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Showing 1 to 20 of 382 Records
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1998 (1) TMI 537 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or other association of individuals; and (b) 'director', in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm." 4. A bare reading of the provision mandates that some facts must come on the record in order to figure as to who should answer the charge ultimately. Necessarily, pre-charge evidence assumes importance. The complainant will have to put his side of the case as given out in the complaint and the persons summoned would have to put on the record all what is material to extricate themselves out. In any case, the crucial time would be when framing charge whereat a decision in that respect would be required to be made by the court. Presently, it appears to us premature to be resolving the conflict and the ratio deduced thereby, may turn out to be obiter Therefore, we think that we need not resolve such conflict at present and leave it to the court concerned to pass appropriate orders at the time of framing of charge. In this manner, we dispose of these appeals.
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1998 (1) TMI 536 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... held the decision of the District Forum based on Section 230 of the Contract Act and, therefore, found it unnecessary to consider the aspect of limitation. The National Forum, as aforesaid, took the contrary view on the applicability of Section 230 of the Contract Act on the mistaken basis referred to above as also by reliance on the third clause of the presumptions to the contrary in Section 230, that is to say that an agent is bound by a contract entered into by his principal who, though disclosed, cannot be sued. That the principal here is "some company in Taiwan situated far outside the jurisdiction of the consumer courts in India" does not mean that it could be inferred, for it had not been so found by the District or State Commissions, that it could not be sued. 6. The judgment and order of the National Commission is erroneous. It must be set aside and the order of the State Commission restored. 7. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 535 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... least of the required value of ₹ 20 lakhs installed and used for such process, it cannot be an industry and will not amount to an industrial undertaking as required under section 80HHA. The assessee has not produced any evidence to show that he has purchased or installed any machinery and there is no evidence on record. As per the provisions of the Excise Act referred to supra, the process of tapping and vending of toddy trees will be done by obtaining the lease and the required licence from the Government and no manufacturing process is involved in extracting toddy and vending. In view of the above circumstances, the activity of tapping and vending of toddy will not amount to an industrial operation and is not an industrial undertaking. The establishment of the lessee is not an industrial undertaking or the assessee is not entitled for exemption under section 80HHA. Accordingly, question Nos. 2 and 3 are also answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue.
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1998 (1) TMI 534 - ITAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ed silica crucibles are captively used for the manufacture of synthetic gem, and not consumed in the manufacture of synthetic gem, inasmuch as it did not become a part and parcel whether separable or not and it was captively used only as refractory goods, which could withstand high industrial temperature, which was necessary for such process of manufacture. What is further revealed is that the Company had not directly passed on silica crucibles, as imported, to the customers or buyers. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the question of passing on the incidence of duty paid on silica crucibles did not at all arise." In view of the fact that the issue is covered by various decisions and even by Madras High Court's decision which has been specifically relied upon by the authorities below, we set aside the impugned order and allow the Appeal with consequential relief to the appellant. 5. Since Appeal has been disposed of, Stay Petition also gets disposed of.
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1998 (1) TMI 533 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... investigation into such an offence the Court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) Cr. P.C., but nothing therein deters the Court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the F.I.R. (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down tin section 340 Cr. P.C. The judgment of this Court in Gopal Krishna Menon and Anr. v. D. Raja Reddy, 1983 3SCR836 , on which the High Court relied, has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case for there cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the offence of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the Civil Court and hence it was held that the Court could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Section 195 Cr. P.C. 3. For the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order.
