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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 566 Records
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1997 (7) TMI 702 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rest in a public trust, the Registrar is bound to make an inquiry. In the present case, the inquiry was made and the Registrar had given a finding vide order dated 14-7-69.1 have held above that Will dated 13-11-1956 is surrounded by suspicious circumstances and has also not been proved in accordance with law, hence the finding that the Will dated 15-12-1949 stood cancelled by the will dated 13-1 1-1956 has to be set aside. The Will dated 15-12-49 subsists and is the last will and its consequences have to How, resulting in the creation of a public trust in the name of Dharmshaki Panna Lal Ajudhya Prasad.' Consequently, the appeal has to be allowed and the order passed by the Registrar is to be set aside. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The Judgment and Decree passed by the Court below as well as the Order of the Registrar are set aside. It is declared that the disputed property is a Public Trust. Under the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 701 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o avoid unnecessary delay, harassment and also causing inconvenience to such persons. This will also lessen the burden on the High Court. It is also noticed in private complaints filed under Section 494 of IPC, in regard to bigamous marriages, the persons who had attended the marriage also are arraigned as accused persons without proper allegations against them. Under those circumstances, it is the duty of the learned Magistrate to properly scrutinise as to whether all the accused are necessary parties and if found unnecessary, the Magistrate can refuse to issue summons against them. 17. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is partly allowed dismissing the complaint as against petitioners 4 to 8 who are accused before the learned Magistrate and they are discharged. To that extent the impugned order is quashed. However, petition as against petitioners 1 to 3 is dismissed directing the Magistrate to proceed against them according to law from the stage at which it is pending.
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1997 (7) TMI 700 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re are numerous primary bodies and also district bodies. There can be intervention by the court in the election process of any of the societies and as a matter of fact it has been mentioned in the counter affidavit that the courts have stayed the elections of primary bodies of three places. All this is apart from the fact that the byelaws of the apex body do not contemplate any election to the Board by the members of the apex body. 75. I have gone through the judgments in M.P. No. 908/90 and M.P. No. 1111 of 1990 and to my mind these do not touch upon conclusion which I have reached and are not quite relevant. 76. In any case since it is stated that the whole process of election to primary and central societies is complete and that election to the Board of the apex body was to be held on April 11, 1997, the writ petition filed by the appellants, therefore becomes infructuous and it would be futile to issue any writ at this stage. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 699 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ered for appointment. The result would be that persons lesser in merit would get preference in the matter of appointment merely on the ground of equity and compassion. It is therefore not safe to bend the arms of law only for adjusting equity. We, therefore, find that the reasoning given by the tribunal that sympathy demands the absorption of the respondent in the service of the Corporation suffers from error of law. 6. For the foregoing reasons the award dated June 15, 1989 and the judgment of the High Court dated October 9, 1989 are set aside. The appeal is allowed, but there shall be no order as to costs. 7. Before we part with this judgment, we would like to observe that, counsel for the Corporation has stated that in the event this appeal is allowed, the Corporation shall not recover any salary paid to the respondent for rendering services in pursuance of the award of the tribunal. We order accordingly. 8. In view of the above, S.L.P. (C) No. 2317/ 1991 stands dismissed.
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1997 (7) TMI 698 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e course of employment, the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death. In the present case, the accident has occurred on 3.2.1992, before the introduction of amendment of Section 140(2) by Central Act 54 of 1994 and as such the claimants are entitled to a compensation of Rs. 25,000 in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. On this ground, this Court has to accept the fair plea put forward by the learned Counsel for the respondents in this appeal and hold that the claimants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 25,000 alone and the respondents are liable to pay the same to the claimants. 34. Therefore, this appeal is allowed in firmed. Parties will bear their own costs part awarding a compensation of Rs. 25,000 throughout, to the claimants recoverable from the respondents. In other respects, the judgment Appeal partly allowed. and decree of the Tribunal below are confirmed. Parties will bear their own costs throughout.
