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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 472 Records
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1998 (9) TMI 697 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... professional money lender. I am fortified in this view by the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mrs. K. Sundersanam v. S. Venkatarao, MANU/AP/0186/1963 AIR1963AP442 . In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the plaintiff had adopted money lending business as a profession. In my view, the lower Appellate Court has rightly held that the plaintiff not being a money lender was not required to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders Act. No fault can be found with the said findings recorded by the lower Appellate Court. I, therefore, find no substance in the aforesaid submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant. 5. No other point was urged before me. 6. In this view of the matter, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below. 7. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 8. Appeal dismissed.
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1998 (9) TMI 696 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing the situation so that the High Court can in its inherent powers or revisional powers direct the committing Magistrate to rectify the committal order by issuing process to such left out accused. But we hasten to add that the said procedure need be resorted to only for rectifying or correcting such grave mistakes. For the foregoing reasons we find it difficult to support the observations in Kishun Singh s case that powers of the Session Court under Section 193 of the Code to take cognizance of the offence would include the summoning of the person or persons whose complicity in the commission of the trial can prima facie be gathered from the materials available on record. In the result we set aside the impugned order of the Session Court adding the appellant as an accused in the case. However, we make it clear that we do so without prejudice to the powers of Session Court to add any person in the array of the accused under Section 319 of the Code. The appeal is thus allowed.
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1998 (9) TMI 695 - JAIPUR ITAT
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... ... ..... proviso to s. 22(1) (analogous to s. 139(1) and the return filed under s. 22(3) is also a return filed under s. 22(1) and therefore the unabsorbed business losses should be allowed to be carried forward". The decision of the apex Court is still a good law. Therefore, the ratio of the decision is very much applicable to the facts of the present case. 7.8. The amendment in s. 80 by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, whereby the above words have been replaced by the words "under s. 139(3)" have been effective for and from asst. yr. 1989-90. Therefore, the amendment is also not have any effect on the facts of the case of the assessee because the case of the assessee pertains to asst. yr. 1986-87. In view of the facts and circumstances, we allow the appeal of the assessee and the AO is directed to allow claim of carry forward loss to the succeeding year. 8. In the result, appeals of the Department are dismissed and appeal of the assessee is allowed in part.
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1998 (9) TMI 694 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ges were also found live by him. 5. It was lastly contended by the learned counsel that the accused had raised a specific defence in this case and therefore the evidence of defence witnesses should have been accepted. The defence was that the appellant was taken into custody by the police 15 days before the date of incident and that the complaint in that behalf was made to the Panchayat which had passed a Resolution protesting against the detention of the appellant. This defence was considered by the Designated Court and was found not acceptable. There was no reason for the police to falsely involve the appellant. Moreover, the Designated Court has pointed out that no complaint was made to the police authorities by the Panchayat regarding alleged unlawful detention of the appellant. In our opinion the Designated Court was justified in not accepting the defence raised by the appellant. 6. As we find no substance in any of the contentions raised in this appeal, it is dismissed.
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1998 (9) TMI 693 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r specific performance without trial. 28. In conclusion, we opine to say that it shall not be proper to extend this wide power to grant of injunction where the case admits a disputed term of contract, which fact requires to be established at the trial. 29. Any opinion expressed in this order or in the order impugned is only for the purpose of disposal of the application for injunction and it shall in no way influence while deciding the issued involved in the suit at the trial. The trial Court to decide all questions uninfluenced by these findings, as they are only tentative and based on pleadings and having no evidence regarding the context and circumstances in which those documents relied on were emanated between the parties. 30. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs in this proceeding. In view of the order passed on this appeal, the C.M.P. No. 9036 of 1998 does not survive for consideration and the same is also dismissed.
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1998 (9) TMI 692 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... d therefore, these are not essential inputs for manufacturing the final products/finished products. 2. We have heard both sides. We have recorded the aforesaid plea of the Revenue appellant, just to dismiss the same as having no substance in the justification, made by the Revenue, regarding essential input or non-essential input for the purpose of Modvat credit. In Modvat scheme, once a commodity has been described as inputs’, distinction regarding essentiality or non-essentiality of the input is immaterial. Hence we dismiss the appeal of the Revenue.
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1998 (9) TMI 691 - ITAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... in the same way and performance of the diesel engine and alternator against any failure checked. 10. A very clear answer had been given that the Diesel Generating Set was started at the time of inspection. This indicates that Diesel Generating Set came into existence at the appellants' premises only, it is clear from this that the D. G. Set was set up and the inspection was conducted thereafter. Accordingly, we hold that the D. G. Set was manufactured in the appellants' premises and uphold the order. 11. However, we find that the duty paid components were used in the manufacture of D. G. Sets. It the appellants are entitled to the MODVAT Credit under the law, the same should be extended to them even if the appellants have not followed the requisite procedure envisaged under the MODVAT Rules. The duty quantum is to be re calculated by the Department accordingly, after extending the benefit of MODVAT Credit. The impugned Order is upheld but for the above modification.
