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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 479 Records
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1998 (11) TMI 702 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ble for Modvat. 3. Learned DR opposed the prayer stating that the item was not in the nature of inputs but in the nature of capital goods and therefore would not be allowed the benefit of Modvat under Rule 57A. It is a refractory item covered by capital goods provision but the benefit thereof also could not be given unless all the conditions including that of declaration in respect of income tax was fully satisfied. 4. I have considered the above submissions. I observe that prima facie what is important is to see whether the item is eligible for Modvat and whether the benefit was available under Rule 57A or 57Q was secondary. If an item was otherwise covered by Modvat Scheme it could be considered w.r.t. the appropriate rules by the concerned authority. 5. In view of the above position I consider that there is lot of force in the learned Counsel s submission and hold that the appellants prayer for waiver of pre-deposit is worthy of consideration. I therefore allow the prayer.
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1998 (11) TMI 701 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... so noticed. When the lathe machines were operated the advocate commissioner noticed that there was no vibration either on the ground floor or on the walls of the main building, though very slight vibration was noticed on the parapet walls of the first floor. 22. Both the fact finding courts found that the above items of damage are only trivial and will not affect the building. But the High Court found that the landlords proved that the tenant caused damage to the demised premises by causing holes and leaving spaces between the shutter and the wall as seen from the Commissioner's report. It was not open to the High Court to substitute the findings of the lower courts with its own findings so easily as that while exercising the limited supervisory jurisdiction. 23. For the aforementioned reasons we are unable to sustain the impugned judgment of the High Court which has manifestly crossed its jurisdiction. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment.
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1998 (11) TMI 700 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lso. The words used are not "gaming house", but "common gaming house". Common gaming house indicates that it is a place intended and used frequently as a common place for the purpose. The existence of such place and gambling conducted there may be public nuisance and the purpose of the Act is to prevent the same and make violations punishable as offence". This decision is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. This learned Public Prosecutor fairly conceded that there is no allegation that the petitioners have committed offence in a common gaming house. Petitioners were found playing cards for profit in a private building in the possession of the first petitioner. That is not an offence coming under sections 7 and 8 of the Act. In the result, Annexures-A1 and A2 in STC No. 2745 of 1995 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I Court, Hosdrug in Crime No. 272 of 1995 of the Hosdrug Police Station are quashed. The Crl. M.C. is accordingly allowed.
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1998 (11) TMI 699 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inant- Company. Therefore, the complainant-Company cannot turn round and say that the evidence of PW1 in respect of Ex.D1 is not binding on them. 14. The lower Court applied the rule of thumb that once the cheque is issued and it is subsequently dishonoured, the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act is made out. This is erroneous. When the complainant itself agreed for the terms of Ex.D1, about which PW1 gave replies in favour of the accused/ appellant it cannot be held that the accused/ appellant is guilty for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. 15. For all the above reasons, no case is made out against the appellant/accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. Hence, the Judgment and sentence of the lower Court are set-aside. The Transfer Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed. 16. Consequent upon the findings in the Transfer Criminal Appeal, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed.
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1998 (11) TMI 698 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to the facts of this case. This is not a case where the High Court/Tribunal found any difficulty in granting an appropriate relief to respondent No. 1 because of some technicality of rules or procedure even though justice demanded it. Moreover, the said observations are no more than an expression of personal view. What is to be noted is Hansaria, J. agreed with what the other two learned Judges held as regards the powers of the High Court/Tribunal to interfere with the order of penalty passed by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi's case has accepted the view mat the High Courts/Tribunals possesses the same power which this Court has under Article 142 of the Constitution for doing complete justice, even in absence of such a provision 9. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court and also that of the Tribunal and dismiss the O.A. filed by respondent No. 1.
