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Showing 1 to 20 of 349 Records
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1998 (10) TMI 555 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er daughter is living in NOIDA which is on the outskirts of Delhi and it would be convenient for that daughter to stay with the mother frequently. (5) Landlord is getting old and developed orthopaedic problems and hence she feels that living in the ground floor is more advisable. (6) The flat in which she lives now at Calcutta is on the third floor whereas the tenanted premises are on the ground floor. 17. Rent Controller approved the claim of the landlord as bona fide after taking into account the aforesaid broad aspects. It cannot be said that the Rent Controller had taken into account irrelevant factors in reaching the conclusion. Hence the High Court has improperly exercised its revisional jurisdiction in upsetting the findings of the Rent Controller. 18. In the result, we set aside the impugned order and restore the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller and direct the respondent-tenant to vacate from the premises on or before the expiry of three months from today.
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1998 (10) TMI 554 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erly instructed on facts and law could reasonably certain the belief, the conclusion would be inescapable that the Income Tax Officer could not have reason to believe that any part of the income of the assessee had escaped assessment and such escapement was by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts and the notice issued by him would be liable to be struck down as invalid." The same principle is reiterated in the decision reported in Dr. Partap Singh and another v. Director of Enforcement, 1986CriLJ824 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and others. 11. If this is the meaning which we have to apply for the expression 'reason to believe' I believe that no person who was properly instructed on facts would come to such a conclusion. First respondent has acted irrationally in issuing the notice. Consequently, the same is quashed. The Revision Petition is allowed. No costs. CMP No.4669 of 1998 is closed.
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1998 (10) TMI 553 - CEGAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... notice was issued to both units by the Assistant Collector on the same issue and of the facts which had been alleged. Subsequent notice had also been issued by the Assistant Collector to both the units on 31.12.1990 on the same facts, therefore, the department being aware of all these facts and also about the registration of the units, therefore, the department cannot say that there was suppression of facts and the department was not aware of the details requiring invokation of larger period. In a similar situation, in the case of Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd., subsequent show cause notice issued invoking the larger period was held to be time barred and therefore, applying the same ratio, we have to clearly hold that the demands are not sustainable. In that view of the matter, for the reasons given on the three points, the impugned order is not sustainable and the appeals are required to be allowed and we ordered accordingly. (Pronounced in the open court on 20.10.1998).
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1998 (10) TMI 552 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... or making a reference under s. 256(1) of the IT Act for the above purpose. In view thereof, we direct that the Tribunal should first dispose of the application under r. 29 on merits and thereafter proceed to dispose of the appeal on merits. The order dt. 3rd Jan., 1997, is, therefore, set aside and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal for disposal on merit in accordance with law. The order of the High Court is set aside as above and the appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1998 (10) TMI 551 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the notification. Considering the object of the notification and the intention of the State Government in granting exemption from payment of sales tax and applying the correct principles of interpretation in such cases, we hold that the word 'sweetmeat' and the words "commodities of like nature" as used in the Notification dated 27.7.91 did not include within their sweep toffees manufactured by industrial units as contemplated by the notification and the Joint Director of Industries, the Tribunal and the High Court were working in taking a contrary view. We, therefore, allow both these appeals, set aside the judgments and orders passed by the High court, and direct the concerned authorities and the State of U.P. to grant the required eligibility certificate and to extend the benefit of sales tax exemption to the extent lawfully available to them under the notification. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
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1998 (10) TMI 550 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... avit it cannot be decided whether there is an alleged debt and whether the company is unable to pay its debt. The court is, therefore, of the view that the disputed questions raised in the present petition can only be decided on the basis of oral and documentary evidence in a regular trial before the competent court. 12. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the court is of the view that the present winding up petition ought not to be admitted and advertised. However, it is made clear that if any of the parties decide that the dispute be adjudicated by the competent civil court or before any appropriate forum, any observation made in this order by this court shall not affect the merits of the suit or the proceedings initiated and the same shall be tried irrespective of any observation made on merits in this order. 13. With these observations, this petition is dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this petition.
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1998 (10) TMI 549 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ers is that they had acquired the shares without knowledge of want of authority, if any, on the part of the share broker. It is an admitted position that the petitioners themselves have not acquired the shares from the share broker in his normal course of business but obtained the shares by way of pledge. Thus, the status of the share broker vis-a-vis the shares becomes very relevant for us to decide on the rectification. In the absence of the broker before us, it is not possible to decide the same unilaterally. It is on record that the registered holders of the shares have already filed certain civil suits in regard to the arrangement with the share broker in which the subject shares have also been impugned. Thus, the petition suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties to determine essential question of facts, without which the prayer of the petitioners cannot be considered. Under these circumstances we dismiss these two petitions. 17. There will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (10) TMI 548 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ne fails to understand why, if really the plaintiff offered to purchase the property for more than ₹ 70,000/-, the defendants would sell the property to the 7th defendant for ₹ 43,200/-only. This circumstance itself renders the alleged agreement set up by the plaintiff improbable. 17. In the result, both the appeals are allowed and the judgment and the decrees of the lower Court are set aside. OS No.69 of 1989 is dismissed. The plaintiff in the said suit will be at liberty to withdraw the amount, if any, deposited by him pursuant to the decree of the lower Court. So far as OS No.87 of 1991 is concerned, there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff in the said suit for possession of the vacant site only, and for profits, past and future, which shall be determined on a separate application. The defendant in the said suit will be at liberty to remove the superstructures raised by him in the suit site. 18. There will be no order as to costs in the above appeals.
