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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 458 Records
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2000 (2) TMI 883 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ture of the offence and power of Superintendent of Police permitting him to authorise a junior officer to investigate. The time between the registration of the FIR and authorisation in terms of second proviso to Section 17 shows further the application of mind and the circumstances which weighed with the Superintendent of Police to direct authorisation to order the investigation. 15. Under these circumstances the appeals are allowed and the judgments of the High Court impugned in these appeals regarding the interpretation of Section 17 and holding the investigation to have not been investigated by an authorised officer being not sustainable in law are hereby set aside with the direction to the Trial Court to proceed with the trial in accordance with the provisions of law. The respondents would be at liberty to defend their cases on all such contentions on facts and law as are available to them which have not been adjudicated upon against them by the High Court and this Court.
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2000 (2) TMI 882 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is not so found by the Tribunal. The further question whether it will be agricultural income within the meaning of Section 2(1A) of the Act as elucidated by this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax West Bengal, Calcutta v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy 1957 32ITR466(SC) does not arise for consideration. It is evident from the Order of the High Court that findings recorded by the Tribunal that the appellant stopped agricultural operation in November 1982 and the receipt under consideration did not relate to any agricultural operation carried on by the appellant, were not questioned before it. Though, we do not agree with the High Court that the said amount was paid for breach of contract as indeed it was paid in modification/relaxation of the terms of the contract, we hold that the High Court is justified in concluding that the said amount was a taxable receipt under the head 'income from other sources'. 13. We find no merit in the appeal and dismiss the same with costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 881 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed to hear and also as which Judges shall constitute a Division Bench and what work those Benches shall do. 11. Though the aforesaid position has not been deviated from by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court it is necessary to remind all concerned of the legal principles involving the prerogative of a Chief Justice. The Division Bench has gone wrong in holding that the petition submitted by the concerned advocates was not maintainable at all. Refusing to exercise the suo motu powers contemplated in Sec 439(2) cannot be on such a fallacious premise. The Division Bench ought to have considered the petitions on merits. 12. We therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order under challenge. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court will now hear the petitions afresh and dispose them of in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. It is open to the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court to allot this matter before a Bench of that High Court.
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2000 (2) TMI 880 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... As indicated above, the applicant/plaintiff should clearly establish two essential requisites. They are -- (i) the defendant is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property; (ii) that the said disposal is being done with an intention to obstruct or delay the execution of the decree that may be passed against him. 31. Thus, in this case, the sine qua non for an order of attachment before judgment, namely, the mala fide intention and the conduct of the defendant in disposing of or about to dispose of his property with the dishonest intention of defeating or delaying the decree that may be passed in the suit, is conspicuously absent. 32. The mere admission in the counter that the property, which is sought to be attached, is already subjected to the mortgage with the Indian Bank, would not be a ground to hold that the essential requirements for Order 38 , Rule 5 of CPC have been complied with. 33. With the above observations, the application is dismissed with costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 879 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the suit, no prima facie case in respect of the liability presently exists. In fact, the liability can only be taken to come into effect if and when a decree in respect of damages has been passed. Secondly it is hotly in contest whether it is plaintiff or the Defendant who has committed a breach of the Agreement to Sell. These documents witness that if the plaintiff has breached the terms of the Agreement, "the earnest money and advance paid by the Purchaser (plaintiff) to the Seller (Defendant) shall stand forfeited and the Seller shall be free to sell the land". Therefore, even in respect of the sums of money paid by the plaintiff to the Defendants pursuant of these Agreements and to the MOU, contentious issues undoubtedly arise. This is not a fit case for proceeding either under the provisions of Order xxxvIII Rule 5 or of Order XXXIX, Rule 1. The application is accordingly dismissed. In view of the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 878 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the defendants are to be issued in the suit. At that stage only the averments in the plaint are to be seen. The learned Counsel has relied on a judgment of this Court in Jawahar Engineering Company and Ors. v. Jawahar Engineers Pvt. Ltd., reported as 1983 PTC 207. Similarly, at this stage it could not have been said that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. The averments in the plaint are sufficient for present purposes. The aspect of territorial jurisdiction can be, if at all considered at a later stage it may require evidence to be led to determine territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly the impugned judgment is set aside. The matter is remanded for trial of the suit in accordance with law. Let the suit be placed before the learned Single Judge for being proceeded with further. 3. The appeal stands disposed of. Since the respondent is ex parte, there will be no order as to costs. Lalli Enterprises vs. Dharam Chand and Sons (11.02.2000 - DELHC)
