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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 455 Records
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1999 (2) TMI 727 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the suit on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. As the learned single Judge was of the view that this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the first place, this Court had no jurisdiction to make any observation on the merit of the suit at all. 16. Having regard to the aforesaid conclusion, we feel that no useful purpose would be served in keeping the appeals pending. We, accordingly, dispose of both the stay applications and the appeals filed by HZL and Gujarat NRE by, i) ' allowing the appeal, filed by HZL and deleting the observation of the learned single Judge; ii) dismissing the appeal, filed by Gujarat NRE, and iii) directing Gujarat NRE to pay costs of its appeal to HZL assessed at Rs. 5,000/-. 17. Let copies of this judgment and order, duly signed by the Assistant Registrar of this Court, be made available to the parties upon their undertaking to apply for and obtain certified copies thereof on payment of usual charges. M.H.S. Ansari, J. 18. I agree.
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1999 (2) TMI 726 - CESTAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... mands raised against the appellants. Likewise the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of BMP Beltings Ltd. v. Union of India as reported in 1990 (50) ELT 10 held that Friction cloth used in manufacture of belts is not capable of being generally marketed and hence they are not 'goods' and not liable to duty. The Tribunal had an occasion to look into some of the judgments that of Punjab High Court rendered in the case of Punjab Rubber and Allied Industries v. CCE as reported in 1983 (12) ELT 53 1982 ECR 487D (P H) as in the case of CCE v. Rubber Co. (P) Ltd. as reported in 1998 (103) ELT 652 and after due consideration held that rubberised cotton fabrics called friction cloth captively consumed has no marketability and not liable to Excise duty. In view of these judgments, we are not inclined to interfere with the Commissioner's order and therefore reject this appeal. The Cross-objection is also disposed of accordingly. (Pronounced and dictated in the open Court).
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1999 (2) TMI 725 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion. It has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case. 12. From the above discussion, it follows that A-1 and A-3 have been rightly convicted under Part-1 of Section 304/34, IPC by the High Court. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, it would meet the ends of justice if we reduce the sentence from seven years to five years and accordingly we do so. 13. So far as A-2 is concerned, he has been convicted by the High Court under Section 326 IPC. Since he is one of the co-owners and possessor of the land and the offence committed by him is causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapon he is protected as he did so in exercise of right of private defence of property under Section 104, IPC, so he cannot be found guilty of offence under Section 326 IPC. A-2 is, therefore, acquitted and is directed to be set free forthwith unless he is required to be incarcerated in any other case. 14. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part.
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1999 (2) TMI 724 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinizing the impugned Judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid stand point, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by re-appreciating the oral evidence. The High Court also committed further error in not examining several items of evidence relied upon by the Additional Sessions Judge, while confirming the conviction of the respondent. In this view of the matter the impugned Judgment of the High Court is wholly unsustainable in law and we, accordingly set aside the same. The conviction and sentence of the respondent as passed by the Magistrate and affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge in appeal is confirmed. This appeal is allowed. Bail bonds furnished stand cancelled. The respondent must surrender to serve the sentence. 6. In view of the order in this appeal, no further order is necessary in SLP (Criminal) No. 1466/94.
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1999 (2) TMI 723 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hem at their expenses. On that basis, public donations were called for. The above appeal, in our view, clinchingly establishes that the mandap, shops, garden, library and Dharmsala or guest house and office rooms etc. were all meant for religious purposes of the Hindu community. There is not a whisper in this appeal of any secular purposes or purposes of other than religious. 30. In our view, the Deputy Commissioner was right in holding that the leasehold land, the temples, the mandap, the library, the guest house or Dharmsala, the office and shops, all of them, formed the endowment. The Deputy Commissioner was, right in rejecting all the contentions of the Society and in appointing non- hereditary trustees under Section 27 of the Endowment Act. 31. For the aforesaid reasons, Civil Appeal No. 2546 of 1992 is allowed and the Civil Appeals Nos. 2547-48 of 1992 are dismissed. The order of the Deputy Commissioner is restored. There will be no order as to costs in all the appeals.
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1999 (2) TMI 722 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ssessing Officer obtained by him subsequent to the assessment order. Whatever information was necessary was already available to the Assessing Officer when the first assessment was made. The order passed by the A.A.C. in another case is not 'information' within the meaning of the Section. Hence, neither Clause (a) nor Clause (b) of the Section would apply in this case. 6. In the circumstances, it is unnecessary for us to consider the question whether a proceeding under Section 147(a) could be converted into a proceeding under Section 147(b) in the course of the proceedings without issuing a fresh notice and initiation of a fresh proceeding. Without deciding that question, we come to the conclusion in this case that the order of the Assessing Officer re-opening the earlier order and passing a fresh assessment order is unsustainable and the view taken by the revenue authorities has been rightly set aside by the High Court. 7. The appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.