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1998 (10) TMI 547 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ovides that the disputes shall be resolved by arbitration and arbitration will be held at Frankfurt/Main and not in India. The German Court have the exclusive and competent jurisdiction in respect of all matters/disputes/differences between the parties. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, this is not an "international commercial arbitration" to which Part I will apply. As such it is not governed by this Act. This follows that Section 9 is not applicable in this case. 26. This application under Section 9 of the Act, Therefore, is not maintainable, is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed. In view of this position, it is not necessary to go into the other points raised. 27. LAs. No.8138/97 and 8138-A/97 of the respondents are accordingly allowed and OMP No. 103/97 of the applicants is dismissed with costs. Costs assessed at ₹ 20,000/-. 28. Interim order dated June 6, 1997 stands vacated. I.As. No.712/98 & 1377/98 also stand disposed of.
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1998 (10) TMI 546 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rotect a weaker section of the community with a view to ultimately protecting the interest of the community in general by creating equality of bargaining power. Although the section is primarily intended for the protection of tenants only, that protection is based on public policy. The respondent could not have waived the benefit of the provision." Therefore, in my opinion, the conclusion drawn by the Court below that the agreement dated 11th May, 1975 was against public policy and would have the effect of defeating the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, was right. It has been rightly held that it is hit by section 23 of the Contract Act and void and the appellants cannot claim possession of the suit premises on that basis. The conclusions drawn by both the courts below are right. 12. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. Cross objections filed by respondents also dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 13. Appeal dismissed.
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1998 (10) TMI 545 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... im arbitration came to an end after the expiry of period of 90 days from the date of intimation of the final bill being ready for payment and thus he was deprived of a very valuable right to claim the amount which was due to him from the respondent. 10. A perusal of the impugned award reveals that the claims of the petitioner herein were defeated simply on the ground that the invocation of the arbitration clause was barred by time. Consequently the arbitrator did not decide the claims on merit. 11. In the circumstances stated above the petitioner are entitled to succeed. The objections are hereby allowed. The award dated January 7, 1994 is hereby set aside. The arbitrator is hereby directed to decide the claims of the petitioner on merits. In case the arbitrator who rendered the impugned award is not available in that eventuality a new arbitrator would be appointed by the authorities to go into the claims of the petitioner and to render the award within the statutory period.
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1998 (10) TMI 544 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... from today. 38. The defendants are further directed to pay future maintenance, month by month, at the rate of ₹ 40,000/- per month, on or before the 5th day of every English calendar month. 39. The defendants would also pay and deposit the school fees and other charges in connection with the studies of plaintiff No.2 straightaway with the school wherever she might be studying. 40. The defendants are further directed to provide a residence to the plaintiffs as agreed upon in the family settlement dated November 4, 1994 (vide clause 4), within two months from today. 41. Prayers mentioned at (e) & (f) of para 5 of the application are rejected at this stage as the same do not arise out of the settlement. 42. Prayers (g) and (h) have already been allowed vide order dated December 15, 1997. 43. Prayer (i) is also declined at this stage inasmuch as nothing has been placed on record to show the medical expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in connection with their treatment.
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1998 (10) TMI 543 - ITAT JABALPUR BENCH
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... ... ..... B and not satisfied with the assessee’s explanation levied penalty. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the orders of the Assessing Officer. On second appeal HELD As the return was submitted on 31-8-1990 and the audit was got completed only on 25-10-1990 it was reasonable cause for the assessee’s failure to furnish the audit report along with the return. The assessee ought to have filed the audit report voluntarily after getting the accounts audited. But his advocate to whom the report was handed over, omitted to file the report with the Assessing Officer as admitted by him. This categorical admission on the part of the assessee’s counsel remained uncontroverted. It is a settled legal position that for default on the part of the counsel, the assessee cannot be penalised. The assessee was, thus, prevented by reasonable cause in not furnishing the audit report before the specified date. The penalty levied under section 271B was, therefore, cancelled.
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1998 (10) TMI 542 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The Allahabad High Court which adopted the contrary view prior to the introduction of the Amendment in 1929 to Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, had occasion to consider a similar contention regarding one Kabuliat executed after such amendment. In Gaon Sabha vs. Jagannath Singh (1984 All. L.J. 518) the High Court following the ratio of Asa. Ram vs. Ram Kali (AIR 1958 SC 183) has held that there was no violation of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. When the defendant in this case did not dispute in the written statement the fact that the lease was validly made it is not open to him to raise a contention later, viz the instrument was not executed by both lessor and lessee and consequently the lease is void. The High Court, has therefore, rightly confirmed the finding of the courts below that the decree for eviction on the ground under Section 11(1)(e) of the Bihar Act is not liable to be interfered with. Accordingly we dismiss this Special Leave Petition.