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1998 (11) TMI 697 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... arly so as a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that supply of fuel wood to employees is for the purpose connected with the plantation, which is a later decision of the two Judge Bench decision of this Court. Further that rested tea area is a part of tea plantation was not properly projected before this Court as has been rightly contended by Mr. Salve. It is a matter of experience and on reference to authoritative text books if rested tea areas are part of the plantation. We allow the appellant to approach the State government to seek exemption under Sub-section 3 of Section 81 of the Act. For this purpose we grant six weeks time to the appellant to apply to the State Government. the State Government shall take decision on such application in accordance with law explained above. till then the stay granted by this Court by order dated December 6, 1984 shall continue tto operate. With these observation the appeal stands partly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1998 (11) TMI 696 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ard, by way of interim measures, pending inquiry. The same is intended for the protection of the interests of the investors and the securities markets. 29. The impugned orders, in our prima facie view, are fully justified. The petitioners, in the circumstances, are not entitled to interim reliefs claimed in the petition. Ad interim orders passed on November 1, 1998, and continued by an order passed on November 3, 1998, are vacated. 30. At this stage, counsel for the petitioners apply for stay of the present orders, as also for continuation of the aforesaid ad interim orders. Counsel for the respondents strongly opposes the same. 31. Having regard to the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, we permit the petitioners, for a period of four weeks from today, to trade in shares and securities other than BPL, Videocon, Sterlite and Nedungadi Bank Ltd. The petitioners' during the aforesaid period of four weeks will not trade in the aforementioned shares and securities.
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1998 (11) TMI 695 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... adha Rao, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1998 (11) TMI 694 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oard would be that the detention of the petitioner also deserves to be set aside. So far as the factual aspect is concerned, it is clearly averred in ground (g) of the writ petition that the shop owner was released on the opinion of the Advisory Board. This has not been controverted in the two affidavits filed on behalf of the State Government. On the other hand, it is admitted now during the course of argument that the shop owner was released and his detention has been quashed on the opinion of the Advisory Board. 10. Consequently, it is a case of clear violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as one co-accused having identical role was released and his detention was set aside while the detention of the petitioner was maintained. The petition, therefore, succeeds and is hereby allowed. The order of detention against the petitioner dated 11-4-1998 is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be released forthwith unless he is wanted in any other criminal case.
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1998 (11) TMI 693 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that nomination as President of Governing Body of various colleges was recorded. The only observation made reads as follows "The following persons are nominated as the President of the G.B. of the College whose terms have been expired. The persons nominated as below except tick marks are persons interested in the field of education." The underlined portion has been written by hand. The tick-marked cases were those where there is mention that "To be discussed with CM". To a query, learned Additional Government Advocate answered that there is nothing on record to show as to on what basis the Minister concluded that the persons named in the order are persons interested in the field of education". There is no material and/or discussion in the file in that regard. 24. The order dated 21-11-1997 (Annexure 2) by which Rama Chandra was nominated is quashed to the aforesaid extent. The writ application succeeds. No costs. Prakash Chandra Naik, J. 25. I agree.
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1998 (11) TMI 692 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t and in the absence of any affidavit from the bank, it cannot be assumed that all the accommodation provided by the bank to its employees is accommodation which is owned by the bank. It is for the AO to make enquiries and decide as to whether r. 3(b) is not at all attracted having regard to the facts as ascertained by him. 9. While doing so, the AO shall keep in view the observations made in the course of this order. The declaration sought by the petitioner cannot be granted. However, liberty is reserved to the members of the petitioner association to place such facts as are relevant, if and when the AO seeks to treat any part of the value of the accommodation provided to them as a perquisite. It is open to the petitioner association to make a collective representation to the CBDT in this regard. The Board shall consider the same in accordance with law. 10. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs. Consequently, WMP No. 3120 of 1995 is dismissed as unnecessary.
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1998 (11) TMI 691 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... rs, soya flour or meal, yeast, etc. are covered by it. We think that the test laid down by Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Chemical Fibres 1982 ELT 917 is a safer and reliable test that where the evidence of trade usage is not beyond doubt, then a reference to technical literature cannot be precluded. In regard to Niger Seed/Rice Bran extractions, we held that they are animal feed. 136. We must now turn to the questions which have been referred to us. On the basis of the aforesaid reasoning the question has been answered in favour of the assessees in so far as reference in Tetragon case & allied cases are concerned. However, in so far as export of Niger Seed/Rice Bran extractions are concerned, we have held that the goods are animal feed for purpose of classification under heading 21 of the 2nd Schedule of the Customs Tariff (Export). The files should now go to the respective Benches for passing appropriate orders after considering other issues, if any, also.
