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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 515 Records
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2000 (3) TMI 1125 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ication by a Civil Court in Civil Suit. When we talk of testamentary capacity, surely it does not include the title of the Testatrix in the property in question as such but only it relates to the capacity of the Testatrix, physically and mentally, at the time of execution of the Will. For what we have said therefore, we are firmly of the view that the learned Court below went wrong in holding that the propounder was not entitled to get the Probate of the Will and on that ground dismissing the application for grant of probate. The appeal accordingly is allowed. The Judgment under Appeal is set aside. It is directed that probate in respect of the Will in question shall be granted as prayed for. No order as to costs. Later Let a xerox copy of this Judgment duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar of this Court, be given to the parties upon their undertaking to apply for and obtain certified copy of the same on usual undertaking. M.K. Basu, J. 10. I agree. 11. Appeal allowed
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2000 (3) TMI 1124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sent case. It cannot be said that the plaintiff has not suffered any prejudice or loss. It is not a case of a voluntary sale. The plaintiff had to execute the sale deed on account of an illegal and without jurisdiction order made under Section 27(1) of the Act in respect of property within the ceiling limit. If the plaintiff has retained the sum of Rs. 2,60,000/- all these years, at the same time, defendants have also retained the possession of the property. The plaintiff on his own did not want to sell the property to the defendants/appellants. The fact that the same amount of consideration as mentioned in the agreement of sale was paid to the plaintiff by the defendants, is of no relevance. On the facts of the case, it cannot be held that there are any equitable considerations against the plaintiff to warrant the denial of relief of possession granted to him by the High Court. 8. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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2000 (3) TMI 1123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ic instructions of the consignee and further that the loss was caused by fire which was beyond their control. It has been mentioned by them that they took due care, within their capacity and new they have lodged a claim on the owner of the adjoining godown from where the fire started. 49. The above will show that the National Commission acted upon the letter dated 14th March, 1994 of Messrs Jeena & Co. without deciding the question whether it was genuine and was at all issued by Messrs Jeena & Co. as the appellant had contended that the letter was forged or was procured collusively. Since the above aspects have not been considered and decided by the Commission, we cannot uphold the judgment of the National Commission. The appeal is consequently allowed, the impugned judgment dated 2.9.1996 passed by the National Commission is set aside and the case is remanded to the Commission for disposal afresh in the light of the observations made above and in accordance with law.
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2000 (3) TMI 1122 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... int under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act should have been given by the drawee himself and, therefore, the entire proceedings initiated against the petitioner alleging offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is illegal and the same is liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not sustainable. The question whether any fact is within the special or personal knowledge of the drawee or holder in due course, as the case may be, and the power of attorney holder cannot depose before the court regarding those aspects and, therefore, the principal himself should give evidence regarding those aspects are matters to be considered by the trial court at the stage of evidence. Therefore, I find absolutely no ground to quash the criminal proceedings launched against the petitioner alleging offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in these cases. Therefore, the Crl. M. Cs. are dismissed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1121 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uired to go in appeal or revision because of an unsatisfactory order. There is another set of situations in which the accused have been convicted and awarded such light sentences which this High Court had occasion to define as flea-bite punishments which, instead of acting as a deterrent and bringing down the number of dishonoured cheques, only acts as an incentive or encouragement to the accused and send out the wrong signals by infusing a confidence that even if one is on the wrong side of the law, the Courts will let the offender off very lightly. The primary purpose of prescribing a fine equivalent to double the face value is in order to ensure that not only the amount but the outstanding interest thereof is recovered and can be awarded to the complainant. The Trial Courts shall take serious note of these observations. The Registrar General to circulate a copy of this judgment to the District Judges and to all Judges and the Magistrates entrusted with this class of cases.
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2000 (3) TMI 1120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ssions Judge, Nagarcoil. 3. S.C. 197/1995 - in the Court of Principal Sessions Judge, Nagapattinam. 6. Regarding the 2nd appellant also, we adopt the same measure and order that the sentences imposed upon him by the Assist ant Sessions Judge, Pondicherry in S. C. 66 of 1991 will run unaffected by another sentence imposed upon him subsequently. Only on the termination of the aforesaid sentence the jail authorities would start reckoning the sentence imposed on him in respect of the remaining 4 cases, which are detailed be low 1. S. C. 32/1994 - in the Court of Sessions Judge, Dindigul. 2. S.C. 135/1993 - in the Court of Sessions Judge, Tuticorin. 3.S. C. 69/1994 - in the Court of Assistant Sessions Judge, Nagarcoil. 4. S. C. 197/1995 - in the Court of Assistant Sessions Judge, Nagapattinam. 7. We make it clear that we permit the sentences passed on the 2nd appellant in respect of above-mentioned 4 remaining cases to run concurrently. 8. Appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
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2000 (3) TMI 1119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ess, we would add - after the appellant completes his evidence in accordance with the permission now granted as per the impugned orders, it is open to the appellant to convince the trial Court that some more persons need be examined in the interest of justice, if the appellant then thinks that such a course is necessary. The trial Court will then decide whether it is essential for a just decision of the case to examine more witness on the defence side. If the Court is so satisfied, the Special Judge can permit the appellant to examine such additional witnesses the examination of whom he considers essential for a just decision of the case or he can exercise the powers envisaged in Section 311 of the Code in respect of such witnesses. We cannot, at present, oversee the situation as to how the trial Court could then reach such a satisfaction. Hence we leave it to the trial Court to do the needful at the appropriate stage. 21. With the above observations we dispose of the appeal.
