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Showing 1 to 20 of 444 Records
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1999 (3) TMI 677 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... said date, cannot be treated alike as they do not belong to one class. The workmen, who had retired after receiving all the benefits available under the contributory Provident Fund Scheme, cease to be employees of the appellant-Board w.e.f. the date of their retirement. They form a separate class. 16. In the light of the foregoing discussion and applying the rulings of this Court above-noted, we answer the issue set out at the outset by holding that the appellant-Board has not acted illegally or contrary to law in introducing the pension scheme prospectively from 1.7.1986 and that the employees (respondents) retired before 1.7.1986 cannot compel the appellant-Board to extend the benefit of the newly introduced pension scheme with retrospective effect. 17. In the circumstances, we set aside the judgment of the Division Bench under appeal and sustain the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petitions. The appeals are allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (3) TMI 676 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... success of some other person i.e., Srinivas Poultry's case (supra). 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that the petitioner paid the tax without passing on the burden to the consumer. There is no undisputable material on this point before us. Assuming for the same of argument that the burden was not passed on to the consumers still then, the petitioner's case does not become any stronger in view of the legal position stated above. It is only when declaration of unconstitutionality is obtained any one person in respect of tax, that the other persons also perhaps may be entitled to take advantage of the declaration of law. We are not faced with that situation and it is not necessary to dilate on it any further. 9. For the reasons given above, we are of the firm view that the writ petitions must fail as the assessment as against the petitioners had become final in June, 1996 and July, 1997. Both the writ petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1999 (3) TMI 675 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ether the complaint is barred under any law, for example, it is barred for want of proper sanction for prosecution or is barred by limitation etc. At the stage of Section 204 Cr. P.C. if the complaint is not found barred under any law, the evidence is not required to be considered nor the reasons are required to be recorded. At the stage of charge under Section 239 or 240 Cr. P.C. the evidence may be considered very briefly, though at that stage also, the Magistrate is not required to meticulously examine and to evaluate the evidence and to record detailed reasons. 8. A bare reading of Sections 203 and 204 Cr.P.C. shows that Section 203 Cr.P.C. requires that reasons should be recorded for the dismissal of the complaint. Contrary to it, there is no such' requirement under Section 204 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the order for issue of process in this case without recording reasons, does not suffer from any illegality. 9. The revision has, therefore, no force and is hereby dismissed.
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1999 (3) TMI 674 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ether the complaint is barred under any law, for example, it is barred for want of proper sanction for prosecution or is barred by limitation etc. At the stage of Section 204 Cr. P.C. if the complaint is not found barred under any law, the evidence is not required to be considered nor the reasons are required to be recorded. At the stage of charge under Section 239 or 240 Cr. P.C. the evidence may be considered very briefly, though at that stage also, the Magistrate is not required to meticulously examine and to evaluate the evidence and to record detailed reasons. 8. A bare reading of Sections 203 and 204 Cr.P.C. shows that Section 203 Cr.P.C. requires that reasons should be recorded for the dismissal of the complaint. Contrary to it, there is no such' requirement under Section 204 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the order for issue of process in this case without recording reasons, does not suffer from any illegality. 9. The revision has, therefore, no force and is hereby dismissed.