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2000 (2) TMI 876 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nswered accordingly. 6. The trial Court has drawn a distinction between "general siding" and the "private siding" and has held that in regard to private siding, demurrage could not have been claimed in respect of the entire block of ten wagons and that it could be charged only in respect of those wagons which had not been emptied or unloaded within the free time allowed under the Rules. This finding is not assailed before us and it has not been shown as to how it is erroneous. Even the Goods Tariff Rules upon which reliance has been placed by the trial Court in coming to this finding, were not placed before us in spite of our insistence, 7. In view of the above, the appeal is partly allowed. The Judgment of the High Court so far as it purports to strike down the Goods Tariff Rules extracted above is set aside, but the other part of the judgment by which the decree passed by the trial Court has been upheld, is maintained. There will be no order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 875 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ant to reopen the assessment that was made upon the first respondent. The fact that the reopening was said to be under Section 14(3) and not under Section 17 can make no difference; the misstatement of the appropriate section would not invalidate the reopening, power to do so being there. 5. In the circumstances, the judgment and order of the Tribunal must be quashed. But the matter should, in our view, go back to the assessing authority for the purposes of determining whether the goods that were brought in by the first respondent fell within the scope of Entry 53(d)(ix) of the Schedule to the Act or whether they were steel scrap. The parties shall be at liberty to lead such evidence as they may consider appropriate in this behalf before the assessing authority. 6. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. The assessment made on 24-2-1994 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the assessing authority as stated above. 7. No order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 874 - CEGAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... to chapter 48 (for the other two products noted above), the products would be rightly classifiable under sub-heading 4901.90, as product of the printing industry. This finding is arrived at after also taking into consideration the ratio of all the decisions noted above, wherein a similar interpretation has been given to these Section Note and Chapter Note with respect to the nature of these products i.e. the nature of the printing done on this media. 10. In view of the aforesaid findings, we set aside all the orders impugned in these appeals and allow the appeals, with consequential relief, if any, as per law. 7. On a perusal of the issue in this case and the findings arrived at in the appellants' own case in para 9 and 10 as extracted above, we notice that the above findings would clearly apply to the facts of the present case also and respectfully applying the ratio thereof, the impugned orders are set aside and appeals allowed. (Pronounced and dictated in open Court).
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2000 (2) TMI 873 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or other Acts referred to above. 10. For the foregoing reasons and as per our findings we come to the irresistible conclusion that all the three courts below committed error in law in holding tenant to be a wilful defaulter. So, we hold even if he was in default it is not a case of wilful default. We hold that the appellant committed no wilful default. Accordingly, the impugned orders and judgments of all the three courts are hereby set aside. The appeal is allowed. However, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the costs on the parties.
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2000 (2) TMI 872 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... egistration falls within the words "other cause of like nature" in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (See Surajmal Dagduramji Shop v. Srikishan Ram Kishan AIR 1973 Bom 313. 28. For all the reasons given above, it is clear that the suit is based on infringement of statutory rights under the Trade Marks Act, It is also based upon the common law principles of tort applicable to passing-off actions. The suit is not for enforcement of any rights arising out of a contract entered into by or on behalf of the unregistered firm with third parties in the course of the firm's business transactions. The suit is therefore not barred by Section 69(2). 29. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed without costs. We should not be understood as having said anything on the merits of the case for we have confined ourselves to the allegations in the plaint as we are here only dealing with an application filed by the appellants under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C.
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2000 (2) TMI 871 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
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... ... ..... rd leave has to be sought unless it is an appeal by right. On a certiorari action the High Court has to certify a case, good for hearing; there are no short cuts to admission. 7. It is well known that a writ jurisdiction of the High Court is not available in generality when the Statute itself has provided an alternate remedy of an appeal. May be, the provision which be the alternate remedy from the business point of view may be irksome and the present Assessee may be required to deposit an amount, 20 per cent, before filing the appeal. But, the legislature has structured the Statute, thus. The Petitioner may take recourse to an appeal under Section 45 of the Act and may contend whatever he contends before appellate authority. The Petitioner is relegated to take recourse to an alternate remedy under Section 45 of the Act. 8. In the circumstances, without commenting on the merit of the situation, this Court finds that the writ petition is misplaced. It is accordingly dismissed.
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2000 (2) TMI 870 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly safeguarded, as the subjective satisfactions arrived at by the Detaining Authority is not open for examination by the Court, unless it is found to be wholly unsupported by any material. The detaining authority, therefore cannot on the basis of his own assessment as to which document should be furnished, and which should not be furnished, deny to the detenu the document which is necessary for the purpose of enabling the detenu to make an effective representation. 7. The continued detention of the detenu in this case, therefore, cannot be considered as a legal after the detenu's right to make an effective representation had been prejudiced by reason of non-supply of remand order which had been sought by the detenu and which had been strongly refused to be supplied by the detaining authority. 8. We, therefore, allow this Writ Petition and direct the detaining authority to set the detenu at liberty forthwith, unless his continuance in custody is required in any other case.