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2000 (3) TMI 1118 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n from limitation even on equitable considerations or hardships. Section 5 of the Act though worded in very wide terms is not applicable to the suits, even if it is assumed that the plaintiff was really incapacitated for any reason, benefit of Section 5 of the Act cannot be availed. 23. For the foregoing reasons appeal is allowed, findings of the trial court on the preliminary issue are set aside. Consequently, the judgment and decree dated 18.1.99 passed by the trial court is also set aside. Suit is remanded back with the directions to proceed with the trial of the suit in accordance with law. Trial court will also decide the issue of limitation afresh, after allowing the parties to lead evidence as the suit has been remanded for trial. The appellant will be entitled for the refund of the court fee on memorandum of appeal for which requisite certificate will be issued in favor of the appellant by the Registry. 24. Parties to appear before the trial court on 21st March, 2000.
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2000 (3) TMI 1117 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lso of no assistance. As noticed above, Clause 29 considered in Keshava Raju's case, supra, contains only sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Clause 29, and not sub-clauses (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Clause 29 found in this case. In the clause considered by Keshava Raju, there is no provision requiring the Contractor to approach the Civil Court for settlement of dispute if he is not satisfied with the decision of the Chief Engineer/Managing Director. In the absence of any such provision requiring the Contractor to approach the Civil Court for settlement of dispute, this Court held that clause amounted to an arbitration clause as it provided for reference of disputes to a chosen form and also made the decision of such forum final and binding. 26. As I have held that Clause 29 (or old Clause 67) relied on by the petitioner is not an arbitration agreement, this civil petition under Section 11 of the Act is not maintainable. Therefore, this petition is rejected as not maintainable.
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2000 (3) TMI 1116 - CEGAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... er subject to the applicant undertaking before the Commissioner to pay, in the event of the appeal being decided against it the duty applicable on the value of the rig that may be arrived at the redemption fine fixed and the balance of the penalty supported by a bank guarantee of ₹ 50 crores. The bond and the bank guarantee has to be furnished within a month of receipt of this order. The stay is subject to the further condition that the applicant gives notice in writing so as to reach the Commissioner of Customs, 15 days prior to the rig leaving the designated area where it is presently located, and one month where the rig is to leave the waters in the exclusive economic zone and also one month notice before the charter with the ONGC is terminated. 20. Having regard to the value of the goods and peculiar circumstances of this case, we also accept the prayer made by the advocate for the department for out of turn hearing and list the appeal for hearing on 5th June, 2000.
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2000 (3) TMI 1115 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... of the appellants in various decisions of the Tribunal as under Conveyor belts have been held to be eligible for modvat credit as capital goods in Nova Iron and Steel Ltd. v. CCE 1997 (96) ELT 165. Testing machines have been held to be eligible for modvat credit as capital goods in Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. CCE Allahabad 1996 (88) ELT 753 (T) . Measure Tanks have been held to be capital goods in Metro Chem Industries v. CCE 1997 (96) ELT 114 (T) since they were necessary for measuring quantity of liquid raw material. Overhead Bridge being a part of the Conveyor System would also be covered by the aforesaid decision. As regards Conductive Plastic Racks, these have also been explained as Storing Devices fitted with the Conveyor System. The earlier decisions of the Tribunal allowing modvat credit on Conveyor System would therefore apply to this item as well. In the light of the above findings, we find no merit in the Revenue Appeal and the same is accordingly, rejected.