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1999 (3) TMI 673 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sdiction were transferred to the Tribunal under section 29 of the Act. The writ proceedings ceased to be applications under Article 226 by such transfer (See L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of india 1997 228ITR725(SC) ). 63. Indeed it was argued by the appellant himself that the provisions of the Limitation Act now apply to proceedings under section 8 because the Munsiff is a Court. As already held civil proceedings before a Court can be a suit or application. That being so, it would follow that section 8 of the WBLRA wilt have to be construed to see which of the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to such proceedings. For the reasons stated we hold that the view expressed by Chatterjee J in Minor Subir Ranjan Mondal v. Sitanath Mukherjee that section 5 does not apply to proceedings under section 8 of the WBLRA to be a correct view and also hold that the view held by Guha J. in Chandra Sekhar v. Baidhyanath Ghosh (supra) does not correctly represent the law. 64. Order accordingly
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1999 (3) TMI 672 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, dated 3-6-1988 made in Civil W.P. No. 6144/87 wherein the High Court was pleased to allow the writ petition filed by the respondents in these civil appeals, quashing the policy decision of the State of Punjab whereby the State had directed its authorities concerned to purchase certain medicines from the public sector under takings only. We have today in C.A. Nos. 4550- 51/89 held that a similar policy decision issued by the State of Rajasthan does not amount to creation of monopoly nor is there any violation of Article 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The facts giving rise to the writ petitions before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, from which the above civil appeals have arisen being the same, we allow these civil appeals and set aside the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 3-6-1988 made in Civil W.P. No. 6144/87. Consequently, the said writ petition stands dismissed. No costs.
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1999 (3) TMI 671 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... res its powers and therefore declared non est in law. Even otherwise, as noticed above, the infraction of the policy decision by the Government itself for extraneous reasons has led to its nullification, and (ii) clauses (e) and (f) of Regulation 5 of the Central Regulations, which declared as ultra vires the powers of the National Council and are thus struck down. Consequently, the decision taken by the Regional Committee or the Appellate Authority refusing recognition on the ground that non-grant of 'No Objection Certificate' by the State Government stands vitiated in law. 53. In the result the writ petition is allowed with direction to the respondent-Regional Committee to consider/reconsider the application filed by the petitioner-institution for grant of recognition under Section 14 of the Central Act on its merits without insisting for obtaining 'No Objection Certificate' from the State Government. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (3) TMI 670 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d rejected, cannot be prejudiced in any other manner by such rejection. 7. Thus the law of parity may be applied in granting bail to a co-accused, but cannot be invoked in rejecting the bail application of another co-accused. The learned Counsel for the complainant relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State v. Jaspal Singh, reported in 1984 SCC (Cri) 441 1984 Cri LJ 1211. The facts of that case were entirely different, in that case the grant of bail to the accused was held not justified in the larger interest of the State, the accused being guilty of offending the provisions of Official Secrets Act, 1923. 8. Let the accused-applicants Yunis and Haroon, involved in Case Crime; No. 41 of 1997, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 429/120-B, I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act, P. S. Kotwali, District Mathura be enlarged on bail on their furnishing a personal bond and two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned.
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1999 (3) TMI 669 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ect of destroying the decree already passed in favour of the plaintiff. As a desperate bid to save the lost battle, learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent No. 1 contended that since the appellants had obtained the sale-deed by fraud, which would not have the effect of conveying any title to them, they cannot, in the matter of withdrawal of suit, intervene nor can they be heard to oppose withdrawal. We are not entering into the legality of the sale-deed as it is not the subject matter of the suit under appeal. Since appellants had already been impleaded as respondents in the appeal on the basis of that sale-deed, they have a right to be heard in the matter of withdrawal of suit. For the reasons stated above, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment passed by the High Court is set aside, the application for withdrawal of suit is rejected and the appeals are remanded to the High Court for deciding it on merit in accordance with law. The parties shall bear their own cost.
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1999 (3) TMI 668 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... id to have the requisite knowledge that the death would otherwise be the inevitable result. In such a situation, even on accepting the prosecution case we hold that the accused did not commit the offence under Section 302 but under part II of Section 304 IPC. We accordingly, set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and instead, convict him under Section 304 Part II. The incident is of the year 1985 and more than 13 years have elapsed. The accused is on bail pursuant to the orders of this Court dated 6th February, 1992. Mr. Lalit, appearing for the accused-appellant stated that he has already undergone sentence of about four years. In such circumstances, for his conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC, we sentence him to the period already undergone. His conviction under Section 324 IPC remains unaltered but no separate sentence is being awarded. This Criminal Appeal is disposed of accordingly. The bail bond furnished by the appellant stands discharged.
