of the Act are not mandatory and it was not incumbent on the prosecution to prove the report under that section. I am afraid that the said view cannot be accepted in view of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balbir Singh reported as 1994 Jcc 303 and Mahinder Kumar v. State, Panaji, Goa, reported as 1995 Crl.L.J. 2074. In the circumstances, I hold that the prosecution has failed to prove compliance with the provisions of Section 57 of the Act. (7) The net result of the above discussion is that the prosecution has failed to prove the compliance with the provision of Sections 42 and 57 of the Act and as such the prosecution stands vitiated and the benefit thereof goes to the appellant. In the circumstances, I allow this appeal and acquit the appellant The appellant be released forthwith unless he is required in any other case.
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1997 (3) TMI 638 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... ty. Both the Members are unanimous in holding that there was no attempt by the appellants to evade payment of duty which is an essential ingredient in imposition of penalty under Rule 173Q. As regards the submissions made by the ld. S.D.R., I find that the job of a Member, sitting in reference, is confined to agreeing with one of the two views projected by the differing Member. It is not within his competence to go into merits of the belief expressed by either of the members. On examination of the issues involved in this case and the judgments cited before me, I am in agreement with the views expressed by the ld. Member (Judicial) that the penalty for the present case is required to be set aside. The papers now may be placed before the original bench for further action. (Dictated in Court). Dt. 7.3.1997 MAJORITY ORDER In terms of the majority order, it is ordered that the (i) demands raised are barred by time (ii) penalty is not imposable. As a result, the appeal is allowed.
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1997 (3) TMI 636 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ct. But the rest of the offences shown in the Schedule were certainly not the offences under any Act at the time of the alleged commission of the offences. 32. The definition of the “offence” has been given in S. 3(38) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 according to which “offence” shall mean any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force and hence for an offence there must be an act or omission made punishable by law for the time being in force. In view of this the petitioner cannot be convicted for the offences mentioned in items (ii) to (viii) of the Schedule appended to the Act, and also the penalty greater than that which has been provided in the Indian Penal Code for such offences can be imposed against her. But she can be tried under the U.P Dacoity Affected Areas Act by the Special Judge constituted under S. 5 of the said Act, for the offences mentioned in item No. (i) of the Schedule to the Act. 33. Order accordingly.
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1997 (3) TMI 635 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pensation under Section 25FFF. Counsel for the workmen stated that some of them have not accepted the compensation. That is a different matter altogether. If the compensation has been offered and not accepted, one cannot find fault with the employer. We also find that the High Court did not record any finding on this question. In fact, the State Trading Corporation had objected to the High Court entertaining the writ petition on the ground that, it involved several questions of fact. But since the High Court limited its direction to the Government of India, it proceeded to entertain the writ petition and disposed it of as above. 7. As we have come to the conclusion that the High Court was not justified in issuing the direction to the Government of India, one cannot allow the impugned judgment of the High Court to stand. 8. In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the judgments of the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench with no order as to costs throughout.
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1997 (3) TMI 634 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the question of determining the intention of the assessee to carry on its business. The Tribunal, after considering the documents came to the conclusion that there was only a lull in the manufacturing and the sanction of Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction clearly shows that the industry has to be revived. The finding of the Tribunal is that the revival had taken place and the assessee is now in the stream. The finding of the Tribunal that there was only a lull in the manufacturing activity of the assessee is based on the materials and the inference drawn by it on the materials should also be regarded as an inference on the facts and the finding of the Tribunal is a pure finding of fact. Therefore, we hold that the Tribunal came to the correct conclusion in holding that no referable question of law arises out of its order. 6. In the result, the tax case petitions are liable to be rejected and they are, accordingly, rejected. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 633 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... for the subsequent vacancies from the open market and, therefore, directions sought could not be given. We find that the reason given by the Tribunal are well justified. Merely because the petitioner has been put in the waiting list, he does not get any vested right to an appointment. It is not his case that any one below his ranking in the waiting list has been appointed which could give him cause for grievance. Thus, he cannot seek any direction for his appointment. 4. For subsequent vacancies, every one in the open market is entitled to apply for consideration of his/her claim on merit in accordance with law and it would be consistent with the provisions of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. Therefore, direction sought for not to fill up the vacancies having arisen subsequently until the candidates in the waiting list are exhausted, cannot be granted. The Tribunal rightly refused to grant any such direction. 5. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 632 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he change in the socio-economic and political system in the country and may appreciate the desirability of submitting to the will of the people expressed through their elected representatives. We are told that the former rulers of Mysore are revered, respected and remembered for their commitment to the cause of the people. They are also stated to have left no stone unturned for preservation of the identity and culture of this renowned southern State of the Country. Each individual is expected to bow before the will of the people. The good gesture shown by the petitioners definitely would revive the cherished memories of their predecessors. 92. Keeping in view the legal position as discussed hereinabove, we find there is no merit in any of these Writ Petitions which are dismissed with costs assessed at ₹ 5,000/- per Writ Petition. 93. We would like to place on record our appreciation of the assistance and co-operation rendered by all the advocates appearing in the case.