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2000 (3) TMI 1114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... earlier, the High Court did record a conclusion on examining the records of the proceedings that the witnesses are dead and, therefore, their former statements under Section 299 could be treated as evidence. We see, no infirmity with the said conclusion of the High Court and we are, therefore, not in a position to sustain the argument of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned senior counsel, appearing for the Appellant that pre-conditions of Section 299 Code of Criminal Procedure have not been complied with. Once the statements of those witnesses, exhibited as Exhibits PW48/A to PW48/E, are considered, and the Sessions Judge as well the High Court have relied upon the same and based the conviction, we see, no infirmity in the same, requiring our interference with the conviction and sentence recorded by the High Court. In the aforesaid circumstances, it must be held that the prosecution case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 6. These appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tered by the trial Court and the Appellate Court regarding the evidence. If a revision is to be disposed of by upsetting the concurrent findings of two Courts below in the aforesaid fashion it would amount to abdication of the judicial function of the High Court. We are a little perturbed that it has happened like that in certain other cases disposed of by the learned single Judge. We make the said observation not with a pleasing mind but we hope that this observation would reach the learned Judge so as to help him to remind himself of the need to give reasons for dissenting from the findings concurrently made by the fact finding Courts. It is redundant to remind that revisional jurisdiction is basically supervisory in nature. 5. In the result, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct the Registrar of the High Court to board the Revision in the hearing list, so that, it can be disposed of afresh in accordance with law. 6. Appeal is accordingly disposed of.
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2000 (3) TMI 1112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... set out in the earlier part of this order that the learned single Judge on full investigation of the records found that notice to the company had not been given, which was admitted by the learned counsel for the appellant before the learned single Judge. Under the scheme of the Act it is clear that the company is also liable to make good the amounts which remain outstanding and, therefore, principles of natural justice also require that a notice should have been given to it. The view taken by the learned single Judge and accepted by the Division Bench to which we have adverted to is placed on sound footing. Therefore, we are of the view that the adjudication made by the Commissioner is void for want of notice to the company and, therefore, unenforceable and so the High Court was justified in refusing to grant the relief to the appellant. In this view of the matter, we affirm the view taken by the High Court and dismiss the appeal. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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2000 (3) TMI 1111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Respondents in respect of the property in question the High Court could not have granted relief in the manner it has been made. It is also pointed out that there are several other strong reasons for the Respondents to have acted in the manner they did. Question of examining the title of the parties does not arise at all as admittedly Respondents were in possession of the property in question and put up structures thereon. On that admitted position High Court took the view that ejectment of the Respondents forcibly without due recourse of law was not in due process. No exception can be taken to that view at all. In fact, this view is consistent with what has been stated by this Court in State of U.P. v. Maharaja V. Dharmander Prasad Singh etc. JT 1989 (1) SC 118 AIR 1989 SC 997. Whatever may be the reasons the Appellant had, they should have acted in accordance with law. 2. In the circumstances, we maintain the order made by the High Court. The appeals are dismissed. No costs.
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2000 (3) TMI 1110 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... wal, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t; 3. He shall surrender his passport within one week to the trial court; and 4. He shall not in any manner either intimidate or influence the witnesses or tamper with evidence. 4. If he is willing to abide by the above conditions, he should file an affidavit to that effect before the trial court within two weeks from today. 5. If the Respondent-State finds for any valid reason that Appellant is missing his bail we permit the Respondent to move for cancellation of the bail as provided under Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. If the trial is to get delayed on account of the delay in apprehending the co-accused, it is open to the trial court to split up the case as against this Appellant and proceed therewith, so that, it can be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. If the trial is delayed on account of dilatory tactics adopted by the Appellant, that itself can be treated as a ground for cancellation of bail. With these observations, this appeal is disposed of.
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2000 (3) TMI 1108 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... J. ORDER Delay condoned. The appeals are dismissed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1107 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... June, 2000. The recovery proceedings, therefore, against all the petitioners shall remain stayed till 29th June, 2000 to enable them to pay first instalment on or before, 29th March, 2000, second instalment on or before 29th April, 2000, third instalment on or before 29th May, 2000, and the last instalment on or before 29th June, 2000. These payments of instalments shall be over and above the regular payments demanded for current liability of cess on mineral rights. If the entire amount as indicated above is paid in four instalments, the Special Area Authority will recall the recovery certificates. In the event of non-payment of any of the instalments, the recovery proceedings against defaulting petitioner shall stand renewed automatically on the day of first default. 37. All the writ petitions are dismissed with the aforesaid observations. The interim orders granted in these petitions are vacated with the directions noted above. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2000 (3) TMI 1106 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t is of utmost importance, said Lord Campbell, that the maxim that no man is to be a Judge in his own cause should be held sacred. This principle was reiterated in R. v. Barnsley MBC. (1976) 3 All ER 452 and in Herring v. Templeman, (1973) 3 All ER 569. 11. In view of the abovementioned judicial pronouncements, I am of the view that even if, parties have agreed that in case of dispute, the matter shall not be referred to arbitration, that cannot confer any power on the one party to fix liability on the plea that the other contracting party has committed breach. I am of the view that since petitioner had not admitted the liability and not admitted the breach of contract the matter has to be resolved not by one of the parties to the contract, but by the properly constituted forum. Only after determination of the liability, the damages could be recovered from the petitioner. In the abovementioned circumstances, writ petition is allowed and Exts. P6, P7 and P9 will stand quashed.
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