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1998 (9) TMI 690 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Honourable the Supreme Court when M/s. Isha Marbles (supra) came to be decided by the Honourable the Supreme Court. In our opinion, so far as this Court is concerned, this Court is bound by the law laid down by the Honourable the Supreme Court and the learned Single Judge as correctly observed that the point is "squarely covered" by the above decision. We, therefore, do not see any merits in the LPA. LPA stands dismissed. No order on Civil Application.
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1998 (9) TMI 689 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... enrolment. This statement has remained unrebutted and has also gone unchallenged in the cross-examination. Even the complainant in his evidence did not depose that the appellant carried on with his taxi business after his enrolment as an advocate. 10. In the face of this material on the record, it is not possible to say that the complainant has established that after the enrolment of the appellant as an Advocate, he was personally engaged in taxi business. The evidence on the record is vague, indefinite and scanty. It does not establish the charge of misconduct against the appellant. The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India, thus, fell in error in holding the appellant guilty of professional misconduct. The charge against the appellant has not been established at all, let alone being established beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India dated 11-4-1998. No costs.
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1998 (9) TMI 688 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o its being maintained as such and not to be treated as just any other public place for being hired at convenience by anyone. The justification sought here that the State would be richer by two lacs of rupees as rental for the day does not convince us a wee bit. That understanding is totally alien to the purpose for which Stadia are built and most of all the present one. 9. Thus, for the afore-reasoning and under standing, we permit just this once, and not ever hereafter, partial use of the Stadium for holding the function confining the user only to the space occupied by the lower and upper galleries, totally isolating the area within the fence above described saving the turfs-natural as well as synthetic. To this extent, the impugned orders of the High Court as also the terms and conditions on which permission has been granted would stand modified. The order of this Court would rule over other orders. 10. The appeal is allowed in this manner and to he extent afore-indicated.
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1998 (9) TMI 687 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... learned single Judge that it is not a situation warranting interference of this Court for issuance of any writ. Incidentally, be it recorded that this Court has not been informed, during the course of hearing, of any time limit for declaration of a new comprehensive policy in the near future, as such we need not detain ourselves in that perspective. 15. In the premises, the order of the learned single Judge thus cannot be sustained and is therefore set aside and quashed. 16. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. 17. After this order has been pronounced in open Court, it has been brought to our notice that there are pending applications with the Government even before the issuance of the Memorandum. On the wake of fresh factual score being brought to our notice at this juncture and to avoid farther litigation we deem it fit and expedient to direct the respondents to dispose off all the pending applications within a period of eight weeks from the date hereof.
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1998 (9) TMI 686 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rced to accept equivalence of certain qualifications and to accept such equivalence for all times to come. 33. In the result, we conclude that there is no force in the contention of the petitioners that the amended qualifications shall not apply to them because they had acquired the equivalent qualifications prior to the amendment of the rules. In, our opinion, the amended rule and the qualifications will apply even to the candidates who have obtained the equivalent qualifications prior to the date of enforcement of amended rule. However, the amended qualifications shall not be applicable to the vacancies which had occurred prior to the date of enforcement of the amended rule and such vacancies shall be filled in in accordance with the qualifications prescribed as on the date of occurrence of vacancies. We, therefore, answer the reference accordingly. The petitions shall now be listed before appropriate Bench for decision in accordance with law in the light of this decision.
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1998 (9) TMI 685 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ach State to do so as early as possible. (4) Until the State Government takes any decision on such recommendations every prisoner must be paid wages for the work done by him at such rates or revised rates as the Government concerned fixes in the light of the observations made above. For this purpose we direct all the State Government of fix the rate of such interim wages within six weeks from today and report to this Court of compliance of this direction. (5) We recommend to the State concerned to make law for setting apart a portion of the wages earned by the prisoners to be paid as compensation to deserving victims of the offence the commission of which entailed the sentence of imprisonment to the prisoner, either directly or through a common fund to be created for this purpose or in any other feasible mode. The appeals and the writ petitions are disposed of in the above terms. registry will despatch a copy of this judgment to the Chief Secretary to every State Government.