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1997 (7) TMI 697 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... allotment. It appears to us that the first licence had not been given due consideration by the Committee. The appeal of DDA against this party has also therefore to be dismissed. 19. Considering the whole aspect of the matter the appeals of the Delhi Development Authority in the case of M/s. Vijay Steel Products SLP (C) No. 9028/95, Kimat Baldev Chhiber SLP (C) No. 9123/95 and M/s. Chawla Sons (Regd.) 9098/95 are dismissed and affirming the orders of the High Court and in the cases of M/s. Ambitious Enterprises SLP (C) 8351/95, M/s. Chopra Dying Industries SLP (C) No. 10819/95, M/s. Basant Parkash Electric & Co. SLP (C) No. 9031/95, Raj Brothers SLP (C) No. 9567/95, R. K. Chandrabhan Multani SLP (C) NO. 18870/95, Joytosma Export SLP (C) 9370/95, M/s. Dolly Toys international SLP (C) No. 9369/95 and Satish Chander SLP (C) No. 10058/95 the appeals are allowed, the orders of the High Court are set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 696 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f time between the expiry of the time provided under the old Act and the commencement of the amending Act. The legislature has given to s. 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, only a limited retrospective operation i.e., upto 1st April, 1956, only. That provision must be read subject to the rule that in the absence of an express provision or clear implication, the legislature does not intend to attribute to the amending provision a greater retrospectively that is expressly mentioned, nor to authorise the ITO to commence proceedings which before the new Act come into force had by the expiry of the period provided, become barred. The above view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in J. P. Jani, ITO & Anr. vs. Induprased Devshanker Bhatt 1969 72 ITR 595(SC) 5. We, therefore, answer the first question in the negative against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. In the facts of the present case the second question is irrelevant and, therefore, we decline to answer the same.
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1997 (7) TMI 695 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... the Customs, Excise & Gold Control (Appellate) Tribunal. In our opinion, there is no merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 694 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dav, appellant, for offence under Section 302 read with Section 109, I.P.C. It is undisputed that no charge was framed against the appellant with the aid of Section 109, I.P.C. This Court's view above-stated is that Section 109, I.P.C. is a distinct offence. The afore-extracted statement of law is clear on the point. The appellant having faced trial for being a member of an unlawful assembly which achieved the common object of killing the deceased, could in no event be substituted convicted for offence under Section 302, I.P.C. with the aid of Section 109, I.P.C. There was obviously thus not only a legal flaw but also a great prejudice to the appellant in projecting his defence. He on such error committed by the High Court, has rightly earned his acquittal. There is no cross-appeal by the State for restoration of the status quo ante. 3. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is allowed. The convictions and sentences of the appellant are set aside and he is set at liberty.
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1997 (7) TMI 693 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... irement of the appellant for the remaining life, the amount of compensation should be adequate to provide for the same according to the current money value. We are satisfied that an amount of Rs. six lakhs in all is the appropriate compensation which should be awarded to the appellant. 6. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The total amount of compensation under all heads inclusive of interest to be paid to the appellant is Rs. six lakhs. After deducting the amount already paid to the appellant, the balance amount be deposited in the Tribunal within a period of four weeks failing which it would carry an interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. 7. The balance amount would be paid to the appellant through the Tribunal which would ensure that the amount in excess of that which is required for clearing any existing liabilities of the appellant would be kept in fixed deposit in a bank. The payment of the amount would be monitored by the Tribunal in this manner. 8. No costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 692 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e became absolute owner on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. On that view, the alienations made by her and challenged in the present litigation, cannot be said to be without authority. We may also point out that the trial court was prepared to accept that factually possession and enjoyment were with Durga Devi, but it held that such possession and enjoyment as one on behalf of the minors in whose favour the mutation was earlier effected on 19.7.54. In view of our conclusion that by mutation the widow has not divested herself of title and possession, the erroneous conclusion reached by the court below have to be set aside. In the result, the appeal are allowed except regarding the properties gifted to Makan Singh under gift deed dated 9.9.70 and the properties dealt with under this gift deed will go to the plaintiffs/reversioner as per the judgment of the trial court confirmed by the appellate court and the High Court. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 691 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent debtor when the decretal amount is deposited in Court but the notice of such deposit is not given to the decree holder. It is imperative that the judgment debtor has to give notice to the decree holder about deposit for the decretal amount. Since motor accident in the instant case, had taken place on May 7, 1983, Order XXI Rule 1 as amended in 1976 is clearly applicable. Even otherwise also, the provision of Order XXI Rule 1 being a procedural law, amended provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable even if the accident had taken prior to 1976 because such amendment of procedural law is retrospective in its operation. 35. In the aforesaid circumstances, no interference is called for against the impugned decision and the appeal is dismissed, without however any order as to cost. Before we part, we intend to palace on record our deep appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Dr. Dhavan who has taken pains in assisting the Court by appearing as an amicus curiae.
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1997 (7) TMI 690 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... irpal, JJ. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (7) TMI 689 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the industry, Section 25-F of the Act is not attracted and the rigour imposed thereunder stands excluded. That was the view taken by this Court. In other cases, that was also followed by another learned Single Judge of the High Court. In that view of the matter, the learned Single Judge has committed grievous error of law in not admitting the writ petition. 6. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The order of the Labour Court stands set aside. No costs. 7. However, Shri K.B. Rohtagi, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents in paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit has stated that all other junior persons whose services were dispensed with along with the respondents came to be appointed subsequently. If that be so, it would be open to the respondents to make representations to the Corporation and the Corporation would consider their representations. If any of the other junior persons were appointed, necessarily the respondents also are entitled for appointment afresh.