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1999 (2) TMI 721 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... barred by limitation since it was a case of provisional sanction. 3. The Trade notice is applicable in the case of the present assessees also and therefore, they are bound by their own undertaking and cannot contend before us that the sanction of the rebate was final and not provisional. We therefore, reject the submission of the assessee that the demand is barred by limitation. The last plea of the appellants is that a show cause notice based on audit objection is without jurisdiction and he relies upon the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Swastik Tin Works reported in 1986 (25) ELT 798 1986 (8) ECR 122 (T) in support of this argument. This plea is also required to be rejected since the demand has been raised on the basis of Notification 108/78 and Trade Notice 140/78 and not merely on the basis of an audit objection and therefore, the decision in the case of Swastik Tin Works is not applicable herein. In the result, we uphold the impugned order and reject the appeal.
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1999 (2) TMI 720 - TAMIL NADU TAXATION SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... on due by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the same had been confirmed by Appellate Tribunal need not be interfered with. 19. It is clear cut specific finding that in respect of a turnover of Rs. 28,615 the assessees were not able to produce either bill of lading or form "H" certificate towards the sale of jaggery effected for export. Even now, there is no material to displace the said finding. So the petitioners are not eligible for the exemption claimed in respect of this turnover of Rs. 28,615 for the sales of jaggery effected. So the petitioners are liable to pay tax, at the rate of 5 per cent including Rs. 28,615 as held by the lower authorities. For the reasons already stated above both the revisions are dismissed in all respects. And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. Issued under my hand, and the seal of this Tribunal on the 2nd day of February, 1999.
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1999 (2) TMI 719 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ake any comment on the character of the lady at this stage. We also have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction to record a finding, that the lady exercised her discretion to have sex with those whom she liked or got money and she willingly submitted herself to most of them who came to her for sex. We refrain from making any further observations in the case as that may affect the investigation or the accused persons but we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion after going through the statements of the victim lady that the High Court certainly exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the F.I.R. and the investigations to be made pursuant to the same so far as respondents are concerned. We, accordingly set aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct the Investigating Agency to proceed with the investigation and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law. These appeals are accordingly allowed.
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1999 (2) TMI 718 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is styled as a letter of subrogation but in the body of the letter it is mentioned thus We hereby assign, transfer and abandon to you all our rights against the railway company/administration or other persons whatsoever, caused or arising by reasons of said damages or loss and grant you full power to take and use all lawful ways and means in your own name and otherwise at your risk and expenses to recover the said damage or loss and we hereby subrogate to you the same rights as we have in consequence of our arising from the said loss or damage. 4. It is a settled law that a document has to be interpreted not by its nomenclature but what is contained in the said document. A reading of the document shows that it was a deed of assignment in favour of the Insurance Company. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Consequently, we do not find any merit in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1999 (2) TMI 717 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... amed with a view to set up a defense during the trial of the said criminal case. What the accused under Section 138 of the Act would put as a defense during the trial cannot be gone into in a civil suit of instant nature. I am constrained to observe that the present suit is a gross abuse of the process of the Court. In K.K. Modi Vs . K.N. Modi 1998 1SCR601 , it was held that a proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the Court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. It was also observed that the Court has power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of public and the court from being wasted. 9. For the foregoing reasons the application is allowed and the plaint is rejected under order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. The plaintiff shall pay the costs of the defendant and bear his own. Counsel's fee is quantified at ₹ 5000/-.
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1999 (2) TMI 716 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cast the burden of proof and had mechanically applied the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The appellate court inspite of holding that no payment had been made to the defendant pursuant to the execution of the promissory note and that there appeared to be collusion between the plaintiff's bank and the supplier of the pumpset, erred in now dismissing the suit. 22. There is no necessity to go into the issue of the liability of the third party who was impleaded by invoking the provisions under Order 8(A) of the Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as I have held that the plaintiff/bank have not successfully established their claim against the first defendant under the said promissory note. Therefore, the said issue does not arise for consideration. 23. In the result, I am unable to sustain the judgment arid decree of the courts below and the same are liable to be set aside. This second appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed. No costs.