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1997 (3) TMI 631 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... khande, (5) Mr. Vinayak Kamlakar Pandit. (6) Mr. Pramod Vijay Nirmalkar and (7) Mr. A.G. Balkundi, are continued with Assistant Charity Commissioner, Nasik being hereby appointed as acting Chairman. The acting Chairman and the ad-hoc trustees shall hold elections within a period of 4 months from to-day and hand over a charge to the newly elected Board of trustees and do such other duties and exercise such powers as mentioned in paras 37 and 38 of this judgment. (vi) Copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Asst. Charity Commissioner, Nasik for information and immediate compliance and to take follow up action as directed by this judgment. (vii) In view of disposal of the appeals, all the 10 Civil Applications namely C.A. Nos. 7002/96, 7148/96, 7149/96, 7150/96, 7151/96. 474/97, 475/97, 473/97,470/97 and 471/97 do not survive and accordingly disposed of. (viii) In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs in these appeals. (ix) Certified Copy expedited.
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1997 (3) TMI 630 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... es which will lead to the conclusion that an investigation is necessary. 14. As we have pointed out earlier, the main reason for the petitioner-corporation seeking an investigation is on the basis of findings of the management auditor and auditor of the company. Other than the observation of these auditors, the petitioner-corporation, which is today controlling the board of directors of the respondent-company has not substantiated the alleged irregularities either by comparison with the earlier years or with similarly placed companies. 15. A mere statement of facts based on the auditor's report without any corroborative evidence will not assist us in framing the requisite opinion. The material placed before us should be such as to satisfy ourselves that a deeper probe is necessary. Therefore, on the premise that on the basis of the material placed before us, we are unable to form an opinion that the affairs of the company should be investigated, we dismiss this petition.
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1997 (3) TMI 629 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ive due consideration of the said submission of the petitioners and, if they have already passed an order, it will be open to the Central Government to pass a supplementary order in the light of this order. Since the moratorium is to expire today and the time available for consideration of the objections submitted by the petitioners was short, we consider it appropriate to extend the time for the Central Government to consider the objections and pass an order till April 7, 1997, if an order has not been passed till now. In order to enable the Central Government to pass order by that date we direct that the moratorium that has been imposed under the orders dated September 30, 1996, shall remain operative till April 7, 1997. 9. This order would not preclude the petitioners from challenging the validity of order passed by the Central Government under Section 45(7) of the Act on all the grounds available under the law. 10. The special leave petitions are disposed of accordingly.
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1997 (3) TMI 628 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s well. The learned Solicitor-General, on the other hand, has, however, argued that such an alternative was offered to the petitioners but they took no concrete steps to convert themselves and on the contrary rejected the suggestion. The petitioners, in any case, shall have further opportunity to represent their case when the Reserve Bank of India prepares a scheme of amalgamation and invites objections from them and the transferee-bank under the provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 45 of the Act. The order of moratorium in each case will run itself out on March 31, 1997, and it will be open for the petitioners to submit their objections at an appropriate time in accordance with law including the plea that they may be permitted to apply to convert themselves into non-banking companies in public interest and in the interests of depositors. 43. In view of the above, the present petitions have no merit and the same are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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