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1998 (1) TMI 532 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ii) to suggest that the purpose for which the expenditure is made should fructify into any benefit by way of return in the shape of income. The plain natural construction of the language of section 57(iii) irresistibly leads to the conclusion that to bring a case within the section, it is not necessary that any income should in fact have been earned as a result of the expenditure." Therefore, the first question has to be answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee. 6. As regards the second question, it raises purely factual controversy inasmuch as the dispute is about the extent of interest allowable as an expenditure. Therefore, the controversy raised in the second question is purely a factual controversy and no question of law arises. In the result the question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the revenue and question No. 2 is left unanswered as it is not a question of law. Parties will, however, bear their own costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 531 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... within the time extended. It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioners misused the export permits and the quantity of liquor permitted to be exported did not reach the destinations and the excise duty was not paid in the importing Slates. On the other hand, it is admitted that by the time the respondents sought invoking bank guarantees the petitioners furnished excise verification reports issued by the competent authorities of the importing States. No short consignment is attributed in any case. 6. In the light of the above facts and in view of our conclusion that the provision in Rule 12-A prescribing time limit of 21 days for production of excise verification certificates is merely directory, we have no option but to hold that the impugned action of the respondents to invoke the bank guarantees furnished by the petitioners is totally unsustainable and liable to be quashed. It is, accordingly, quashed. 7. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed. No costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 530 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ernor under Article 309 of the Constitution. The amendment in the General Recruitment Rules would not have the effect of displacing or altering the Rules made under Section 39 of the Fire Force Act, 1964 as the Act of the Legislature would have precedence over any Rule made by the Executive under the Proviso to Article 309. 15. As pointed out earlier, fire service was created and established under Fire Force Act, 1964 made by the State Legislature which gave rule-making power to the State Government. Instead of amending the General Recruitment Rules, the Government could well have exercised its power under Section 39 of the Fire Force Act, 1964 and amended the Rules specially made for the fire services. The Government, however, in its wisdom, did not do it obviously because it n ever intended to touch the fire services specially created by the State Legislature. 16. In view of the above, the appeals have no merits and the same are dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 529 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ry of the said time schedule. But such a concession from the respondent may not help the Directorate because of the statutory limitation contained in Section 41 of FERA. Since the period fixed for return of the seized documents would have expired for no lapse on the part of the officials of the Directorate, we are of the considered opinion that public interest should not suffer by non utilization of the seized documents for interrogating the respondent. We therefore extend the said period for a further period of six months commencing from 4-1-1998. We make it clear that the Directorates shall abide b y this extended time and no further extension shall be made by them except with the leave of this Court. Subject to the aforesaid to the aforesaid observations we allow the appeal filed by the Directorate and dismiss the appeal filed by the respondent. We set aside the order of the learned single judge of the High Court and restore the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
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1998 (1) TMI 528 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1 Moreover, supposing it is possible to accept this submission, would be possible for this Court to sit in appeal over the view taken by the learned Arbitrator? I think, it would amount to exceeding the jurisdiction in such matters to set aside an award for two views are possible and this court favours the view contrary to the view taken by the learned Arbitrator. High Court has no jurisdiction to set aside an award by substituting its own view in place of the arbitrator's view as if it was dealing with an appeal (See B.V. Radha Krishan Vs. Sponge Iron India Ltd., (1994) 4 SCC 639). 11. For the above said reasons, I feel that there is no force in the objections filed by the claimant. Objections vide I.A. No. 8510/93 are rejected accordingly. 12. Since objections IA 8510/93 stands dismissed, the award passed by Shri D.M. Spolia dated October 15, 1990 is hereby made rule of the Court. The said award shall form part of the decree. Let a decree sheet be prepared accordingly.
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1998 (1) TMI 527 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... single Judge in writ petitions filed by the SAS accountants had been affirmed in appeal earlier by Division Bench, the second Division Bench could not have dismissed the writ petitions and set aside the judgment and order of the learned single judge. We are not going into the validity or the orders passed by the two Division Benches as SAS Accountants did not come up in appeal in this Court against the order of the Division Bench subsequently made dismissing the writ petitions. We would, however, only like to say the second Division Bench if it was of the opinion that it has to take a different view than that taken by the first Division Bench the matter should as a matter of propriety have been referred to a larger bench. It is certainly a question of self-discipline which court should observe. o p /o p These appeals are, therefore, allowed the impugned judgment of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal is set aside and OAs filed by the respondent are dismissed. o p /o p
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1998 (1) TMI 526 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ve been allowable as deduction. The AO has made the addition on notional basis without considering the agreements on record. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the AO has not justified in making the addition on notional basis and accordingly, the addition of ₹ 1,97,504 on account of excess receipt in the project C.S. Pandit Site at Ambernath is deleted. 19. In view of our finding in paras 6, 7, 8 and 9, wherein we have held that the AO had passed a detailed and well-reasoned order and the computation was merely for giving the details of the income assessed for the entire block period which is not a separate order as projected by the assessee’s counsel, the appeal No. 50/Mum/1997 need not be decided separately. In fact, all the issues taken up in the said appeal have been discussed in detail in paras 6 to 9 of appeal No. 130/Mum/1997. 20. In the result, the appeal No. 50/Mum/1997 is dismissed whereas the appeal in ITA No. 130 is partly allowed.