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1999 (3) TMI 667 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t them. If as found by us that the sale of the suit property on 10.1.1964 was a valid sale then the said property was not available for court sale. Consequently, by purchasing the property in court sale dated 17.9.1962, the appellants did not acquire any right, title or interest in the suit property. 11. In view of our finding that younger Sadanandan had only an inchoate right in the suit property, the contention of the appellant that at least to the extent of his share, the court sale should be upheld, cannot also be accepted. 12. In view of the finding given by us with regard to the validity of the private sale executed by Smt. Suseela and elder Sadanandan on 10.1.1964 and our consequential finding on the validity of the court sale, the question pertaining to the tenancy does not survive for our consideration. In this view of the matter, the judgment and decree of the High Court does not call for any interference and the same is affirmed by dismissing this appeal. No costs.
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1999 (3) TMI 666 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e first instance granting leases as per its order dated 29th June, 1997 in the reserved area of 419.18 hectares out of 1261.476 hectares for mining of Chromite in favour of the four parties i.e. the appellant and Respondents 3 to 7 in Sukinda valley of Jaipur District. It is obvious that the grant of mining leases to the extent of 50% to the appellant and Respondents 3 to 7 as per Order of the Orissa Government dated 29th June, 1997 will remain binding between the parties. However, any additional leases granted by the State of Orissa pursuant to the Report of Shri Jagadish Prasad Dash Committee or even otherwise to the appellant and Respondents 3 to 7 to meet wholly or partially their remaining 50 per cent of assessed needs as per Central Governments order dated 17th August, 1995 will be subject to the revisions, if any, by the aggrieved parties before the Central Government in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case.
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1999 (3) TMI 665 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt necessary for taking a good photograph or painting a good portrait. 21. In B.C. Kames case (1977) 39 S.T.C. 237 (supra), the Supreme Court has considered only the first category of work and second and third categories were not specifically considered. It was also found by Their Lordships that the value of the photographic paper is so minimal comparing to the charges taken by them after processing. Therefore, Their Lordships held that the photographic paper, the property which is transferred to the customer, is exigible to tax. Accepting the above view and the contentions of the Appellants, the learned Single Judges disposed of the Original Petitions finding that the Assessees are entitled to the benefit of exemption coming under first category. The categories coming under second and third are exigible to tax. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the Writ Appeals are only to be dismissed and accordingly we do so. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (3) TMI 664 - CEGAT
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... ... ..... e basis of violation of principles of natural justice. Even on remand, the department had not produced any evidence. Therefore, on a total analyses of the matter, the Collector (A) having come to conclusion that the Invoice price placed, is the Transaction Value is a correct order. The Collector has given a detailed finding as to why the transaction value is required to be accepted which we find is in terms of Section 14 of Customs Act as well as in terms of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above noted judgments. Further we have noticed from these judgments that mere quotation cannot be the basis of enhanced valuation. This being a settled law, therefore, any attempt by the Revenue to introduce a new ground or to bring new facts at this stage before the Tribunal is not acceptable in law. In that view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order and there are no other grounds for consideration and hence the Revenue appeals are rejected.
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1999 (3) TMI 663 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he lives of those entrusted to his care depend on his skill and attention. 40. A physician is expected to uphold the dignity and honour of his profession. Once having undertaken a case, the physician should not neglect the patient. The doctors declare, while taking their pledge at the time of registration, that they would maintain the utmost respect for human life and practice their profession with conscience and dignity, and that the health of the patients would be their first consideration. 41. The doctors, especially Tamil Nadu Doctors are known for the above qualities. When these qualities are shown in the profession, there is no difficulty in removing the fear of the public in approaching the doctors for entrusting their entire body and life to the hands of the doctors. The people also should not go for prosecution against the doctors in each and every case. Then only the fear in the mind of the doctors in conducting operation, can be erased. Thus, this is purely mutual.
