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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 697 Records
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2001 (8) TMI 1452 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... JJ ORDER Delay condoned. The civil appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (8) TMI 1451 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ts are at liberty to bring to the notice of the valuer all the events that had taken place after this date up to the date of our order (25-9-2000) which would have a bearing on the valuation of the shares and the valuer will take all these aspects into consideration in determining the value of shares. All other directions in regard to the valuation as contained in our order dated 29-12-2000 will remain as they are, Both the parties 'shall submit their oral and written submissions latest by 10-10-2001 to the valuer who will prepare his draft valuation report by 10-11-2001. Thereafter, the parties should react to the draft valuation report by 25-11-2001. The final report of the valuer should be made available to the parties by 15-12-2001. On receipt of the valuation report, the respondents should pay the consideration for the 50 per cent share of the company to the petitioner within 30 days. 6. With the above directions, the application is disposed of with liberty to apply.
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2001 (8) TMI 1450 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... us from doing so, since in the normal course of events appellate forum ought not to interfere with the award of compensation. In the view, we have taken as noted hereinbefore, we do not feel in inclined to deal with the other issue of the school authority being a joint-tort feasor as submitted before this Court by the respondents. The issue thus is left open. As regards the question of interest as contended by Mr. Malhotra, we feel it inclined to grant 6% simple interest from the date of the judgment of the High Court till payment on the reducing balance. The amount so directed by the High Court together with interest as modified above be paid by eight (8) quarterly installments. The amount deposited in terms of earlier order of this Court inclusive of interest with the Registrar of this Court be made available to the parties pro-rata in terms of this order and the balance, however, be paid as directed above. This appeal thus stands disposed of without any order as to costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1449 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ce the arbitration proceedings have since not been concluded and the order restraining encashment of bank guarantee has been in operation since 17.02.1998, it appears appropriate to us to make that order absolute till the matter is disposed of by the arbitrator. However, so far as the seized machinery is concerned, learned Counsel for the Respondent does not object to the seized machinery being sold in open auction by the Appellant. We, therefore, permit the Appellant to sell the seized machinery by open auction under intimation to the Respondent and deposit the sale proceeds in the trial court. 4. We are informed at the Bar that there is a vacancy in the office of one of the arbitrators which is to be filled up by the Central Government. We expect the competent authority of the Central Government to do so at an early date for which purpose the attention of the competent authority may be invited by either party. 5. With these observations, the appeal is disposed of. No costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1448 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on, it would neither be fair nor be reasonable at this stage to nullify the efforts of an inspector under the Rules. The matter needs further enquiry and in and investigation as to the factum of entry being made before hand in the register maintained in terms of section 61 of the Factories Act. It is too early in the day to say that there would not be even a possibility of non-compliance of section 63 which is turn envisages non-compliance of section 61 and section 62 of the Factories Act. 21. A long catena of cases some of which stand referred by us hereinbefore in this judgment signifies one principle rule that the complaints ought not to be quashed at the initial stages unless it is termed to be an abuse of the process of the court the complaint in question in our view, cannot be so termed as such we do not find any justification for interference with the order as passed by the High Court. The Appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1447 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... he one under the 1994 regulations which was replaced by the 1997 regulations. These two cases are therefore of no relevance to the matter under consideration. 31. Section 15H(ii), which the Adjudicating Officer has invoked for the purpose of imposing penalty is applicable only if a person who is required under the Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, fails to make a public announcement to acquire shares at a minimum price. The Adjudicating Officer has imposed monetary penalty on the ground that appellant had violated the provisions of regulation 10, based on his finding that it acquired 15.04 per cent shares of APL without making an open offer. The said finding does not sustain for the reason that the appellant's acquisition entitling it to exercise voting rights was below the 10 percent benchmark provided in regulation 10. Therefore imposition of penalty cannot be sustained. 32. For the reasons stated above the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside.
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2001 (8) TMI 1446 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... er dated 8th November, 2000 of the noticees, that around that period the shares were traded in BSE, at below par value, and there was no trading on Hyderabad and Chennai exchange. That means there was no loss to investors and gain to the Acquirers. This aspect was taken into account, therefore maximum penalty is not levied. 41. The fact that the acquisition price was more than the then prevailing market price, would have induced the investors to avail of the public offer and exit from the company gainfully may not be ignored. However, this benefit was in any case not available to the shareholders as the acquirers were exempted from making public offer under regulation 11(2) as the acquisition was in a preferential allotment. Since the Adjudicating Officer has taken into consideration the relevant factors while deciding the quantum of penalty, I do not consider it necessary to interfere with his decision in this regard. 42. For the reasons stated above the appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (8) TMI 1445 - PUNJAB HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ccupation by the tenant or the owner. 41. We also do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the impugned provision should be declared ultra vires to the Constitution because all the tenanted premises have been treated at par for the purpose of determination of annual value. This argument of the learned counsel misses the central point raised by the petitioners, namely, determination of market value of land or building only from the point of view of its occupation by the tenant or the owner. In our opinion, if the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is accepted, no legislative enacts ment or administrative decision can be invalidated on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and such an interpretation cannot be accepted as valid. 42. We may now refer to the facts and the prayer made (in addition to the common prayer for striking down Section 3(1) of the Act) in each of the above noted petitions.