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1998 (11) TMI 690 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... B. Pattanaik, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1998 (11) TMI 689 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tances of the present case for more than one reason. Firstly, that decision was based on concession of both parties unlike the present case. Secondly, the lease in favor of appellant was granted and renewed during pendency of these proceedings in Courts and there were orders of restrain. Thirdly, renewal deed contains a clause that it is subject to the outcome of the LPA. Fourthly, though the order to maintain status quo was passed in this appeal on 8th December, 1992, lease deed for renewal was executed in 1994 effective from 29th June, 1991. There are no special equities in favor of the appellant which should result in denial of grant of lease in favor of Avtar Singh for unexpired period of about six years despite determination of lease of Avtar Singh being held to be illegal by learned single Judge and also in this appeal. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in these appeals which are, accordingly, dismissed. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
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1998 (11) TMI 688 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r Section 138 is a statutory offence and the petitioners 1 to 3 are being prosecuted for the issue of cheque without there being sufficient funds in the bank and thus the proceedings are totally different and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that Section 28(2) prohibits the continuation of criminal proceedings initiated for dishonour of cheques under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act without the leave of the Court against a person who is seeking to adjudicate as insolvent. 11. Reference has also been made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Real Value Appliances Ltd v. Canara Bank, 1998 3SCR170 . But in our view the same does not really advance the matter any further. As such we need not dilate further in regard thereto. 12. In that view of the matter, we are unable to record our concurrence to the submissions made in support of the petition. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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1998 (11) TMI 687 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent company within the tax net of water-tax and the said notification did not cover only the residential buildings. This point is therefore, answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondent. Point No. 6 20. As a result of the aforesaid finding on the relevant points, we set aside the order of the Division Bench and confirm the order of the learned single Judge and allow the writ petition of the appellant Municipality on the reasoning indicated herein-above. It is held that the impugned levy of water-tax on residential and non-residential buildings of the respondent company was perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. As the levy of the water-tax for the relevant period is found to be well sustained there will remain no question of refunding any amount collected by the appellant A towards the said levy from the respondent. 21. The appeal is accordingly allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, mere will be no order as to costs.x
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1998 (11) TMI 686 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... suo motu proceedings, since, in any event, the lands of the said Trust were exempted from the operation of Section 37 of the said Tenancy Act. 12. In this view of the matter the Executing Court rightly rejected the objections of the respondents and handed over the possession of the Trust lands to the Trust on 1S.6.8S. The District Judge has also dismissed the appeal in a lengthy judgment. The High Court in Revision, in these circumstances, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any factual basis in support of the plea of tenancy raised by the 1st respondent. 13. The appeals are, therefore, allowed and the impugned order of the High Court, insofar as it directs framing of an issue relating to the tenancy of the 1st respondent and directs this issue to be decided by the Tehsildar, is set aside. The direction in the impugned order, directing possession of the Trust properties to be handed over to the 1st respondent, is also set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (11) TMI 685 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e question as to what shall be the period of limitation applicable in the present case may prejudicially affect the consideration of application for amendment on merit inasmuch as the consideration of an application for amendment of written statement at this stage shall also entail consideration whether as a result of such amendment if issue about invalidity is now allowed to be raised, whether such issue shall be within the period of limitation or not. As in the circumstances, on the conclusion which we have reached above the maintainability of petition at the instance of appellant at this stage, is sufficient for deciding this appeal, we leave the matter at that and further refrain from expressing any opinion on the question whether the rectification application shall still be within limitation or not, if amendment of written statement is allowed. As a result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Looking to facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1998 (11) TMI 684 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t from the correspondence relied upon by the learned single Judge of the High Court, the tax messages p exchanged between the parties, referred to above, go to show that the parties were only negotiating and had not arrived at any agreement. There is a vast difference between negotiating a bargain and entering into a binding contract. After negotiation of bargain in the present case, the stage never reached when the negotiations were completed giving rise to a binding contract. The learned single Judge of the High Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in holding that Clause 53 of the Charter Party relating to Arbitration had no existence in the eye of law, because no concluded and binding contract ever came into existence between the parties. The finding recorded by the learned single Judge is based on a proper appreciation of evidence on the record and a correct application of the legal principles. We find no merit in this appeal, p It fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1998 (11) TMI 683 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion 347-E of the Act. 9. That apart, it is undisputed that an adequate alternative remedy by way of appeal under the provisions of the Act was available to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have filed the present suit for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from demolishing and/or sealing the offending portion of the building. Section 41(H) of the Specific Relief Act lays down that an injunction, which is a discretionary equitable relief, cannot be granted when an equally efficacious relief is obtainable in any other usual mode or proceeding except in cases of breach of trust. Thus, the present suit for injection is also barred under Section 41(H) of the Specific Relief Act. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the plaint is rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs may pursue the remedy before the Appellate Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the Act, if advised to do so. plaintiffs shall pay the costs of the defendant.
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