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1998 (1) TMI 525 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . Gowda, (1994) 5 SCC 213 (1994 AIR SCW 2721) can help the respondent-Bank to contend that Section 21-A overrides the provision contained in Order 34, Rule 11, CPC. If, therefore, Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 does not come to the aid of Banks vis-a-vis Order 34, Rule 11, CPC, the question whether for the period during the pendency of mortgage suits in Courts, the Courts discretion should continue or whether it should be fettered and if so to what extent and as to what rate of interest and whether there should be any distinction between different kinds of debtors - These are all matters of policy for the legislature and it will be for Parliament to lay down its policies and bring forward such legislation as it may deem fit in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of India. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed and the rate of 6 from date of suit fixed by the trial Court is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.Appeal allowed
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1998 (1) TMI 524 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the sanction was raised in the trial Court. Admittedly, the above point was not raised in the trial Court nor do we find anything on record from which it can be said that the error or irregularity in the sanction (even if we assume that the finding of the High Court in this regard is correct) did occasion any failure of justice. In that view of the matter it must be said that the High Court was not at all justified in acquitting the respondent on the ground that there was no valid sanction to prosecute him. Since on facts, the concurrent findings of the Courts below are based on proper appreciation of evidence and supported by cogent reasons the judgment of the High Court has got to be reversed. 3. Resultantly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and restore the conviction and sentence recorded against the respondent by the trial Court. The trial Court will now take appropriate steps to incarcerate the respondent to serve out the sentence imposed by it.
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1998 (1) TMI 523 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ether ignoring the time required for formation of the lay out, the period for which the money would be locked up in the investment and the waiting period as also for the reduced price for land when lumpsum payment is made. Bearing in mind these aspects we are of the view that the High Court should have reduced the price arrived at by the Reference Court at ₹ 100/- per sq. yard by atleast 40 per cent. In the circumstances of the case, we hold that the market value fixed at ₹ 100/- sq. yard relying upon Exb. B- 30 , the sale deed, to be correct. However, we reduce the compensation payable to ₹ 60/- per sq. yard computing the whole of the land under acquisition in the two cases on the aforesaid basis. The respondents are entitled to the statutory benefits as awarded by the courts below. The award made by the Reference Court as modified by the High court shall stand further modified as indicated by us in the course of the Order. The appeals are allowed in part.
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1998 (1) TMI 522 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the petitioner. As the parties are present before this Court, it is directed that the petitioner shall appear before the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner on March 23, 1998. On his appearance before the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, the said Commissioner shall give proper opportunity to the petitioner to submit his case and if the Commissioner is of the opinion that the documents are required, then he may give notice to the petitioner to produce the documents. It is made clear that a fresh enquiry is required to be made in the matter and any finding recorded earlier would not be used by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner against the present petitioner. Till March 23, 1998, the respondents are restrained from recovering the amount from the petitioner establishment. The petitioner shall be free to move an application before the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, who shall be free to pass orders regarding the recoveries. 9. The petition is allowed. No costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 521 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he basis of the notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the LA Act. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Parishad that the proceedings for acquisition were initiated on the basis of notifications published under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam and notifications were not issued under Section 4(1) of the LA Act and the compensation had to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the LA Act as modified by Section 55 read with the Schedule to the Adhiniyam and that under the said provisions solatium was payable under Section 23(2) of the LA Act 15 and not 30 . 46. Since in view of the construction placed by us on the provisions of Section 55 of the Adhiniyam there is no difference in the amount of compensation payable under the provisions of the LA Act as applicable to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Adhiniyam and the compensation payable for acquisition of land under the LA Act, the special leave petitions are dismissed.
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1998 (1) TMI 520 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... xplanation for the delay of 315 days which has taken place in filing this Petition. Hence the Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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1998 (1) TMI 519 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
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... ... ..... n India is not taxable in the hands of the applicant . . .” Since the applicant’s authorised representative has himself brought this mistake to the notice of the Authority requesting for rectification thereon and the concerned Commissioner of Income-tax has no objection, the aforesaid error which is found to be apparent from the record is, therefore, rectified and the ruling to question No. 2 is amended as under (2) Whether such advertising revenues remitted out of India by the agent(s) of the applicant is subject to deduction of tax at source under section 195 or any other provision of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and, if so, what would be the amount on which the tax would be deducted at source ? No. The advertising revenues received by the applicant in India are not taxable in the hands of the applicant in view of article 7 read with article 5 of the DTAA. There is, therefore, no obligation to deduct tax at source from the remittances made to the applicant by BCL.
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1998 (1) TMI 518 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot justified in allowing the full expenditure of ₹ 9,31,920 as claimed by the assessee, especially in the absence of good reasons therefor. Therefore, we are of the view that the order of the Appellate Tribunal to the extent it allowed the entire expenditure claimed by the assessee in the absence of any supportive material, is not sustainable. As already pointed out, in the absence of cogent evidence, it was the duty of the Assessing Officer to assess the expenditure by best judgment assessment and the case deserves to be remitted to the Appellate Tribunal. In the result, both the questions-questions Nos. 1 and 2-are answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and the case is remitted to the Appellate Tribunal to assess the expenditure claimed by the assessee by best judgment assessment. The Appellate Tribunal, if deemed proper, may remand the case to the assessing authority to assess the expenditure by best judgment assessment.
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