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2001 (8) TMI 1444 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the grievances of the claimants and arguing the matter with great ability and clarity of thoughts. We also keep on record the able assistance of Shri F.S. Nariman, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the company for his advice to his clients, not to pursue this litigation, as an adversarial one, but to come forward to pay the determined compensation with an helping attitude, which advice has been duly accepted by the company. We also appreciate the stand of Shri Nariman that the compensation for the children could be doubled outright and for others, the Court may determine, as to what would be the just sum. We are indeed sorry, that this matter has dragged on for this length of time, but there was no way out and the circumstances indicated by Shri Justice Chandrachud in his Report, are sufficient to hold that there has been no latches on his part, in determining the compensation. This writ petition is accordingly disposed of. There will however be no order as to costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1443 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iled by the petitioners to notice Annexure-G after giving an opportunity to the petitioners. (iii) The petitioners are reserved liberty to file additional statement, if any, and also produce such documents which they may intend to rely upon in support of their claim. (iv) The Appellate Authority is directed to reconsider the matter and take fresh decision in the matter as expeditiously as possible and at any event of the matter, not later than four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 12. Since there has been an interim order operating in favour of the petitioners granted in these petitions and also in the earlier writ petition, I am of the view that it is just and proper to direct the respondents not to take any coercive steps to recover the amount assessed in terms of notice Annexure-A, dated 6th March, 2000, till the matter is reconsidered by the Appellate Authority, as directed above. 13. In terms stated above, this petition is allowed and disposed of.
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2001 (8) TMI 1442 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... same is required to be modified by convicting accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(i) of the N.D.P.S. Act and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and is ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 50.000/- (in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 15 months). Though, conviction under Section 20(b)(ii) of the Act and order of sentence is confirmed, we intend to modify the sentence imposed, in default of payment of fine. Under Section 20(b)(ii), the punishment provided is 10 years rigorous imprisonment and payment of fine is Rs. 1 lakh, but the Court is empowered to impose sentence in default of payment of fine, as discussed hereinabove. Therefore, over and above the sentence awarded under Section 20(b)(ii), we sentence accused No. 1 to undergo two and a half years rigorous imprisonment, in default of payment of fine. It is ordered that the sentences shall run concurrently. 21. Appeal allowed accordingly.
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2001 (8) TMI 1441 - COMPANY LAW BOARD PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... gard to the allotment of further shares, this Bench found some substance in the allegation and had directed that she should be offered proportionate shares. In regard to the allegation of having been sidelined in the management, this Board had directed that she should continue as a director as long as her shareholding continued to be 14.7 per cent shares and in respect of appointment of additional directors we had held that in terms of article 89, the incoming shareholders had the power to appoint additional directors. The only reference to the receipt is in para 10 of that order that in view of the said receipt the petitioner cannot complain of non-receipt of the notice for the meeting on 10-2-2000. Thus, it is apparent that none of these findings on the main allegations of the petitioner is based on the alleged fabricated postal receipt. This being the position, the question of reviewing our order dated 12-1-2001 does not arise and, accordingly, we dismiss this application.
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2001 (8) TMI 1440 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ect any person to be present before him so as to be available for interrogation who appears to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case provided that the said person is available within the limits of his own or any adjoining station." 8. Undisputedly, in this case, the petitioner is not residing within the limits of police station of respondents 1 and 2 herein or any adjoining station. He is residing at Hyderabad, which is far away from Pune. Therefore, the action of the respondents in issuing summons to the petitioner, under Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be upheld. 9. The Writ Petition is, therefore, allowed with costs. 10. A Writ of Mandamus shall issue declaring the action of the respondents in issuing summons to the petitioner under Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing him to be present before them at Samarth Police Station. Pune, in connection with investigation in Crime No. 3 of 1998 as illegal and void.