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1999 (3) TMI 662 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 79. The said paragraph put in bracket after hearing the parties, will stand substituted as under Before concluding these proceedings, we must mention that it would be necessary to direct that the present judgment will operate only prospectively to avoid unnecessary confusion and complications. It is clarified that this judgment will have no retrospective effect in the sense that it will not apply to those applicants for enrolment who have earlier applied for enrolment and have successfully completed their pre-enrolment training as per the impugned rules. However, all those who apply for enrolment after this judgment will not have to undergo pre-enrolment training. This will be irrespective of the fact whether they had earlier applied for enrolment and have not completed their pre-enrolment training under the impugned rules till the date of this judgment or whether they had not earlier applied for enrolment despite getting their law degrees prior to the date of this judgment.
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1999 (3) TMI 661 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on settlement of the final bill, the right to get further payment gets weakened but whether the claim subsists or not, is a matter which is arbitrable. When this direction was cited before the High Court, the same was distinguished by stating that it was a decision on its own facts and has no application to the case. We find that this view does not appear to be correct. Whether any amount is due to be paid and how far the claim made by the appellant is tenable are matters to be considered by the arbitrator. In fact, whether the contract has been fully worked out and whether the payments have been made in full and final settlement are questions to be considered by the arbitrator when there is a dispute regarding the same. We, therefore, set aside the order made by the High Court and dismiss the application filed under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act. Now proceedings before the arbitrator/s will have to be continued in accordance with law. 2. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
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1999 (3) TMI 660 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ut the learned standing counsel submits that the said decision is distinguishable and does not resolve the controversy. The question whether the amount of ₹ 9 lakhs deposited with the IDBI is deductible under section 32A & B of the Income-tax Act seems to be a debatable question. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, submits that in the light of the amendment of section 28 with retrospective effect, the controversy does not survive for consideration. The same is disputed by the learned standing counsel. The Tribunal has not adverted to the amendment. The impact and applicability of the amendment as regards section 32A and 32B is a point to be decided by the High Court, according to the learned standing counsel. 4. Keeping in view the nature of controversy, hence, a question of law arises out of the order of ITAT. We consider it a fit case to direct reference of the second question for the decision of the High Court. Accordingly, the ITC is partly allowed.
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1999 (3) TMI 659 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... partment itself liable to refuse ₹ 50 lakhs to the assessee. 6. The profit and loss account as well as the balance sheet as on 31-12-1998 reveal, firstly, that the assessee is a public limited company whose shares were quoted in the Stock Exchange and, secondly, its assets are substantial and in view of the substantial assets position of the assessee, we feel that it is justifiable to grant stay only on the basis of an affidavit being filed by the managing director of the assessee-company undertaking not to alienate the assets of the company till the hearing of the appeal is over or till the matter is disposed of by the Tribunal without obtaining the prior permission of the Tribunal. This affidavit should be filed within 10 days from the date of receipt of this order. The stay application is ordered accordingly. 7. Just like in other similar cases, since it is a stay granted matter, the office is directed to post this appeal out of turn in the last week of August, 1999.
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1999 (3) TMI 658 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it was executed on 23.4.1998. Obviously, the effect of non-execution of the order was that the authorities themselves gave liberty to the detenu to carry on his earlier activities giving rise, in that process, to a question whether the activities complained of were really prejudicial activities within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act. As pointed out above, the execution of the order of detention long after it was passed would have the effect of vitiating the order as also the “satisfaction” of the authorities who passed that order. 15. For the reasons set out above, the appeal is allowed and the order of detention passed under Section 3 of the Act is quashed with the direction that Ramesh Nahar, husband of the appellant, shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless his detention is required in connection with some other case. WRIT PETITION CRL. No. 30 of 1999. 16. The Writ Petition is dismissed as having become infructuous. Appeal allowed and petition dismissed.
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