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1999 (2) TMI 715 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ontrol) Appellate Tribunal dated 6th December, 1997 and do not find any reason to interfere with the same. Civil Appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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1999 (2) TMI 714 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t be an order made appealable by the Statute. It has to satisfy the test with regard to the characteristics of the order that is made appealable by the Statute. 11. As observed above, in the present case, the order does not fall within the category of orders that are made appealable under Rule 5, Chapter VI11 of the High Court Rules. On the other hand it is an order falling within one of the exempted or prohibited category. It is an order which is expressly excluded from being appealable under Rule 5. Chapter VIII of the High Court Rules. 12. Therefore, we find sufficient force in the submission of Mr. Vivek Saran that this appeal having sought the relief of the implementation of an award, the same comes within the prohibited zone as provided in Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules. Therefore, the appeal is not maintainable. 13. We, therefore, hold that the appeal is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1999 (2) TMI 713 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tation could not be postponed on the basis of non-availability of the report of the advisory board. For both the aforesaid reasons, disposal of the representation could not be postponed. In our opinion, the long delay in deciding the representation could not be explained by the affidavit in Bina Prasad and the continued detention of the petitioner has been rendered illegal and he is entitled to be released. 67. For the reasons stated above, our opinion is that the order of release from preventive detention cannot be claimed on the basis of parity that the other detenu who was detained on the basis of similar grounds has been released under Section 12 or 14 of the Act. The contrary view taken by the Division Benches is not correct and is accordingly overruled. However, the continued detention of the petitioner is found illegal and he is entitled for release for which orders were already passed by us on 4-12-1998. 68. The writ petition is finally disposed of on the above terms.
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1999 (2) TMI 712 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 5)Cal. 533, by Sir John Woodroffe in is commentary on the Evidence Act (1931) p. 181) was not accepted by Lord Balnesburgh in Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ramsunder. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, we reject the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff and hold that the T.T.D. could rely on the judgment in O.S. No. 51 of 1937 as evidence to prove its title in regard to the suit property, even though the present plaintiff was not a party to that suit. Point No. 1 is held accordingly against the respondent. In view of this pronouncement of Honourable Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the judgments are irrelevant and inadmissible. It could be admitted under Section 13 of Evidence Act. That apart, defendant also claiming under the same temple against whom the decision was arrived. Hence, they are admissible and relevant piece of evidence. 29. Both the contentions of appellant are found against him. 30. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed with cost.
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1999 (2) TMI 711 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... -sections (2) and (3) of section 111-A by equating transfer of shares with the allotment of shares. It is thus clear that there is no right of appeal provided by section 111-A in relation to the public limited companies, which was contained in sub-section (4) of section 111 of the Companies Act. It is thus clear that the plaintiff would not be entitled to approach the Company Law Board for seeking the reliefs that are prayed for in the civil suit and therefore, there is no question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court being barred by the availability of remedy to the plaintiff under section 111-A of the Companies Act. 6. In this view of the matter, therefore, the appeal is allowed and the order impugned in the appeal is set aside. It is held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the civil suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff. The trial Court is directed to try the suit and any application that may be filed in the suit in accordance with the law. 7. Appeal allowed.
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1999 (2) TMI 710 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. These principles, it appears, were lost sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. The High Court it appears to us overlooked the distinction of the factors relevant for rejecting bail in a non-bail-able case in the first instance and the cancellation of bail already granted. 5. These principles appear to have been totally lost sight of by the High Court while cancelling the bail. The High Court overlooked the distinction of the factors while cancelling the bail of the appellant in a rather mechanical manner. The order of the High Court, under the circumstances, cannot be sustained. The same is set aside and that of the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge dated 8th August, 1997 is restored. Appeal is allowed accordingly. 6. Nothing said by the High Court or by us hereinabove shall be construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the case. The trial Court shall expedite the trial.
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1999 (2) TMI 709 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r material has been placed before us by the petitioner. Even the order of appointment of the petitioner has not been placed before us to show that such appointment was made as regular appointment though to temporary post. There is no merit in this petition. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. 4. In S.L.P. (C) No. 9114/87 12. This petition is filed by the State Government against another order passed by the High Court which followed the order passed in the earlier matter considered in Civil Appeal No. 1454/87. In view of the dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 1454/87, this Special Leave Petition is dismissed. 5. In S.L.P. (C) No. 12013/87 13. On request of learned counsel for both sides, thus Special Leave Petition is taken on board along with the above matters, This is filed by two of the transferees/promotes. The contentions which are urged in the other matters are put forward in this petition also. there is no merit in this petition. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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1999 (2) TMI 708 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... , JJ. ORDER Delay condoned. The appeal is dismissed.
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