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1998 (10) TMI 541 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Two more cases under the Code of Civil Procedure were also cited. One is (A.I.R. 1981 Del. 25) and another of the very Court (A.I.R. 1985 Del. 65). In both the matters it was found that the person who either filed a suit or sought leave to defend had no authority to do so. 22. As stated above, this would be a matter of proof with regard to the submission that absence of authority be equated with absence of sanction required under the statute. The submission is dealt with for the purpose of record only. Obviously, in absence of any statutory provision of that nature in the said Act, the contention cannot be permitted to be raised to that level. 23. In my opinion, therefore, the order of the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained. The petition is therefore allowed. Order of the trial Court is set aside. The complaint is restored at the stage where it was for being dealt with on its own merits and in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute accordingly. 24. Petition allowed.
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1998 (10) TMI 540 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s at India were two separate businesses not connected with each other. This is a fallacy. In B. R. Ltd. v. V. P. Gupta, CIT 1978 113 ITR 647, the Supreme Court has held that the test for deciding whether the business is one or two is common management and common control of the business. A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in SnamProgetti S. P. A. v. Addl. CIT 1981 132 ITR 70. The business activity carried on by the assessee at Kuwait and in India was the same, i.e., construction business. The management and control of the business was common. It is not the case of the Department that the expenditure is not referable to section 37 of the Act. The Tribunal was, therefore right in forming an opinion that the findings recorded by the Tribunal were those of fact and did not raise any question of law. The questions suggested by the Department do not arise as questions of law from the order of the Tribunal. The petition is, therefore, rejected.
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1998 (10) TMI 539 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... estion are owned and/or possessed by Chauhan and/or the names in which they may have been acquired are fictitious or fraudulent or merely cloaks can be decided after parties have led evidence. The Court has always the power of lifting the corporate veil or mere cloaks where device is employed and the properties have been acquired fictitiously in others names for the purpose of committing illegalities or for defrauding others so as to enable it to pass appropriate orders to do justice between the parties concerned. (See DDA Vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., . 47. In view of this discussion, the objection petition of respondents being EA No. 206/98 has no merit and the same is hereby dismissed and interim orders dated February 17, 1998 (in EA No. 78/98) and February 19, 1998 (in EA No. 80/98)are hereby confirmed. 48. EAs No. 78/98, 80/98 and 206/98 stand disposed of accordingly. This case may now be listed before the appropriate Bench for directions on 16th October, 1998.
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1998 (10) TMI 538 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... d by virtue of a restrictive covenant or in lieu of the loss of a potential source of income, it has to be regarded only as a capital receipt, as held by the jurisdictional High Court in the case of R.N. Agrawala (supra) and the two decisions of the Tribunal cited in support of his plea by the learned counsel for the assessee. We may also mention that the CIT(Appeals) has quoted the relevant portion of the decision of the Hon’ble Sind High Court in the case of CIT v. Mills Store Co. (1941) 9 ITR 642, which reads as follows - "A restrictive covenant, whereby a person undertakes for consideration to abstain from doing a particular act or from following a particular course of conduct, is something quite outside an ordinary contract of employment and the word ‘salary’ cannot be held to include the consideration of such a contract." 8. We are entirely in agreement with the view taken by the CIT(Appeals). We uphold his order. 9. The appeal is dismissed.
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1998 (10) TMI 537 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as a parent High Court. It does not exclude Judges who have occupied the office of a Judge or Chief Justice of that High Court on transfer. 6. "Strong cogent reasons" do not have to be recorded as justification for a departure from the order of seniority, in respect of each senior Judge who has been passed over. What has to be recorded is the positive reason for the recommendation. 7. The views of the Judges consulted should be in writing and should be conveyed to the Government of India by the Chief Justice of India along with his views to the extent set out in the body of this opinion. 8. The Chief Justice of India is obliged to comply with the norms and the requirement of the consultation process, as aforestated, in making his recommendations to the Government of India. 9. Recommendations made by the Chief Justice of India without complying with the norms and requirements of the consultation process, as aforestated, are not binding upon the Government of India.
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1998 (10) TMI 536 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he matter, we are of the opinion that the first respondent be given some reasonable time to vacate the premises and which in this case wed consider will be a period upto 30th of June, 1999 subject to the filing of usual undertaking within four weeks from today. In the event such an undertaking is not filed before this Court, it would be open to the appellant to seek for immediate eviction in addition to the condition that he shall vacate the premises and deliver the same on or before 30th of June, 1999. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5040 OF 1998 ARISING OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 4557 OF 1998. In view of the decision rendered by us in Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 6836 of 1996, the view taken by the High Court has got to be upheld and this appeal deserves to be dismissed. However, the appellant is granted time to vacate the premises on or before 30th of June, 1999 upon his furnishing the usual undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today.
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