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2000 (2) TMI 869 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nt. and more of steel is lost as scale during one heat. ...............” 3. It is clear from the above extract that the expert opinion produced by the appellant, of loss of about 2% being normal is correct. In the appellant's case total steel round involved in manufacture was over 2700 MTs. Since the loss of 49 MT is within the norm, we find the allegation of failure to account for the scrap or its removal without payment of duty, is not justified. Therefore, the demand of duty on this count also is liable to be set aside. We do so. As the demands of duty are not sustainable; the penalty is also required to be vacated. Therefore, the penalty of ₹ 15,000 imposed on the appellant is also set aside. Thus, the appeal is allowed with full relief to the appellants and the impugned order is set aside. 4. The amount of ₹ 32,000 which was deposited pending decision of the appeal shall be returned to the appellants forthwith as demands remain set aside.
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2000 (2) TMI 868 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... led before the Conciliation Officer was not considered by the State Government. We may state here that the records were not placed by the State Government before the High Court but were made available by Ms. A. Subhashini before this Court. From the record we find that in the failure report the Conciliation Officer has indicated all the contentions raised by respondent No. 1 in his letter. Therefore, this contention has no force. 18. For the reasons stated above we hold that both the appellate Court and the learned single Judge of the High Court erred in law in issuing a mandamus directing the State Government to make an appropriate reference, therefore, the Judgment of the learned single Judge passed in writ petition No. 155 of 1998 and the judgment of the appellate Court are hereby set aside. 19. In the result we find merit in the present appeal and accordingly it is allowed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 867 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is to be within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court, it will not be necessary for us to continue these proceedings any further. It goes without saying that if in future any of the parties will have any grievance in connection with the orders that may be passed by the Trial Court, the same grievance can be ventilated higher-up in accordance with law. In view of our present order setting aside the order of the High Court in the Arbitration Petition No. 242 of 1997, the consequential order passed by the High Court in the Arbitration Petition No. 239 of 1997 extending time to the arbitrator to give award will not survive and will stand vacated as the very reference to arbitration has stood rescinded as directed by us. The Appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs. We make it clear that we express no opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties. It will be for the Trial Court to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law after hearing the parties.
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2000 (2) TMI 866 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... its market price. Similarly, when the market price of the seized vehicle is much more than of the essential commodity, it cannot be said that instead of confiscation it should be released at a price which is less than its market price. Further it is required to be noted that under Section 6B(2) no order confiscating vehicle or other conveyance can be passed if the owner proves to the satisfaction of the competent authority that it was used in carrying the essential commodity without his knowledge or connivance. In the result, the appeals are allowed and the impugned orders holding that measure of imposing fine in lieu of confiscation under second proviso to Section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act would be the market price of the essential commodity seized are set aside. However, considering the fact that since vehicles are already released, no further directions are required to be given with regard to the fine amount in lieu of confiscation. Ordered accordingly. No costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 865 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assets, and the inventory report of the Official Liquidator, dated July 30, 1999, there is a fit and appropriate case to accord leave to withdraw the winding up petition with following safeguards (1) The appellant company shall give public advertisement in the same newspapers in which earlier advertisements were given on or before 15th March, 2000, about the settlements and the grant of leave for withdrawal of the winding up petition. (2) It shall also report to the Registrar of Companies on or before 30th March, 2000. (3) The authorised Officer of the Company shall file an affidavit before the Registrar of this Court about the compliance of the two conditions on or before 31st March, 2000, failing which, the Office shall place this matter for further orders. 12. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the directions, leave to withdraw the winding up petition is granted. Accordingly, this appeal and the main petition shall stand disposed of. No order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 864 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... dissented from by the Bombay High Court in Sidhwa’s case, has to be understood only as applying to those observations of the Madras High Court made in relation to an assessment of the arrears of fees due to the deceased and received by the recipient under section 176(4) of the Act. It is only with regard to such an assessment that the Madras High Court held that the receipt may be taxed as income from other sources. As already noticed by us, this part of the judgment of the Madras High Court is not relevant to the controversy that has arisen before us and, therefore, it is that we say that it is not necessary for us to pronounce upon the correctness of Mr. Dastur’s submission. Such an argument, if advanced, can fall to be considered only in an assessment made in the hands of the executrix as recipient of the fees under section 176(4) of the Act. 24. In the result, the order of the CIT(A) is upheld, though for entirely different reasons and the appeal is dismissed.
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2000 (2) TMI 863 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... view of the pronouncement of law on the subject in Anil Hada v. India Acrylic Limited 4. Learned Counsel for the respondent then submitted that there are other contentions which respondent has to raise as against the prosecution. We are not disposed to deal with all those contentions, for, it is open to the respondent to raise such contentions in the trial Court. 5. In the result we set aside the impugned judgment and direct the trial Court to proceed with the trial. 6. The appeals are disposed of.
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