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2001 (8) TMI 1439 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by the learned Trial Judge as well as the First Appellate Judge, and the necessity for his interference to prevent total miscarriage of justice, with convincing reasons. The findings recorded by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court was shown to be not only vitiated due to perversity of reasoning but also due to surmises and misreading of the materials on record. On a careful and critical scanning through of the judgment in the Second Appeal, we are unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the appellant at any findings of fact concurrently recorded were mechanically interfered with without justification or by transgressing the limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, C. P. C. The reasons assigned by the learned Judge in the High Court for the conclusions arrived at do not suffer from any infirmity warranting our interference in this appeal. The appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1438 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e present case, the petitioner stood disqualified as held by the appellate authority. The appellate authority has recorded a finding that the petitioner was in possession of the Panchayat land land, rejecting his plea that the same was in possession of his son. In a writ of certiorari, the Court does not sit in a appeal over the decision of a Tribunal. The appellate authority, on the basis of the jamabandis Exhibits P3, P1 and P-7 held the petitioner to be in possession of the Panchayat land rejecting the application of the petitioners' son who claimed to be in possession, on the ground that the petitioner's son was only 2/3 years of age and could not be in possession. The authority after examining documents Exhibit P2 and Exhibit P-8 showing the petitioner to be in cultivation, came to the conclusion that the petitioner was cultivating the Panchayat land. No ground has been made out for interference with the said order. 3. This writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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2001 (8) TMI 1437 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... separate property and characterised it s a joint Hindu Family property this must fall to the ground simply on the ground that as on the date there was no coparcenary or joint Hindu family property with which the two properties could have been blended. For this reason alone the findings of the learned Single Jude on issues 1 to 4 deserve to be set aside. It must be held that Lala Bal Mukand did not constitute joint Hindu family with the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and that the properties 8/10 and 8/11, Western Extension Area, Karol Bagh continued to be individual properties and never became joint Hindu family properties. No other point was urged. 35. In view of the findings aforementioned the suit of plaintiff/appellant deserves dismissal. Consequently RFA (OS) 31/76 is dismissed and RFA (OS) 37/76 is allowed. Judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside as aforementioned. The suit of plaintiff/appellant is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1436 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sed as plaintiff and then proceed with the matter. 18. In view of the above, we allow the appeal as follows (i) The order dated 3-2-1998 passed in OS No. 5/1991 on the file of the Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural District (dismissing the suit by accepting the memo of the plaintiff for dismissal) is set aside. (ii) The fifth defendant in the suit is permitted to get herself transposed as a plaintiff No. 2 and the plaintiff is transposed as Defendant No. 10. (iii) The suit by original plaintiff (who is renumbered as plaintiff No. 1 on transposition of 5th respondent) shall stand dismissed as settled out of Court. (iv) The suit with transposed 5th defendant as plaintiff No. 2 shall be continued from the stage at which was dismissed, if necessary by permitting parties to let in further evidence, having regard to the changed circumstances. (v) As the suit is of the year 1990, the court shall endeavour to dispose of the matter expeditiously. (vi) Parties to bear their respective costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1435 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ave petition. He states that he will move the High Court in review stating that it has erred in recording that "all the bills were paid and cleared earlier to the commencement of the Act." The special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn accordingly.
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2001 (8) TMI 1434 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he learned single Judge cannot be held to be laying down good law. 18. We are thus of the considered view that the respondent was rightly held entitled to judgment on admission. On the extent of the share the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge is liable to be modified to the extent that respondent No. 3 is entitled to 1/2 share each in properties described in Annexure 'A' and Annexure 'B'. 19. The result is that the appeal is partly allowed. The aforesaid observations of the learned Single Judge about exercise of power under Order 12 Rule 6 of the code on ground of delay in suits is set aside. The preliminary decree passed by learned Single Judge in terms of the impugned order is sustained with the modification that respondent No. 3 is held to be the owner of 1/2 share each in properties described in of Annexure 'A' and Annexure 'B' of the schedule attached to the written statement. 20. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1433 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pment Authority to run the lotteries occasionally' and on 1st April, 1992, the operation of the lotteries came to be transferred to Delhi government. The permission granted to Delhi Development Authority, later on transferred to Delhi Government, did not imply any compulsion to run the lotteries and if Delhi Government does not wish to run the lotteries, there is nothing in the decision of the central government which compels it to do so. 6. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court need not have entered into and dwelt upon the questions which it did and as such, the expression of opinion by the High Court is unnecessary and uncalled for. Constitutional issues should not be decided unless that is necessary to do for the purpose of giving relief in a given case. We, therefore, do not express any opinion on the pleas raised in the writ petition and in the appeal and leave the same open for decision in an appropriate case. 7. The appeal be treated as disposed of.
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