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1997 (7) TMI 688 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ors and therefore suit should be permitted continued against the guarantors. It be seen that unless and until the liability of the company is determined the guarantors cannot be held liable. It may be possible to proceed against the guarantors if the decree is obtained against the company which is going to be executed. Therefore, in such a situation when a composite suit has been filed and when leave of the Company Court is required for proceeding against the company then the conclusion is inescapable that the suit cannot proceed unless and until the leave of the Company Court is obtained. 11. This petition is, accordingly allowed leaving the State Bank of India to seek and apply for leave to proceed with the suit. It would also be apt if the State Bank of India also seeks direction from the Company Court to the effect that in case leave is granted then the Courts at Gwalior should be permitted to continue with the litigation in question. There would be no order as to Costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 687 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n the first instance, the remedy under Article 226 or under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and then avail the right under Article 136 of the Constitution by special leave to this Court etc. Thus, in view of the admission made by the respondents in their counter-affidavit that the workmen of the appellant-Association are holding civil posts and are being paid monthly wages and benefits and are considered to be employees, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal stands excluded. It is open to the aggrieved party to approach appropriate authority in accordance with law. In that view, the finding of the Tribunal in the impugned judgment is legal and warrants no interference. It is open to the respondents to avail of such remedy as is available to a regular employee including the right to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal or the High Court or this Court thereafter for redressal of legal injury. 12. The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1997 (7) TMI 686 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... own right de hors the title, necessarily he has to plead and prove the date from which he disclaimed the title and asserted possessory title as against the State and perfected his possession to the knowledge of the real owner viz., the State. Such a plea not having been taken or argued nor any evidence adduced in that regard, the plea of adverse possession against the State cannot be accepted at all at this stage. The question of adverse possession, therefore, does not arise and examining whether he has been in possession for 30 years or 12 years will not be of any relevance in this case. In that view of the matter, we find no force in the said contention. 5. The plea of adverse possession is not proved. In view of the concurrent finding after elaborate consideration of the law laid down by this Court on the factual aspects, in our opinion, no substantive question of law arises warranting interference with the impugned decision. 6. The Civil Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1997 (7) TMI 685 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nder section 202 Cr.P.C. after police investigation. As the complainant had already been examined under section 200 Cr.P.C., in my view, it was not permissible for the J.M.F.C., Nasik, to again examine him under section 202 Cr.P.C. Such a view is also in tune with common sense. After all, it makes no sense that the same person should be examined again. Regretfully, the order summoning the petitioner was only passed on 25-6-1990, after the complainant had been examined for a second time under section 202 Cr.P.C. on that very day. This being the position, the order dated 25-6-1990, passed by the J.M.F.C., Nasik, summoning the petitioner for various offences is clearly unsustainable in law and has to be quashed. 6. In the result, this petition is allowed. The order dated 25-6-1990 passed by the J.M.F.C., Nasik in Criminal Case No. 258 of 1989, summoning the petitioner for offences under section 452, 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. is quashed. Rule is made absolute. 7. Petition allowed.
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1997 (7) TMI 684 - COMPANY LAW BOARD NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... in this instant petition is valid. This is a substantive matter going to the root of entitlement to file the petition under Section 397/398. This requirement of Section 399(1) is not a procedural matter at all. It is a qualification prescribed for moving a petition under Section 397/398 and as such it is a substantive requirement which has to be satisfied before a petition is considered on the merits. Therefore, we are unable to agree with counsel for the petitioners that the requirement of Section 399 is a procedural matter and can be condoned. 17. In view of our finding that the schedule containing the signatures of the shareholders purported to have given their consent in writing does not meet the requirement of Section 399(3), the petitioners by themselves do not qualify under Section 399(1) for filing this petition, under Section 398/399 and as such we dismiss this petition, without adverting ourselves to the other preliminary objection, as also the merits of the case.
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1997 (7) TMI 683 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... personal asset to the partnership firm represents a real attempt to contribute to the share capital of the partnership firm for the purpose of carrying on the partnership business or is nothing but a device or ruse to convert the personal asset into money substantially for the benefit of the assessee while evading tax on a capital gain. 4. There is no finding by the Tribunal that transferring the property towards the capital was a device or a ruse. In view of the above authority, it must be held that making over the property to the firm by the assessee as his contribution towards its capital cannot fall within the terms of s. 48 and that such a case must be regarded as falling outside the scope of capital gain tax altogether. We, therefore, hold that though the transfer of the property by the assessee towards capital of the firm amounts to transfer but on the facts and circumstances of the case, that cannot be subjected to capital tax. The reference is answered accordingly.
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