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1998 (9) TMI 684 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lusion that the defence is highly improper or fantastic, it can put the defendant upon term before granting leave to defend. 40. Therefore, in the above situation, we feel that the trial Court has rightly and justifiably imposed a conditional direction to the defendant to put in ₹ 5,00,000/- as Bank Guarantee as a condition precedant for grant of leave to defend. Therefore, we are not in favour of granting any interim stay till the disposal of the appeal. Since there are divergent opinion on the points as regards appealability of the conditional order directing the defendant to furnish security and on fulfilling that condition the leave could be granted whether or not would come within the expression 'Judgment' therefore, it is desirable that the matter shall be placed before a larger Bench to resolve the dispute once and for all. Therefore, the Hon'ble Chief Justice is requested to constitute a larger Bench for deciding the above appeal. 41. Appeal allowed
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1998 (9) TMI 683 - COMPANY LAW BOARD NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... fact such a prima facie finding itself could not be proper as held in Colaba Land and Mill Co. Ltd. v. Vasant Investment Corporation Ltd., AIR 1964 Guj 107, cited by counsel for the petitioners. It can be done only on a specific finding given in respect of each allegation. From the averments of the petitioners without primary documents, especially when the respondents have defended each of the allegations it is not possible for us to give any definite conclusion on the allegations of financial irregularities. Since the petitioners have already filed a criminal complaint with the police who have seized the primary documents and other records of the company, we consider it appropriate not to express any opinion about the alleged act of financial irregularities. In the circumstances, we are not in favour of going into the merits of the various irregularities alleged by the petitioners against respondents Nos. 2 to 6. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1998 (9) TMI 682 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Company prays that he may be given two months more time to deposit the amount. Considering that the period of four months has already expired on 28th August, 1998 and the bona fide shown by the Company in expressing its willingness to pay the amount, time of two months as prayed for is granted. In other words, in order dated 28th April, 1998 the period of four months is extended by a further period of two months only. Needless to say if the Company makes a payment, the Criminal Court will consider this fact while disposing off the complaint. Hence the following Order - ORDER (i) Company Application No. 446 of 1998 in Company Petition No. 457 of 1997 is dismissed. (ii) Company Application (Lodg.) No. 621 of 1998 in Company Petition No. 220 of 1997 prayer (a) is allowed in as much as additional time of two months is given from the expiry of the period from order dated 28th April, 1998. Prayer (b) rejected. There shall however be no order as to costs. 12. Ordered accordingly.
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1998 (9) TMI 681 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nsurance amount should be accepted and the other set, which interpreted to deduct, is to be rejected. For all these consideration we have no hesitation to hold that such High Courts were wrong in deducting the amount paid or payable under the life insurance by giving restricted meaning to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act basing mostly on the language of English statutes and not taking into consideration the changed language and intends of the legislature under various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1 "39. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 9th September, 1985 and restore the judgment of the tribunal dated 29 September, 1980 and hold that the amount received by the claimant on the life insurance of the deceased is not deductible from the compensation computed under the Motor Vehicles Act. The concerned respondent shall make the payment accordingly, if not already paid in terms thereof. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. Cost on parties.
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1998 (9) TMI 680 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rovide for break down a machinery and in view of the fact that the applicants herein did not make an attempt whatsoever to take part in the management of the Companies for all these years and further in view of the fact that the accounts maintained by the respondents herein have not been questioned; in our opinion, proper exercise of the jurisdiction would be to direct the appellants to sell their shares in favour of the respondents. However, the value of such share may be fixed as on the date of passing of the judgment keeping in view the fact that the property in question is an immovable property and during course of the pendency of the proceedings the value might have gone up. Such valuation may be made by one of the Chartered Engineers nominated by the Registrar, Original Side of this Court. 102. This application is allowed to the extent mentioned hereinbefore but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. D.B. Dutta, J. 103. I agree.
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1998 (9) TMI 679 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the slight distinction is not material for us in this case. Vide, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Ottapiurakkal Thazath Suppi & ors. vs. Alabi Mashur Koyanna Koya Kunhi Koya (AIR 1917 Madras 448) a Single Judge of the Patna High Court in Nawal Kishore Singh & ors. vs. Rajendra Prasad Singh & Ors. (AIR 1976 Patna 56) which was subsequently approved by a Division Bench of the same High Court. Kapildeo Upadhyay vs. Raghunath Pandey AIR 1978 Patna 212 . We, therefore, disagree with the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order regarding the scope of Rule 2A of Order 39 of the Code. However, we are in agreement with him that in view of the subsequent actions done by the respondent (by removing the obstruction and tendering unconditional apology to the court) it is not necessary to put the respondent in prison. We, therefore, dismiss this special leave petition subject to the clarification made above regarding the legal position.
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1998 (9) TMI 678 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... us remedy but that can never be a ground for maintaining a civil suit. Both the jurisdictions are different and are governed by different principles. Article 226 provides a constitutional remedy. It confers the power of judicial review on High Courts. The finality clause in a statute is not a bar to the exercise of this constitutional power whereas the jurisdiction of a civil court arises from another statute, viz., Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In our view it has always been the law in our country that a constitutional remedy available to a citizen cannot be barred by a provision regarding finality or alike in a statute. In on but it has not been so held in the judgment under appeal. For the aforestated reasons we set aside the impugned judgment and remand the writ petition for fresh decision. The parties shall appear before the learned Single Judge on 22nd September, 1998. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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